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Referat:  
This thesis examines reactions of German manufacturing firms to emerging market competitors 
while operating in the institutional conditions of the Russian market. Although the literature on 
internationalization of emerging market firms is rapidly growing, research in the Russian 
institutional context remains scarce. At the same time, rivals from emerging economies already 
hold strong positions in this major market, especially in the mature manufacturing industries.  
Against this background, the theoretical framework of this dissertation stems from theories of 
industrial organization, strategic management, marketing, and international business. To 
address the novelty and complexity of this inquiry, the thesis adopts interpretivism paradigm, 
primary inductive logic, and qualitative research strategy. The study was conducted in two 
stages among 34 managers representing 28 German automotive and mobile machinery suppliers 
operating in Russia. The process of data collection and analysis was enhanced by combining 
key procedures of the grounded theory with several other common qualitative techniques. 
The analysis showed that despite hostile activities of emerging market firms, the German 
managers primarily focused on competition with rivals from other developed countries. The 
emerging market competitors were perceived as benefiting from cost-leadership strategy and 
local market proximity. Consequently, the managers frequently ignored their activities and 
considered that their firms were protected from competition by several entry barriers. Those 
companies, which responded to these competitors, mainly combined strategies of 
differentiation, localization, retreat, and a narrow set of tactical retaliations. This study also 
determined the direct and mostly deteriorative influence of the Russian institutional 
environment on the competitive advantage of the German companies. Furthermore, the 
longitudinal research design revealed a largely adverse impact, which the occurred institutional 
changes had on the competitiveness of the German firms.  
The findings provide a novel synthesis of competitive reactions to entrants from emerging 
markets. Moreover, this research is the first one to describe an aggregated impact of Russian 
institutional environment on the competitiveness of Western firms related to emerging market 
companies. In this way, it supports the institution-based view of strategy, and synthesizes a 
practically applicable decision framework for competitive reaction. Considering the importance 
of the Russian market and increasing competitiveness of emerging market firms, this thesis 
makes an important contribution to competition research in emerging economies.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Research problem 
A striking shift of economic power towards emerging markets is one of the key macroeconomic 
trends of the last 15 years (Dobbs et al., 2015b). The share of the major developing economies 
in the global GDP grew from 13.8% in 2000 to almost 30% in 2014 (World Bank Group [WBG], 
2015a), with nearly 50% of all vehicles being currently produced and sold in these countries 
(International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers [OICA], 2016a). Despite the recent 
slowdown, the rise of emerging markets is expected to persist in the upcoming years (Eder and 
Heise, 2015; Nettesheim et al., 2016).  
Although this development creates extra sources of revenue for German firms, it also triggers 
the rise of new competitors. The number of Fortune Global 500 companies originating from 
emerging markets increased from 22 to 142 within the last 15 years ("Fortune Global", 2015). 
Some scholars argue that the world currently faces the fourth wave of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), following the previous global expansion of companies from Europe, North America, 
and Japan (e.g., Ramamurti, 2012a, pp. 243–244). Many of these firms have already turned into 
formidable competitors for companies from advanced economies, especially in manufacturing 
industries (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Bughin et al., 2014; Lang et al., 2015; Ramamurti, 
2012a).  
As a result, business research on emerging markets has flourished in the last years (Griffith et 
al., 2008, p. 1225, 1227; Xu and Meyer, 2013). However, several promising areas of inquiry 
received rather limited attention. The existing literature focuses primarily on strategies which 
Western firms use while entering and operating in emerging markets (e.g., Hilmersson and 
Jansson, 2012; Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer et al., 2009). Moreover, many studies concentrate 
on the growth and the internationalization of firms from developing countries (e.g., Hoskisson 
et al., 2013; Luo et al., 2011b; Tsai and Eisingerich, 2010). Surprisingly few publications 
provide recommendations for Western firms on competitive reactions to a new breed of rivals 
from emerging markets.  
Furthermore, the existing studies deal mainly with the import competition in developed 
countries (e.g., Antoniades, 2015; Auer and Fischer, 2010; Federico, 2014) and the rivalry in 
the context of Asian emerging economies (e.g., Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and Park, 2012; 
Ju et al., 2013). Only a few scholars refer to the competition occurring in the institutional context 
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of other emerging economies, such as Russia. Considering the importance of the Russian market 
for German business (Statistisches Bundesamt [Destatis], 2016a, 2016c), this aspect remains of 
primary relevance for both managers and business scholars. For instance, the share of major 
emerging economies in Russian imports of machines, equipment and vehicles increased by a 
factor of 2.3 within the last 11 years, while the portion of Germany dropped by 73% (Federal 
Customs Service, Russian Federation [FTS Rossii], 2016c, 2016a). In parallel, scholars 
commonly recognize the crucial role of a country-specific institutional context for strategies in 
emerging markets (e.g., Bamiatzi et al., 2015; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Jormanainen and 
Koveshnikov, 2012; Meyer et al., 2009; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011; Xu and Meyer, 2013).   
Finally, despite the fact that defensive stance is highly relevant for the Western incumbents, the 
mainstream research on competition is predisposed to offensive strategies (Homburg et al., 
2013, p. 186; Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2010, p. 1078). Existing recommendations for 
defensive reactions to emerging market firms remain highly fragmented and lack focus on the 
managerial perceptions of competition (Blees et al., 2003, pp. 8–9; Johnson and Russo, 1997, 
p. 177, 192; Kaplan, 2011). Consequently, the current study addresses the following research 
problem:  
How do German (manufacturing) companies react to competition from emerging market 
firms when operating in the institutional conditions of the Russian emerging market?  
Following the discussion above, this research generates highly relevant and novel results by 
addressing an unexplored problem, which is important for both, practitioners and the scientific 
community (cf. Shugan, 2003).   
The sample of this research includes automotive and mobile machinery supplier firms. The 
following considerations determine this choice. First, several studies reveal a rapidly growing 
competitive pressure in these industries (e.g., Lang et al., 2015; Lazard and Roland Berger, 
2014, p. 30). This trend can be observed even in niche and high-quality segments, which are 
traditionally dominated by German firms (German Mechanical Engineering Industry 
Association [VDMA] and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 44).  Second, these industries have 
a crucial importance for the German economy and foreign trade (Di Bitonto and Trost, 2015; 
Destatis, 2016d; German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 2015b, p. 6). Third, 
representatives of these sectors give particular importance to emerging markets, including 
Russia (KPMG International, 2015; VDMA and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 42). Fourth, 
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considering high levels of consolidation in these industries (Castelli et al., 2011, p. 239; 
Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003, p. 5; Humphrey, 2003, p. 137; Sedgwick, 2013, p. 3; 
Sturgeon et al., 2009, p. 9), research in their context was expected to generate rich examples of 
defensive competitive reactions (Bunch and Smiley, 1992; Reid et al., 1993, p. 185; Simon, 
2005, p. 1238). 
Despite the variety of disciplinary approaches, previous studies analyzed the subject mainly 
from the perspective of one discipline only (Section 2.2.1). Therefore, I undertake a 
comprehensive review, which covers the disciplines of industrial organization, strategic 
management, marketing, and international business research (Section 2.3). As a result, based on 
the identified research gaps and developed theoretical framework (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.4) the 
following research questions guide this thesis: 
1. How do German managers perceive the competition from emerging market firms in 
Russia?  
2. What are the competitive reactions of German companies to emerging market firms in 
Russia?  
3. How does the Russian institutional environment influence the competitive advantage of 
German companies compared to emerging market firms?  
Despite the complexity of the subject, the majority of existing investigations on competition 
between companies from developed and emerging markets ignore the merits of qualitative, 
theory-building methodology (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Therefore, the thesis adopts interpretivism 
paradigm, primary inductive logic, and qualitative research strategy. In total, I conducted 55 
interviews with 34 managers representing 28 German companies. To increase the validity of the 
findings, the data were collected in two rounds. Thus, the study included 34 interviews between 
October 2013 and June 2014 and 21 interviews between May and June 2015. Additional insights 
resulted from the analysis of company-related extant texts, and memos. Such thorough approach 
to data collection assured valuable insights into the real-life context and a comprehensive 
understanding of the competitive behavior. Moreover, combining the techniques of grounded 
theory and qualitative content analysis appeared to be strongly efficient in producing data-rich 
findings.  
As a result, this research demonstrates perceived key attributes of emerging market competitors 
(EMCs) and shows that German managers frequently ignore their activities. The study also 
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identifies and describes an array of heterogeneous instrumental competitive reactions to EMCs. 
Furthermore, a significant and direct influence of the institutional environment in Russia on the 
competitive strategy is revealed. Moreover, the thesis includes a detailed description of the main 
institutional drivers and their individual influence on the competitiveness of the analyzed 
German firms. 
These findings produce several significant theoretical, methodological and managerial 
implications (Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). The main contribution is the development of a novel 
theoretical framework illustrating competitive reactions to emerging market firms. The study 
also has implications for the theories of industrial organization, strategic management, 
marketing, international business, competitive perception, competitive reaction, entry barriers, 
and institution-based view of strategy as well as the qualitative research procedures. Moreover, 
the thesis develops a number of important practical recommendations, which should improve 
decision-making of German managers in competition with EMCs. Finally, the study proposes 
several promising directions for future inquiries. 
1.2. Key definitions and scope of the research 
After defining the research problem, it is important to establish a common ground for the main 
definitions and delimitations of this study. Definitions applied by researchers frequently differ 
(Perry, 2002, p. 18). Therefore, the discussion below outlines three key terms applied in this 
thesis: emerging markets, competitive reaction, and institutional environment. 
Emerging markets. Despite numerous references to the term, the literature did not reveal a 
commonly accepted definition. Therefore, the thesis adopts a broad definition provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (2016), which includes an array of emerging markets and 
developing economies from Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe. This 
definition also largely corresponds to the classification accepted in the strategic management 
research (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Furthermore, the thesis frequently mentions the term major 
emerging economies. This term refers to a list of “G-20 developing economies” (World Trade 
Organization, 2014, p. 54), namely Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
Competitive reaction. Competitive reaction is defined here as a counteraction of an incumbent, 
which aims at defending its position in response to the rival’s actions (Chen et al., 1992; Grimm 
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et al., 2006; Kuester et al., 1999). Following the remark of Heil and Walters (1993, p. 53), not 
only implemented actions, but also decisions to act are considered as a competitive reaction. 
Institutional environment. Based on the conceptualizations of Peng and Meyer (2011), North 
(1990), and Scott (2001), the institutional environment in this study represents a combination of 
formal and informal institutions, which include political, economic, and legal systems, as well 
as culture, language, and religion.   
Several delimitations establish the boundaries of this research (Perry, 2002, p. 19). First, 
regarding the competitive stance, the study is limited to the analysis of defensive reactions, 
aiming to sustain competitive advantage of a firm (Porter, 1985/2004, p. 482). Defensive 
strategies receive relatively scarce attention in the academic publications (Homburg et al., 2013, 
p. 186; Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2010, p. 1078), despite their high relevance for the case of 
competition with entrants from emerging markets (Section 2.2.3). Moreover, the scope of this 
thesis cannot cover both defensive and offensive strategies in reasonable depth. 
Second, the study considers the perceptions of managers representing incumbent firms only. 
Previous publications on market entry often evaluated the perceptions of potential entrants (e.g., 
Han et al., 2001; Karakaya and Stahl, 1989, p. 83; Karakaya and Parayitam, 2013). Nevertheless, 
following the argumentation of Lutz et al. (2010, p. 21), the perceptions of managers already 
familiar with industry specifics are expected to provide a more viable picture of the studied 
phenomena. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify challenger firms, since some of them might 
play a minor role in the market by the time of data collection. Potential biases related to the 
incumbency of informants were considered at the study design stage (Section 3.8).  
Third, this research focuses on the instrumental dimension of competitive reaction. Thus, as 
suggested by Kuester et al. (1999), competitive reaction has five dimensions, namely 
instrumental, intensity, breadth, speed, and time. The existing studies revealed that the 
instrumental dimension of a competitive reaction has a primary importance for industry 
practitioners (Section 2.2.3). Moreover, given the exploratory-descriptive nature of this 
research, it does not aim to measure intensity and speed of reaction. However, when possible, 
data on other dimensions of competitive reactions supplement the research findings.  
Fourth, several delimitations of this research are related to the industry focus and country setting. 
Thus, the study analyzes exclusively German suppliers of components for automotive and 
mobile machinery industries, operating in the Russian market. Section 3.4 provides the detailed 
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justification for this decision. Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter 5, the findings of the thesis 
may apply for other manufacturing industries in various emerging economies.  
Finally, this study does not investigate the impact of competitive reactions on the firm 
performance. This can be attributed to the exploratory-descriptive, rather than the normative 
aim of this research and the relatively short period of the observation. 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
Following the recommendations of Perry (2002) and Phillips and Pugh (2005), this thesis has a 
five-chapter structure. The current chapter introduces the topic of the research, justifies its 
theoretical and practical relevance, outlines the research problem, the research questions, key 
definitions, and the scope of the study. Moreover, it provides a synopsis of the accepted 
methodology and main research findings. Chapter 2 approaches the identified research problem 
from two directions. First, it reviews the studies related to the research problem, and in this way 
shows the state of the art in research on competitive reactions to emerging market firms and the 
Russian institutional environment. Second, it establishes the conceptual foundation for the 
research problem. In line with the existing studies, the research accepts a multidisciplinary 
approach by considering an array of theories from the disciplines of industrial organization, 
strategic management, marketing, and international business. This chapter concludes with the 
theoretical framework, outlining three research questions. Chapter 3 describes and justifies the 
methodology used in this research. Consequently, it explains the methodological foundations of 
the study, the research design, the research context, selection of participants, data collection, 
analysis, as well as trustworthiness, limitations, and ethical issues of this research. Chapter 4 
presents the patterns revealed in the data, illustrated by rich interview quotations. Accordingly, 
the chapter includes a description of respondents, coding frame, and findings arranged in line 
with the defined research questions. Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions of the research and 
embeds the findings into the existing literature. Moreover, this chapter reflects on the 
implications of the findings for theory, methodology, and managerial practice. Lastly, the 
chapter outlines limitations of this study and directions for future research. Figure 1 shows the 
outline of this thesis. 
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Figure 1: Outline of the thesis  
 
Source: Own compilation 
1.4. Conclusion 
This chapter established the foundation of the research. First, the background of the research on 
the competitive reactions to emerging market firms in the institutional conditions of the Russian 
market, as well as research problem and research questions were introduced. Then, the chapter 
described the applied methodology, as well as key findings and contributions. Finally, the key 
terms, scope, and outline of the thesis were presented. Based on this foundation, the next chapter 
proceeds with the literature review. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter has two primary aims. First, it explains the state of the art in research on related 
topics. Second, it establishes the theoretical foundation for this thesis. Consequently, three main 
sections constitute this chapter (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Outline of Chapter 2
Source: Own compilation 
Section 2.2 presents related studies on two topics, namely the competition with emerging 
market firms and the specifics of the Russian institutional environment. The review reveals 
several key findings, including gaps in existing research and theories applicable for this 
inquiry. Based on these findings, Section 2.3 provides the conceptual foundation of the thesis. 
This section consists of parent and focal theories, which explain the analyzed phenomena 
(Perry, 2002; Phillips and Pugh, 2005). Finally, Section 2.4 summarizes the literature review 
in the form of a theoretical framework and the research questions. 
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2.2. Review of related studies  
The related studies deal with two topics: competition with emerging market firms (Section 2.2.1) 
and specifics of the Russian institutional environment (Section 2.2.2). Section 2.2.3 summarizes 
the key findings, and in this way articulates the attributes of the current thesis. 
Following the recommendations of Denk et al. (2012), Denyer and Neely (2004), and Tranfield 
et al. (2003), the literature review was conducted systematically and includes the most relevant 
and highly cited studies, published in the last 15 years in the top-quality journals. Additionally, 
in line with Garrido et al. (2014), several internationally accepted measures of the institutional 
environment, such as the IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard, The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Global Competitiveness Index, and Corruption Perceptions Index supplement the 
review. As a result, the final list of related studies comprises 89 articles on competition between 
developed and emerging market firms and 85 studies on the Russian institutional environment. 
2.2.1. Competition with emerging market firms 
To enhance the analysis, each publication was categorized according to the following criteria: 
competition context, competitive stance of developed-economy firms, discipline, industry 
context, origin of a competitor, country of competition, and applied methodology1. The 
following review is structured according to the competition context criteria into national 
(Section 2.2.1.1) and cross-national (Section 2.2.1.2) studies. 
2.2.1.1. National studies 
The review of the national context studies shows that all of the selected articles considered firms 
from developed economies to be in a defending position related to EMCs. Only three out of 16 
studies applied a qualitative methodology. The majority of the publications were within the 
                                                 
1 An explanation should be given here regarding the competition context and competitive stance criteria. 
Concerning the competition context, the studies were divided into national studies and cross-national studies. The 
national studies analyzed import competition from emerging markets, which occurs in the context of developed 
economies. The cross-national studies investigated competition from emerging markets in a global context, in the 
home country of EMCs, and/or in the third-country context. Turning to the question of the competitive stance, 
marketing and strategic management literature suggested that firms could be classified into those positioned in 
defending or attacking stance (e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992, pp. 542–544; Kotler and Keller, 2012, p. 303; 
Porter, 1985/2004, pp. 482–535). Each of these stances requires a distinct set of strategies and tactics (e.g., Porter, 
1985/2004, pp. 482–535). Consequently, I divided publications into three groups, depending on the position of 
developed-economy firms: defending, attacking, and mixed. The defending articles, considered the competitive 
reactions to the growth of emerging market firms, as well as studies on international expansion of EMCs. 
Publications assigned to the attacking group referred to entry of MNEs to emerging markets and defense by local 
firms from foreign entrants. Mixed articles considered competitive interactions between established companies 
from developed and developing economies. 
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disciplines of economics and international economics, with a few exceptions from the domains 
of management, marketing, and international business. All of the studies examined 
manufacturing firms. The relevant findings of the national context studies refer to two themes: 
attributes of EMCs and competitive reactions of firms from developed countries. Table 1 
summarizes these findings and corresponding literature.  
Table 1: Summary of the findings from national studies 
Themes Findings Literature 
Attributes of 
emerging 
market 
competitors 
 Strong cost advantage  
 Weak differentiation, including low quality, weak research 
and development capabilities, low capital and skill 
intensity 
 Growing technological capabilities 
Antoniades, 2015; Auer et al., 
2013; Bernard et al., 2006; 
Colantone et al., 2015; Coucke 
and Sleuwaegen, 2008; 
Federico, 2014; Kaufmann and 
Koerte, 2010; Lu and Ng, 2013; 
Martin and Mejean, 2014; 
Mion and Zhu, 2013; Parrish et 
al., 2006; Utar, 2014 
 
Competitive 
reaction 
 Differentiation on such dimensions as quality, market  
proximity, marketing, product design, and technological 
innovations  
 Industry exit (especially by large firms with low 
productivity), retreat to industries with higher skill and 
capital intensity, and focus on niche customer segments 
 Price and quality reduction when facing intense 
competition, in particular among the least productive firms 
and companies in the labor-intensive industries 
 Offshoring and international sourcing by firms with 
experience, low logistical costs, and prior orientation 
towards low-cost countries, in particular for products, 
which can be produced with high quality in these countries 
 Productivity gains by firms facing labor-intensive imports  
 Ignoring 
 Slow, but aggressive and concentrated response  
 
Antoniades, 2015; Auer and 
Fischer, 2010; Auer et al., 
2013; Bernard et al., 2006; 
Bugamelli et al., 2015; 
Colantone et al., 2015; Coucke 
and Sleuwaegen, 2008; 
Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010; 
Lu and Ng, 2013; Martin and 
Mejean, 2014; Mion and Zhu, 
2013; Parrish et al., 2006; 
Seyoum, 2007; Utar, 2014 
 
Source: Synthesis of reviewed literature 
As seen in Table 1, regarding the attributes of emerging market competitors, all studies 
underlined their cost advantage, combined with weak differentiation. Only two articles implied 
other sources of competitive advantage for EMCs, such as growing technological capabilities. 
These findings suggest the dominance of EMCs in cost-driven mature manufacturing industries. 
Turning to the competitive reaction, this construct includes instrumental, intensity, breadth, 
speed, and domain dimensions (Kuester et al., 1999). The selected studies referred almost 
exclusively to the specific competition instruments, which highlights the importance of this 
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dimension. Thus, companies from developed markets mostly rely on various facets of 
differentiation. Nevertheless, in some cases, they also engage in cost-based competition with 
EMCs, which is expressed by price reductions, offshoring, outsourcing, and productivity gains. 
Moreover, some firms exit industries with excessive competition from EMCs and switch to 
products with higher skill and capital intensity. Consequently, the analysis showed that the 
attributes of EMCs highly determine the instrumental dimension of competitive reaction applied 
by Western firms.  
2.2.1.2. Cross-national studies 
The majority of selected articles analyzed the competition between developed-country MNEs 
and EMCs at the global scope or in the home countries of EMCs. Only three publications 
referred to the competition in a third-country host context. Concerning competitive stance, the 
majority of sources acknowledged that firms from developed economies were in a defending 
position. Cross-national articles applied different methodologies, including large-scale surveys, 
case studies, in-depth industry descriptions, historical analysis and conceptual studies. 
Similarly, disciplinary domains also demonstrated great variety, including international 
business, international management, strategic management, economics, industrial organization, 
and marketing. Such theoretical and methodological diversity might suggest that there is no 
commonly accepted approach yet for the investigated problem. With respect to the industry 
focus, the existing studies gave the primary attention to mature manufacturing industries, 
including the automotive industry. Considering competitor origin, the identified articles were 
highly predisposed to firms originating from South and East Asian emerging markets, especially 
China and India. Despite the fact that several studies considered Russia as one of the main 
countries of origin for EMCs, the specifics of Russian firms received rather limited attention. 
Only one conceptual investigation focused exclusively on competitors originating from Eastern 
Europe. In addition, only one study took account of the specifics of the institutional context, 
particularly in the Russian market. This demonstrates the relevance of the research on 
competition with firms from diverse emerging economies in the context of the Russian market.  
The relevant findings of cross-national studies covered five themes: competitive threat posed by 
firms from emerging markets, advantages of developed-country firms related to EMCs, 
advantages of EMCs related to developed-country firms, competitive reactions of developed-
country MNEs to EMCs, and the role of the institutional environment of emerging markets in 
the competition. Table 2 shows the main findings and corresponding literature for each theme. 
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Table 2: Summary of the findings from cross-national studies 
Themes Findings Literature 
Competitive 
threat 
 Growing market share of emerging market 
competitors (EMCs) 
 Fast growth rates of EMCs 
 Development of innovative and 
technological capabilities by EMCs 
 Rapid international expansion of EMCs 
 Increasing access of EMCs to higher value-
added segments  
 Declining profitability of Western firms 
Altenburg et al., 2008; Bonaglia et al., 2007; 
Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and Xu, 2008; 
Chang and Park, 2012; Contractor et al., 
2007; Deng, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2015a; 
Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Ju et al., 2013; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Kothari et al., 
2013; Luo, 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Luo 
and Rui, 2009; Mathews, 2006; Moghaddam 
et al., 2014; Santos and Williamson, 2015; 
Williamson and Zeng, 2004; Williamson and 
Ming Zeng, 2009; Williamson, 2010; Zeng 
and Williamson, 2003 
Advantages of 
developed-
country firms 
 Early mover position 
 Access to international capital 
 Superior technological capabilities 
 Ownership of proprietary technologies 
 Efficiency in operations and common 
governance 
 Access to excellent talent pools 
 Brand awareness 
 Positive country-of-origin image 
 Advertising and marketing know-how 
Altenburg et al., 2008; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
2000; Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and 
Park, 2012; Deng, 2012; Ghemawat and 
Hout, 2008; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 
2012; Ju et al., 2013; Khanna and Palepu, 
2006; Li and Li, 2008; Poulis et al., 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012b; Santos and Williamson, 
2015; Williamson, 2010 
 
Advantages of 
EMCs 
 Access to home-country cheap labor 
 Efficiency in production and logistics, 
including economies of scale gained from 
home market size and sub-contracts from 
Western firms 
 Frugality approach to manufacturing and 
innovations 
 Capability to acquire new knowledge from 
global markets, acquisitions, partnerships, 
and subsidiaries of foreign firms in emerging 
markets 
 Protectionism and state support, including 
support for technological upgrade and access 
to resources and markets 
 Experience in overcoming lack of financial 
and managerial resources, high risks for 
intellectual property rights, poor regulatory 
conditions, economic and political volatility, 
underdeveloped distribution channels, 
limited access to capital, and generally harsh 
and adverse environments 
 Reliance on relationships with customers, 
suppliers, universities, and governments, 
including host country governments  
 Membership in networks, economic groups, 
and global value chains  
 Ability to identify market niches ignored by 
Western MNEs  
 Understanding of consumers in emerging 
markets, often based on ethnic connections, 
Altenburg et al., 2008; Baack and Boggs, 
2008; Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008; 
Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Bonaglia et al., 
2007; Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and 
Park, 2012; Contractor et al., 2007; 
Contractor, 2013; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 
2008, 2010; Deng, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2015a; 
Elango and Pattnaik, 2011; Gadiesh et al., 
2007; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Grosse, 
2003; Guillén and García-Canal, 2012; Jan 
and Hsiao, 2004; Jormanainen and 
Koveshnikov, 2012; Ju et al., 2013; Jullens, 
2013; Khalid and Larimo, 2012; Khanna and 
Palepu, 2006; Kothari et al., 2013; Kumar, 
2006; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Li et al., 
2008; Li et al., 2009; Luo, 2007; Luo and 
Rui, 2009; Moghaddam et al., 2014; 
Mudambi, 2008; Poulis et al., 2012, 
Ramamurti, 2012a, 2012b; Santos and 
Williamson, 2015; Seyoum, 2007; Sun et al., 
2010; Williamson and Zeng, 2004; 
Williamson and Ming Zeng, 2009; 
Williamson, 2010; Williamson and Yin, 
2014; Zeng and Williamson, 2003; Zeschky 
et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2011 
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language commonality, and presence of 
large diasporas  
 Family or private equity ownership, which 
determines strong entrepreneurial 
orientation, strategic agility, speed of 
execution, and tolerance to risk  
Competitive 
reactions 
 Costs-related strategies, including cost 
optimization, price reduction, introduction 
of low-cost businesses, product 
simplification, offshoring and outsourcing  
 Differentiation-related strategies, including 
innovative branding and marketing, solution 
or system sales, skilled-labor-intensive 
innovations, flexibility, closer managerial 
ties with local stakeholders  
 Hybrid strategies, such as localization of 
financial and organizational commitment, 
relocation of R&D activities, higher 
autonomy for local subsidiaries, frugal 
innovations, and influence on local 
institutional environment 
 Withdrawal from low-end customer 
segments, products, or whole industries 
threatened by low-cost competition to 
differentiated niches 
 Cooperation and/or coopetition 
 Acquisition 
 Ignoring  
 
Altenburg et al., 2008; Baack and Boggs, 
2008; Chang and Park, 2012; Chick et al., 
2014; Deng, 2012; Eizenberg and Salvo, 
2015; Gadiesh et al., 2007; Ghemawat and 
Hout, 2008; Ichii et al., 2012; Javalgi, et al., 
2009; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010; Khalid 
and Larimo, 2012; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; 
Kothari et al., 2013; Kumar, 2006; Li and Li, 
2008; Li et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009; London 
and Hart, 2004; Luo, 2007; Luo et al., 2011b; 
Mascarenhas, 2013; Narayanan and Fahey, 
2005; Potter, 2004; Ramamurti, 2012a; 
Salonen et al., 2006; Santos and Williamson, 
2015; Sun et al., 2010; Thoenig and Verdier, 
2003; Tian, 2010; Williamson and Zeng, 
2004; Williamson and Ming Zeng, 2009; 
Williamson, 2010; Williamson and Yin, 
2014; Zeschky et al., 2011 
 
 
Role of the 
institutional 
environment 
 Crucial determinant of competitive 
advantage in emerging markets 
 Challenge for operations of Western MNEs 
 Determinant of the international success of 
EMCs 
 
Contractor, 2013; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 
2008, 2010; Deng, 2012; Jormanainen and 
Koveshnikov, 2012; Ju et al., 2013; Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006; London and Hart, 2004; 
Mutlu et al., 2015; Santos and Williamson, 
2015; Shinkle et al., 2013; Williamson, 2010 
 
Note: EMC stands for emerging market competitor; MNE stands for multinational enterprise 
Source: Synthesis of reviewed literature 
Concerning the competitive threat, Table 2 suggests a growing threat from EMCs. However, 
these findings primary referred to manufacturing firms (Chick et al., 2014; Salonen et al., 2006) 
operating in industries with a low role of research and development (R&D) and brand for 
competitive advantage (Chang and Park, 2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008). In contrast, in 
service industries such as commercial banking, emerging market firms hold rather weak 
competitive positions (Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Altenburg et al., 2008; Humphrey, 2003; 
McDermott and Corredoira, 2010). This suggests a high potential for data-rich findings in the 
population of automotive supplier firms.    
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Regarding the advantages of developed-country firms, Table 2 shows that differentiation and 
pioneering advantages provided a solid base for the global dominance of Western MNEs in the 
previous decades. Meanwhile, the findings on the advantages of emerging market firms, explain 
the recent rise of competitive intensity. Thus, despite frequent reference to cost advantages of 
EMCs, numerous recent articles also recognized their non-cost advantages, which are frequently 
rooted in institutional specifics of their home economies. These attributes often enable EMCs 
to win not only on home turf but also in the global markets.  
Turning to the competitive reactions, as seen from Table 2, despite relatively limited 
recommendations, the reactions mentioned in the literature can be grouped into costs- and 
differentiation-related strategies, market withdrawal, cooperation, acquisition, and ignoring the 
competition. Concerning cost-related strategies, Baack and Boggs (2008) suggested that cost-
leadership might be ineffective for developed-country MNEs in the conditions of emerging 
markets. Moreover, scholars underlined the limited applicability of cost reductions in 
competition with emerging market firms (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013; Potter, 2004). Despite 
some studies, which promoted cost-related strategies, it can be difficult for traditional MNEs to 
accomplish such transformation (Kumar, 2006). Consequently, cross-national articles mainly 
suggested various forms of differentiation-related strategies for Western MNEs. Several 
strategies suggested for developed-country firms combined both elements of differentiation- and 
cost-related elements. Furthermore, some studies proposed alternatives to business-level 
strategies in competition with emerging market firms, namely withdrawal, cooperation or 
coopetition with and acquisition of emerging market rivals. Finally, Potter (2004) proposed that 
under certain market conditions, established companies ignore the activities of competitors. 
Several entry barriers, which enabled companies to ignore competitors, were stated, including 
legal actions and blocking access to distribution and supplies. These findings correspond to the 
traditional reliance of EMCs on cost advantages and offer several important initial contributions 
for answering the research problem. Nevertheless, existing recommendations for defensive 
reactions to emerging market firms remain highly fragmented and lack focus on the managerial 
perceptions of competition.  
The last group of findings addresses the role of the institutional environment of emerging 
markets in the competition. As seen from Table 2, several studies underlined the crucial 
importance of institutions, particularly informal ones, for competitive advantage in emerging 
markets. The literature proposed that the institutional environment of emerging markets might 
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pose a challenge for operations of Western MNEs. Consequently, MNEs should not only adapt 
their strategies to conditions of each emerging market (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008, 
2010; Mutlu et al., 2015; Shinkle et al., 2013), but also integrate their business with local 
societal and commercial networks (Santos and Williamson, 2015). Consequently, this thesis 
pays particular attention to specifics of the Russian institutional environment. 
2.2.2. Specifics of the Russian institutional environment  
As suggested by Puffer (2011) “Any discussion of business and management in Russia must 
include the environment in which companies operate” (p. 23). This section provides an overview 
of the literature on specifics of the Russian institutional environment. The identified sources are 
classified into those related to the formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions include 
laws, rules, contracts, and regulations explicitly defined by authorized bodies (Garrido et al., 
2014, p. 86; North, 1990, pp. 46–47; Peng and Meyer, 2011, p. 38; Peng et al., 2009, p. 67). 
Informal institutions depict constraints, which people impose on themselves to reduce the costs 
of relations by structuring them (North, 1990, p. 36), and consist of norms, values, and ethics 
(Peng et al., 2009).  
2.2.2.1. Informal institutional environment 
The findings related to informal institutions were grouped into six cultural dimensions identified 
by Hofstede et al. (2010): power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, 
long-term orientation, and indulgence. This framework is applied due to its broad dissemination 
and relevance (Garrido et al., 2014, p. 91). A detailed review of the findings on each cultural 
dimension and corresponding literature are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Findings on specifics of Russian informal institutional environment 
Cultural 
dimensions 
Findings Literature 
Power 
distance 
 High power distance 
 Autocratic or transactional leadership style  
 High centralization in decision-making  
 Rigid work hierarchies  
 Command control  
 Application of power strategies for 
negotiations  
 Paternalism in attitude to leaders and state  
 Punishment-oriented working culture  
 Low initiative of employees  
 Avoidance of responsibility  
 Secrecy regarding mistakes and problems  
 Sentimental work relationships  
Adair et al., 2004; Alexashin and 
Blenkinsopp, 2005; Ardichvili, 2001; 
Ardichvili and Gasparishvili, 2003; 
Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Engelhard 
and Nägele, 2003; Filippov, 2012; Godey 
et al., 2012; Gyula et al., 2002; Hofstede et 
al., 2010; Jansson et al., 2007; Kets de 
Vries, Manfred F.R., 2001; McCarthy et 
al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2008; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2008, 2013; 
Muratbekova-Touron, 2002; Naumov and 
Puffer, 2000; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011 
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 Small distinction between private and 
professional at work  
 Prevalence of social orientation over task 
orientation  
 Importance of status and prestige symbols, 
including country-of-origin and brand 
 Shift to liberal values and transformational 
leadership among young Russians 
 Mentality difference between older and 
younger management generations 
 Significant decrease in power distance among 
Russian employees, after the transition to 
market economy 
 
 
Collectivism  Collectivist society 
 Importance of informal relationships and 
favors in business life 
 Importance of relationships with political 
actors, media and interest groups 
 Prevalence of high-context and indirect 
communication strategies 
 Strong in-group affiliation 
 Importance of personal networks due to 
inefficient formal institutions 
 Increased individualism among Russians in the 
transition period 
 
Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010; Adair et al., 
2004; Aidis et al., 2008; Ardichvili and 
Gasparishvili, 2003; Batjargal et al., 2013; 
Elg et al., 2008; Gyula et al., 2002; 
Hofstede et al., 2010; Hunter, 2003; 
Jansson et al., 2007; Karhunen, 2008; Kets 
de Vries, Manfred F.R., 2001; Latusek and 
Cook, 2012; Li et al., 2008; McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2008; McCarthy et al., 2012; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Michailova 
and Husted, 2003; Michailova and 
Hutchings, 2006; Muratbekova-Touron, 
2002; Naumov and Puffer, 2000; Puffer 
and McCarthy, 2007, 2011; Tretyak et al., 
2013 
 
 
Masculinity  Relatively low masculinity 
 Increased masculinity among Russians in the 
transition period 
 
Ardichvili, 2001; Ardichvili and 
Gasparishvili, 2003; Hofstede et al., 2010; 
Jansson et al., 2007; Naumov and Puffer, 
2000 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 High uncertainty avoidance 
 Importance of survival values (economic and 
physical security) 
 Attention to factual information  
 Strong believes in technical solutions, 
bureaucracy, and detailed planning  
 Tendency to suspicion  
 Resistance to change, risk, and new knowledge  
 Distant approach to any outsiders, including 
foreigners, high national pride  
 Low trust  
 Fear of failure  
 Inefficient knowledge exchange outside of a 
group  
 Limited efficiency in team-working  
 Increased uncertainty-bearing  
 Openness of young generation to Western 
knowledge  
 
Adair et al., 2004; Bucar et al., 2003; 
Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Engelhard 
and Nägele, 2003; Filippov, 2012; Global 
Entrepreneurship Research Association, 
2016; Gyula et al., 2002; Hanson and 
Teague, 2005; Hofstede et al., 2010; 
Jansson et al., 2007; Koveshnikov et al., 
2012; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2008; 
Latusek and Cook, 2012; Luo et al., 2011a; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Michailova 
and Husted, 2003; Michailova and 
Hutchings, 2006; Muratbekova-Touron, 
2002; Naumov and Puffer, 2000; Puffer 
and McCarthy, 2011; Shlapentokh, 2006; 
World Values Survey Association 
[WVSA], 2016 
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Long-term 
orientation 
 Strong long term-term orientation 
 Importance of secular-rational values  
 Situation-specific approach to truth and 
ethicality  
 Low respect for laws, traditions, and authority 
 Persistence towards achieving goals  
 Unethical business practices, such as lack of 
honesty, low concern about private property 
and damage resulting from own behavior  
 Low corporate social responsibility  
 Short-term business orientation  
 Low commitment to employers 
Ahmed et al., 2003; Alexashin and 
Blenkinsopp, 2005; Bucar et al., 2003; 
Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Engelhard 
and Nägele, 2003; Filippov, 2012; Grimes, 
2004; Gyula et al., 2002; Hitt et al., 2004; 
Hofstede et al., 2010; Jansson et al., 2007; 
Latusek and Cook, 2012; Luo et al., 2011a; 
McCarthy et al., 2005; McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2008; Robertson et al., 2003; 
WVSA, 2016 
 
 
Indulgence  Extremely low indulgence, Hofstede et al., 2010 
Source: Synthesis of reviewed literature 
Concerning power distance, the publication of Hofstede et al. (2010) suggested that Russia is a 
country with very unequal power distribution. This finding corresponds to numerous studies 
depicting such specifics of Russian culture as transactional leadership style, application of 
power strategies for negotiations, a low initiative of employees, secrecy regarding mistakes and 
problems, the small distinction between private and professional at work, and the importance of 
status (Table 3). Nevertheless, some studies registered a shift among young Russians to liberal 
values and US-like transformational leadership.  
Turning to collectivism, as shown in Table 3, Russia has a relatively high score in this 
dimension. Thus, interpersonal relationships, favors, indirect communication strategies, as well 
as strong network affiliation play a significant role in business life. For instance, Puffer and 
McCarthy (2007) proposed that the Russian economic system can be termed as “state-managed 
network capitalism” (p. 3). Nevertheless, some scholars cast doubt on the collectivism 
orientation of the Russian culture, arguing that individualism increased among Russians in the 
transition period.  
Following Table 3, Russia is among the countries with relatively low masculinity, which 
however grew in the conditions of market economy, in particular among the younger or less 
educated population. Moreover, some studies characterized Russia by low customer orientation 
(Engelhard and Nägele, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2005) and weak product differentiation 
(McCarthy et al., 2005), which contradicts to typical features of feminine culture (Hofstede et 
al., 2010).  
As seen from Table 3, the Russian society has an extremely high level of uncertainty avoidance. 
Thus, strong bureaucracy, resistance to change, national pride, low trust, and high fear of failure 
Literature review    18 
 
determine the Russian culture. Nevertheless, this cultural dimension also experienced a 
significant transformation within the years of economic and social transition. Thus, uncertainty-
bearing among Russians increased, and the young generation became eager to learn Western 
knowledge.  
Russians score high on a long-term orientation, which predetermines their situation-specific 
approach to truth as well as the persistence towards achieving goals (Hofstede et al., 2010). This 
cultural specific, accompanied by volatile and underdeveloped formal institutions explains 
commonality of unethical business practices in Russia and short-term business orientation of 
Russian managers (Table 3). However, a survey conducted by Robertson et al. (2003) revealed 
that American employees are more likely to sacrifice ethical standards for individual and firm 
financial rewards than Russians are. This controversy prompts to the further investigation of 
long-term orientation of Russian employees. 
Finally, Russian culture is characterized by extremely low indulgence, which may suggest a 
strict and rather pessimistic approach of Russian managers towards negotiations (Hofstede et 
al., 2010). On the other hand, restrained societies typically demonstrate high moral discipline, 
which contradicts to the situation-specific orientation of Russian managers (Hofstede et al., 
2010; Robertson et al., 2003).  
2.2.2.2. Formal institutional environment 
Scholars generally agree that Russia has weak, non-transparent, inefficient, and highly unstable 
formal institutions (e.g., Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010; Batjargal et al., 2013; Estrin and Prevezer, 
2011; Karhunen, 2008; Luo et al., 2011a). To provide a systematic overview of this issue, the 
findings were grouped into those related to political-legal and economic systems (cf. Peng and 
Meyer, 2011). Table 4 summarizes the main points of critique and corresponding literature on 
Russian formal institutions.  
Table 4: Key deficiencies of Russian formal institutions 
Political-legal institutions Economic institutions 
Low and declining political freedom (Batjargal 
et al., 2013; WBG, 2015d) 
Highly turbulent business environment (Doern and Fey, 
2006; Hunter, 2003; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011) 
Low political stability (Alon and Banai, 2000; 
Doern and Fey, 2006; Estrin and Prevezer, 2011; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2001; WBG, 2015d) 
Limited access of individuals and businesses to financing 
(Doern and Fey, 2006; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 2014; Filippov, 2012; Gratchev and 
Bobina, 2001; Khanna et al., 2005; Leasmond, 2005; 
Pissarides et al., 2003; Shekshnia, 2008)   
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High public and private sector corruption (Aidis 
et al., 2008; Alon and Banai, 2000; Estrin and 
Prevezer, 2011; European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2014; Doh et 
al., 2003; Filippov, 2012; Hardoon and Heinrich, 
2011; Hunter, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Karhunen, 2008; Khanna et al., 2005; Luo et al., 
2011a; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011; Heritage Foundation, 2016; 
WBG, 2015d; Transparency International, 2015) 
Weak development of capital markets (Gratchev and 
Bobina, 2001; Hunter, 2003; Kogut and Spicer, 2002; 
Latusek and Cook, 2012; Luo et al., 2011a; World Economic 
Forum [WEF], 2015) 
High crime rate (Alon and Banai, 2000; Hunter, 
2003; Johnson et al., 2000; Puffer and McCarthy, 
2001) 
Excessive involvement of state in the economy (Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2010; Baer and Bang, 2002; Buck, 2003; 
Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Khanna et al., 2005; 
McCarthy et al., 2005; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; 
McCarthy et al., 2008; Puffer and McCarthy, 2007; Puffer 
and McCarthy, 2011; Heritage Foundation, 2016) 
The weak rule of law regarding contract 
enforcement (WBG, 2015d) 
Low international competitiveness of Russia and Russian 
firms (International Institute for Management Development, 
2016; Luo et al., 2011a; McCarthy et al., 2008) 
Weak protection and enforcement of property 
rights (Hunter, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Khanna et al., 2005; McCarthy and Puffer, 2003; 
McCarthy et al., 2008; McCarthy and Puffer, 
2013; Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004; Puffer 
and McCarthy, 2011; Heritage Foundation, 
2016; WBG, 2015d) 
Low economic freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2016), 
unequal distribution of national assets and income (Baer and 
Bang, 2002; Birdsall and Nellis, 2003; Buck et al., 2000; 
Buck, 2003; Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004; Heritage 
Foundation, 2016) 
Underdeveloped judicial system (Hunter, 2003; 
Johnson et al., 2000; Latusek and Cook, 2012; 
McCarthy et al., 2008; McCarthy and Puffer, 
2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011; Heritage 
Foundation, 2016; WBG, 2015d) 
High inflation (Luo et al., 2011a; WEF, 2015) 
Low government support of private sector 
development (WBG, 2015d) 
Low technological innovativeness (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2014), limited 
technological adoption (WEF, 2015) 
Confusing and heavy taxation (Berkowitz, 2000; 
Gratchev and Bobina, 2001; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Luo et al., 2011a; Puffer and McCarthy, 2001) 
Low productivity (Buck et al., 2000; Polishchuk and 
Savvateev, 2004; WEF, 2015) 
Inefficient trade and investment policies (Alon 
and Banai, 2000; Buck et al., 2000; European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
2014; Heritage Foundation, 2016) 
Overreliance on natural resources combined with weak 
diversification of economy (Hofstede et al., 2010; McCarthy 
et al., 2008; Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004) 
Excessive bureaucracy and overregulation 
(Batjargal et al., 2013; European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2014; Johnson 
et al., 2000; Khanna et al., 2005; Pissarides et al., 
2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2001; Heritage 
Foundation, 2016).  
Low business sophistication (WEF, 2015) 
Weak business infrastructure (Doern and Fey, 2006; Hunter, 
2003; Jansson et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2005; Pissarides et 
al., 2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2001; WEF, 2015) 
Rigid labor market (Heritage Foundation, 2016) 
Deficiency of the skilled workforce, including personnel 
with managerial competences (Björkman et al., 2007; 
Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Engelhard and Nägele, 
2003; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
2014; Hunter, 2003; Luo et al., 2011a) 
Source: Synthesis of reviewed literature 
As shown in Table 4, there are multiple traces of weak Russian formal institutions, including 
turbulent business environment, the excessive involvement of the state in the economy, limited 
access to financing, and low technological innovativeness. These deficiencies increase the role 
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of informal institutions (e.g., Batjargal et al., 2013; McCarthy et al., 2012; McCarthy and Puffer, 
2013; Puffer et al., 2013; Tretyak et al., 2013), and limit entrepreneurship and innovativeness 
(Aidis et al., 2008; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014; Pissarides et 
al., 2003). However, certain improvements occurred within the last years in several political-
legal aspects, such as government effectiveness for public services, the rule of law (WBG, 
2015d), as well as fiscal and business freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2016). Equally, some 
authors highlighted contrasting characteristics of the Russian economic system, such as the 
strong banking system (Khanna et al., 2005), the moderate technological capabilities (Bruton 
and Rubanik, 2002; Khanna et al., 2005; Luo et al., 2011a; WEF, 2015), as well as a large pool 
of skilled, educated, and trained personnel (Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Hunter, 2003; 
Khanna et al., 2005; Luo et al., 2011a; WEF, 2015). 
To conclude, the discussion in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 showed that due to relatively recent 
transition of Russia to the market economy many features of Russian institutional environment 
remain a disputable matter and require further empirical investigation. 
2.2.3. Key findings from the related studies  
The review exposed several important findings, which guide the further investigation. For the 
aims of visualization, these results are grouped into four categories: content of research, context 
of competition, disciplinary domain, and methodology. The discussion below synthesizes main 
research gaps within each of these categories. 
Concerning the content of research, the review showed that emerging market firms pose a 
growing competitive threat for companies from developed economies, especially in the mature 
manufacturing industries. Thus, the vast majority of the studies considered developed-economy 
firms to be in a defending position related to EMCs, especially when competing in the context 
of developed and mid-range emerging economies, such as Russia (Hoskisson et al., 2013). 
These rivals possess certain competitive advantages over Western MNEs, particularly if 
competition occurs in the institutional environment of emerging markets. Accordingly, scholars 
recognized the crucial role of the institutional factors in emerging markets and argued that they 
strongly determine the strategy and competitive advantage of both, local firms and foreign 
players. Nevertheless, several deficiencies were found in the body of the existing research. First, 
studies considering specifics of the Russian business environment ignored its impact on strategic 
choices and competitive advantage of foreign firms operating in Russia. Second, specifics of the 
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Russian institutional environment often demonstrate contradictory patterns, which prompts their 
further empirical validation. Third, existing recommendations for competitive reactions to 
emerging market firms remain relatively scarce, highly fragmented, and primarily focused on 
the instrumental dimension2. Fourth, only one conceptual study analyzed competitive 
interactions between Western MNEs and companies from emerging economies, despite the 
central role of competitive dynamics for competitive advantage (e.g., Grimm et al., 2006). 
Regarding the context of competition, the analysis revealed that the extant literature primarily 
focused on the rivals from South and East Asia. However, significant differences exist among 
firms originating from different emerging markets (Altenburg et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2013). 
Additionally, research on strategy in the Russian context is relatively scarce (McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2013, p. 84; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011, pp. 31–32), with a majority of cross-national 
studies analyzing competition in the context of Asian emerging markets. 
With respect to the disciplinary domain, the review showed that the problem was approached 
from the diverse theoretical lenses of strategic management, economics, international business, 
and marketing. However, the majority of investigations was based on the theoretical insights 
from one discipline only.  
Similar diversity also exists in the methodological approaches applied in the selected studies. 
Thus, there is no commonly accepted methodology among the reviewed cross-national studies. 
This might point to a rather recent development of the research inquiry in this area. Additionally, 
relatively few studies applied a qualitative methodology, despite its crucial role in understanding 
the managerial perceptions on competitive dynamics (Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004).  
In sum, these research gaps determine several key attributes for the current investigation:  
 Analysis of the competitive reactions of developed-country firms, operating in the 
Russian market, towards competitors from diverse emerging markets  
 Focus on the instrumental dimension of defensive competitive reactions 
 Analysis of the influence, which Russian institutional environment has on competitive 
advantage of German firms 
 Empirical identification of the main drivers of the Russian institutional environment  
 Investigation in the manufacturing sector context 
                                                 
2 In line with delimitations of the research described in Section 1.2, this specific was considered here as an indicator 
of the importance given to the instrumental dimension by practitioners, rather than as the gap in existing research. 
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 Multidisciplinary theoretical approach  
 Qualitative research strategy 
Numerous future research recommendations of related studies confirmed the validity of the 
identified research attributes. 
2.3. Conceptual foundation 
In order to specify the identified research attributes into worthy research questions, I conducted 
a review of the theoretical literature. In agreement with Perry (2002) and Phillips and Pugh 
(2005), the conceptual foundation was categorized into parent and focal theories.  
2.3.1. Parent theories 
The parent theories critically analyze key themes and trends in the disciplines, constituting the 
boundaries of the thesis (Perry, 2002, pp. 20–22; Phillips and Pugh, 2005, pp. 57–58). Based on 
the findings from the related studies, this review follows a multidisciplinary approach and 
includes theories of industrial organization (Section 2.3.1.1), strategic management (Section 
2.3.1.2), marketing (Section 2.3.1.3) and international business (Section 2.3.1.4). 
2.3.1.1. Industrial organization  
Industrial organization or industrial economics (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 2; Schmalensee, 
1988, p. 643), is a field of research, which examines market structure with particular emphasis 
on the competition between firms (Cabral, 2000, p. 3). The analysis here focuses on the supply 
side of the manufacturing sector (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, p. 2; Scherer and Ross, 1990, 
pp. 1–2; Schmalensee, 1988, p. 643), which determines its crucial role for this study.  
The research in industrial organization is centered around three topics, namely imperfect 
competition and market power (Cabral, 2000, pp. 6–7; Schmalensee, 1988, p. 644; Shepherd, 
2005, p. 103), behavior of firms (Cabral, 2000, pp. 7–8; Schmalensee, 1988, p. 643) and public 
policy (Cabral, 2000, pp. 9–11; Schmalensee, 1988, p. 644). This review aims to provide a 
theoretical background for analyzing inter-firm competition. Therefore, this discussion on the 
historical development of the industrial organization pays specific attention to the matters of 
firm behavior.  
Although the basic ideas of competition and monopoly power were known since the beginning 
of civilization (Jong and Shepherd, 2007, p. xxviii), industrial organization emerged as a distinct 
field of research only in the 1930s (Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987, p. 372; Conner, 1991, p. 
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125; Grether, 1970, p. 85). The advance of the field was closely connected with the rise of large 
US enterprises. This development brought to life vivid cases of ineffective competition 
(Schmalensee, 1988, p. 643; Shepherd, 1999, p. 4), which triggered the attention towards the 
questions of market power (Shepherd, 2005, p. 112, 114). The additional impulse to the advance 
of industrial organization was given by the Great Depression, which caused public concerns 
about the efficiency of private economy (Conner, 1991, pp. 126–127; Peltzman, 1991, pp. 201–
202).  
Contributions of Bain (1968), Mason (1939), and Mason (1949), along with the development of 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP paradigm) marked the early years of the 
discipline. The SCP paradigm postulated that market structure variables determine firm conduct, 
which in turn defines market performance (Cabral, 2000, p. 12; Carlton and Perloff, 2005, p. 4; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 5; Shepherd, 1999, p. 7, 2005, p. 104). Traditionally, the paradigm 
was characterized by rather deterministic relationships between its elements, with the main 
focus given to the linkages between market structure and performance (Grether, 1970, p. 85; 
Porter, 1981, p. 611). Public policy was treated as a favorable intervention in structure or 
conduct, necessary to maintain effective market performance (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 7; 
Martin, 1994, p. 2; Wirth, 1995, p. 16). The conduct received little attention since it was 
considered to be an outcome of the structure (Conner, 1991, p. 124; Porter, 1981, p. 611).  
Despite wide applicability of the SCP paradigm, several important points of critique emerged 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Scholars criticized the deterministic causality 
between elements, lack of stable associations between variables, and the assumption of idealistic 
market conditions (Conner, 1991, p. 124; Church and Ware, 2000, p. 10; Ferguson and 
Ferguson, 1994, pp. 17-18, 27-28; Wirth, 1995, pp. 17–18). Several distinctive approaches to 
industrial organization addressed this critique.  First, the Austrian or Schumpeterian school 
(Cabral, 2000, p. 9), considered market power as a major determinant of technological progress 
(Carlton and Perloff, 2005, p. 560). This school treated capitalism and competition as an 
“evolutionary process” (Schumpeter, 1943/2003, p. 82), rather than as a static construct 
(Shepherd, 1999, p. 79; Wirth, 1995, pp. 18–19). Accordingly, large firms were considered not 
as deterrents of competition, but as promoters of innovative competition (Cabral, 2000, p. 9; 
Carlton and Perloff, 2005, p. 560; Conner, 1991, pp. 124–128; Schumpeter, 1943/2003, p. 106). 
Particular attention was paid to the dynamic nature of competition (Jacobson, 1992, p. 789; 
Young et al., 1996, pp. 243–244) and interaction of firms in the marketplace, termed as “the 
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process of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1943/2003, pp. 81–86). The focal theories of this 
thesis consider these aspects in more details. 
Next, the Chicago school appeared in the 1960s, as a response to overreliance on public policies. 
Proponents of this tradition claimed that market power in conditions of free competition never 
persists, since high prices attract new entrants (Shepherd, 2005, p. 115, 120). As a result, entry 
is essentially free and prompt in the majority of the markets (Cabral, 2000, p. 6; Shepherd, 2005, 
p. 115, 120). Chicago school postulated that a firm could gain market power because of 
governmental public policy (Cabral, 2000, p. 10), and therefore state intervention in market 
functioning had to be minimized (Conner, 1991, p. 148; Martin, 1994, p. 2). High profits were 
considered as a sign of market efficiency, rather than market power (Ferguson and Ferguson, 
1994, p. 19). Contrary to the Austrian tradition, this school focused on the efficiency of a firm, 
as the key determinant of firm size and scope (Conner, 1991, pp. 129–130; Shepherd, 2005, p. 
115). As a result, this view contradicted the central postulate of SCP paradigm, claiming that 
conduct of a firm influences variables of market structure (Shepherd, 2005, p. 106). However, 
scholars representing Chicago school performed relatively little empirical work, other than that 
of Stigler (1968/1983) and studies criticizing SCP paradigm (Martin, 1994, p. 11). 
Baumol (1982) advanced the free market ideas of Chicago School in his work on contestable 
markets. He challenged deterministic relationships between elements of the SCP paradigm by 
the idea that industry performance modifies industry structure (Wirth, 1995, p. 18). Potential 
competition, instead of actual interactions, received primary attention (Martin, 1994, p. 480; 
Shepherd, 2005, p. 120), and the idea of markets with no entry and exit barriers was introduced. 
In such “perfectly contestable” (Baumol, 1982, p. 2) setting new entrants could instantly enter 
and leave the marketplace, forcing incumbents to optimize their conduct and thereby assuring 
good market performance (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, p. 18). Nevertheless, this approach 
received major critique for the lack of contestable markets in the real-life setting (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2005, p. 6; Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 376; Shepherd, 1999, pp. 219–220, 2005, pp. 
120–121).   
Additionally, a set of ideas, which can be loosely labeled as new industrial organization 
(Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, pp. 5–6; Kadiyali et al., 2001; Schmalensee, 1988) emerged by 
the late 1970s. Similar to other schools, here researchers recognized the presence of reverse 
causal linkages in the SCP paradigm, thereby accepting that conduct of powerful firms could 
influence the market structure (Shepherd, 1999, p. 6). Owing to developments in non-
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cooperative game theory, scholars constructed sophisticated theoretical explanations of firm 
behavior in the oligopolistic markets (Church and Ware, 2000, p. 11; Martin, 1994, pp. 11–12; 
Shepherd, 1999, p. 29; Wirth, 1995, p. 18). As a result, a set of game-theoretic models largely 
replaced the traditional SCP paradigm (Martin, 1994, p. 12). The research here focused on the 
analysis of specific industries and firm behavior in the conditions of imperfect competition 
(Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987, p. 371; Church and Ware, 2000, p. 10; Ferguson and 
Ferguson, 1994, p. 19) and theoretical modeling of competitive interactions (Grimm et al., 2006, 
p. 38). Consequently, new industrial organization, which encompasses analysis of strategic 
behavior and entry deterrence (Blees et al., 2003, p. 9), is closely related to business strategy 
(Church and Ware, 2000, p. 11). However, high reliance on game theoretical models was 
criticized for lack of practical applicability (e.g., Shepherd, 2005, pp. 121–122).   
As a key discipline for analyzing inter-firm competition, industrial organization provides the 
foundation for several important constructs related to this reaction. Thus, Sections 2.3.2.2 and 
2.3.2.3 include multidisciplinary discussion on the competition playground (industry and 
market), entry barriers, and strategic behavior of a firm in imperfect competition. 
2.3.1.2. Strategic management  
The discipline of strategic management studies factors, which determine success or failure of 
firms in the competition (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 70; Porter, 1994, p. 423; Rumelt et al., 
1994b, p. 9). As an academic field, strategic management was established with publications of 
Ansoff (1965), Chandler (1962/2001), and Christensen et al. (1978). With roots in such diverse 
fields as economics, sociology, organizational theory, finance, psychology, political science, 
and marketing (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 72; Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp. 354–355; Nag et 
al., 2007, p. 936, 949) the discipline is marked by numerous theories and approaches. Thus, 
some scholars distinguished between four (Ma, 2003), eight (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014) and 
even ten (Mintzberg et al., 1998) main schools of thought (Nag et al., 2007, p. 937). A great 
deal of confusion also surrounds the key terms applied in the field (Leontiades, 1982).  
Nevertheless, the majority of researchers agree on the meaning of the strategy concept (Nag et 
al., 2007, p. 937; Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin, 2012, p. 182). Thus, Ronda-Pupo and 
Guerras-Martin (2012) synthesized the definition of a strategy as “the dynamics of the firm’s 
relation with its environment for which the necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals 
and/or to increase performance by means of the rational use of resources” (p. 180). 
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Consequently, competitive advantage is determined by firm’s actions, which must be aligned 
with both external environment and internal firm resources. This definition resembles the ideas 
of the SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunities and threats) framework (cf. Christensen et al., 
1978, p. 258; Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp. 24–26) and the concept of strategic fit (Grant, 2010, 
pp. 12–13; Ma, 2003, p. 74; Zajac et al., 2000). Accordingly, various perspectives on strategic 
management are typically categorized into those focusing on external environment and internal 
characteristics of a firm (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014). Two major schools of thought, which 
depict this split, are market-based and resource-based views.  
The market-based view (Makhija, 2003, p. 433), primary represented by publications of Porter 
(Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979, 1980/1998, 1985/2004), stems from the ideas of 
industrial organization, and particularly SCP paradigm (Ma, 2003, p. 75; Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992). However, contrary to the mainstream industrial organization, which focused on the 
optimum industry performance, the market-based view analyzes conditions leading to the 
superior performance of an individual firm (Porter, 1981, p. 612). In this way, the elements of 
SCP paradigm are considered from a perspective of a firm seeking for monopoly rents 
(Jörgensen, 2008, p. 236). Thus, a firm can reach competitive advantage by positioning itself in 
the favorable industry or by manipulating competitive forces within the industry (Porter, 
1980/1998, p. 4). The major contributions of this perspective include the five forces framework, 
generic strategies and value chain analysis (Porter, 1980/1998, 1985/2004, 2008). In the five 
forces framework, five dimensions of market structure help to assess industry attractiveness. 
These dimensions depict threats for a competitive position of a company, including the threat 
from new entry, existing rivalry, substitute products, buyers, and suppliers. Porter (1980/1998, 
pp. 35–46) argued that a firm can reach a defendable position in the industry by following one 
of three generic strategies: differentiation, overall cost leadership, or focus. He proposed value-
chain analysis, as a tool to develop a competitive strategy (Porter, 1985/2004, pp. 37–38).  
The market-based view provoked multiple points of debate (e.g., Grant, 2010, pp. 96–98; 
Jörgensen, 2008, p. 237; D'Aveni et al., 2010; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 23; Makhija, 2003; 
McGrath, 2013, Grant, 2010, p. 96, 2010, pp. 83–85). Nevertheless, the main criticism is related 
to its overreliance on external conditions, backed by assumptions of perfect resource mobility 
and homogeneity (Barney, 1991, p. 100; Jörgensen, 2008, p. 237). Thus, several empirical 
studies revealed the relatively low importance of industry structure for firm profitability (e.g., 
Makhija, 2003; Powell, 1992; Rumelt, 1991).  
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As a response to this critique, the resource-based view shifted attention to firm-related 
determinants of strategy (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 100). As proposed by Barney (1991, pp. 
106–112), a company can reach sustainable competitive advantage if it possesses valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable resources. The resource-based view postulates that 
internal resources, capabilities and competencies of the firm determine sustainable competitive 
advantage (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 73; Ma, 2003, p. 76; Makhija, 2003, p. 433; Teece et 
al., 1997, p. 510). As summarized by Spanos and Lioukas, (2001), while the market-based view 
perceives a firm as a “bundle of activities” (p. 909), the resource-based view defines a firm as a 
“bundle of resources” (p. 909). This view recognizes that resources are heterogeneous across 
firms and not perfectly mobile (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997, p. 514), which enables a firm 
to earn Ricardian rents (Madhok et al., 2010, p. 97; Peteraf, 1993, p. 180; Teece et al., 1997, p. 
513). Some scholars claimed that the resource-based view represents a paradigm shift in 
strategic management, which determined the research direction of the recent years (Furrer et al., 
2008, p. 5, 11). Thus, this perspective gave birth to several influential sub-streams of strategic 
management, including knowledge-based approach (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996), dynamic 
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007), resource-advantage 
theory of competition (Hunt and Morgan, Robert, M., 1995; Hunt and Davis, 2012), and 
resource orchestration approach (Sirmon et al., 2011). Despite the prevalence of the resource-
based view in strategic management literature (Furrer et al., 2008; Ramos-Rodríguez and Ruíz-
Navarro, 2004, p. 1001), it was also criticized for its static nature, limited prescriptive power, 
and underdeveloped focus on environmental attributes (Fahy, 2000, pp. 100–101; Furrer et al., 
2008, p. 16; Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp. 281–283; Priem and Butler, 2001, pp. 35–36; Priem et 
al., 2013, p. 477).  
Nevertheless, both resource-based and market-based views focus on sustaining, rather than 
achieving competitive advantage (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 74; Ma, 2003, p. 75; Teece et 
al., 1997, p. 509; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, p. 68), Consequently, they are useful in explaining 
the defensive perspective of this research (Section 2.2.3). Additionally, numerous scholars 
considered both approaches as complementary, rather than contrasting to each other (Grant, 
1991, pp. 117–118, 2010, p. 96; Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 71; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992, 
pp. 371–375; Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 282; Porter, 1994, pp. 446–447; Spanos and Lioukas, 
2001, pp. 919–920). Therefore, similar to several related studies (Koerte, 2006, p. 41; Salonen, 
2012, p. 16), focal theories of this thesis rely on concepts stemming from the market-based view, 
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and the resource-based view is used as a complementary theory. Thus, Sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2, 
and 2.3.2.3 review concepts of entry barriers, mobility barriers, isolating mechanisms, strategic 
groups and competitive strategies. Furthermore, to address the critique of both views for being 
static (e.g., D'Aveni et al., 2010; Furrer et al., 2008, p. 16; Makhija, 2003), this review covers 
the topic of competitive interactions and reviews the dynamic model of competitive advantage 
(Grimm et al., 2006, p. 86).  
2.3.1.3. Marketing 
Marketing, contrary to industrial organization and strategic management, is a study of the 
demand side of the economy (Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, pp. 58–62; Schmalensee, 1988, p. 643).  
The mainstream definition of marketing changed several times within the twentieth century, 
depicting shifts of the disciplinary focus between wide societal role and narrow managerial 
function (Ellis et al., 2011, p. 15). For the purposes of the current review, a highly cited 
definition of the (American Marketing Association, 2016) is accepted: “Marketing is the 
activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and 
exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large” (para. 
2). Marketing is characterized by evolving nature, a diverse range of analyzed topics and vague 
disciplinary boundaries (Ellis et al., 2011, p. 13; Hunt, 2002, pp. 11–12; Luedicke, 2006, p. 26; 
Lusch, 2007, p. 261, 267). This discipline focuses on customer-related aspects of an individual 
firm (Nag et al., 2007, p. 949) and relies heavily on theoretical contributions of strategic 
management and industrial organization (e.g., Kuester et al., 1999, pp. 90–94). Therefore, this 
thesis provides only a brief overview of those aspects of the discipline, which are directly 
dealing with competition.   
Marketing managers are assumed to be mindful of competitors and their reaction (Leeflang and 
Wittink, 1996, p. 104). Thus, competition plays a crucial role in the stream of literature, which 
is labeled as marketing strategy (Reid and Plank, 2000, pp. 18–23; Varadarajan and 
Jayachandran, 1999, p. 121; Varadarajan, 2010, p. 130, 131). Smith (1991) defined marketing 
strategy as “an endeavor by a corporation to differentiate itself positively from its competitors, 
using its relative corporate strengths to better satisfy customer needs in a given environmental 
setting” (p. 161). Contrary to strategic management and industrial organization, marketing 
addresses strategy from supply-side and demand-side perspectives, considering the strategic 
behavior of firms within the context of consumer behavior (Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, pp. 59–
60; Varadarajan and Jayachandran, 1999, p. 140; Varadarajan, 2010, p. 133; Weitz, 1985, p. 
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229). Following Sabnis and Grewal (2012), marketing literature on competition is grouped in 
two streams, dealing with competitive market structure and competitive interactions in the 
marketplace. Another important stream of research in marketing strategy examines market 
pioneering or first-mover advantages (Cho et al., 1998; Kerin et al., 1992; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). Here, scholars investigate competitive advantage associated with the order 
of market entry, which is closely related to the entry barriers literature from industrial 
organization and strategic management (Weitz, 1985, p. 234).  
The competition-related aspects are considered in details within focal theories. Thus, Sections 
2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2 reflect on competitive market structure and competitive interactions, and 
Section 2.3.2.3 considers competitiveness in the light of the market entry order. 
2.3.1.4. International business  
The disciplines of industrial organization, strategic management, and marketing do not provide 
a sufficient theoretical foundation for research in the cross-national context. Thus, the 
fundamental perspective of industrial organization is that “international markets should not be 
very different from national markets” (Shy, 1995, p. 7). Therefore, in the international setting, 
industrial organization strives to explain cross-border trade with models of imperfect 
competition, analyze state interventions in international trade, and evaluate the impact of these 
interventions on competition (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, pp. 597–627; Krugman, 1986). These 
aspects have limited relevance for the current inquiry. Meanwhile, strategic management 
literature is mainly based on the samples of North American and European firms, such as the 
Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) database (Campbell-Hunt, 2000, pp. 136–137; 
Strategic Planning Institute, 2015). The domain of international strategic management 
primarily deals with the matters of business-level strategy for multiple countries (Eden et al., 
2011, p. 61; Ghemawat, 2003, p. 146), which is not relevant to this thesis. Finally, international 
marketing provides a limited contribution to the study, since it mainly acts as an extension of 
existing marketing topics to the conditions of international trade (Bartels, 1976, p. 215; 
Leonidou et al., 2010, p. 509). Consequently, theoretical underpinnings of international 
business3 research supplemented this review. The main body of international business research 
deals with the coordination of MNE activities (Caves, 1998; Seno-Alday, 2010, p. 28; Shenkar, 
                                                 
3 International business should be distinguished from the international management, which is a sub-field of the 
discipline, dealing with the process of managing an organization involved in cross-border activities (Apfelthaler 
and Vaiman, 2013, p. 31; Eden et al., 2011, pp. 55–56).   
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2004, p. 165). This literature is not directly related to the inquiry of the current thesis and 
therefore is not reviewed here. However, this section includes a concise overview of 
international trade theories, which explain “the pattern of overall international economic 
activity” (Markusen, 2001, p. 70), and specifically competition between firms from advanced 
and emerging economies.  
Before the industrial revolution, international trade was defined by ideas of mercantilism, which 
viewed an excess of country’s export over import as a determinant of national wealth and 
promoted governmental control of international commerce (Czinkota et al., 2011, p. 64; Daniels 
et al., 2011, p. 263). The industrial revolution resulted in increased supplies of goods and 
emergence of first MNEs (Bartels and Pass, 2000, p. 5), which stimulated scholarly interest in 
international trade. Thus, Smith (1776/1998) claimed that countries increased their welfare by 
exporting products in which they had the absolute advantage of efficient production. Ricardo 
(1817/2001), who proposed that countries specialize in those products, for which they have 
efficiency advantage compared to other manufactured goods, further developed these ideas. In 
this way, comparative advantage is based on costs of what should be given up to produce a 
certain product. Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1967) proposed that differences in factors of 
production, rather than efficiency, determine patterns of international trade. Consequently, 
labor-abundant countries should specialize in the production of labor-intensive products. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory relies on several assumptions, including similarity of production 
technology across countries, which were often not met in the real world. Leontief (1953) found 
that products imported to the capital-intensive economy of the United States of America (USA) 
were more capital-intensive than the exported products. This finding stimulated the 
development of several alternative approaches to international trade, which did not rely on 
assumptions of perfect competition (Markusen, 2001, p. 71). Thus, Linder (1961) explained 
trade in manufactured goods by similarities of consumer preferences. Alternatively, Vernon 
(1966) proposed that a country’s advantage in the production of particular products changes 
over time, while products pass through phases of “new product”, “maturing product”, and 
“standardized product” (p. 191, 196, 202). The product life cycle theory assumes that output of 
a new product starts in Western economies and gradually moves to less-developed countries 
with lower labor costs due to the growth of competition and technology imitation. In this way, 
Vernon was one of the first scholars who analyzed foreign direct investments (FDIs) conducted 
by MNEs.  
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Nevertheless, traditional trade theories did not address organization and ownership of value-
adding activities by MNEs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, pp. 79–80). This topic gained 
momentum in the management literature only at the end of the 1950s (Seno-Alday, 2010, p. 26; 
Wright, 1970, p. 110). Thus, Hymer (1960) accomplished the first comprehensive analysis of 
MNEs and their decisions to invest in foreign operations. He suggested that FDI decision is 
determined by certain firm-specific capabilities, which are not shared by competitors in target 
countries. These capabilities stem from market imperfections and enable the internationalizing 
firm to offset “barriers to international operations” (Hymer, 1960, p. 38).  
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) shifted the focus from FDIs towards the internationalization 
process.  Based on the investigation of Swedish MNEs, (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) 
developed the Uppsala model, with a sequential process of business internationalization. In line 
with this approach, a firm gradually gains knowledge of foreign markets, which results in its 
higher resource commitment to international operations.  
Several holistic explanations of cross-border activities emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Internalization theory analyzes decisions of large firms to conduct certain international market 
functions internally. This approach proposes that multinational hierarchies act as alternatives to 
market mechanisms in the cross-national context (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 93). The 
eclectic or ownership, location, internalization paradigm states that decisions about foreign 
production are determined by three factors: ownership advantages of a firm related to host 
country companies, the locational attractiveness of countries, and advantages of internalization 
of cross-border market activities (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, pp. 99–100). This paradigm was 
promoted as an “envelope” (Dunning, 2000, p. 183) for various theories explaining activities of 
MNEs. 
In the 1980s-1990s various theoretical approaches from other disciplines entered the field, 
including transaction cost economics (Teece, 1986), network theory (Chetty and Blankenburg 
Holm, 2000), and resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Peng, 2001). Parallel to this, scholars 
strived to explain lowering international competitiveness of US firms. Thus, Porter (1990b, p. 
78) developed the diamond of national advantage, which postulates that innovativeness and 
consequently competitiveness of particular industries within a country is determined by four 
national attributes, namely factor endowments, demand specifics, related and supporting 
industries, as well as firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. Despite substantial critique (Davies, 
2000) and suggested modifications (e.g., Brouthers and Brouthers, 1997), this model constitutes 
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an inherent part of international business literature (Bartels and Pass, 2000; Czinkota et al., 
2011). 
Several theories emerged in the last years, as a response to evolving patterns of the international 
economy. A growing body of literature is dedicated to the phenomenon of early 
internationalizing firms (Rialp et al., 2005), which is rooted in the recent globalization of world 
markets and developments in information technology, logistics, and production (Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004, p. 125). Another stream of research deals with the recent growth of emerging 
markets (Wright et al., 2005). Thus, Mathews (2006) suggested that a linkage, leverage and 
learning (LLL) framework could explain accelerated internationalization of enterprises from 
emerging Asia-Pacific economies. He proposed that these firms possess certain innovative 
features (e.g., accelerated internationalization, strategic and organizational innovation), despite 
the lack of traditional internationalization advantages. Contrary to Western MNEs, whose 
internationalization is driven by existing resources, firms from emerging markets 
internationalize to gain resources, which otherwise remain unavailable to them (Mathews, 2006, 
p. 22). Consequently, Mathews (2006) proclaimed small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
from emerging markets as “truly global firms” (p. 23). Luo and Tung (2007) proposed a 
springboard perspective, where emerging market companies overcome constraints in home 
markets and latecomer competitive disadvantages through international expansion and 
aggressive acquisitions. They distinguished between four groups of emerging market firms 
based on the level of international diversification and ownership: niche entrepreneurs, world-
stage aspirants, transnational specialists, and commissioned specialists. The international 
investments of these companies are driven by both, attempts to limit negative constraints of 
home environment and encouraging policies of the home government (Luo and Tung, 2007, p. 
492). Finally, in the last years, managers and scholars became interested in the specifics of 
institutional conditions in emerging markets. This interest resulted in the development of the 
institution-based view of international business strategy (Peng et al., 2008), which is considered 
in the Section 2.3.2.4.     
Despite substantial development within the last 50 years (Aharoni and Brock, 2010; Seno-
Alday, 2010) there are essential points of critique related to international business research. 
Thus, the scholars alerted that the discipline is “running out of steam” (Buckley, 2002, p. 365), 
loses its usefulness and domain (Shenkar, 2004, p. 162, 166), relies on single-disciplinary 
knowledge (Cheng et al., 2009), and gives little attention to real world phenomena (Cheng et 
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al., 2011). Nevertheless, the international business provides several significant contributions for 
this thesis. Reviewed theories establish a contextual background of the cross-national 
competition between German firms and their emerging markets rivals. This dissertation gives 
particular importance to the institution-based view of strategy, which explains the impact of host 
country environment on the competitiveness of German firms. Additionally, concepts of liability 
of foreignness and costs of doing business abroad, effectively supplement the theory of entry 
barriers in the international context. The following sections consider these concepts in details.   
2.3.2. Focal theories 
Focal theories represent a body of knowledge directly related to the research problem (Perry, 
2002, pp. 20–22; Phillips and Pugh, 2005, pp. 57–58). The following sections include an 
overview of the theories of competitive perception (Section 2.3.2.1), competitive reaction 
(Section 2.3.2.2), entry barriers (Section 2.3.2.3), and institution-based view of strategy (Section 
2.3.2.4). 
2.3.2.1. Competitive perception  
Competitive analysis and perception are essential for formulating a firm strategy (Clark and 
Montgomery, 1999, p. 67; Deshpandé and Gatignon, 1994, p. 271; Porter, 1980/1998, p. 47), 
which determines their importance for this thesis. Three approaches to the analysis of 
competitive market structure can be found in the literature: economic, cognitive, and 
environment-based views (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012). 
The economic view relies on the assumptions of calculated rationality and complete information, 
which have their roots in the industrial organization literature (Johnson and Russo, 1997; Kemp 
and Hanemaaijer, 2004). Here, the emphasizes is given to mathematical modeling, market 
equilibria, and outcomes of the competition (Johnson and Russo, 1997, p. 177, 192). However, 
this approach was criticized for overreliance on secondary sources, low applicability in modern 
highly dynamic competitive environments, and limited applicability for real-life competitive 
interactions (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, p. 8). These points are addressed by behavioral or 
cognitive view on the competition in marketing and strategic management literature. This 
perspective recognizes the role of managerial perceptions of competition, with the primary focus 
given to the firm-level competitive interactions, rather than to the outcomes of the competitive 
process (Johnson and Russo, 1997, p. 177, 192; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, pp. 8–9). 
Moreover, Sabnis and Grewal (2012) advanced an environment-based perspective of 
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competition (p. 62-63), which investigates the impact of various macro-environmental factors 
on competitive configurations.  
This thesis follows the behavioral view on competition, which can be justified by three 
considerations. First, several empirical investigations confirmed that subjective perceptions of 
industry participants, rather than objective industry characteristics determine managerial 
reaction to competition (Fouskas and Drossos, 2010, p. 489; Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994, 
pp. 545–547; Waarts and Wierenga, 2000, pp. 76–77). Second, this study aims to describe firm-
level competitive interactions rather than outcomes of competition. Finally, the influence of 
macro-environmental factors on competition is covered in this thesis by the institution-based 
view of strategy (Section 2.3.2.4).  
Within the behavioral perspective, decision-makers can interpret competitive environment in 
two ways: from firm-driven view and event-driven view (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004). For 
the aims of this research, both of them are considered as complementary. 
Firm-driven view. This approach aims to identify and categorize competitors, based on the 
subjective perceptions of reality by industry participants (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, p. 21). 
In this way, it is closely related to competitive dynamics research (Chen, 1996; Chen and Miller, 
2015, p. 759, 760). Scholars following this view recognized that competitors can be identified 
either from the demand-side or from supply-side perspectives (Clark and Montgomery, 1999; 
Yu et al., 2015; DeSarbo et al., 2006; Porac et al., 1989; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012)4. According 
to the demand-side perspective, competitors include those firms whose products consumers 
perceive as substitutable, since they satisfy similar needs (Clark and Montgomery, 1999, p. 67; 
DeSarbo et al., 2006, p. 104; Porac et al., 1989, p. 406; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, p. 59; Yu et 
al., 2015). Here customers eventually decide which firms compete with each other (Sabnis and 
Grewal, 2012, p. 59). This perspective is closely related to the market commonality construct 
from competitive dynamics literature (Bergen and Peteraf, 2002, p. 160; Chen, 1996). On the 
contrary, according to the supply-side perspective competitors are identified based on such 
attributes as applied technology and available resources (Clark and Montgomery, 1999, p. 67; 
DeSarbo et al., 2006, p. 102; Porac et al., 1989, p. 406; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, p. 61). This 
approach resembles the notion of resource similarity (Bergen and Peteraf, 2002; Chen, 1996), 
                                                 
4 This categorization can be traced to supply- and demand-side substitutability definitions (Grant, 2010, p. 85; 
Shepherd, 1999, pp. 62–68).  
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with industry competition depicted by perceptions of managers representing rival firms (Sabnis 
and Grewal, 2012, p. 61). 
Three considerations justify reliance of the current research on the supply-side perspective. 
First, contrary to the narrow focus of demand-side perspective on marketing strategy, the 
supply-side perspective provides a reliable basis for understanding long-term trends in the 
industry (Grant, 2010, pp. 84–85). Second, this research aims to identify competitive reactions 
of German firms, which are determined by managerial perceptions. Considering the exploratory-
descriptive nature of the thesis, managerial perspective serves as an excellent source of 
knowledge for both tactical and strategic actions of a firm. Third, the supply-side perspective 
focuses on the analysis of direct competitors and new entrants, rather than indirect competitors 
or substitutors (Bergen and Peteraf, 2002, pp. 160–161). 
In line with the supply-side perspective, competitive actions and firm performance can be 
predicted by managerial awareness of competition or cognition (Clark, 2011, p. 209). The 
research of Porac et al. (1989) provided an important initial contribution to this stream of 
literature. Their study demonstrated that managers perceived that their companies were 
competing against a few national firms rather than again direct foreign competitors (pp. 407-
408). To describe this phenomenon, they coined the term “cognitive oligopoly” (p. 413), 
suggesting that interfirm perceptions and coordination lead to oligopolistic situations. Porac et 
al. (1989) underlined that the traditional definition of strategic groups relied on rather abstract 
attributes, which were not reflecting opinions of industry participants (p. 414). As a result, he 
concluded that companies could be categorized not only per technological or material attributes 
but also based on cognitive distinctions of industry participants.   
These ideas received substantial dissemination in strategic management research (Kaplan, 2011, 
pp. 669–672). For instance, several studies emphasized the cognitive perspective in strategic 
groups (Leask and Parker, 2006; Reger and Huff, 1993), strategy (Kaplan, 2011, p. 671), and 
categorizations of markets (see Durand and Paolella, 2013 for an overview). Indeed, cognitive 
classifications of competitors usually agree with objectively derived strategic groups (Osborne 
et al., 2001, p. 449; Reger and Huff, 1993, pp. 119–120). Based on the cognition ideas Clark 
and Montgomery (1999) determined 10 most common attributes, applied by managers to 
categorize their competitors. Meanwhile, Kemp and Hanemaaijer (2004) came out with five 
attributes. Based on these sources, the most common attributes applied by managers to identify 
and categorize their competitors included pricing, product style, company positioning, 
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geographic scope, firm success, resources used, customer perception of a firm, size, distribution, 
financial strength, and competitor behavior.  
Event-driven view. The second division of behavioral approach examines interpretation and 
reaction of firm decision-makers to various competitive events (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, 
pp. 24–25). This stream of research mainly emphases the concepts of perceived threat and 
signaling. Thus, in line with Kuester et al. (1999, p. 96), Popma et al. (2006, p. 225), and Waarts 
and Wierenga (2000, p. 68), perceived threat depicts managerial interpretations in the case of 
new entry. Perceived threat is typically evaluated with constructs derived from signaling 
research (Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, p. 25; Kuester et al., 1999, p. 96; Waarts and Wierenga, 
2000, p. 70). In this way, competitive signaling literature supplements competitive dynamics 
literature, by proposing that competitors react not only to actions of other firms (Grimm et al., 
2006, pp. 86–87) but also to preannouncements of actual actions (Heil and Robertson, 1991, p. 
403).  
The signaling research developed a set of conditions for evaluating perceived threat. Thus, Heil 
and Robertson (1991), proposed that signal interpretation is affected by signaling commitment 
and reputation, signal consistency, clarity and aggressiveness, receivers’ expertise in signaling, 
alone with similarity between sender and receiver. The empirical investigation of Heil and 
Walters (1993) confirmed the significance of hostility and consequences for the strength of 
competitive reaction. Similarly, Robertson et al. (1995), explained patterns of reaction to new 
product announcements by signal hostility and credibility. As a result, Kuester et al. (1999, p. 
96) defined perceived threat by criteria of hostility and consequences of actions. Additionally, 
Hultink and Langerak (2002) accepted the same set of market signals to investigate linkages 
between product launch decisions, entrant characteristics, industry attributes, and reactions from 
incumbents.  Finally, Popma et al. (2006) accepted that threat perception was based on 
consequences, commitment, credibility and consistency. In summary, the majority of studies 
suggested that hostility and consequences of competitor actions are the key determinants of 
perceived threat. A competitor can be defined as hostile if its activities are inconsistent with the 
competitive conduct in an industry, performed in an over self-serving manner, and threaten 
livelihood of other companies in the marketplace (Heil and Robertson, 1991, p. 410; Heil and 
Walters, 1993, p. 55, 57, 60; Hultink and Langerak, 2002, p. 201, 210; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 
2004, p. 25; Robertson et al., 1995, p. 3, 13). In turn, actions of competitors have consequences 
if they affect sales, market share, and/or profitability of another firm (Heil and Walters, 1993, 
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pp. 55-56, 57-58, 60; Hultink and Langerak, 2002, p. 201, 210; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, 
p. 25; Waarts and Wierenga, 2000, p. 78).  
In conclusion, the behavioral view on competition represents a promising perspective for the 
current research. Both, firm-driven insights on perceived attributes of competitors and event-
driven characteristics of perceived threat, provide a comprehensive picture of perceived 
competition, which is important for the exploratory-descriptive aims of this investigation 
2.3.2.2. Competitive reaction 
Understanding how competitive interactions can lead to the long-term competitive advantage is 
a key goal of strategic management (Ketchen, JR et al., 2004, p. 799). Indeed, research on 
actions and reactions of competitors (Varadarajan and Jayachandran, 1999, p. 125) is a vital 
theme for competition research (Chen and Miller, 2015, p. 759; Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, p. 58, 
65; Schumpeter, 1943/2003, pp. 83–84). This section covers the topic from perspectives of 
industrial organization, strategic management, and marketing. 
Within industrial organization literature competitive reaction is represented by the construct of 
conduct (see SCP paradigm in Section 2.3.1.1). Historically, industrial economists emphasized 
the impact of structure on performance, assuming that conduct is defined by the structure 
(Grether, 1970, p. 85; Porter, 1981, p. 611). Nevertheless, the discipline recognized effects of 
firm’s strategic behavior on the industry performance (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, p. 350; Martin, 
1994, p. 5). Thus, Bain (1956, p. 22, 172) suggested that conduct might determine entry 
conditions. In this way, he differentiated between easy, ineffectively impeded, effectively 
impeded, and effectively blockaded entry. Subsequently, this classification was modified into 
conditions of accommodated entry, deterred entry and blockaded entry (e.g., Hüschelrath, 2005; 
Shy, 1995, pp. 186–187; Tirole, 1994, pp. 306, 323–328). As suggested by Besanko et al. 
(2013), accommodated entry represents a situation when structural entry barriers are low, and 
the incumbent is not able to impede the entry effectively. Here an incumbent firm adjusts its 
behavior, considering occurred entry (Shy, 1995, p. 187) and restrains from pre- or post-entry 
retaliation (Church and Ware, 2000, p. 532; Tirole, 1994, pp. 326–328). Deterred entry occurs 
when an incumbent can keep the newcomer out of the market by modifying own behavior and 
making new entry unprofitable (Bain, 1956, p. 199; Church and Ware, 2000, p. 535; Shy, 1995, 
p. 187). A condition of blockaded entry exists when an incumbent can ignore activities of 
competitors due to high structural barriers (Besanko et al., 2013, p. 199; Martin, 1994, p. 75; 
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Shy, 1995, p. 186; Tirole, 1994, p. 324). Similar classifications can be found in strategic 
management (Besanko et al., 2013; Blees et al., 2003) and marketing literature (Kuester et al., 
1999).  
Recent advances in industrial organization, including the emergence of new industrial 
organization, recognized the importance of firm conduct in market functioning. For instance, 
Carlton and Perloff (2005, p. 350) suggested that cooperative or non-cooperative strategic 
behavior helps firm to increase its profits by influencing the market environment. Non-
cooperative moves aim to increase firm benefits by harming rivals (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, 
p. 351). In contrast, cooperative moves include activities, which strive to reduce competition 
and increase profits of all market players. Cooperative behavior is typically represented by most-
favored-nation and meeting-competition clauses in contracts, information sharing, market 
division, and uniform prices. A non-cooperative behavior includes limit and predatory pricing, 
as well as various investments to lower own production costs and raise rivals’ costs (Carlton 
and Perloff, 2005, pp. 351–386). 
The study of strategic moves accomplished by Schelling (1994) explained the functioning of 
some of these mechanisms. Strategic move was defined as “one that influences the other 
person’s choice, in a manner favorable to one’s self, by affecting the other person’s expectations 
on how one’s self will behave” (Schelling, 1994, p. 160). Consequently, a firm conducting 
strategic move should accept short-term sacrifices (e.g., investment, loss of profits), which lead 
to net gains in a long-term perspective (Hüschelrath, 2005). Schelling (1994) referred to threats 
as to moves, which impose a penalty on a rival if he performs the action. In this way, the strategic 
moves, which increase the credibility of the threat and turn them into commitment, closely 
resemble indirect effects of entry deterrence (Hüschelrath, 2005). At the same time, in line with 
Church and Ware (2000, p. 15, 464), strategic behavior may also give rise to direct effects, in 
situations when competitor’s profits directly depend on actions of another firm.  
Competitive moves are often classified into tactical and strategic, depending on the time and 
resources required to implement them. Thus, tactical decisions are typically conducted by mid- 
and low-level management, can be quickly implemented, and do not involve significant sunk 
costs (Chen et al., 1992, p. 445). Such decisions would include changes in pricing, output, and 
service quality (Church and Ware, 2000, p. 466; Connelly et al., 2010, p. 728; Tirole, 1994, pp. 
205–206). On the other hand, strategic decisions, which are normally taken by top management, 
encompass those moves which cannot be changed fast, require significant sunk expenditures 
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and aim to alter long-run competitiveness of a firm (Chen et al., 1992, p. 445). Examples of 
strategic moves are strategic alliances and acquisitions, R&D investments, changes in capacity, 
product characteristics, vertical integration and marketing (Church and Ware, 2000, p. 466; 
Connelly et al., 2010, p. 728; Tirole, 1994, pp. 205–206).  
Development of the industrial organization research in the 1970s resulted in a large body of 
game theoretical modeling, labeled as “New Empirical Industrial Organization” (Kadiyali et 
al., 2001, p. 162). However, this approach has limited applicability for this research. Thus, some 
scholars pointed out that the stylized assumptions of game theory models result in their low 
applicability for predictions of competitive interactions and design of competitive strategies 
(Grant, 2010, pp. 104–105; Shepherd, 1999, p. 29). Additionally, game theory relies on the 
belief that firms influence each other or are in a state of “interdependence” (Moorthy, 1985, p. 
262). Thus, competitive situations, which game theory analyzes, generally include the 
interaction of “closely matched players” (Grant, 2010, p. 105). Considering fundamental 
differences between companies from developed and emerging economies (Section 2.2.1), these 
rivals should rarely appear in a state of mutual interdependence. As a result, this thesis does not 
explicitly review game theory literature.  
Ideas from industrial organization found further development in strategic management, which 
analyzed competitive interactions from the perspective of individual firms. Michael Porter 
provided a significant contribution here, by applying knowledge generated in industrial 
organization to the domain of strategic management. Thus writing of Porter (1980/1998, pp. 88–
108) on defensive moves in oligopolistic competition closely resembled the research on strategic 
behavior of a dominant firm in industrial organization (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, pp. 111–112; 
Grimm et al., 2006, pp. 158–161; Martin, 1994, pp. 69–81). Similar to Schelling (1994), Porter 
(1980/1998, p. 98) underlined the importance of commitment in defensive moves. These ideas 
were developed in his later work, which outlined measures, which a firm can apply to enhance 
the sustainability of competitive advantage (Porter, 1985/2004). He classified these measures 
into those, which could raise structural barriers, increase expected retaliation, and lower the 
inducement for attack (Porter, 1985/2004, pp. 482–512). At the aggregated level of company 
positioning in the industry, Porter proposed that a firm can reach competitive advantage by 
following a general line of strategic behavior or a generic strategy. He offered that a firm should 
aim its overall strategy at reaching leadership in costs or differentiation. At the same time, 
measures of operational effectiveness were recognized as an essential foundation of competitive 
Literature review    40 
 
advantage, but not a strategy by themselves (Porter, 1996; Porter and Heppelmann, 2014). Porter 
(1985/2004, p. 16) argued that a firm cannot combine differentiation and cost orientation 
successfully in the long term, due to a risk of being “stuck in the middle”. However, this 
statement prompted an intensive debate in the subsequent literature. Thus, some scholars 
proposed to supplement the original typology with “hybrid strategy” (Thornhill and White, 
2007, p. 553), which aims at reaching cost and differentiation advantage simultaneously (Fleck, 
1995; Miller, 1992; Thornhill and White, 2007) Moreover, some alternative classifications of 
competitive strategies were advanced (e.g., Miles et al., 1978; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). 
Nevertheless, typology proposed by Porter is recognized as the most well-known and commonly 
used one (Koerte, 2006, p. 49; Thornhill and White, 2007). 
Despite the fact that Porter recognized the importance of competitive interactions, the early 
research in strategic management remained mostly focused on such aggregated concepts as 
industry, strategic group, and firm (Chen, 2009, p. 8; Chen and Miller, 2012, p. 142). Only in 
the second half of the 1980s, scholars started to analyze individual competitive actions5 (Chen, 
2009, p. 7; Chen and Miller, 2012, pp. 137–138). Publications of MacMillan (1988) and Bettis 
and Weeks (1987) gave birth to the competitive dynamics research. This stream of literature 
placed stress on the investigation of competitive interactions in competition with defined rivals 
(Grimm et al., 2006). Here, competitive advantage is considered to be temporary, and shaped 
by continuous “moves and countermoves” (Chen, 2009, p. 13) of competing firms. Thus, an 
emphasis is given to the conduct of an individual firm (Chen, 1996, p. 109), resembling the way, 
how business practitioners typically view competition (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 16). 
Competitive dynamics research paid particular attention to the activities of a dominant firm and 
leader-challenger dynamics (Ketchen, JR et al., 2004, pp. 781–783). Thus, it was argued that a 
dominant firm can sustain its monopoly power by deterring competition through the means of 
predatory pricing, limit pricing, product proliferation, defensive innovations, investments in 
advertising, promotion, excess capacity, manipulation of information, price leadership, and 
patenting (Grimm et al., 2006, pp. 161–167). Additionally, competitive dynamics literature 
recognized that firms could collaborate with competitors using market signaling, the disclosure 
                                                 
5 Following remark of Heil and Walters (1993, p. 53), the current thesis considers not only implemented actions, 
or realized strategy but also decisions to act, or intended strategy (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 10) since it may take 
years to implement strategic decisions in mature industries.  
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of competitive information, base point pricing, as well as sharing patents and technology (Chen 
and Miller, 2015, p. 762; Grimm et al., 2006, pp. 189–193).  
Competitive dynamics research addressed several critical points associated with traditional 
approaches to strategic management (Section 2.3.1.2). First, it departured from static approaches 
to strategy formulation. Thus, the continuous interplay of actions and reactions of competitors 
are said to determine the competitive advantage and performance of firms (Ferrier, Walter, J. et 
al., 1999, p. 373; Grimm et al., 2006, p. 86). Next, this perspective integrates resource-based 
and market-based views on strategy, by accepting that both internal resources and external 
market positioning define competitive actions (Grimm et al., 2006, p. 91). Finally, competitive 
dynamic research recognized that subjective managerial decisions and perceptions strongly 
define actions of a firm (Sabnis and Grewal, 2012, p. 68; Varadarajan and Jayachandran, 1999, 
pp. 127–128). In line with the awareness–motivation–capability model, managerial awareness 
about competitor’s moves, as well as motivation and capability to perform an action determine 
competitive actions (Chen, 1996; Chen and Miller, 2012, p. 136, 153; Smith et al., 2001). 
Moreover, this approach accepts that managers are exposed to various biases in their 
competition-related perceptions, including competitive over- and under-emphasis (Deshpandé 
and Gatignon, 1994, p. 272).  
The topic of competitive actions and reactions also received considerable attention in the 
marketing literature. However, the research here is limited to investigating marketing aspects 
only (Nokelainen, 2008, p. 17). Therefore, only a brief account of marketing literature dedicated 
to the topic is provided here. Similar to strategic management, mainstream marketing literature 
recognizes offensive and defensive stances in competition (Kotler and Singh, 1981; Kotler and 
Keller, 2012, p. 303). Several marketing publications also considered defensive strategy. Hauser 
and Shugan (2008) analyzed price and expenditures on advertising, distribution, and product 
improvement of a firm facing a new product entry. As a result, they developed 14 theorems, 
which suggest how managers should adjust their marketing strategy when confronted with a 
new entrant. In contrast to common managerial logic, their research advocated that under some 
conditions price increase and savings on differentiation may constitute the optimal defense 
strategy. Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) provided another important contribution by conducting 
a comprehensive overview of entry deterrence. They developed an entry deterrence strategy 
framework, which assigned strategies to functional, business unit, and corporate levels. Similar 
to competitive dynamic literature scholars, Gruca and Sudharshan acknowledged the importance 
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of managerial perceptions in the development of a firm strategy. Gatignon et al. (1989), 
investigated interfirm differences in reaction to the entry of a new product in an oligopolistic 
market. They empirically confirmed that firms tend to react positively (retaliation) with their 
effective marketing mix instruments and negatively (withdrawal) with ineffective instruments. 
These ideas were further developed by Robertson and Gatignon (1991) and Gatignon and 
Reibstein (1997), who, based on industrial organization literature (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 
387), proposed a decision model for market pioneers defending their positions from market 
entrants. Accordingly, they suggested that a firm facing new rivals has options of ignoring, 
accommodation, abandonment or retaliation. Kuester et al. (1999), attempted to synthesize 
previous work on competitive reactions from industrial organization, strategic management, and 
marketing. They described two broad reactions to competitive entry: retaliatory and non-
retaliatory behavior. The authors empirically confirmed the recommendations of Hauser and 
Shugan (2008) by identifying instances of price increases in response to new product entry. 
Successive marketing literature on competitive interactions widely accepted similar 
classification of competitive reactions (e.g., Blees et al., 2003; Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 
2010; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004; Kuester et al., 1999; Timmor et al., 2009).  
In order to structure the multidisciplinary discussion provided above, this research synthesized 
a classification of defensive competitive reactions (Figure 3). For reasons of parsimony, only a 
synthesis of this literature is provided here, without any references to the literature. Appendix 
A reports a detailed analysis and list of sources. Despite a diversity of theoretical perspectives, 
scholars often agreed that managers face two broad alternatives - either to ignore observed 
actions of entrants or to respond to them. Competitive response occurs when a company is aware 
that entry barriers, protecting the industry are too low to deter new entrants, and when the 
company is capable of responding. The response reaction could be divided into retaliation and 
accommodation. Retaliation or counterattack is defined as any competitive reaction, which is 
introduced with the deliberate aim to deter new entry or worsen the competitive position of new 
entrants. Consequently, retaliation embraces actions of an established firm occurring at both, 
pre-entry and post-entry phase. In line with the classification provided above, competitive 
actions are grouped into tactics and strategies. Strategies, in turn, can be categorized into those, 
which aim to enhance a firm’s position on costs, differentiation, or both competitive advantages 
simultaneously. In situations where the incumbent has the low ability and/or motivation for 
retaliation, a firm might choose an option of accommodating the newcomer. This category 
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embraces tactical and strategic actions of an incumbent, which are not threatening for an entrant. 
Strategic actions embrace retreat and cooperation. Cooperation includes actions aimed at 
gaining competitive advantage in the market through reduction of competition with new 
entrants. Retreat represents a withdrawal from product and/or geographic markets, which are 
threatened by new entrants. Nevertheless, in real world competition, companies often prefer to 
ignore activities of their competitors. A decision to ignore competitive actions may occur if an 
incumbent is not aware of them, not able or not motivated to respond. Particular attention shall 
be provided to the condition of blockaded entry, where a firm has low motivation to act due to 
the low threat posed by the entrant. Consequently, the next chapter reviews entry barriers, which 
determine a “void of strategic interactions” (Tirole, 1994, p. 324) or condition of blockaded 
entry. 
 Figure 3: Classification of defensive competitive reactions 
 
Source: Own compilation based on reviewed literature  
2.3.2.3. Entry barriers 
Based on the established classification of competitive reactions, this thesis gives particular 
attention to the subject of entry barriers. First, the definition of entry is clarified. Traditionally, 
economic scholars use two terms about the domain of entry, namely industry and market 
(Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, pp. 24–25; Shepherd, 1999, pp. 9–16). In line with Grant (2010, 
pp. 83–85), the current thesis accepts a practical definition of industry, viewing it as a group of 
firms which compete to supply a particular market. Turning to market, scholars typically define 
it based on a customer choice or substitutability (Kenyon and Mathur, 2001, p. 72; Shepherd, 
1999, p. 62; Weitz, 1985, p. 230), which occurs in dimensions of product type and geographic 
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area (Grant, 2010, p. 85; Shepherd, 1999, p. 62; Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 74–76). There are 
several ways, in which substitutability can be identified (see Shepherd, 1999, pp. 63–68 for an 
overview). Current thesis accepts “informed judgments of market participants” (Shepherd, 
1999, p. 65) as an evidence of product substitutability. Such definition is based on the experience 
of actual market players and thereby assures practically applicable delineation of entry. 
Moreover, since this definition is based on perceptions of suppliers (Grant, 2010, pp. 84–85; 
Shepherd, 1999, p. 68) it provides the foundation for analyzing a broad construct of competitive 
advantage (Day, 1997, pp. 31–32; Grant, 2010, pp. 84–85). As a result, this research considers 
entry as an addition of a new seller to the group of firms, which compete to supply a particular 
market, defined by judgments of suppliers operating in this market.  
Consequently, entry barriers can be broadly viewed as advantages, which help established firms 
to prevent or impede new entry (Porter, 2008, p. 81). Bain (1956, p. 3) accomplished the first 
in-depth investigation on the subject and proposed that entry barriers enable incumbent firms to 
set higher prices without attracting new entrants. Based on the analysis of 20 manufacturing 
industries, he measured the height of four entry barriers: economies of large scale, product 
differentiation, absolute cost advantages, and capital requirements. This publication received 
positive reviews (e.g., Heflebower, 1957) and triggered interest to the topic within the domain 
of industrial organization. For instance, the Chicago school economists, contrary to Bain (1956), 
focused on costs, which new entrants should carry compared to incumbent firms (Stigler, 
1968/1983, p. 67).  Consequently, due to occurring cost asymmetries, they expected incumbents 
and entrants to possess various market efficiency. Another approach was proposed by 
Weizsäcker (1980a, 1980b), who analyzed the impact of barriers to entry on social welfare, and 
viewed them as “socially undesirable limitations” (Weizsäcker, 1980a, p. 13) leading to market 
inefficiencies. Weizsäcker (1980b, p. 419) determined that economies of scale and product 
differentiation can improve social welfare, and therefore should not be always treated as entry 
barriers. In line with the general focus of industrial organization, these conclusions specifically 
addressed public policy makers.   
Contrary to this perspective, strategic management literature focused on the role of entry barriers 
for individual firms. Thus, Porter (1980/1998, pp. 7–17) considered entry barriers as conditions, 
which determine the attractiveness of the industry and ability of an individual firm to establish 
competitive advantage. Yip (1982), extended this view, by suggesting that entry barriers can 
represent not only as restrictions for entry but also “gateways” (p. 86) for newcomer firms. This 
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idea was further developed by Han et al. (2001, p. 11), who empirically proved that entry 
barriers could be also harmful for an incumbent (e.g., innovative entry).  
The concept of entry barriers received several important extensions in the business literature. 
Thus, Caves and Porter (1977) were the first ones to recognize that mobility barriers can protect 
firms within one industry from the competition. The concept of mobility barriers stems from 
ideas of Hunt (1972), who proposed that firms within an industry could be grouped into strategic 
groups, according to the strategies they pursue. As suggested by Caves and Porter (1977, p. 
261), mobility barriers restrain the movement of firms between these intra-industry groups. 
Consequently, mobility barriers represent “a downsized version of entry barriers” (Mintzberg et 
al., 1998, p. 108), which protect members of a particular strategic group not only from the firms 
outside of the industry, but also from the members of other strategic groups within the same 
industry (Porter, 1980/1998, p. 133).  
The resource-based view of strategic management proposed an even more fine-grained 
construct, enabling companies to sustain competitive advantage. Thus, Rumelt (1984, p. 567) 
suggested that the notion of mobility barriers should not be limited to groups of firms, but can 
be extended to individual firms. Isolating mechanisms serve as entry barriers at the firm level 
(e.g., Besanko et al., 2013, p. 370; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992, p. 371; Rebernik and Mulej, 
2000, p. 1136), protecting business from imitative competition (Cool and Dierickx, 1993, p. 48; 
Rumelt, 1984, p. 567, 1987, p. 19).  
The literature on market pioneering provided another important extension to the concept of entry 
barriers. First-mover advantage reflects a competitive advantage, which a firm gains from being 
the first in the market (Varadarajan and Jayachandran, 1999, p. 130). Scholars explained this 
advantage by the contribution of entry barriers (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994, p. 20; Kerin et 
al., 1992, p. 34) and isolating mechanisms (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014, p. 1974; Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1988, p. 42; Rumelt, 1987, p. 19). Thus, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) 
proposed that firms, moving first into the market may sustain “positive economic profits” (p. 
41) due to such isolating mechanisms as technological leadership, buyer switching costs and 
preemption of assets. The subsequent studies proposed various classifications of first-mover 
advantages (e.g., Cho et al., 1998; Kerin et al., 1992).  
International business research provided an additional perspective on barriers to competition. 
Here, the scholars considered the liability of foreignness and the costs of doing business abroad 
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as barriers to entry into foreign markets (Hymer, 1960, pp. 38–41; Niu et al., 2012, p. 69; 
Petersen and Pedersen, 2002; Yaprak, 2012, p. 1216). Hymer (1960, pp. 38–39) was the first 
one to highlight that international firms entering foreign markets face certain barriers for 
operations, compared to national companies. Zaheer (1995, pp. 342–343) developed his ideas 
further into the concept of liability of foreignness, which was defined as all costs occurring for 
the company operating overseas. Her article stimulated an intensive research in this area (Denk 
et al., 2012, p. 322), with several classifications for the sources of liability of foreignness and 
costs of doing business abroad being proposed (e.g., Eden and Molot, 2002; Eden and Miller, 
2004; Sethi and Judge, 2009; Denk et al., 2012). 
As seen from the discussion above, diverse mechanisms explain the ability of firms to reach 
blockaded entry condition and sustain competitive advantage. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts 
to synthesize these classifications, to provide a practically applicable explanation of blockaded 
entry condition for German firms operating in foreign markets. As a result, entry barrier is 
defined here as a structural6 condition at the level of a firm, strategic group, and industry, which 
enables incumbents to ignore potential entrants (Besanko et al., 2013, p. 199; Bain, 1956, pp. 
22, 24, 172–173; Shy, 1995, p. 186). Totally 11 key entry barriers, which block competition 
from new entrants were identified from the literature: capital requirements, experience and 
know-how, location, access to distribution channels, economies of scale and scope, access to 
strategic resources, government policy, customer switching costs, core offering differentiation, 
augmented product differentiation, and image differentiation (Appendix B). Considering a 
variety of classifications available in the literature, this listing does not follow the goal to provide 
an all-embracing representation of all reviewed constructs, but was developed exclusively for 
the aims of this investigation.  
2.3.2.4. Institution-based view of strategy 
The related studies (Section 2.2) showed that contextual conditions play a pivotal role for the 
competition in emerging markets. Therefore, this section reviews theoretical approaches to 
                                                 
6 Scholars and authorities traditionally divide entry barriers into strategic (exogenous), which are determined by 
the behavior of the incumbent firm and structural (endogenous), which represent basic market conditions (Blees et 
al., 2003, p. 24; Gable et al., 1995; Lutz et al., 2010, p. 22; OECD, 2007; Pehrsson, 2009, p. 66; Shepherd, 1999, 
pp. 210–211). Similar to Gable et al. (1995, p. 215, 218) and Pehrsson (2009, p. 67). Strategic barriers are 
considered as explicit reactions to particular entrants in this thesis (Section 2.3.2.2). Therefore only structural entry 
barriers, which are not purposefully erected against particular type of competitors, are reviewed here. 
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cross-national contextual conditions in business literature. Considering the focus of this thesis 
on emerging markets, the main focus is given to the institution-based view of strategy.  
Business scholars traditionally gave high importance to contextual attributes. Thus, within the 
marketing discipline, literature on environmentalism, comparative, and international marketing 
recognized a crucial role of environmental factors, also in foreign countries (Bartels and Pass, 
2000, pp. 206–215). However, the analysis of contextual aspects was typically limited to their 
influence on marketing mix aspects only (Craig and Douglas, 2005, p. 1-4, 25; Kotler and Keller, 
2012, pp. 74–84; Lamb et al., 2011, pp. 109–134). International business also has a long-
standing tradition of studying contextual aspects. The international business scholars recognized 
that firms should adapt their business strategies to the pressures of foreign environments (e.g., 
Ferreira et al., 2009; Hafsi and Farashahi, 2005, pp. 504–505; Khanna, 2014; Shenkar and 
Glinow, 1994). An important stream of international business literature was dedicated to 
culture-related influences (e.g., Hofstede et al., 2010; House et al., 2004; Kogut and Singh, 
1988) and relationships between MNEs and host governments (e.g., Eden and Molot, 2002; Luo, 
2004a; Osland and Björkman, 1998). Moreover, scholars advanced various forms of 
intercountry distance, including liability of foreignness (Section 2.3.2.3), institutional distance 
(Kostova, 1999, p. 316), the CAGE distance framework (Ghemawat, 2001, p. 140), and cultural 
distance (Kogut and Singh, 1988, p. 422). Nevertheless, international business studies mainly 
considered specific dimensions of institutional environment (Garrido et al., 2014, p. 84) and did 
not provide a “common platform” (Peng and Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2009, p. 62) to explain the 
overall impact of host country environment on competitiveness and business strategy.  
Strategic management has long recognized the aspects of the external environment as crucial 
determinants of firm strategy and performance (Oliver, 1991). For instance, country effects were 
found to be at least as important as industry or firm-related attributes (Gao et al., 2010; Makino 
et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the strategic management literature typically implied an indirect 
impact of macro environment on firm strategy (Grant, 2010, p. 65; Hitt et al., 2011, p. 37; 
Ingram, 2005, p. 20). Thus, traditional approaches to strategic management mainly focused on 
task environment and firm attributes (Peng, 2002, p. 253; Garrido et al., 2014, p. 83). However, 
recent years were marked with growing importance of institution-based view of strategy, which 
emphasized a direct impact of institutions on business strategy (Guerras-Martin et al., 2014, p. 
72; Peng, 2002; Peng et al., 2009). As shown in Figure 4, this perspective postulates that firm 
conduct and performance are determined by a combination of three factors: industry-based 
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competition, firm-specific resources, and institutional aspects (e.g., Peng et al., 2008; Peng and 
Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2009; Peng, 2009; Peng and Meyer, 2011).  
Figure 4: Three perspectives on competition 
 
Source: Adapted from (Peng, 2009, p. 15) 
In line with Peng et al. (2009, pp. 64–65) and Garrido et al. (2014, p. 84), the emergence of this 
perspective can be attributed to three tendencies. First, in the last decades, the world experienced 
growing connectedness and the rise of international trade (e.g., Ghemawat and Altman, 2014; 
Subramanian and Kessler, 2013). This development determined the rise of academic attention 
to competitiveness in the international environment (Garrido et al., 2014, p. 84; Ingram, 2005, 
pp. 3–4). Second, movement of new institutionalism, which occurred throughout social sciences 
in the last decades (Peng et al., 2009, p. 63; Scott, 2008; Wright et al., 2005, p. 6), prompted 
management and sociology scholars to recognize immediate influence of institutions on 
organizational structure, firm strategy, and competitive advantage (Ingram, 2005, p. 20; Scott, 
2008, p. 427; Wright et al., 2005, p. 6). The third tendency, which explains the rise of the 
institution-based view, is a response to the limited role which traditional strategy approaches 
gave to contextual factors (Narayanan and Fahey, 2005; Peng et al., 2008, pp. 920–921; Peng 
et al., 2009, p. 65; Priem and Butler, 2001, p. 32). Thus, the context theorizing remained 
surprisingly low in management literature (Bamberger, 2008, p. 839, 842), despite scholars 
recognizing contextual influence on the economic conduct as early as in the middle of the 18th 
century (Peng et al., 2009, p. 65; Peng and Meyer, 2011, p. 38). As a result, the institution-based 
view is rooted in a combination of both, economic (e.g., North, 1990) and sociological (e.g., 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) perspectives on institutions (Peng et al., 2009, p. 74). 
It is important to define and classify institutions for this research. Being human in their origin 
(Oliver, 1997, p. 699; North, 1990, p. 3), institutions represent “rules of the game” (Ingram, 
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2005, p. 136) in a society. In this way, they reduce uncertainty by structuring social, political, 
or economic interactions between humans (North, 1990, p. 3). In line with Scott (2001, p. 49), 
institutions tend to be resistant to change, as well as transmitted, maintained and reproduced 
across generations. Several approaches to classification of institutions exist in the literature (e.g., 
Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011; Ingram, 2005, pp. 9–17). The scope of institutional environment 
covered by this research corresponds to the classifications proposed by North (1990) and Scott 
(2001), and accepted by scholars following the institution-based view of strategy (e.g., Garrido 
et al., 2014; Peng et al., 2009; Peng and Meyer, 2011). In line with North (1990), institutions 
can be divided to formal and informal. Formal institutions, which received particular attention 
from economists, include laws, rules, contracts, and regulations, explicitly defined by authorized 
bodies (Garrido et al., 2014, p. 86; North, 1990, pp. 46–47; Peng, 2009, p. 67; Peng and Meyer, 
2011, p. 38). These aspects correspond to the regulative pillar of institutions (Peng and Meyer, 
2011, pp. 38–39; Scott, 2001, pp. 51–54). In contrast, informal institutions depict constraints, 
which people impose on themselves, to reduce the costs of relations by structuring them (North, 
1990, p. 36). These constraints determine the appropriate behavior within a society and consist 
of norms, values, and ethics, which are emphasized in sociological literature (Peng, 2009, p. 
67). In this way informal institutions correspond to normative and cognitive institutional pillars 
(Peng et al., 2009, p. 64; Peng and Meyer, 2011, pp. 38–39; Scott, 2001, pp. 54–58). North 
(1990) underlined that formal institutions represent only a small part of constraints that shape 
societal behavior. For instance, the changes of formal rules, such as revolutions and occupations 
typically do not affect major attributes of the society (North, 1990, pp. 36–37). In the case of 
emerging economies, the role of informal institutions becomes even more important, since 
formal constraints tend to be underdeveloped (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  
Scholars applying institutional theory for studying MNEs (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2009; Kostova, 
1999; Kostova et al., 2008) also accept similar definition of institutions. In this way, such 
commonly studied country-level construct as culture (Kirkman et al., 2006; Leung et al., 2005) 
is considered as a “substratum of institutional arrangements” (Hofstede et al., 2002, p. 800), and 
a part of institutional context (Peng et al., 2008, p. 922; Peng and Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2009, p. 
55; Zaheer, 1995, p. 352)7.  
                                                 
7 Some researchers accepted a narrower definition, considering only government-related aspects of institutions 
(e.g., Henisz, 2000). However, such definition would exclude some elements, which received high attention in 
studies investigating country impact on strategy (e.g., McManus and Kouznetsov, 2009; Nakata and Sivakumar, 
1997). 
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An institutional-based view provides an integrative framework, which describes the role of 
institutions in firm behavior and performance. Thus, in line with propositions of North (1990) 
“both what organizations come into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally 
influenced by the institutional framework” (p. 5). Based on this notion, Peng (2002, p. 253) 
suggested that combination of firm-specific resources, industry conditions, and dynamic 
interactions between organizations and institutions determine the strategic choice of 
organizations. Consequently, the institution-based view not only connects diverse debates in 
global strategy (Peng and Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2009), but also adds important insights (Ingram, 
2005; Rumelt et al., 1994a, pp. 2–4) to the fundamental issues which define the strategic 
management research (Peng et al., 2009, pp. 68–72). As a result, this perspective is 
complementary to market-based and resource-based views of strategy (Peng et al., 2009, p. 72). 
To summarize, the institution-based view could play a central role in strategy research (Peng et 
al., 2009, p. 64) and has a potential to be applied for gaining new insights on a variety of topics 
in the international context (Garrido et al., 2014, p. 84).  
The institutional theory in general, and particularly the institution-based view, are especially 
relevant for strategy research in emerging markets (e.g., Bamiatzi et al., 2015; Hoskisson et al., 
2013; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012, pp. 716–717; Meyer et al., 2009, p. 62; Peng et al., 
2008; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011, pp. 29–30; Wright et al., 2005; Xu and Meyer, 2013). Thus, 
a review conducted by Garrido et al. (2014, pp. 85–86) revealed that the majority of studies, 
which used the institution-based view, focused on the analysis of emerging and non-developed 
countries. This can be explained by a crucial role of research on emerging markets for 
international business (Griffith et al., 2008, p. 1225, 1227), drastic differences between 
emerging and developed economies (Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008, p. 86; Peng, 2008, p. 
923; Prasad et al., 2008, p. 625), and heterogeneity of institutional frameworks across emerging 
economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013). The institution-based view is particularly important for 
investigating activities of firms from developed countries, operating in emerging economies: “it 
seems impossible to do well in emerging economies without an understanding of how formal 
and informal institutions affect their firms and consumers” (Wright et al., 2005, p. 6). At the 
same time, the multifaceted impact of emerging market institutions on strategic behavior of 
Western entrants was not analyzed sufficiently (Wright et al., 2005, p. 25). Therefore, it is 
important to focus this research on the in-depth description of key institutional aspects, and the 
way how these aspects impact firm behavior (Peng et al., 2009, pp. 75–76; Wright et al., 2005, 
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p. 25). Finally, a dynamic nature of institutional environments in emerging economies (Prasad 
et al., 2008, p. 622) promotes longitudinal research design (Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 253).  
To conclude, the institution-based view is an important approach to strategy, which is 
particularly relevant for investigating the conduct of firms from developed economies in 
emerging markets. In-depth longitudinal analysis of key institutional conditions and their 
influence on the competitiveness of Western firms in emerging markets seems to be a promising 
route for this investigation. 
2.4. Theoretical framework and research questions  
An overview of existing studies revealed a number of gaps in the existing research. Thereupon, 
the synthesis of parent and focal theories produced the following research questions, which 
guide the subsequent data collection and analysis: 
1. How do German managers perceive the competition from emerging market firms in 
Russia?  
2. What are the competitive reactions of German companies to emerging market firms in 
Russia?  
3. How does the Russian institutional environment influence the competitive advantage of 
German companies compared to emerging market firms? 
Figure 5 visualizes the discussion by linking research questions and literature reviewed in 
previous sections. Considering the lack of multidisciplinary research on the topic, all of the 
research questions stem from a combination of disciplines. Thus, the first research question 
relies on the analysis of competitive perception literature, which has its roots in the disciplines 
of industrial organization, marketing, and strategic management. The second research question 
is synthesized from the literature on competitive reaction and entry barriers. For its turn, 
competitive reaction theory originates from the insights provided by industrial organization, 
strategic management, and marketing literature. The analysis of entry barrier theory extends the 
traditional borders of strategic management and industrial organization literature, by including 
insights from international business.  As for the last question, it is based solely on the institution-
based view of strategy, which stemms from both, international business literature and strategic 
management research.   
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Figure 5: The link between the research questions and reviewed literature 
 
Note:  IO stands for industrial organization, SM for strategic management, IBR for international business, M for 
marketing, and RQ for research question 
Source: Own compilation 
Following the recommendations of Adams and White (1994, p. 566) these research questions 
were integrated into the theoretical framework (Figure 6). This framework addresses various 
facets of competitive reaction, which the advanced economy (Germany) firms have towards 
actions of EMCs in the host country context of an emerging market (Russia). Thus, based on 
the behavioral view on the competition (Johnson and Russo, 1997, p. 177, 192; Kemp and 
Hanemaaijer, 2004, pp. 8–9), subjective managerial competitive perceptions determine 
competitive reaction. Consequently, the first research question considers perceptions of German 
managers regarding competitors from emerging markets. The analysis focuses on both 
perceived threat from the new competitors (e.g., Kuester et al., 1999) as well as on their 
perceived attributes (e.g., Clark and Montgomery, 1999). The second research question deals 
with competitive reactions of German firms to EMCs. In line with reviewed literature (Sections 
2.2.3, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3), the research focuses on both, active responses to EMCs and entry 
barriers, which determine a lack of reaction. Following the propositions of Peng et al. (2009, 
pp. 66–67), the strategy of a firm is contingent to institutional factors, industry conditions 
(Porter, 1980/1998, 1985/2004) and firm-specific resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1991). Consequently, the third research question approaches an influence of the Russian 
institutional environment on the competitiveness of German firms. Considering the multifaceted 
effects of institutions on strategy and competition (e.g., Peng et al., 2008), the thesis focuses on 
the influence of the Russian institutional environment on cost and/or differentiation advantage 
(Porter and Heppelmann, 2014) of German firms against EMCs. This approach corresponds to 
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the logic of competitive dynamics literature, which suggested that competitive advantage is 
created “in the context of action and reaction” (Grimm et al., 2006, p. 86). As for the institutional 
factors, in line with the widely accepted classification of North (1990), they were divided into 
formal and informal. In short, the research framework suggests that competitive advantage is 
determined by competitive reaction, which is dependent on managerial competitive perceptions, 
which, in their turn, are contingent upon institutional, industry, and firm-specific factors8. 
Figure 6: Theoretical framework of the thesis 
Note:  RQ stands for research question 
Source: Own compilation based on reviewed literature 
To conclude, this chapter reviewed eight parent and focal theories. The emerged theoretical 
framework revealed three research questions, which guide the current research. The next chapter 
justifies and describes the methodology applied to explore these research questions. 
                                                 
8 An important remark concerning the theory building nature of this study should be mentioned here. In line with 
the recommendations of Perry (2002), the research questions in exploratory investigations “should supplement and 
not displace the subjects’ own meanings and interpretations” (p. 26). Consequently, the formulated theoretical 
framework indicated the primary interest of the research but did not constrain the information received during the 
data collection. 
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3. Methodology   
3.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter revealed several gaps in the existing literature and formulated research 
questions, which guide this research. This chapter describes and justifies the methodology of 
this investigation. In total, the chapter consists of 11 sections shown in Figure 7.  
Figure 7: Outline of Chapter 3 
 
Source: Own compilation 
The discussion begins with the description of the research paradigm, research approach, and 
research strategy in Section 3.2. Next, Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 explain research design, study 
context, and procedures for the selection of participants. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 review the methods 
applied for data collection and analysis. The information in these sections is divided according 
to the data sources and periods of the data analysis. Sections 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 supplement this 
information by reflecting on the quality of this research, methodological limitations, and ethical 
principles. Finally, Section 3.11 concludes the discussion in this chapter. 
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3.2. Methodological foundations of the research 
The first section of this chapter discusses the basic considerations, which determine the research 
design, including the choice of research paradigm, research approach, and research strategy.  
Research paradigm. A research paradigm is an over-arching subject, which depicts the way in 
which the investigator views the world (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 107; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985, p. 15). Several authors agree that the most common research paradigms are positivism 
and interpretivism (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 19; Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 43; Perry, 1998, 
p. 786). Four considerations support the choice of the interpretivism for this thesis. First, this 
research shall rely on subjective perceptions of study participants about socially constructed 
reality (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 22; Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 45). Thus, on one hand, the 
information on competition with EMCs in the context of the Russian market is largely not 
publically available. As a result, it is not possible to capture the phenomenon in any other way 
than from the managers of the competing firms. On the other hand, subjective managerial 
perceptions produced in the real market settings (Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004, p. 457) seem to be 
an acceptable source of the knowledge about competition. Managerial perceptions play an 
important role for both, academic research and organizational activities (Mezias and Starbuck, 
2003). Moreover, literature on marketing (Flint et al., 2002, p. 104; Matthyssens and 
Vandenbempt, 2008, p. 320), competitive dynamics (Chen and Miller, 2012, pp. 152–157), and 
cognitive research (Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Porac et al., 1989) agrees that managerial 
perceptions are crucial for studying competition. Second, the interpretivism promotes close 
involvement of the investigator with the studied phenomena (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 23; Collis 
and Hussey, 2014, p. 47; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 119). Meanwhile, economic (Reid, 1987, p. 
3; Shepherd, 2005, p. 110) and international business scholars (Doz, 2011; Johanson, 2004, p. 
3; Kriek et al., 2009, p. 132) underline the importance of establishing close contact with the 
phenomena. Third, the literature review showed that there is a need to unearth theoretical 
categories, which cannot be defined in advance. In the meantime, interpretivism relies on an 
emerging design, with categories emerging during the research process (Collis and Hussey, 
2014, p. 47). Fourth, the interpretivism relies on detailed descriptions of the phenomena, with 
qualitative methods (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 45, 49; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 119; Schreier, 
2012, pp. 20–21) and small research samples (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 23). Despite existing 
calls to apply more qualitative in-depth studies of competitive interactions (McGee and Thomas, 
1986; Porter, 1981; Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004; Vachani, 1990) and specifically defensive 
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competitive reactions (Karakaya, 2002, p. 385; Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2010, pp. 1084–
1085; Kuester et al., 1999, p. 104), this methodology received limited application in the research 
on competition between Western firms and EMCs (Section 2.2.3). In conclusion, interpretivism 
seems to be an appropriate paradigm for this investigation. 
Research approach. This study followed a primary inductive approach (Parkhe, 1993; Perry, 
1998; Saunders et al., 2009), with some elements of deduction. Several considerations 
determined such choice. Thus, the literature review showed that the research topic under 
investigation is rather new, viewed from the concurring theoretical perspectives, and in many 
respects lacks in-depth analysis (Section 2.2.3). Nevertheless, the available body of theories, 
which can explain the phenomenon (Section 2.3), justify the presence of deduction elements in 
the research. Moreover, two major considerations promoted the combination of deductive and 
inductive approaches. First, despite inherently different properties of both approaches, it is 
frequently advantageous to combine both of them (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 127). For instance, 
Charmaz (2006, p. 103-104, 186) promoted an abductive reasoning which iteratively compares 
data and theory, with the aim to develop plausible interpretations. Similarly, Strauss and Corbin 
(2001, pp. 93–94) suggested that continuous movement between inductive and deductive 
thinking is an inherent part of data analysis. Second, several authors argued that pure induction 
is not a proper approach for doctoral research (Phillips and Pugh, 2005, p. 50; Perry, 1998, p. 
788, 2002, p. 26).  
Research strategy. The research approach strongly determines the choice of research strategy. 
The scholars typically distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research strategy (Adams 
et al., 2007, p. 26; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 28; Creswell, 2009, p. 4). This thesis adopted the 
qualitative research strategy. In line with suggestions of Creswell (2009, p. 19), the appropriate 
research strategy is determined by the research problem and personal experience of the 
researcher. Turning to the research problem, there is virtually no research on the specifics of 
competition with EMCs in the context of Russian market (Section 2.2.3). Consequently, 
qualitative research with the exploratory-descriptive purpose (Partington, 2003, p. 140; 
Saunders et al., 2009, p. 140; Yin, 2003, pp. 5–6) may help to fill this void. As for the personal 
experience, my professional track in the analyzed industries predetermines the interest for close 
interaction with the phenomena. Thus, participatory researchers typically incline towards more 
flexible, researcher-designed qualitative strategies (Creswell, 2009, p. 19). Finally, despite its 
merits, qualitative research is still relatively rare in the disciplines of strategic management (e.g., 
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Bettis et al., 2015; Ketchen, JR et al., 2008; Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004), international business 
(e.g., Andersen and Skaates, 2004, p. 468; Doz, 2011; Kriek et al., 2009, p. 132), and economic 
research (Shepherd, 2005, p. 110; Starr, 2014). Similarly, despite existing calls (Jormanainen 
and Koveshnikov, 2012, p. 712; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010, pp. 255–256; Kothari et al., 2013, 
p. 296) relatively few studies utilized qualitative methodology to investigate competition with 
EMCs (Section 2.2.3).  
In brief, several important arguments determined the choice of interpretivism paradigm, primary 
inductive approach, and qualitative research strategy for this thesis. 
3.3. Research design 
As seen from the previous section, the methodological foundations determine the procedures 
for data collection and analysis. The research design represents a detailed study plan, which 
guides these procedures (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 195; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 39; Collis 
and Hussey, 2014, p. 344; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 136). This thesis follows the longitudinal 
research design, with elements of grounded theory. The discussion below explains this choice. 
Originally, the study had a cross-sectional research design (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 55), with 
member check prior to the closure (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 373–378). Nevertheless, the 
changes, which occurred in the Russian institutional environment between the periods of data 
collection, predetermined longitudinal nature of this investigation9 (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 
60; Hermanowicz, 2013; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 315–316; Menard, 2008), with main and 
follow-up study stages. Such adjustment was expected to enhance the findings of this 
investigation in two ways. Thus, qualitative longitudinal research is particularly powerful in 
linking “the micro to the macro, especially during periods of sustained and dramatic change” 
(Farrall, n.d., p. 7), as the one which occurred in Russia in the last years. Additionally, 
longitudinal research could contribute to existing methodological literature, in view of its 
novelty in qualitative research (Flick et al., 2004, p. 148; Hermanowicz, 2013; Neale and 
Flowerdew, 2003) and existing calls in related literature (Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012, 
p. 712; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010, pp. 255–256; Koerte, 2006, p. 210).  
At the outset of data collection, I decided to pursue several techniques from grounded theory 
methodology, specifically the version of Strauss and Corbin (2001). Several considerations 
                                                 
9 Despite integration of longitudinal elements, no specific research question addressed the occurred changes. 
Instead, the occurred changes were investigated within the previously formulated questions. 
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justify this choice. First, in line with Goulding (2002, p. 107), the reliance on grounded theory 
was determined by the lack of literature on the competition between German firms and EMCs 
in the context of the Russian market (Section 2.2.3). Second, grounded theory fits particularly 
well for studying human actions and interactions, based on the perceptions of participants 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 78; Goulding, 2002, p. 107). Third, grounded theory is associated with 
interpretative research paradigm, inductive research approach, and qualitative research strategy 
(Charmaz, 2006; Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004, p. 457; Saunders et al., 2009; Strauss and Corbin, 
2001). Fourth, despite the applicability of grounded theory for the analysis of competitive 
strategy (e.g., Anderson et al., 1992; Goulding, 2002, p. 51; Schroeder et al., 1995), it remained 
a novel methodology for the studies of competition with EMCs (Section 2.2.3). Fifth, this 
methodology provided a good opportunity to immerse in the data (Rennie, 1998, p. 101) related 
to strategy in manufacturing industries, which corresponded to author’s professional interest. 
Finally, a decision to follow explicitly the approach of Strauss and Corbin (2001), rather than a 
version advanced by Glaser (1992), was based on its popularity (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 585; 
Gasson, 2004, p. 81) and formalized process (Creswell, 2009, p. 66; Ellis, 1993, p. 477; O'Reilly 
et al., 2012, p. 249). Nevertheless, the initial stages of the investigation showed that the research 
process had to be adjusted. Thus, the emerged research questions became partially descriptive. 
Consequently, I decided to apply techniques from the qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 
2012) for presenting research results. Such change goes in line with inherently “emergent 
flexibility” (Schreier, 2012, p. 24) of the qualitative research. Following the warning of 
Goulding (2002, pp. 160–161) to prevent accusations of methodological transgression, this 
thesis provides a detailed description of the research process. The research flow and duration of 
main and follow-up study stages of the study are shown in Figure 8. 
The research started from preliminary literature review, which, however, was not exhausted at 
that stage. The literature and researcher’s professional experience broadly defined the research 
problem, research questions, and study context. Next, the data collection began immediately 
after the selection of the first participants. The data analysis was conducted simultaneously with 
the data collection. As a result, the research problem, study context, sampling, and data 
collection procedures were gradually adjusted according to the emerging results of the data 
analysis. Data collection and analysis were ceased during the main study stage after reaching 
the theoretical saturation. The developed theoretical model was further refined based on the 
insights from literature. After enfolding the literature, I proceeded with the follow-up data 
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collection and analysis, to refine the theoretical model and register the occurred changes. 
Subsequently, the theoretical saturation was reached, and the theoretical model was finalized. 
To enhance the theoretical model, memoing and literature review were carried out along the 
whole research process. The following sections provide the detailed description of key study 
stages and research context. 
Figure 8: The research process 
 
Source: Own compilation 
3.4. Research context: German automotive and mobile machinery 
suppliers operating in the Russian market 
In line with the previous section, choice of the study context was one of the pivotal decisions at 
the initial stage of the investigation. The industry to which a firm belongs determines the 
competitive strategy (Ping et al., 2013). Consequently, this section justifies the choice of the 
study context. The discussion is divided into two parts. First, the focus on automotive and mobile 
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machinery supply industries are explained. After this, the thesis reflects on the choice of German 
firms and Russian market.   
3.4.1. Industry context  
The current study focuses on firms representing two industries, namely automotive and mobile 
machinery suppliers. Initially, the analysis focused solely on the automotive suppliers, or firms 
manufacturing parts for cars, commercial vehicles, and buses. Several considerations 
predetermined the choice of this industry for this research. First, the competitive threat from 
emerging market firms is particularly acute in the manufacturing sector (Section 2.2.3). Indeed, 
several surveys of global executives confirmed this conclusion (McKinsey & Company, 2006, 
p. 21, 2008, p. 20), which can be explained by advantages of firms from emerging markets in 
the low-cost production and process efficiency (Chang and Park, 2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 
2008; McKinsey & Company, 2008). Nevertheless, contrary to some other heavy industries, the 
Western firms still dominate the automotive supply industry (Lang et al., 2015). This can be 
attributed to the importance of economies of scale, value chain linkages, capital, and 
technological entry barriers for competitive advantage in this industry (Humphrey and 
Memedovic, 2003; Jan and Hsiao, 2004, pp. 1146–1147; Sturgeon et al., 2009). Nevertheless, 
in view of rapidly growing and diverse competitive pressure for various automotive components 
(Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Labitzke and Gronemeier, 2015; Lang et al., 2015; Lazard and 
Roland Berger, 2014, p. 30) this industry was expected to provide an ideal opportunity for 
inspecting the phenomenon in “a range of competitive situations” (Porter, 1983, p. xii). 
Next, the German automotive industry, with a share of 20% in total revenues generated by 
German industry, is a backbone of the German economy (Di Bitonto and Trost, 2015, p. 3). It 
is one of the leading employers in Germany, accounting for almost one-third of the R&D 
expenditures (Di Bitonto and Trost, 2015, p. 3; German Association of the Automotive Industry, 
2014). This advanced (Jan and Hsiao, 2004, p. 1146; Muro et al., 2015, p. 2) industry also plays 
a major role in the German foreign trade. With 18.9% of total exports, motor vehicles, and their 
parts were ranked as the main German export product (Destatis, 2016d). Suppliers play an 
increasingly important role in the automotive industry. Thus, the share of value added generated 
by suppliers in the automobile manufacturing was continuously increasing and exceeded 70% 
in recent years (Di Bitonto and Trost, 2015, p. 8; German Association of the Automotive 
Industry, 2014).  
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Additionally, emerging markets remain a priority for global and German automotive executives 
(Destatis, 2016c). This tendency matches the importance, which governments in emerging 
economies assign to the development of automotive industry (Jan and Hsiao, 2004, p. 1145). 
Nevertheless, developing economies proved to be a challenging operating environment for 
German firms. In line with Global Intelligence Alliance (2012), German firms generate less than 
20% of their revenues in these countries. Moreover, the same report suggests that the majority 
of German executives are unsatisfied with their strategy in emerging markets.  
Finally, the automotive supply industry was expected to provide rich examples of defensive 
competitive reactions. Automotive industry in general, and automotive supply industry in 
particular, are marked by high levels of consolidation (Castelli et al., 2011, p. 239; Humphrey 
and Memedovic, 2003, p. 5; Humphrey, 2003, p. 137; Sedgwick, 2013, p. 3; Sturgeon et al., 
2009, p. 9). Meanwhile, application of defensive competitive reactions is widespread in highly 
concentrated industries (Bunch and Smiley, 1992; Reid et al., 1993, p. 185; Simon, 2005, p. 
1238).  
After initial interviews, I decided to enlarge the sample with suppliers of parts for mobile 
machines (see also Section 3.5). These firms manufacture components for agricultural and 
construction machinery and constitute a sub-branch of the mechanical engineering industry. 
Several arguments can explain this decision. First, similarly to the automotive supply industry, 
the mechanical engineering industry experiences growing competition from emerging market 
firms. These new market participants have been rapidly improving their innovation capabilities 
and are expected to pose a significant threat even in high-quality industry niches, which are 
traditionally dominated by German firms (VDMA and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 44). 
Likewise, several reports confirmed the growing role of firms from emerging economies, 
particularly in the agricultural machinery and construction machinery markets (Lang et al., 
2015; Oliver Wyman, 2012, pp. 9–11; German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 
2015c, p. 20; Roland Berger, 2011, p. 27).  
Second, mechanical engineering industry also plays a crucial role in the German economy: it is 
the largest industrial employer in Germany and, with 212 billion Euro generated in 2014, closely 
follows automotive industry in terms of revenue (German Mechanical Engineering Industry 
Association, 2015b, p. 6). In this way, it is responsible for over 3% of national gross value added 
(VDMA and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, this sector plays a particularly 
important role in the innovativeness of the German economy, making up 11% of German R&D 
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expenditures in manufacturing (VDMA and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 6). Likewise, with 
14.2% of total German exports, this industry is vital for the German foreign trade (Destatis, 
2016d). Consequently, findings generated in the sample of companies representing mechanical 
engineering and automotive industry were expected to have strong generalizability for German 
manufacturing firms. 
Third, representatives of German mechanical engineering industry increasingly recognize 
growing opportunities in emerging markets, including Russia (VDMA and McKinsey & 
Company, 2014, p. 42). Thus, already in 2015, the share of emerging and developing economies 
reached 38.2% in total German export of machines (Destatis, 2016a). As suggested by the study 
of VDMA and McKinsey & Company (2014, p. 42), 43% of sales are expected to occur in BRIC 
countries by 2017.  
Finally, automotive and mobile machinery suppliers are closely related to each other. The 
interviews showed that some of the analyzed firms were active in both industries. Therefore, to 
facilitate access to research participants and data analysis, the sample of mechanical engineering 
companies was limited to manufacturers of components for mobile machinery only.  
Given the above-given argumentation, suppliers of automotive and mobile machinery parts are 
especially suitable for studying the defensive competitive reactions of German firms to 
emerging market players in the cross-national context. 
3.4.2. Geographic context 
This investigation analyzes competition between German firms and their counterparts from 
emerging economies in the context of the Russian market. The choice of German companies is 
determined by their crucial role in the investigated industries. Germany is the leading European 
automotive producer, with more than 18% of global automotive output (Di Bitonto and Trost, 
2015, p. 3). Accounting for 21 out of the top 100 automotive suppliers, Germany also holds a 
leading global position in the automotive supply industry (Crain Communications Inc., 2015; 
Di Bitonto and Trost, 2015). Likewise, Germany is the largest exporter of machinery, 
responsible for 16% of global machinery exports and 11% of world machinery production 
(VDMA and McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 6). Consequently, the findings generated in the 
sample of German firms could have high transferability for manufacturers from other developed 
economies. 
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Turning to the Russian market, several considerations support such geographic focus. First, by 
the time of the study design, Russia was one of the most promising markets for German exports 
in both, automotive and mechanical engineering industries (Leiste et al., 2013). Despite recent 
economic turbulences, Russia still remains one of the largest developing economies 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016; World Trade Organization, 2015, pp. 26–29), playing 
important role for German firms (Berret et al., 2014, p. 21; Global Intelligence Alliance, 2015, 
p. 3). A brief overview of automotive and mobile machinery industries in Russia illustrates the 
potential of the Russian market.  
Automotive industry. The attractiveness of the automotive market is defined by the size of 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and aftermarket segments10. Regarding the OEM 
market, following the classification of OICA (2016b), the discussion below reflects on the state 
of the Russian market for passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and buses. In total, over 88% of 
all vehicles produced in Russia in 2015 represented passenger cars (Association of Russian 
Automakers [OAR], 2016a). Leading manufacturers of passenger cars in Russia and the 
Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) are AVTOVAZ, AVTOTOR, SOLLERS, and AZIA AVTO 
(OAR, 2016b). Despite a relatively low share of the Russian market in the global car sales 
(Automotive Statistics Ltd., 2016), almost all main automotive producers launched 
manufacturing facilities in Russia within the last fifteen years, including Toyota, Volkswagen, 
GM, Renault-Nissan, Hyundai, Ford, and PSA (Litvinenko, 2014, p. 13). As a result, foreign 
brands continuously increased their stake in the volume of vehicles manufactured in Russia in 
the last years11 (Automotive Statistics Ltd., 2013). Thus, the share of foreign brands reached 
72.5% of the total passenger cars production in 2015 (OAR, 2016a). Following the deteriorated 
macroeconomic situation in Russia, the total production of passenger cars in Russia declined 
from 1,927.58 thousand vehicles in 2013 to 1,215.97 thousand units in 2015 (OAR, 2016a.).  
Next, according to OAR (2016a) manufacturers of light commercial vehicles and trucks 
constituted 9.1 % of all vehicles produced in Russia in 2015. Its data suggest that key 
manufacturers of commercial vehicles in Russia and EACU include GAZ Group, KAMAZ, 
Sollers, MAZ, AVTOTOR, AVTOVAZ, and Volvo Vostok. Meanwhile, the share of foreign 
                                                 
10 The OEM market consists of manufacturers, which purchase parts either for the assembly of new vehicles and 
machines or for their own service network. Aftermarket customers are represented by wholesalers, which source 
products to replace worn or damaged original parts (replacement parts), or to increase comfort, performance, 
customization, safety or convenience (accessories) (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011). 
11 An exception is year 2015, when the share of foreign brands reduced due to the generally worsened 
macroeconomic conditions, accompanied by a devaluation of Russian currency (Chuprov, 2015). 
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brands was rather low here, reaching only 9.3% in 2015 (OAR, 2016a). Nevertheless, several 
global producers established their presence in Russia in the last years, including MAN, Scania, 
Volvo, Daimler, Iveco, and Mitsubishi Fuso (Zinoeva, 2015). Similar to the passenger cars, the 
output of commercial vehicles in Russia experienced a significant decline in the last years, from 
85.2 thousand vehicles in 2011 to 45.6 thousand vehicles in 2015 (OAR, 2016a).  
Finally, OAR (2016b) suggested that the category of buses and coaches represented only 2.6 % 
of all vehicles produced in Russia in 2015. It noted that among the largest manufacturers in 
Russia and EACU are such companies as GAZ Group, SOLLERS, MAZ, and KAMAZ. Here, 
similarly to the commercial vehicles, the market is dominated by Russian brands, which 
constitute 78.7% of all vehicles produced in Russia (OAR, 2016b). Foreign brands (e.g., 
Hyundai, Ford, Mercedes, Volkswagen, and Peugeot) are mainly manufactured in Russia by 
various local licensees ("Proizvodstvo avtobusov", 2012). The production of buses in Russia 
also experienced a sharp decline in the last years, from 57.9 thousand buses produced in 2012, 
to only 36.95 thousand buses manufactured in 2015 (OAR, 2016b).    
In summary, despite this dramatic decrease, with totally 1,378.7 thousand vehicles produced in 
2015 (OAR, 2016a), Russia remains an important manufacturing location for the global 
automotive industry. Moreover, in terms of the automotive components, the Russian market is 
traditionally strongly driven by the aftermarket demand (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 23; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 6; Tomyshev, 2014, p. 8). Thus, aftermarket generated more 
than half of the sales in the light vehicle component market in 2012 (Ernst & Young, n.d.). With 
over 50 million vehicles in use (OICA, 2016c) and an aging fleet (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 11), 
Russia continues to be attractive for the aftermarket sales. As a result, it was the sixth largest 
market outside of the European Union (EU) for German exports of automotive parts in 2015 
(Destatis, 2016c). Furthermore, the majority of the leading automotive suppliers localized their 
manufacturing operations in Russia by 2014 (Litvinenko, 2014, pp. 16–17).  
Mobile machinery industry. The mobile machinery can be categorized into agricultural and 
construction machinery. Below is provided a brief overview of these sub-industries in Russia. 
Agricultural machinery manufacturers include producers of tractors, harvesters, and various 
agricultural implements. As stated by Avtoselkhozmash Holding (ASM, 2016c), the total 
volume of the Russian tractor market in 2015 was 26,852 tractors. However, the report showed 
that Russian brands covered only 9.7% of this volume, with 43.6% representing imports from 
Belarus and Kazakhstan and 14.6% sales of the Belorussian MTZ brand and foreign brands 
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(John Deere, Claas, Case New Holland, Versatile, HTZ) assembled in Russia. The main tractor 
manufacturers in Russia are ChTZ-URALTRAC, SAREX, VgTZ, Promtractor, Rostselmash, 
Peterburgsky Traktorny Zavod, Agrotechmash, KAMTZ, ElAZ, TD MTZ-ElAZ, TD HTZ, John 
Deere Russia, ChLMZ, CLAAS, Buzuluk Mechanical Plant, and CNH-KAMAZ Industrial 
("Traktornoje i selskohozajstvennoje", 2016). The general production of tractors in Russia 
continuously declined in the last three years (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian 
Federation, 2016b) and reached 6,3 thousand units in 2015 (ASM, 2016a). 
With 5787 combine harvesters produced in 2014 (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian 
Federation, 2016b), Russia represents an important market for this type of agricultural 
machinery. Main manufacturers of combine harvesters in Russia are Rostselmash, 
Bryanskselmash, CLAAS, CNH-KAMAZ Industrial, Kranspetsburmash, and John-Deere 
Russia ("Traktornoje i selskohozajstvennoje", 2016). As noted by ASM (2016b), the combine 
harvester market in 2015 constituted 5,098 units, with only slight decline of 6% compared to 
the market volume in 2014. In line with this report, the share of domestic brands increased from 
56.3% in 2014 to 63.7% in 2015, followed by 21.1% belonging to the Belorussian brands. 
Meanwhile, a share of foreign brands, manufactured in Russia experienced a sharp decrease 
from 16.7% in 2013 to 6.4% in 2015 (ASM, 2016b).   
The Russian market for agricultural implements also experienced a decline in the last years. In 
line with VDMA (2015c), the market share for imported machines varies between 30% and 
100% for different types of equipment. This report suggested that main imports are from the 
EU, USA, China, Ukraine, and Belarus, with a rapidly increasing share of China in the last 
years. The manufacturers of agricultural implements embody producers of plows, disc harrows, 
sprayers, seeders, cultivators, and trailers. The Russian production of this machinery showed a 
mixed dynamic in between 2015 and 2014. Thus, production of plows and harrows increased 
by 18.4% and 57.2% respectively, while the output of cultivators decreased by 5.7% (ASM, 
2016a). 
In brief, despite the recent decline and relatively low volume of agricultural equipment 
production (Gundermann et al., 2014, p. 5; German Mechanical Engineering Industry 
Association, 2015a), the CIS represents 6% of the global market for agricultural machinery 
(German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 2015c, p. 9). Therefore, it maintains its 
crucial importance for German suppliers.  
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The main types of construction machinery used in Russian market include crawler dozers, wheel 
loaders, excavators, motor graders, and truck cranes. As suggested by Novosjolov (2015b), the 
overall production of crawler dozers in Russia experienced a dramatic decline from 4249 
machines in 2008 to 834 machines in 2014, with 91% of Russian crawler dozers being produced 
by three firms: ChTZ-URALTRAC, Promtractor, and VgTZ. At the same, he reported that the 
share of Russian manufacturers in the total market decreased from 60% in 2008 to 28% in 2014. 
The main competitors of Russian manufacturers are Chinese producers, which constitute 67% 
in total imports (Novosjolov, 2015b). 
As stated by Novosjolov (2014c), the market of wheel loaders also experienced a significant 
decline in the last years, with the overall output in Russia and Belarus decreasing from 3205 
machines in 2008 to 1673 machines in 2013. He argued that such decline resulted from growing 
imports from China, which held 68% of the market and 85% of all imports in 2013. As a result, 
in line with Novosjolov, in 2013 only 3.1% of the market was covered by local production in 
Russia and another 14.9% by the Belorussian manufacturer Amkodor. The leading Russian 
producers of wheel loaders are Amkodor-Bryansk, ChTZ-URALTRAC, Dormash and ChSDM 
(Novosjolov, 2014c). 
Likewise, the output of excavators experienced a dramatic decline, from 6272 machines 
produced in 2007 (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation, 2016a) to 1933 machines 
manufactured in 2014 (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation, 2016b). As shown 
by Novosjolov (2014b) this market is also highly dominated by imports, with Russian 
manufacturers holding only 7% of the market share. The main Russian producers of excavators 
are Tverskoy Excavator, EKSMASH, DONEX, KRANEKS and Promtractor (Novosjolov, 
2014b).  
The review of Novosjolov (2015a) showed that the total output of motor graders in Russia fell 
from 1364 machines in 2012 to only 327 machines produced in the first three quarters of 2015. 
Nevertheless, he noted that for this category of machinery, the market share of Russian 
producers increased from 59% in 2013 to 84% in 2015, which resulted from a dramatic decrease 
in imports in 2015. The same article showed that strong positions in imported machines belong 
to Chinese manufacturers, which were responsible for 59% of all imported wheel graders in the 
first three quarters of 2015. Almost all production of motor graders in Russia is shared between 
three firms: Bryanski Arsenal, ChSDM, and Dormash (Novosjolov, 2015a).  
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Finally, another publication of Novosjolov (2014a) demonstrated that the production of truck 
cranes also experienced a decline in the last years, from 6251 machines produced in 2008 to 
4988 machines manufactured in 2013. His article showed that similarly to motor graders, 80% 
of this market belonged to Russian manufacturers. The main truck crane manufacturers in 
Russia are Avtokran, Galich mobile cranes plant, KAZ, and Chelyabinks mechanical plant 
(Novosjolov, 2014a).  
In brief, being the 10th biggest market for construction equipment in Europe, Russia accounts 
for a relatively small share of the global market (Committee for European construction 
equipment, 2016, p. 9). Moreover, following the worsened macroeconomic situation, this 
market experienced a significant decline in the last years. Finally, the share of Russian 
manufacturers was mainly decreasing in the previous years, especially due to competition from 
China. The key Russian manufacturers of construction equipment are consolidated in several 
industrial groups, namely RM-Terex (includes Tverskoy Excavator, Bryanski Arsenal, ChSDM, 
and Zavolzhsky Crawler Vehicle Plant), Concern Tractor Plants (includes 17 manufacturing 
companies, such as VgTZ, Vladimir Motor and Tractor Plant, SAREX, and Promtractor), and 
Uralvagonzavod (includes Dormash and ChTZ-URALTRAC). Moreover, in the last years, 
several foreign OEMs opened their manufacturing facilities in Russia, including Hitachi, 
Komatsu, Caterpillar, Volvo, and John Deere (Bagdasarov, 2015).  
All in all, despite recent decline, Russia continues to play an important role for German suppliers 
of automotive and mobile machinery components. For instance, it was the third-largest market 
for German mechanical engineering industry in 2015 (Destatis, 2016a). Likewise, products of 
mechanical engineering and automotive industries are the two main items in German trade with 
Russia, accounting for 22.3% and 16.3% of total exports (Destatis, 2016b). As a result, Germany 
was the largest importer of automotive components to the Russian market in 2014, accounting 
for the 15.2% of total imports (FTS Rossii, 2016b).  
The second factor, which determines the choice of Russia for the current research, is the 
particularly intense competition with emerging market firms in this market. Thus, in line with 
FTS Rossii (2016c) and FTS Rossii (2016a), the general portion of imports to Russia from the 
major emerging economies increased from 14.1% in 2004 to 27.3% in 2014. The same sources 
show that this trend is even more evident in the analyzed industries. The share of these countries 
in Russian imports of machines, equipment and vehicles increased for 2.3 times within the last 
11 years, while the portion of Germany dropped by 73% (FTS Rossii, 2016c, 2016a). Several 
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aspects explain the predisposition of the Russian market to purchases from emerging economies. 
First, as seen from the discussion above, the share of foreign OEMs manufacturing their 
products in Russia remains relatively small. In their turn, Russian OEMs in both, mobile 
machinery and automotive industries, are frequently characterized by technological 
backwardness compared to Western firms (Lang and Mauerer, 2010, p. 17, 36; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 8; Tomyshev, 2014, p. 12). Consequently, Russian 
manufacturers primary address the low-end segment of the domestic market, where they 
experience significant price pressure from Chinese imports (e.g., Novosjolov, 2013). 
Presumably, this might motivate them for purchases of lower priced components from emerging 
market suppliers. Next, due to remnants of the Soviet Union economy, Russian OEMs often 
have strong linkages and vertical integration with local suppliers (Ernst & Young, n.d; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 8). Thus, Russian car manufacturers hold up to 50% of the 
market share in the automotive components market (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 9). 
Additionally, emerging markets often have low industry standards (e.g., Nakata and Sivakumar, 
1997). This is particularly the case for commercial vehicles, which determines strong positions 
of local OEMs in emerging markets (Becker, 2014, p. 9; KPMG International, 2011, pp. 19–
20). Moreover, emerging markets are commonly defined by high price sensitivity and low 
quality requirements of local consumers (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2015, pp. 287–
288; Global Intelligence Alliance, 2012, p. 26; Prahalad and Hammond, 2002). Likewise, the 
recent economic turbulences in the Russian economy provoked a sharp decline in real earnings 
(Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation, 2015b, p. 86) and increased the price 
sensitivity of Russian population (GfK SE, 2015). These tendencies had a potential to increase 
positions of emerging market firms in the analyzed industries. For instance, a recent press 
release of GfK documented a shift towards the low-end segment in Russian spare parts 
aftermarket (Fedotov and Ignatyeva, 2015). Finally, all of these factors were reinforced by 
recent political changes in Russia, which promoted a stronger orientation of Russian business 
on cooperation with such emerging economies as China (Hones, 2015, p. 15). 
The third argument, which justifies the choice of the Russian geographic market, is the potential 
for generalizability of the study findings for other emerging economies. Russia shares similar 
features with several other major emerging markets: a high portion of low-income consumers 
(Stierli et al., 2014; WBG, 2016), economic volatility (Euler Hermes, 2015; Euromoney 
Institutional Investor PLC, 2016; Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2014; Political Risk 
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Services Group, 2015), significant impact of corruption on business conduct (Doh et al., 2003; 
Govindarajan and Trimble, 2012, pp. 17–18; Hardoon and Heinrich, 2011; Luo, 2004b, p. 750), 
and a strong role of informal relationships (Hofstede et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 2012).  
Fourth, as it appeared during the research, the study in the context of the Russian market 
provides an optimal platform for investigating the impact of institutional conditions on strategy. 
Given a major shift, which occurred in the Russian political and economic environment in the 
last years, this thesis could validate the direct impact of institutional factors on competitive 
advantage (Peng et al., 2009).  
Based on these considerations, the Russian market provides a suitable context for analyzing the 
research problem. At the same time, only a handful of existing studies referred to the 
competition occurring between Western firms and EMCs in the host-country context of 
emerging markets. In fact, studies investigating this phenomenon in the Russian market are 
virtually non-existent (Section 2.2.3). As a result, it was expected that the research among 
German firms operating in the Russian market would generate important contributions for both, 
industry practitioners and scientific community. The next section describes the specific 
procedures, which were used to select participants for this research. 
3.5. Selection of research participants 
The sampling decision is strongly determined by the unit of analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 24). This 
thesis accepted the perceptions of individual managers on the firm behavior in competition as a 
unit of analysis12. Such approach goes in line with competitive dynamics literature, which 
recognizes managerial perceptions as a foundation for competitive actions of a firm (Chen and 
Miller, 2012, pp. 152–157). Likewise, managerial perceptions frequently served as the main 
source of data for studies investigating the competitive behavior of firms (e.g., Aulakh et al., 
2000; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010; Khalid and Larimo, 2012; Kuester et al., 1999) and strategic 
groups (Leask and Parker, 2006, p. 393). Previous literature authorized managerial perceptions 
as a reliable source of the information, by recognizing the causal relationship between 
managerial cognition and strategic outcomes (Kaplan, 2011), and confirming a high level of 
congruence between managerial reports and archival data (Kuester et al., 1999, p. 104). As a 
                                                 
12 In terms of Yin (2003, p. 76), the study was about organizations. Therefore, this thesis names the firms, which 
interviewees represented, as the analyzed firms/suppliers or German firms/suppliers.  
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result, the sampling was conducted among managers representing German firms operating in 
Russia. 
Potential study participants were located from the directory of the German-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce, catalogs of specialized trade shows and corporate websites. Several specialized 
trade fairs served for establishing initial contacts with the interviewees. Following the 
recommendations for elite interviewing (Harvey, 2009, p. 16), the further contact was 
maintained per e-mail (Appendix C). In this manner, totally, I contacted 156 potential 
interviewees during the whole period of sampling. Out of them, 34 managers representing 28 
strategic business units13 agreed to participate in the study. The relatively small size of the 
sample is justified by qualitative research strategy, which aims to analyze participants in-depth 
and within their context (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27). Furthermore, it is consistent with 
the accepted sample size for qualitative research (Kvale, 1996; MacCracken, 1988, p. 17; Ruyter 
and Scholl, 1998, p. 8) and PhD dissertations relying on the qualitative interviews (Mason, 2010; 
Perry, 1998). In line with Gillham (2000, p. 38) and Saunders et al. (2009, p. 191), prior to the 
interviews each of the informants received an interview description, which defined purpose and 
process of the research, requirements to the participants, future data usage, and main interview 
themes (Appendix D). This measure helped to establish the informed consent (Kvale, 1996, pp. 
113–114; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 190) and prepared participants to the interview. The 
discussion below provides detailed information on the sampling strategies, applied in this 
research. 
Throughout the study, theoretical sampling from grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006, p. 96; Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967/2006, p. 45; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 149–156) was combined with 
strategies of purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990, pp. 169–183). In line with criteria of theoretical 
sampling (Goulding, 2002, p. 67, 2005, p. 296; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 201; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 27), the list of participants was not specified a priori but evolved according 
to the emerging results of the analysis. Following Strauss and Corbin (2001, pp. 30-31, 44-45), 
the specialized literature and my professional experience determined the patterns of the initial 
sample. Thus, several first informants were selected among managers, who were the most likely 
to provide valuable information for the investigation (Goulding, 2002, p. 106-107, 296). 
                                                 
13 Strategic business units belonging to the same company are considered as separate firms in the current study, 
due to important differences in their strategic orientation. Strategic business unit is defined here as a part of a firm, 
which competes in a distinct market (Grant, 2010, p. 431; Johnson et al., 2008, p. 7, 223). 
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Theoretical considerations, which occurred after early data analysis further drove the selection 
of participants (Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006, pp. 61–62)14. The goal of sampling evolved 
during the research, from generating a maximum number of potentially relevant categories, to 
validating identified relationships between categories and filling in missing information (Strauss 
and Corbin, 2001, pp. 149–156). As a result, the sampling during the main study continued for 
the extensive period of 10 months.  
At the same time, the research utilized several purposeful sampling strategies (Patton, 1990, pp. 
169–183).  In line with the intensity sampling strategy (Patton, 1990, p. 171), the research aimed 
to select participants, which would be able to provide valuable information about the 
phenomenon. Accordingly, the sample included all levels of management, with the majority of 
the interviewees representing the middle management. Such structure ensured the competence 
of participants in both, tactical and strategic issues (Griffin, 2008, pp. 3–4). Next, the research 
secured the comparability of the data, by implementing some elements of the homogeneous 
sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 173). Thus, the sample was limited exclusively to the suppliers of 
automotive and mobile machinery parts. Furthermore, the research focused only on tier one 
suppliers15. Within this homogenous sample, the study strived to maximize the heterogeneity of 
findings with maximum variation sampling strategy (Patton, 1990, p. 172). The participants 
represented all levels of management and firms of various sizes16. The analyzed firms had 
different levels of internationalization, from small, purely exporting organizations to firms with 
over 50 worldwide subsidiaries. Additionally, the participants represented enterprises that 
supplied products to both, OEM and aftermarket customers. The criterion sampling (Patton, 
1990, p. 176), was utilized by limiting study participants exclusively to those, which were in 
defensive stance against EMCs (Section 2.2.3). Consequently, the sample included 
representatives of those firms, which had regular sales in the Russian market. Moreover, the 
interviewees were prompted to reflect on the critical incidents (Flanagan, 1954a; Gremler, 2004) 
                                                 
14 For instance, the first interviews showed different patterns of competition in deliveries to automobile OEMs and 
to manufacturers of commercial vehicles. Consequently, in order to develop this emerging category (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967/2006, p. 49, 62; Goulding, 2002, p. 112) I decided to enlarge research sample with representatives 
of firms, which supply components to agricultural and mobile machinery. 
15 Namely those firms, which sell their finished products directly to vehicle manufacturers or aftermarket customers 
(U.S. Department of Commerce (2011). 
16 For the aims of the current study, the analyzed firms were classified by the number of employees to small (less 
than 1500 employees), medium (between 1500 and 10.000 employees) and large (over 10.000 employees) ones. 
Such definition significantly exceeds values specified by common definition of SME (European Commission, 
2015). Nevertheless, taking into account dominance of large firms in the analyzed industries (Sedgwick, 2013, p. 
3) and among firms engaged in international activities (Ruzzier and Ruzzier, 2015) this measure assured meaningful 
representation of the sample. 
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which depicted the defensive stance only. The research also benefited from snowball sampling 
(Patton, 1990, p. 176). Thus, each of the interviewees was asked to identify other informants 
who were knowledgeable about the phenomenon. This measure helped to recruit six new 
informants.  Similarly, the research also utilized the merits of opportunistic sampling (Patton, 
1990, p. 179). For instance, one of the managers agreed for an interview exclusively in a face-
to-face conversation, immediately after the recruitment. Consequently, this interview was 
conducted directly at the specialized trade fair. Finally, I took into account the convenience 
considerations, which, however, were the least important compared to other strategies (Patton, 
1990, pp. 180–181). 
In summary, this study carefully combined methodological suggestions for theoretical and 
purposeful sampling. Attributes of the research sample are displayed in Section 4.2. 
3.6. Procedures for data collection 
In grounded theory data collection is intertwined with data analysis, so that evolving categories 
are constantly compared with newly collected data (Charmaz, 2006, p. 54; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967/2006, pp. 101–117). Nevertheless, for the sake of visualization, this section reviews data 
collection only, and data analysis is described in Section 3.7. 
Grounded theory can be based on a variety of sources, which may include interviews, secondary 
data, elicited and extant texts, observations, introspection, memos, and life histories (Charmaz, 
2006, p. 13; Goulding, 2002, p. 56). This research utilized the interviews as the primary source 
of data. Nevertheless, it accepts that specifics of the organizations shape the perceptions of 
interview participants. Therefore, when possible, the interviews were triangulated (Denzin, 
1978; Flick et al., 2004) by analysis of extant texts and memos. Such approach corresponds to 
the recommendations of Yin (2003, p. 76) to base organizational studies on multiple data 
sources. The sections below justify the choice of these data collection techniques and describe 
applied procedures. 
3.6.1. Semi-structured interviews 
The interviews conducted in the current research can be defined as semi-structured interviews 
with key informants (Blumberg et al., 2008, pp. 385–386; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 474; Flick 
et al., 2004, pp. 156–165; Jarratt, 1996, p. 9; Rubin and Rubin, 2012, p. 5; Saunders et al., 2009, 
pp. 320–321). Several considerations justify high reliance on semi-structured interviews. First, 
qualitative interviews are highly applicable for the investigation of complex and open-ended 
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problems (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 386; Daniels and Cannice, 2004, p. 186; Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 323), like the one guiding the current research.  At the same time, interviews help to 
overcome a lack of publically available information on competitive issues (cf. Kuester et al., 
1999, p. 92) and establish a rapport with informants (Daniels and Cannice, 2004, p. 187; 
Saunders et al., 2009, p. 324). Second, the interviews provide an opportunity to gain rich insights 
from a relatively small number of potential participants (Daniels and Cannice, 2004, p. 186; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2012, p. 6). Thus, the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce included only 
72 firms representing categories of mechanical engineering and manufacturing of vehicles and 
their parts (Deutsch-Russische Auslandshandelskammer, 2016). Third, this technique is 
particularly advisable for economic and management research (Reid, 1987, p. 4), including the 
cross-national studies (Daniels and Cannice, 2004, pp. 186–189; Yang et al., 2006, p. 603). 
Contrary to the corporate databases, interviews can provide information on events, which did 
not take place in reality (Singh et al., 1998, p. 231), such as defensive competitive reactions 
(e.g., Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980/1998, 1985/2004). Additionally, they help to overcome 
difficulties connected to empirical research on entry barriers (Lutz et al., 2010, p. 20). Fourth, 
interviewing is a particularly useful method for theory-building research (Charmaz, 2006, p. 25; 
Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537; Goulding, 2002, p. 25; Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 140, 323–324), 
including competition studies (e.g., Daniels and Cannice, 2004, p. 186). Fifth, the interviewing 
technique ensures better access to managers, than for instance, mail questionnaires (Daniels and 
Cannice, 2004, p. 188; Gillham, 2000, p. 14; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 324).   
From the outset, I decided to rely mainly on the telephone interviews17. Nevertheless, three face-
to-face interviews were conducted during this research. In average the interviews lasted one 
hour, which ensured depth of the provided information (Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 488). All of the 
interviews included individual informants, which enhanced rapport and trust18 (Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 345; Stokes and Bergin, 2006).  
The conducted interviews can be divided into three sequential stages:  interview preparation, 
main study, and follow-up. The discussion below reflects on each of these stages. 
                                                 
17 This decision resulted from the limited opportunities, which existed for face-to-face interviews. Thus, the 
participants were often working abroad or had dense business schedules. 
18 Two firm representatives were present during one of the face-to-face interviews. However, only one informant 
was an active interview participant. 
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3.6.1.1. Interview preparation 
The proper implementation of the interviewing technique was assured by a diligent preparation 
(Gillham, 2000, pp. 25–36; Kvale, 1996, pp. 148–149; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 328). First, the 
interview guide was developed, which included pre-interview briefing, interview questions, 
potential probes, and post-interview briefing. Several experienced researchers helped me to 
structure this guide and improve the wording of the questions. Moreover, the questions were 
rehearsed before each interview (Charmaz, 2006, p. 29; Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 494). Second, 
following recommendations of Adams et al. (2007, p. 147), Gillham (2000, pp. 21–23), 
Hermanowicz (2002, p. 494), Harvey (2009, p. 11), and Kvale (1996, p. 147), this research 
included several trial and pilot interviews. During trial interviews, the questions were tried out 
on two informants, which had the same occupational background as the main study participants, 
namely international sales in manufacturing firms. Next, the pilot interviews were conducted 
with two managers responsible for Russian market activities of foreign automotive suppliers. 
All of them provided a detailed feedback to the interviews (Gillham, 2000, p. 55). Additionally, 
three of these interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently examined for possible 
improvements. Third, I carefully analyzed available data on the informant and the analyzed firm 
before each interview (Harvey, 2009, p. 22 and Saunders et al., 2009, p. 328). This measure 
helped to tailor each interview, evaluate the accuracy of responses, and enhance my credibility. 
To summarize, thorough interview preparation produced significant improvements in the 
interviewing technique. Moreover, it reinforced researcher’s confidence, integrity, and fluency 
(Gillham, 2000, p. 53; Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 491–492; Kvale, 1996, p. 147). These aspects 
played an important role in this research, considering the potential misbalance of power in 
interviews with persons “in positions of authority” (Gillham, 2000, p. 81). 
3.6.1.2. Main study 
The research proceeded with the main study interviews, which lasted for the extensive period 
of 10 months. The information on date, mode, and duration of each interview is provided in 
Appendix E. Totally 33 out of 3419 interviews were tape-recorded, which assured the accuracy 
of data collection, and prevented loss of valuable information (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 489; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 496–497; Partington, 2003, p. 144; Yin, 2003, p. 92). Despite the 
flexibility of the interviewing process (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 28–29; Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 
                                                 
19 One interview was conducted at the trade fair, with no opportunity to record the conversation.  
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482–483), the sequence of each interview was planned upfront, to assure the progressive flow 
of the conversation (Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 488–489). Thus, all interviews included four broad 
parts. In the first, pre-briefing part, the interviewee received information on the study’s 
background, goals, ethical principles, and interview flow (Gillham, 2000, p. 40; Hermanowicz, 
2002, pp. 494–495; Kvale, 1996, p. 128; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 332). Each informant 
consented for tape recording, which reinforced trustful relationships (Goulding, 2002, p. 60; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 494–495). Following the recommendations of Hermanowicz (2002, p. 
495), the introduction was read verbatim, which demonstrated seriousness of the research.  
In the second, opening part, I asked the interviewees to share easy and non-sensitive information 
about his/her company and competitive situation in Russian market (Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 
488)20. Following the recommendations of Gillham (2000, p. 41), Kvale (1996, p. 13), 
MacCracken (1988, p. 38), and Merton and Kendall (1946, p. 547), these questions were 
formulated in a fully unstructured and open manner. This part helped to provide the context of 
the following replies, and establish the interviewee’s comfort with talking (Hermanowicz, 2002, 
p. 488). Nevertheless, in some cases, such questions immediately yielded information on the 
investigated phenomena (Kvale, 1996, p. 133) and produced valuable and unanticipated findings 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 26).  
In the third part, which constituted the core of the interview, the discussion focused on the issues 
directly related to the research problem. This part of the interview included the most sensitive 
questions regarding competition with EMCs (Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 488). For instance, 
questions about the negative consequences of competition with EMCs (e.g., loss of revenue), 
were addressed here. Nevertheless, I balanced difficult and easy questions, thereby encouraging 
the respondents to share their true insights (Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 489)21.  
The fourth part (closure) summarized the key points mentioned during the interview (Kvale, 
1996, p. 128). In several cases, important material emerged at this stage. Generally, following 
the recommendations of Cassell and Symon (2004, p. 18), Charmaz (2006, p. 30), and 
Hermanowicz (2002, pp. 488, 495–496), the interviews ended on a positive note, with questions 
which prompted participants to reflect on strengths of their firms. Moreover, the managers were 
                                                 
20 Most of the interviewees represented multiproduct companies. Therefore, to increase specificity of the answers, 
the managers were prompted to limit a number of product markets under consideration.  
21 In several cases, sensitive questions resulted in strongly defensive and even rude responses from participants. 
Nevertheless, respectfulness, concern, and integrity were maintained throughout the interviews (Hermanowicz, 
2002, pp. 491–494). 
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encouraged to provide comments regarding the interview procedure (Harvey, 2009, pp. 26–27). 
Finally, several days after the interview, each informant received a personalized mail thanking 
for participation and outlining key aspects revealed during an interview (Harvey, 2009, p. 27).  
Several details should be noted regarding the interviewing technique. In line with Charmaz 
(2006, p. 28), the interviews were open-ended, directed, and emergent. All interviews addressed 
personal perceptions of participants, based on their experiences and insights (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
29; Lindgreen, 2001, p. 80). Thus, each of the participants was asked to describe vivid situations 
of competition with EMCs, including causes and outcomes of these events (Flanagan, 1954b; 
Keaveney, 1995; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 332). I strived to uncover the meaning behind 
provided information, as well as limit the bias and errors, by formulating questions in the open-
ended manner, paying attention to own non-verbal behavior, prompting interviewee’s for 
altruism, applying interview transitions, avoiding jargonism, leading, obvious, and multiple 
questions, contrasting interviewee with comparative questions, verifying and interpreting the 
answers during the interviews, asking retrospective questions and applying probes extensively 
(Adams et al., 2007, pp. 148–149; Cassell and Symon, 2004, pp. 17–18; Gillham, 2000, p. 46; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 485–488; Kvale, 1996, p. 133, 145; Merton and Kendall, 1946; 
MacCracken, 1988, pp. 29–48; Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 326–329). For instance, the interviews 
showed that silence probes (Harvey, 2009, p. 26; Kvale, 1996, pp. 134–135; Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 340) and clarification requests (Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 485–488) frequently prompted 
informants to provide extensive answers. The participants were encouraged to provide a 
description of the studied topics in fluent, conversational manner (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 28–29; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 482-483, 489). The order and wording of questions were carefully 
adjusted, according to clues provided by the interviewees, especially in the most sensitive, third 
part of the interviews (Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 483–484). This helped to assure the comfort of 
the participants during interviewing process (Charmaz, 2006, p. 30). Nevertheless, to assure 
control over the data collection, an interview guide with sequenced themes of interest 
accompanied each of the interviews (Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 488). Thus, in several cases, when 
the interviewees were diverging from the topic of the investigation, subtle interruptions, and cue 
transitions were applied (Kvale, 1996, p. 134; MacCracken, 1988, p. 39; Merton and Kendall, 
1946, p. 553; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 340). Moreover, the specific wording for each question 
and probe were formulated beforehand. This measure helped to enhance my confidence and 
focus on the answers of participants (Charmaz, 2006, p. 29). Following the recommendations 
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of Hermanowicz (2002, p. 488), each question was formulated in a concise and clear manner, 
omitting terms, which could be confusing. Finally, I applied the attentive listening technique, 
by showing interest, understanding, and respect to the participants (Gillham, 2000, pp. 28–36; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, pp. 483–484; Kvale, 1996, p. 128; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 334). The 
probes, including probe questions, occurrence to feelings, and silence probes, were applied 
throughout the study to reinforce its exploratory power (Charmaz, 2006, p. 27; MacCracken, 
1988; Merton and Kendall, 1946). The category prompts or mutational questions were used only 
if the interviewees did not mentioned pre-defined themes (Gillham, 2000, p. 45; Kvale, 1996, 
p. 134; MacCracken, 1988, pp. 29–48; Merton and Kendall, 1946, p. 553).  
In line with Cassell and Symon (2004, p. 245), Charmaz (2006, p. 28, 29), Glaser and Strauss 
(1967/2006, p. 61, 73), and Rubin and Rubin (2012, p. 11, 44, 45), the nature of interview 
questions and interview design evolved during the 10 months of theoretical sampling. Thus, 
after each interview, I took field notes and summarized emerging themes to refine questions for 
the next interview (Cassell and Symon, 2004, p. 245). As a result, with time the focus of 
interviews narrowed on aspects which were relevant for participants and assisted in developing 
categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006, pp. 75–76; Partington, 2003, p. 144)22. 
Consequently, the interviews shared some similarity with convergent interviewing technique 
(e.g., Dick, 1998; Rao and Perry, 2003). The shift of the interview focus can be seen by 
comparing the interview guides for the first (Appendix F) and 34th (Appendix G) interviews. 
Notes on important or unclear themes during the interviews proved to be exceptionally useful 
in this research. Such notes provided the foundation for data analysis and ensured that the 
subsequent questions followed all information leads (Charmaz, 2006, p. 32). Consequently, the 
same questions were often restated several times in the same interviews (Hermanowicz, 2002, 
p. 486; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 339).  
In brief, the main stage of this research applied a thorough interviewing technique, which helped 
to reveal in-depth perceptions of respondents on the studied phenomena. 
                                                 
22 For instance, during the initial interviews, the informants were asked to define low-cost competitors. This 
measure showed that competitive advantage of firms from emerging economies often stemmed not from access to 
cheap resource inputs (Hoskisson et al., 2013, pp. 1303–1304; Koerte, 2006; Ryans, 2008), but from other 
attributes, such as geographic location, state policy and specifics of business conduct (cf. Section 2.2.1). 
Consequently, I replaced the term low-cost with emerging in the further interviews (cf. Lindgreen, 2001, p. 80). 
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3.6.1.3. Follow-up  
The follow-up interviews were conducted with the two-fold aim to validate the findings and 
explore changes, which occurred between two stages of data collection. In this way, the study 
combined respondent validation (Barbour, 2003, p. 184; Bloor, 1978; Bryman, 2004, p. 274; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007, pp. 411–412; Torrance, 2012) or member checking (Buchbinder, 2011; 
Flowerday and Schraw, 2000; Goulding, 2002, p. 89; Koelsch, 2013; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 
pp. 373–378; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 188–190) with the elements of longitudinal panel 
study (Babbie, 2007, p. 103; Bryman, 2004, pp. 60–61; Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 64; Flick et 
al., 2004, p. 148; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 155).  
To achieve the validation aim, the participants were asked to reflect on the 18-page summary of 
the research findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 275). This summary included information 
on the study background, methodology, preliminary study findings, and practical implications. 
Additionally, to stimulate rich feedback, each interviewee received a note with the main findings 
from his/her interview (Bloor, 1978, p. 549; Buchbinder, 2011, p. 109). Following 
recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 276), the specific examples were included 
in the findings, which made the information comprehensible for industry practitioners. 
Concerning the longitudinal aim, the study revealed the changes, which occurred between the 
stages of data collection, by interviewing the same group of participants (Babbie, 2007, p. 105; 
Hermanowicz, 2013, p. 190). The issue of sample attrition received particular attention (Babbie, 
2007, p. 105; Hermanowicz, 2013, p. 202), especially for those participants, who provided the 
most data-rich or contrasting information in the first round of interviews. As a result, totally 21 
interviews with 20 participants, were conducted in the period between May and June 2015 
(Appendix H). 
The interviewing technique, applied during the follow-up study, closely resembled the 
procedures described in Section 3.6.1.2. Nevertheless, due to abundant information collected in 
the first round of interviews, the validation interviews were shorter than the interviews in the 
main study and lasted on average 30 minutes. Likewise, in view of the previously developed 
theoretical model, the follow-up interviews were of more focused nature. Finally, the interview 
guide, applied for the follow-up interviews corresponded to the recommendations for member 
checking (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 373–378) and longitudinal qualitative studies 
(Hermanowicz, 2013, pp. 197–199). Thus, the interview started from short pre-briefing about 
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the interview goals, confidentiality statement, and tape-recording consent. Next, to stimulate 
feedback from the participants, the executive summary of the findings was read verbatim. After 
this, the participants were asked to express their opinion about the validity of the findings. To 
assure maximum depth of the received feedback, I deliberately proposed the informants to 
reflect on the points of disagreement or underline the missing information. Moreover, those 
managers who expressed bland agreement with the findings, or seemed to have a superficial 
introduction to the report, were engaged in in-depth discussions (cf. Bloor, 1978, p. 550). This 
measure assured that results became meaningful for the industry practitioners (Bloor, 1978, pp. 
548–549; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 411; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 276; Torrance, 2012, 
p. 116). In several cases, this validation technique provided important refinement for the 
formulated categories. Additionally, the thesis explored the changes, which occurred in the 
competition with EMCs. Here, the interviewees were asked to reflect on the institutional 
changes, developments in the competition with EMCs, and changes, which occurred with their 
firms. Finally, the interview closure summarized gathered information and ended the 
conversation in a positive manner.  
In conclusion, the research showed that interviewees, especially mid-level managers who were 
directly involved in sales activities in the Russian market, were highly informative for the 
research problem under investigation. The few revealed discrepancies were clarified by 
implementing the two-stage interviewing procedure and utilizing complementary sources of 
information, such as extant texts and memos. 
3.6.2. Extant texts  
As suggested by Charmaz (2006, p. 35), any qualitative investigation partially relies on the 
textual analysis. Therefore, extant texts, which were produced without the influence of this 
inquiry, supplemented the interview data (Blumberg et al., 2008, p. 328; Charmaz, 2006, p. 35, 
37). The analyzed texts included press releases, mass media outputs, industry reports, 
advertisements, business periodicals, corporate annual reports, and company presentations. The 
criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning assured the quality of 
collected texts (Scott, 1990).  
Following suggestions of Blumberg et al. (2008, p. 328), Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 566), and 
Charmaz (2006, p. 37, 38), the data available from extant texts were treated not as objective 
mirrors of reality, but rather as definitions adopted by report writers. For example, corporate 
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reports typically aim to establish the public image of an organization, rather than depict 
organizational processes and perceptions of organizational actors (Blumberg et al., 2008, pp. 
328–329; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 566; Charmaz, 2006, p. 38). Therefore, the textual data 
mainly helped to verify, set the context, and reinforce the data obtained from the interviews 
(Section 3.8), which served as the main source of information (Charmaz, 2006, p. 37, 38). For 
instance, interviews showed that participants were reluctant to reflect on the captive offshoring 
implemented by their firms. Therefore, analysis of publically available information and 
corporate websites supplemented and/or verified information on the offshore manufacturing of 
the analyzed firms. In several cases, such triangulation (Denzin, 1978, p. 295; Flick et al., 2004, 
pp. 179–180) showed a lack of congruence (Charmaz, 2006, p. 38) between publically available 
information and interview data. Finally, reports on Russian mobile machinery and automotive 
industry (Section 3.4.2) provided an important context for the data analysis and facilitated 
development of the categories. 
3.6.3. Memos  
The theory development in inductive approaches strongly depends on memos, which are 
accumulated during data collection and analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p. 72; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967/2006, pp. 105–113; Goulding, 2002, pp. 64–66; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 74; Strauss 
and Corbin, 2001, pp. 163–185). Memos serve as a source of data in the grounded theory 
research, by summarizing ideas and depicting concepts emerging from the investigation 
(Goulding, 2002, pp. 55, 64–66; Morrow and Smith, 1995, p. 26). This study relied on memos 
in several ways. Initially, memos were applied mainly to facilitate open coding. Thus, early 
ideas about creating, deleting, and combining codes were noted as they appeared (Schreier, 
2012, pp. 94–104). The first memos were composed during (Appendix I) and immediately after 
(Appendix J) the interviews, as well as during the transcription process (Appendix K). 
Additionally, following the recommendations of Goulding (2002, p. 65), Hutchison et al. (2010, 
p. 287), Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 74), Morrow and Smith (1995, p. 26), and Strauss and 
Corbin (2001, p. 163), I held a study blog with conceptual and procedural considerations, which 
occurred during the whole process of the study. Here, the ideas were written in a free manner, 
without concrete structure, which stimulated further generation of abstract relationships and 
frameworks (Goulding, 2002, p. 65). Moreover, each of the defined categories of the coding 
frame included coding memos. Such memos often contained unstandardized (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 74) description of the category, positive and negative examples, decision 
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rules, emerging ideas, and, at a later research stage, literature referring to this category (Schreier, 
2012, pp. 94–104; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 163). Appendix L demonstrates an example of 
such coding memo. At the final stage of data analysis, when the categories were already well 
developed (Charmaz, 2006, p. 60; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 81) memos mainly depicted 
ideas on the linkages between them. These memos frequently took the form of diagrams with 
hypothesized relationships between different categories (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 180). An 
example of such diagram is provided in Appendix M. 
All in all, the study relied on several measures summarized by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 
74) regarding memoing technique. First, memos received the priority in the research process 
and were written in a fluent and fast manner. As a result, some memos were in the Russian 
language. Second, the memoing lasted throughout the greater part of the research, starting with 
the first interview, until the completion of the thesis (Figure 8). The key memos were kept well 
organized, by assigning them to appropriate categories or topics. Third, the main attention in 
memo writing was given to generating ideas for the analysis rather than to providing data 
examples. In short, memos proved to be a valuable data source for this research. 
3.7. Procedures for data analysis  
In line with the research process shown in Figure 8, the data analysis included main and follow-
up stages. Below is given a detailed account of the procedures applied at each stage.  
3.7.1. Main study  
The data analysis in this research had begun before the actual coding started. Researcher’s 
professional experience with competition in the Russian market provided initial ideas about the 
research problem (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 30–31). The first notes on the research inquiry 
were composed already during trial and pilot interviews23. Additionally, during each interview, 
I took notes on issues, which seemed to be important for the participants, or were particularly 
promising for conceptualization (Appendix I). Finally, in line with Hermanowicz (2002, p. 496), 
Kvale (1996, p. 129), and Saunders et al. (2009, p. 334), right after the completion of each 
interview, detailed field notes were recorded, which included my immediate impressions about 
the interview (Appendix J). Such measure facilitated the early data analysis, assured systematic 
                                                 
23 Nevertheless, these interviews were not coded, since this could affect the quality of the coding frame due to 
differences in material of main study and preparatory interviews (Schreier, 2012, p. 91). 
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data storage, and improved the interviewing technique. In brief, in line with Charmaz (2006, p. 
29), the actual data analysis started from the outset of the research. 
Additionally to the procedures of grounded theory, this research implemented techniques of 
qualitative content analysis to display part of research findings in quantitative style (Schreier, 
2012). The focus of this investigation on categories, rather than on separate cases justifies a 
quantitative presentation of results (Schreier, 2012, p. 231). Moreover, triangulation literature 
recommends verifying findings and enhancing representativeness of the research by combining 
several approaches to data collection (Kimchi et al., 1991; Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007). As 
a result, along with continuous text, absolute frequencies of codes across interviews were used 
to display findings.  
A distinctive note should be given to the role of theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 135–
140; Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006, p. 46; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 45). As suggested by 
Strauss and Corbin (2001, p. 35), a researcher’s theoretical sensitivity is crucial for the 
interpretation of data and conceptualization. At the outset of the data analysis, author’s 
professional experience served as a foundation of theoretical sensitivity. Later on, analytical 
process and literature systematically enhanced theoretical sensitivity (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, 
p. 43). Nevertheless, following the recommendations of Glaser and Strauss (1967/2006), I 
integrated literature with great care, aiming to exclude commitment “to one specific 
preconceived theory” (p. 46).  
Almost all interviews were transcribed verbatim and tape-recorded24. Tape-records proved to 
be particularly useful for data analysis since they saved some important aspects of narrative and 
nonverbal cues, including pauses, intonation and sighs (Charmaz, 2006, p. 33, 70; 
Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 496). This measure assured the possibility for repeated examination and 
precision of the evidence (Heritage, 1984/1992, p. 238; Partington, 2003, p. 144). Moreover, the 
personal transcription of the interviews facilitated early analysis (Gillham, 2000, p. 9; 
Partington, 2003, p. 144). Thus, during the transcription, I took notes on the key themes, which 
emerged from the data (Appendix K). To maintain the meaning, which participants assigned to 
the information, the translation of interviews to English was delayed till the final composition 
of the thesis (Temple and Young, 2004, p. 174). Given the potential risk of losing valuable 
                                                 
24 Except the interview, which was conducted at the trade fair. However, detailed notes helped to reconstruct the 
transcript immediately after the interview.   
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information (Koelsch, 2013, pp. 170–171; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 485), the participants did 
not receive the transcripts for the final inspection. 
The actual coding was conducted by iteratively moving between three stages described by 
Strauss (1987/2003) and Strauss and Corbin (2001): open, axial, and selective coding. The 
analysis proceeded jointly with data collection and sampling, until no new and significant 
categories, sub-categories, or linkages between them occurred in the data (Charmaz, 2006; 
Gasson, 2004, p. 84; Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 202; Strauss, 
1987/2003; Strauss and Corbin, 2001). Consequently, the below-given description represents a 
rather stylized summary of this highly iterative process.  
To assure early categorization, the open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 53–62) started 
after the first three interviews, and was facilitated by MAXQDA 11 software. This software was 
chosen due to its flexibility, context tracking power, and applicability for presenting results in 
both qualitative and quantitative styles (Schreier, 2012, pp. 245–256). The analysis mainly 
relied on the interview transcripts, which, when necessary, were supplemented with other types 
of evidence (Section 3.6). Thus, transcripts were examined, by constantly comparing data with 
data, and later on data with categories and sub-categories (Charmaz, 2006, p. 47; Dick, 2000; 
Gasson, 2004, p. 84; Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006, pp. 105–117). Such comparisons reflected 
constant movement between inductive and deductive logic, where emerging conceptualizations 
are constantly tested against new data (Charmaz, 2006, p. 104; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 93). 
The data were analyzed in a detailed manner of incident-to-incident labeling (Charmaz, 2006, 
p. 53), which ensured inclusion of all relevant information in the analysis. Additionally, memos 
helped to reach the early abstraction from the data. As a result, such coding approach revealed 
a comprehensive list of 281 codes. The code labels resulted from both, the language of 
participants and my personal knowledge (Strauss, 1987/2003, pp. 33–34). This measure helped 
to maintain an intimate connection with a meaning assigned to the information by the 
participants (Charmaz, 2006, p. 55; Morrow and Smith, 1995, p. 26). Moreover, in line with 
recommendations of Charmaz (2006, p. 49), the initial codes were labeled with gerunds, to 
maintain close linkage to the ideas and actions of participants (see an example in Appendix N). 
Next, initial codes and data behind them were reviewed in the context of the whole research.  
Consequently, the codes were grouped into categories, and in some cases divided, reassigned, 
or deleted (Goulding, 2002, p. 110; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 55). Since the data set consisted 
of over 400 pages of transcribed interviews, texts, and memos, a primary goal here was to 
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produce a manageable number of categories for the further analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, 
p. 55). The comparisons with the literature were made with great care, by giving priority to the 
field data (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 45). Decision rules, examples, negative examples, and 
links to the literature were included in code memos to implement clear differentiation between 
categories (Schreier, 2012, pp. 94–104). As a result, the categorization process revealed 12 
preliminary categories and numerous sub-categories. Appendix O shows an example of one of 
the preliminary categories and its subcategories.  
During coding process, I took notes and memos on the main issues, theoretical ideas, and 
retrospective thoughts (Section 3.6.3). In this way, the first patterns and linkages in the data 
started to appear, and directions for the theoretical sampling (Section 3.5) were identified. In 
parallel, the research iterated between data analysis, research problem, and data collection (cf. 
Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 588). So, the early categorization influenced the focus of the study, 
choice of further participants, and interview inquiry. 
The first ideas on the linkages between categories and sub-categories were formulated and noted 
already at the initial stages of open coding (Strauss, 1987/2003, p. 32). During axial coding the 
research focused on exploring these relationships (Strauss, 1987/2003, p. 59; Strauss and 
Corbin, 2001, p. 81). Following the recommendations of Strauss and Corbin (2001, pp. 81–96), 
I went in several rounds through categories and related data to identify phenomena, causal 
conditions, context conditions, intervening conditions, strategies, and consequences. As a result, 
managerial perceptions about competition with EMCs were defined as the phenomenon. The 
causal conditions, which represent conditions leading to the phenomenon, included 
institutional-level factors, along with industry and firm-level entry barriers. The phenomenon 
of competitive perceptions determined the actions or competitive reactions of German firms. 
The competitive reactions were also influenced by the contextual specifics of the phenomena, 
including attributes of emerging market firms, and criteria of perceived threat. Additionally, 
various intervening conditions stipulated the choice of each competitive reaction. For instance, 
customer price sensitivity, stage of the product life cycle, and criticality of the component 
conditioned the differentiation. The actions of participants led to the consequence, in the form 
of a competitive advantage of German firms against EMCs. Figure 9 shows the theoretical 
model, which was developed during the axial coding. At this stage, the literature served as one 
of the identifiers for potential relationships, which existed between categories and sub-
categories. Nevertheless, to stimulate the research progress (Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 45), 
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the ultimate contrasting of the revealed theoretical model with extant literature was delayed until 
the final stage of research.   
Figure 9: The preliminary theoretical model for perceived competition with EMCs  
 
Note: EMC stands for emerging market competitor 
Source: Own compilation 
Finally, during selective coding, the theoretical model was described by identifying the core 
category of the investigation. Following the recommendations of Strauss (1987/2003, pp. 255–
256) and Strauss and Corbin (2001, p. 99), this was conducted by gradually moving from a 
rather descriptive to the more analytical storyline about the research. As a result, competitive 
reactions to emerging market firms were accepted as a core category of this investigation. This 
category seemed to be central and easily related to other categories, frequently appeared in the 
data, and promised clear implications for the theory (Strauss, 1987/2003, p. 36). The identified 
core category guided further data collection and analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 586; 
Strauss, 1987/2003, p. 33). So, the tentative propositions regarding conceptual categories and 
linkages between them were tested by new data and modified till the theoretical saturation 
(Morrow and Smith, 1995, p. 26; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 91–92). As a result, a decision 
was taken to cease the sampling and data collection after 34 interviews. 
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The derived categories and relationships between them were further contrasted to the existing 
body of literature (Charmaz, 2006, p. 166; Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545; Reid et al., 1993, p. 184). 
This process revealed categories, which seemed to be poorly developed and required further 
modification and several relationships between categories, which needed further verification 
(Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 45, 93, 118). Therefore the follow-up data collection and analysis 
helped to refine and validate the theoretical model. 
3.7.2. Follow-up  
At the follow-up stage, the interviewees were asked to validate the research findings and answer 
additional questions aimed to register occurred changes (Section 3.6.1.3). After reviewing the 
summary, the participants largely confirmed the validity of findings, for the market situation at 
the moment of the main study. At the same time, all of the interviewees suggested that 
substantial changes occurred in the competitive situation between the two stages of data 
collection. As a result, the coding frame and theoretical model received several essential 
modifications. The findings, depicting these changes, are shown in Chapter 4. Subsequently, the 
literature was enfolded again to finalize the theoretical model. The closure was reached when 
further comparison with the literature resulted in no additional interpretations of the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545) and all categories received satisfactory development (Strauss and 
Corbin, 2001, p. 45, 118). Data analysis procedures applied at the follow-up stage largely 
resembled the techniques described in the Section 3.7.1.  
To summarize, data analysis during two stages of research lasted for the extended period of 28 
months, from November 2013 till February 2015. The findings of this study resulted from the 
iterative process of constant comparison of emerging categories with data and literature.   
3.8. Research trustworthiness 
Following recommendations of Guba (1981), Lincoln and Guba (1985), Miles and Huberman 
(1994, pp. 278–280), Saunders et al. (2009, pp. 156–158), and Schreier (2012, pp. 26–27), the 
criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability ensured the 
trustworthiness of this research. The discussion below reflects on the key procedures, which 
were employed regarding each of them. 
Credibility (internal validity, authenticity) represents the degree to which the findings can be 
accepted as true and plausible representation of the data (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106; Guba, 1981, 
p. 83; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278). Several techniques proposed by Lincoln and Guba 
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(1985, pp. 301–316) ensured credibility of this research. First, in line with their 
recommendations, the study involved prolonged engagement and persistent observation. Thus, 
I approached the problem with extensive professional experience in the related setting, which 
guaranteed deep understanding of the study context. The data analysis lasted for the extensive 
period of 28 months. To limit researcher bias, the interpretations were noted during the study 
(Section 3.6.3). Various interviewing techniques, including detailed preparation and extensive 
probing, were applied to address informant distortions (Section 3.6.1). Throughout the study, I 
deliberately worked on building trustful relationships with the key informants (Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 326). For example, personal contact was established at the trade shows, each informant 
received a detailed description of the study, and respondents were engaged into co-production 
of the findings. Nevertheless, I was cautious about risks of “going native” (Babbie, 2007, p. 
290; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 303) and strived to maintain scientific objectivity. For instance, 
respectful, but still detached relationships were kept with the interviewees (Gillham, 2000, pp. 
39–40;Hermanowicz, 2002, p. 493). The persistent observation was ensured by integrating 
constant comparative method and detailed memoing (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967/2006; Goulding, 2002; Strauss, 1987/2003; Strauss and Corbin, 2001) into the analysis 
and describing these techniques in details (Sections 3.6 and 3.7).  
Next, the triangulation technique helped to generate deep knowledge on the investigated 
phenomenon (e.g., Begley, 1996; Denzin, 1978; Fleck, 1995, p. 179; Flick, 2011, p. 183). Thus, 
interviewing participants with the average interval of 15 months assured data triangulation 
(Denzin, 1978, pp. 295–296). Besides the congruence of some key findings across the time, this 
strategy also revealed important inconsistencies, which resulted from institutional changes (cf. 
Kimchi et al., 1991, p. 364). Additionally, data triangulation was assured by interviewing 
different representatives of one firm (Kimchi et al., 1991, p. 365)25. Moreover, during the 
interviews, the managers were constantly contrasted with accounts of other informants 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 183). Turning to the within-method triangulation (Fleck, 
1995, p. 179; Kimchi et al., 1991, p. 365), this research included several qualitative methods of 
data collection (Section 3.6). At the same time, considering the well-grounded choice of the 
qualitative methods for this inquiry no cross-method triangulation was used (Bloor, 1978, p. 
548). Finally, the elements of analysis triangulation (Kimchi et al., 1991; Leech and 
                                                 
25 Nevertheless, such person triangulation had limited applicability in this study, since the investigated problem 
was mainly in the competence of a single representative of a German firm. 
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Onwuegbuzie, 2007) were introduced by integrating techniques of qualitative content analysis 
(Schreier, 2012) with the grounded theory procedures (Section 3.7).  
Several other techniques reinforced the credibility of this study. First, within peer debriefing 
sessions (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 308–309) I regularly reflected on the study findings with 
the colleagues. This measure helped to test emergent conceptualizations, limit researcher bias, 
and refine the methodological design. Likewise, an experienced researcher joined several initial 
interviews and provided his feedback, which helped to refine the interviewing technique. 
Second, the constant comparison method closely resembled negative case analysis (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985, pp. 309–313). Third, in line with the principle of referential adequacy (Guba, 1981, 
p. 83; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 313–314), I archived tape recording, extant texts, and 
memos. Moreover, the interview transcripts helped to limit researcher bias. Fourth, the research 
strongly relied on member checks (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 314–316). Thus, interpreting 
questions validated data patterns during each interview (Kvale, 1996, p. 135, 145). Follow-up 
data collection included more formal member check (Sections 3.6.1.3 and 3.7.2).  
Transferability (external validity, fittingness) is defined as the degree to which findings from 
this study can be generalized to other contexts (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106; Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p. 279). Transferability of the qualitative research is a rather ambiguous issue: “the 
naturalist can only set out working hypotheses together with a description of the time and the 
context in which they were found to hold” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 316). Consequently, this 
thesis provides an exhaustive description of the research methodology, study context, and 
sample. Furthermore, the quality of theoretical inferences from this research (Bryman and Bell, 
2007, p. 424) was assured by scrutinizing the findings against the body of existing knowledge 
(Chapter 5). 
Dependability (reliability, auditability) reflects the degree to which findings are stable and 
consistent across researchers, methods, and points of time (Babbie, 2007, p. 143; Flint et al., 
2002, p. 106; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278; Yin, 2003, p. 37). In line with Lincoln and 
Guba (1985, pp. 316–317), techniques, which ensured credibility, also contributed to the 
dependability of this research. For instance, the convergence of the main categories of 
competitive reactions from both rounds of interviews demonstrated the dependability of the 
findings. Additionally, the audit trial (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 414; Guba, 1981, p. 87), was 
established by carefully storing field notes, memos, and coding schemes. A great attention was 
given to the documentation of the research process (Flick et al., 2004, p. 187; Saunders et al., 
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2009, p. 328; Yin, 2003, p. 38). For example, I archived both, raw data and interim versions of 
the coding scheme. MAXQDA helped to build and archive the data categorizations and 
presentations (Schreier, 2012, pp. 245–258). Finally, within peer reviews, the findings were 
presented to fellow researchers and supervisors (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278).  
Confirmability (objectivity) is the extent to which interpretations represent opinions of 
participants and/or phenomenon, rather than researcher’s personal views and beliefs (Flint et 
al., 2002, p. 106; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278). Although complete objectivity is 
impossible in research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 43), several measures minimized the impact 
of subjectivity. First, triangulation ensured both, credibility and confirmability of the research 
(Guba, 1981, p. 87; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 319). Next, the broad application of memos, 
such as study blog, stimulated my reflexivity (Guba, 1981, p. 87). Then, following Lincoln and 
Guba (1985, pp. 319–320), I collected and stored records required for the audit trial, such as 
interview transcripts, field notes, extant texts, interview summaries, analytical notes, coding 
schemes, preliminary research findings, reflexive notes, and emerging interview guidelines. 
Additionally, the rigor of the interviewing process was ensured (Section 3.6.1). Finally, the 
study and its findings were regularly discussed with the supervisors and peers (Flint et al., 2002, 
p. 106; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 320).        
To conclude, four criteria, which are common for qualitative investigations, helped to assess the 
trustworthiness of the research process and its findings.  
3.9. Limitations of the research methodology  
After establishing the research trustworthiness, this section describes common points of critique 
regarding applied methodology and the way in which this study addressed them. First, turning 
to the qualitative research strategy, positivists frequently criticize it for its subjectivity (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007, p. 423; Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 154; Goulding, 2002, p. 18). For instance, 
the decisions on theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation highly depend on the ideas of 
the researcher (Creswell, 2009, p. 68; Goulding, 2002, p. 156). A detailed documentation of the 
research procedures, member checking, peer reviews, multi-disciplinary literature review, 
reflexivity stance, and constant comparison method addressed this critique (Section 3.8). Next, 
as suggested by Goulding (2002, pp. 18–19), qualitative research is often charged with the lack 
of pre-defined procedures. However, particularly this emergent, flexible, and data-driven nature 
of the investigation determines its strength and practical relevance (Charmaz, 2006; Goulding, 
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2002; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 225; Patton, 2009, pp. 43–45; Rubin and Rubin, 2012, pp. 
43–46; Strauss and Corbin, 2001). Finally, techniques discussed in Section 3.8 and the choice 
of the study context (Section 3.4) addressed criticism related to generalizability, research 
transparency, and replicability of qualitative research (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 154; 
Goulding, 2002, pp. 17–18)26. 
Next, the grounded theory methodology is often criticized for setting aside existing theories 
before the investigation (Creswell, 2009, pp. 67–68). This aspect was addressed by conducting 
the literature review both, prior and throughout the process of data analysis (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 
165–168; Partington, 2003, pp. 140–141; Strauss and Corbin, 2001, pp. 43–45; Suddaby, 2006, 
pp. 634–635). In this way, the initial theoretical framework emerged before the data collection 
(Partington, 2003, pp. 140–141). Following the recommendations of Suddaby (2006, p. 635), I 
drew the literature from several research disciplines, remained constantly aware of potential 
preconceptions, and strived to elaborate existing conceptualizations, rather than develop entirely 
new theory. As a result, despite permitting existing theories entry in the investigation, this 
research ensured the priority of data over the literature.  
In terms of longitudinal research design, in line with comments of Babbie (2007, p. 105), Collis 
and Hussey (2014, p. 64), and Hermanowicz (2013, p. 202), this research was a subject to panel 
attrition. Nevertheless, I explicitly focused on this subject (Section 3.6.1.3). As a result, 20 out 
of first 34 informants took part in the follow-up interviews.  
Common limitations of member checking technique should also be mentioned here. Thus, it can 
be problematic for the respondents to reflect on the cumulative results of the scientific analysis 
(Bloor, 1978, pp. 548–549; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 411; Torrance, 2012, p. 116). 
Additionally, respondents may be reluctant to remain critical and tend to agree with information, 
which does not represent their position (Bloor, 1978, p. 550; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 315). 
These issues were addressed by a thorough approach to data collection during the follow-up 
study stage (Section 3.6.1.3).  
Finally, this section should outline several limitations of the interviewing technique. First, the 
interviews typically provide lower sensitivity to the study context compared to participant 
observation (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 503). Similarly, interviews can be especially 
challenging with foreign informants and high-level managers (Daniels and Cannice, 2004, p. 
                                                 
26 Nevertheless, only a large-scale study can grant broad generalizations of the research findings. 
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189; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 335). Moreover, interviews rely mainly on verbal behavior, which 
might omit some implicit attributes of the social life (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 503). Author’s 
professional and inter-cultural experience combined with thorough interview preparation 
(Section 3.6.1.1) and other data collection methods (Section 3.6) partially resolved these issues. 
In brief, this research carefully addressed the most common methodological critique.   
3.10. Ethical considerations  
Taking into account the sensitivity of the research topic, particular importance was granted to 
ethical issues. In line with the recommendations for management research (Bell and Bryman, 
2007; Bryman and Bell, 2007), this research addressed the following considerations: harm to 
participants, dignity, informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, anonymity, deception, 
affiliation, honesty and transparency, reciprocity, and misrepresentation. The discussion below 
reflects on several key procedures, which assured ethicality of this study. 
First, despite active recruitment, the managers were not pressured to join the investigation 
(Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 32; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 190). Before research participation, 
informants received a meticulous description of study purposes, intended use of data, and 
participants’ rights. Each manager provided informed consent for the data collection and tape-
recording (Kvale, 1996, p. 111; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 190). Additionally, during the post-
interview briefing, managers were encouraged to ask for study-related information.  
I specifically focused on minimizing subjectivity and selectivity of the research findings (Bell 
and Bryman, 2007, p. 71; Kvale, 1996, p. 111; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 194). Thus, the 
participants regularly received transparent information on the research progress. Detailed 
summaries of the findings were presented to the informants, before the publication of the thesis. 
The data collected during this research were used only in a way to which the informants agreed. 
For instance, I rejected the proposition to publish a scientific article, which was not previously 
agreed with the study participants.  
The issues of anonymity and confidentiality were treated with extreme caution (Bell and 
Bryman, 2007, p. 71; Kvale, 1996, p. 111, 114; Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 183–201). Thus, the 
study reports did not reveal names of participant companies and persons, as well as any other 
persons and companies, which the interviewees mentioned. In some cases, other contextual data, 
such as the category of manufactured products, were also anonymized. Finally, the data 
provided by participants were stored in a manner assuring anonymity, by applying password 
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protection for the interview transcript files, and separating the original tape records from the 
transcripts and memos (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 335).  
3.11. Conclusion  
In summary, following the recommendations of Perry (2002), this chapter was written in a 
manner “analogous to an accountant laying an audit trail” (p. 33). Thus, a thorough description 
of the applied methodological procedures was provided. The chapter justified the choice of the 
methodology and gave an in-depth description of the sampling, data collection, and analysis. I 
documented in details techniques of in-depth interviewing and grounded theory coding. 
Moreover, the chapter reflected on the measures, which were employed to support the 
trustworthiness and ethicality of the conducted investigation. The next part of the thesis presents 
the results of applied methodology and describes the findings of this research. 
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4. Data analysis  
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the methodology for data collection and analysis. The objective 
of this part is to demonstrate the findings of the research. To preserve objectivity, this chapter 
is limited to representation and analysis of the data only (Perry, 2002, p. 35). Thus, as shown in 
Figure 10, this chapter consists of nine parts.   
Figure 10: Outline of Chapter 4  
 
Source: Own compilation 
First, Section 4.2 provides descriptive information on the study participants and their firms. 
Section 4.3 describes the strategies applied for data presentation. Then, Section 4.4 outlines the 
coding frame, as an essential finding of this research. The next three sections describe research 
results, arranged according to the research questions. Each of these sections includes 
longitudinal elements of the investigation, depicting changes, which occurred between the two 
stages of data collection. Finally, Section 4.8 summarizes results of the data analysis. 
4.2. Description of the respondents  
The research sample included 34 managers representing 28 German companies. Considering 
specificity of the research problem, the study mainly described categories, rather than single 
firms or participants (Schreier, 2012, pp. 223–224). Nevertheless, following the 
recommendations of Perry (2002, p. 34), Figure 11 provides a brief description of the sample.  
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Figure 11: Study sample 
 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data   
The sample attributes correspond to the strategies of purposeful sampling (Section 3.5). Thus, 
participants represented all levels of management, firms of various sizes, with different levels 
of internationalization, and supplying products to both OEM and aftermarket customers27. 
Additionally, the study focused on firms representing exclusively two industries, namely 
automotive (17 firms) and mobile machinery (17 firms) suppliers.  
When possible, the findings display the differences in data patterns, which occurred between 
participants, representing different sample categories (Chapter 4). For instance, the text provides 
comparisons between participants employed by firms of various sizes, representing automotive 
or mobile machinery suppliers, or operating in different customer markets. Such descriptive 
group comparisons (Schreier, 2012, pp. 235–237) aimed to increase the depth of data 
exploration.  
4.3. Data display 
This section describes strategies applied for data presentation, as well as certain stylistic 
specifics of this chapter. Data display can be defined as “an organized, compressed assembly of 
information that permits conclusion drawing and action” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 11). In 
                                                 
27 For the sake of confidentiality, this thesis does not reveal participants’ job titles, as well as specific product 
categories, the number of worldwide subsidiaries, and the exact numbers of firms’ employees. 
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line with Schreier (2012, pp. 220–237), three strategies display the findings of this research: 
continuous text, text matrices/graphs, and numeric matrices/graphs. This thesis applies the 
continuous text to describe categories, demonstrate relationships between them, and provide 
information on the most distinctive findings. The trustworthiness of the text was enhanced with 
rich interview quotations. Such an in-depth representation of qualitative evidence is especially 
relevant for the analysis of the complex research problem addressed by the current thesis. 
Moreover, extensive quotations seem to be particularly relevant for reporting the elite interviews 
(Gillham, 2000, p. 83).  
Miles and Huberman (1994) warned that overreliance on continuous text in data display may 
lead to “hasty, partial, unfounded conclusions” (p. 11). Following their recommendations, I 
supplemented the text with matrices and graphs. In this way, the collected information is 
presented in “immediately accessible, compact form” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 11), which 
facilitated conclusion building and limited researcher’s bias. The thesis includes both qualitative 
style (text) and quantitative style (numeric) matrices and graphs. Text displays are mainly used 
to illustrate categories and summarize information on the coding frame. The numeric matrices 
and graphs facilitate analysis of large data batches and verify analytical honesty (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 253). Thus, absolute frequencies show the number of coding for a particular 
category across interviews (Schreier, 2012, p. 232). For the aims of this research, repetitions 
within one interview are not counted, with absolute figures representing a number of interview 
participants who reflected on a particular theme.  
The research findings are organized according to the categories of the coding frame. A decision 
to apply this strategy, rather than arranging results by individual cases, was determined by 
specifics of the research inquiry and importance of the coding frame as a finding of the thesis 
(Schreier, 2012, pp. 219–220). Additionally, considering the fact that the coding frame primary 
corresponds to the research questions such approach ensured a structured presentation of the 
data (Perry, 2002, p. 26). 
Several stylistic specifics should be mentioned concerning the data presentation. First, italics 
were applied to distinguish interview quotations from the remaining text. To omit confusion 
with words italicized for emphasis, the quotations are marked with reduced script size 11. Next, 
I used back-translation for interview quotations (American Psychological Association, 2013, p. 
32), which were originally in Russian or German. The anonymity of the respondents is ensured 
by indexing each of the interviewees with a numerical label (e.g., Informant 1, Informant 2). 
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The identification of the stage of the interview and a number of the translated quotation 
supplement these labels.28 The original, not translated version of quotations is provided in 
Appendix P. Additionally, some quotations were modified to preserve the criteria of 
confidentiality and anonymity. However, these were minor modifications only, which didn’t 
affect the meaning of quotations. For example, generic word component substitutes specific 
product categories, and the phrase Russian OEMs replaces names of Russian vehicle 
manufacturers. Regarding numeric data displays, information is mostly presented in absolute 
frequencies. However, percentages are used for the findings from the second round of 
interviews, due to the changes in the sample size (Schreier, 2012, p. 236). Finally, despite the 
recommendations of Hegde (2010, p. 100), a decision was taken not to mark language mistakes 
in quotations, since none of the study participants was a native English speaker. 
4.4. Coding frame   
Given the exploratory-descriptive nature of this research, the coding frame is an important 
outcome of the data analysis (Schreier, 2012, p. 218). Despite the fact that main categories of 
the coding frame were constructed primary in a concept-driven manner, their final structure was 
determined throughout the interview process, and subcategories were built in a data-driven 
manner of grounded theory (Schreier, 2012, pp. 84–90).  Several rounds of iterative coding 
gradually shaped the structure of the coding frame (Section 3.7). Figure 12 shows the overview 
of the final coding frame.  
As seen from the Figure 12, seven main categories served as a basis for constructing a coding 
frame. Six of these categories are related to the research questions and represent the core inquiry 
of the thesis. An additional main category included diverse themes, which were identified by 
interviewees as important but were not directly related to the research questions.  
The first two main categories (competitor’s attributes and threat) are based on the theory of 
competitive perception (Section 2.3.2.1) and corresponded to research question 1. Categories 
three (entry barriers), four (competitive response), and five (determinants of differentiation) 
were influenced by the theory of competitive reaction (Section 2.3.2.2), entry barriers (Section 
2.3.2.3) and related studies on competition with EMCs (2.2.1). Category six (institutional 
conditions) stems from the institution-based view of strategy (Section 2.3.2.4) and related 
                                                 
28 For example, quotation marked as Participant 3-II-2 represents a statement of Participant 3 from the follow-up 
stage of data collection, translation number 2. 
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studies on Russian institutional environment (Section 2.2.2). The last main category is purely 
data-driven and was identified from the interviews by following the constant comparative 
method of the grounded theory (Sections 3.6 and 3.7). 
Figure 12: Overview of the coding frame 
 
Note:  RQ stands for research question 
Source: Own compilation 
Each of the main categories consists of several sub-categories, which were identified in a 
concept- and data-driven way (Schreier, 2012). For instance, the first main category deals with 
the perceptions of participants regarding attributes of competitors from emerging markets. The 
literature review determined 11 attributes, which managers commonly use to identify 
competitors (Section 2.3.2.1). Nevertheless, the interviews revealed that German managers 
referred only to some of them, when reflecting on the EMCs. Consequently, after several trials 
and modifications, the main category of competitor’s attributes included only the subcategories 
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of pricing, product style, company positioning, size, reputation, resources used and geographic 
scope. All remaining sub-categories, except those related to additional themes, were determined 
in a similar way. The following sections include a detailed description of the categories, related 
absolute frequencies, and relationships between sub-categories.  
4.5.  Research question 1: perceived competition from emerging 
market firms 
To examine the first research question, I analyzed the managerial perceptions regarding 
competition with EMCs in the context of the Russian market. In line with the literature (Section 
2.3.2.1), the participants were prompted to describe perceived competition by reflecting on the 
constructs of competitive threat and attributes of EMCs (Figure 13). The interviews revealed 
that perceived attributes of EMCs could be classified into seven categories. Detailed data display 
on each of these categories is provided in Section 4.5.1. Turning to the competitive threat, 
German managers typically described it by hostility associated with competitive actions and 
consequences of these actions for profitability and revenue of their firms (Section 4.5.2).  
Figure 13: Constructs depicting perceived competition from EMCs 
 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data and reviewed literature 
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4.5.1. Attributes of competitors  
The first theme analyzed within the research question 1 refers to the attributes of emerging 
market rivals. Participants commonly agreed that EMCs could be segmented into distinctive 
groups of companies following similar strategies (cf. remarks on strategic and competitive 
groups in Sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2). A majority of managers considered competitor’s country 
of origin as a key attribute explaining differences in the strategic orientation among emerging 
market firms. As a result, this research identified the following three groups29 of EMCs:  
1. Suppliers from the former Soviet Union – manufacturers, which originate mainly from Russia, 
with few exceptions from Belarus and Ukraine30. This category includes both, traditional 
supplier companies and vertically integrated OEMs performing operations typically conducted 
by supplier firms.  
2. Suppliers from Asia – manufacturers, which originate from the emerging Far East Asian 
economies, especially China31. These companies operated in the Russian market directly, as 
well as via trading organizations within private label agreements.   
3. Suppliers from Turkey – manufacturers, which originate from Turkey. 
Table 5 illustrates attributes, which German managers used to identify each group of EMCs.  
Table 5: Illustration of key attributes of emerging market competitors 
Attribute 
name 
Definition Illustrative quotes 
Pricing Pricing practice of a competitor “Then I see that there are offers from 
China, which issue prices with which even 
Russian producers cannot keep up” 
(Informant 27-I-1). 
Product style Industry-defined or functional attributes of 
competitor’s offering 
“They copied our products, they bring 
them into the market, but anyway, they face 
their problems, they are not as reliable as 
ours” (Informant 18-I).   
Company 
positioning 
The value proposition, which a competitor 
offers to the customer 
“Chinese products have better quality and 
are cheaper than Russian ones. But 
Russian products maintain their positions 
because they are considered as domestic 
products, and also they are close to the 
region” (Informant 21-I-114). 
                                                 
29 In line with Reger and Huff (1993), identified cognitive competitor groups represent rather “fuzzy sets” (p. 116). 
Nevertheless, they provided convenient and practically applicable models for depicting industry competition. 
30This strategic group is further referred to as Russian suppliers 
31This strategic group is further referred to as Chinese suppliers 
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Size Relative and absolute size of a competitor, 
measured by revenue, production capacity, as 
well as the number of customers, employees, 
and/or locations 
“Yes, if you look for the Belorussian 
competitor, it was a big company, a very 
big company, and still a big company with 
several thousand of workforce working 
there” (Informant 18-I). 
Reputation General perceptions of customers regarding 
competitor and his products  
“To say for a management for example 
‘Well, I am working with Chinese partners’ 
it’s not as nice as to say and to show like 
to work with for example with big 
American or European companies” 
(Informant 18-I). 
Resources 
used 
Application by a competitor of particular 
resources, including raw materials, suppliers, 
allies, facilities, employee skills, or processes 
“And maybe, 20..10 years ago they didn’t 
care much about their costs, but the costs 
in Russia are growing in all areas. It’s not 
only energy, it’s material costs, salaries.” 
(Informant 13-I). 
Geographic 
scope 
Geographic characteristics of customers served 
by a competitor 
“In this scheme, [OEM’s] purchasing can 
never ever qualify a Russian supplier. . . . 
Because, if they cannot export, because 
they are not competitive in the export, then 
the sourcing table will always reject them. 
Because who would go for the length of 
qualifying a supplier that can only do 
Russia” (Informant 3-I). 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature (Section 2.3.2.1) 
Perceptions of participants on each strategic group of competitors, structured according to the 
identified attributes are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Attributes of emerging market competitors 
Attribute Russian competitors Chinese competitors Turkish competitors 
Pricing Russian firms typically operated 
at prices considerably lower than 
those at which the German firms 
did. However, in a few cases, the 
price gap was low and/or rapidly 
decreasing. Among the main 
factors contributing to low pricing 
were savings on differentiation, 
absence of costs for operating in 
foreign markets, access to cheap 
local resources, specific profit-
generation models, low return-on-
investment targets, and 
devaluation of Russian currency 
Prices of Chinese firms were 
dramatically lower than 
prices of the German 
suppliers. This was 
explained by lower costs, 
due to savings on 
differentiation and 
technological innovations, 
high-scale operations, access 
to cheap resources, and 
support of Chinese 
government. 
Prices of Turkish firms 
were only somehow lower 
than prices of the German 
firms. This was explained 
by savings on 
differentiation and 
technological 
innovations, access to 
cheap resources, and 
economies of scale. 
Product style The managers perceived Russian 
products as technologically 
obsolete, mature, low skill- and 
technology-intensive, aimed at 
mass-market segments, and direct 
imitations of components 
produced by Western firms. The 
Chinese products were often 
described as unsafe, not 
corresponding to basic 
quality requirements, direct 
imitations, labor-intensive, 
material-intensive, aimed at 
mass-market segments, and 
Parts produced by Turkish 
suppliers were mainly 
identified as good enough 
products. However, some 
participants defined them 
as low-end products, with 
low skill intensity, based 
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product quality was typically 
perceived as either good enough 
or lacking basic quality 
requirements. 
lacking adequate marketing 
support (no-name brands).  
Nevertheless, Chinese 
suppliers were perceived as 
capable of producing 
products at various quality 
levels. 
on imitations from 
Western suppliers.  
Company 
positioning 
Key benefits offered by Russian 
suppliers stemmed from their 
geographical location (e.g., 
compliance with localization and 
import substitution stimuli, local 
product availability, local service 
support, smooth interactions with 
local customers, local product 
adaptation, and informal 
customer relationships), strategic 
agility (flexibility in decision-
making, time-to-market for new 
product development, risk-taking 
propensity, and speed of reaction 
to market volatility), and low 
prices. 
Customers mainly benefited 
from low prices for Chinese 
products. In some cases, 
customer value resulted from 
products with good enough 
quality level, strategic 
agility, and short lead times. 
Additionally, the follow-up 
data collection suggested 
that Russian customers could 
potentially benefit from 
work with Chinese firms due 
to the current orientation of 
the Russian government on 
closer cooperation with 
emerging economies. 
Russian customers mainly 
benefited from good 
enough quality of Turkish 
products, the high 
strategic agility of Turkish 
suppliers (short time-to-
market, high risk 
propensity, and speed of 
reaction to market 
volatility), and, in some 
cases, from smooth 
customer interaction. 
 
Size Russian firms were typically 
smaller than German ones in 
terms of production capacity and 
number of employees. 
Nevertheless, some participants 
also reported on larger Russian 
competitors, with high market 
share, especially among vertically 
integrated OEMs. Competitors 
with a large number of employees 
typically suffered from low 
production effectiveness and a 
declining market share. 
Despite large production 
capacities, Chinese 
competitors typically had a 
low market share in Russia. 
This was mainly explained 
by their orientation on 
domestic or other foreign 
markets. However, the 
majority of participants 
expressed concerns about a 
growing share of Chinese 
suppliers in Russia. 
German managers mainly 
described Turkish firms as 
relatively small in terms 
of production capacity 
and number of employees. 
Regarding the market 
penetration, participants 
reported on companies 
with various market 
shares.  
 
Reputation Despite the high brand awareness 
among local customers, Russian 
firms had a negative reputation of 
companies with weak 
performance and substandard or 
outdated products. However, 
several interviewees reported that 
Russian brands were also 
benefiting from positive brand 
associations related to consumer’s 
nationalism.  
Russian customers often had 
negative perceptions about 
Chinese products and overall 
performance of Chinese 
firms, which was rooted in 
their previous unsuccessful 
experience, negative 
associations, and low brand 
recognition. Nevertheless, 
private label products 
utilized a pseudo-premium 
image. 
Half of the informants 
proposed that Turkish 
firms benefitted from 
positively perceived 
product quality and firm’s 
performance, rooted in 
their supplies to global 
OEMs. Another half 
suggested that companies 
from Turkey still suffered 
from low brand 
recognition among 
Russian buyers. 
Resources  
used 
Russian firms benefited from 
access to cheap labor and energy, 
which, however, was rapidly 
eroding. Additionally, they often 
relied on manufacturing 
equipment and qualified technical 
personnel, which remained from 
Despite eroding cost 
advantages, access to low 
labor costs was still the main 
resource attribute of Chinese 
suppliers. In some cases, 
they also benefited from 
cheap raw materials, modern 
Turkish firms mainly 
relied on modern 
equipment and access to 
Western innovations, 
transferred from global 
firms operating in Turkey. 
Participants also reported 
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the Soviet times. Nevertheless, 
due to limited access to capital 
required for modernization, 
innovative capacities of Russian 
firms were insufficient for the 
sustainable introduction of 
competitive products. 
equipment, technological 
spillovers from Western 
firms operating in China, and 
lower overhead costs. 
on cases when Turkish 
firms benefited from 
access to locational cost 
advantages (esp. labor 
costs). 
Geographic 
scope 
Russian suppliers focused 
exclusively on serving the needs 
of the local market, lacked 
international service network and 
a global footprint in deliveries. 
Consequently, interviewees 
suggested that Russian 
competitors were not competitive 
in deliveries to global OEMs, as 
well as in supplies for machines 
and vehicles produced for export 
needs. 
Chinese companies 
primarily focused on other 
geographic markets than 
Russia, namely China, India, 
North America, and Europe. 
This resulted in their low 
commitment to the Russian 
market, manifested by weak 
customer relationships and 
poor local service support 
(e.g., repair, delivery, and 
marketing). 
Turkish suppliers 
included both, firms that 
were highly focused on 
the Russian market (e.g., 
wide local customer 
network) as well as 
companies with low 
commitment to the 
Russian market. 
 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature (Section 2.3.2.1) 
Totally 32 participants reflected on competition from Chinese suppliers, 28 informants reported 
on competitors originating from Russia and only eight managers mentioned Turkish firms. The 
analysis showed that Russian suppliers utilized customer proximity, local market expertise, and 
access to cheap resources, but generally had the lowest product quality and operational 
efficiency among all EMCs. Chinese competitors primary benefited from access to cheap 
resources, economies of scale, and short lead times, but were characterized by low product 
quality, poor branding, and lack of augmented product differentiation. Turkish companies 
combined satisfactory product quality, strategic agility, and access to cheap resources. As seen 
from the Table 6, Turkish and Chinese suppliers shared several similar attributes, compared to 
Russian firms. Nevertheless, most of the participants who mentioned Turkish suppliers 
considered them as more threatening than other emerging market firms. This can be explained 
by the fact that Turkish firms were often capable of reaching market segments close to those 
served by the German firms. All in all, German managers suggested that Chinese, Russian, and 
Turkish competitors had typically cost-leadership orientation, based on economies of scale, 
access to cheap resources, as well as low investments in differentiation and R&D.  
Changes between stages of data collection. The second round of the interviews revealed that 
the perceptions of German managers regarding attributes of EMCs remained mainly unchanged. 
The only exception is related to pricing and company positioning. Thus, several managers 
suggested that Russian competitors gained a temporary price advantage, due to Ruble 
devaluation. “The price advantage, which Russian producers had, it became particularly high at the 
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peak of currency depreciation” (Informant 20-II-2). At the same time, Ruble fluctuations also 
negatively affected the pricing of Chinese competitors. A possible explanation for this might be 
that Russian Ruble devaluated stronger against Yuan than against Euro between the two stages 
of the data collection. “[Asian manufacturers] started to lose their sole pricing advantage, and in this 
respect became closer to products from developed, rather than from emerging markets” (Informant 20-
II-3). Additionally, some participants underlined that the value proposition of competitors from 
China and especially Russia strengthened due to deteriorated trade relations between the EU 
and Russia, combined with the course of the Russian government on closer economic 
cooperation with China. “Political and economic changes had considerable impact. . . . Customers 
from not only Russia but also global customers started to consider more seriously Chinese and local 
suppliers” (Informant 17-II-4). These aspects are discussed in details in Section 4.7.1. 
4.5.2. Competitive threat 
The competitive threat represents the second theme within research question 1. The majority of 
participants focused on rivals from other developed countries rather than on EMCs. Thus, some 
of the participants, especially the first-line managers, suggested that they were operating in 
different product markets with EMCs. A few interviewees referred to EMCs with a degree of 
superiority and did not recognize them as competitors for their firms. “I don’t know the Russian 
[component] producer, I don’t care about them. Because we are comparing us with this kind of products, 
we saw a few [components], and then we said ‘Ok that is a different world of products’ ” (Informant 
16-I). However, when questioned further, the same participants often provided examples of 
losing revenues or profitability due to activities of these competitors. “We were in contact with 
[the OEM] already but they prefer to import by themselves products from China, very cheap products 
and also they are buying [products] either from their own production or from the Russian market 
themselves” (Informant 16-I). 
Based on literature (Section 2.3.2.1) and interviews, the category of perceived threat includes 
two sub-categories: hostility associated with competitive actions of EMCs and consequences of 
these actions for a German firm. Information on a number of interviewees who referred to each 
category can be found in Appendix Q, whereas below is provided a detailed description of the 
identified themes.  
Hostility. Almost all of the study participants agreed that companies from emerging markets 
were typically acting in a hostile manner, by disrupting the conventional rules of competitive 
conduct (Section 2.3.2.1). None of the interviewees recognized that EMCs were concerned with 
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maintaining or improving the profitability level and general structure of the industry. While 
competitors from other developed countries were commonly perceived as following similar 
strategies with the German firms, companies from emerging markets were defined as aiming to 
disrupt the industry equilibrium. Thus, almost all of the participants mentioned that EMCs 
practiced predatory pricing, by setting prices for their products at a significantly lower level 
than accepted in the industry. According to interviewees, predatory pricing of EMCs was mainly 
rooted in their access to low-cost resources and economies of scale, specific models of profit-
generation, low return-on-investment targets, and government subsidies. For instance, as 
mentioned by several participants, Russian companies were able to set low prices for OEM 
deliveries, due to postponed profit-generation. Thus, when operating in the OEM market, 
Russian firms were supplying low-quality parts at prices which the German companies could 
not match. Those parts were typically malfunctioning after the expiry of the warranty period, 
which enabled Russian suppliers to earn profits on replacement sales in the aftermarket.  
They are selling in minus, and then they are earning money at the aftermarket. Because they know 
their products are working maximum one year. And the end-user has to buy, not the OEM. They are 
selling to OEM very cheap, but they know that after one year it will be damaged. . . . That means the 
end-user has to buy that. (Informant 28-I)  
Participants also argued that EMCs frequently abused government support in the competition. 
This conduct was especially valid for Russian firms, which, as suggested by 17 interviewees, 
benefited from localization requirements, import substitution recommendations, and restricted 
access to certain industries. “There is a program of [Russian] government for import substitution. So 
the firms are advised, this is not a law, to search for suppliers from Russia or the CIS, and to minimize 
their purchases in Europe and USA” (Informant 30-II-5). 
At the same time, four participants suggested that the support of Chinese government, such as 
tax exemptions and preferential access to scarce resources partially determined cost benefits of 
Chinese firms. “You even get re-paid tax if you ship your products [from China] to US, America or to 
Europe . . . from point zero on, with the first shipment of the container to Europe, you have an EBIT of 
30%” (Informant 34-I). 
Finally, several participants referred to cases when EMCs were breaking rules of fair 
competition by applying bribes and/or speed money when serving Russian OEM customers. 
“[Corruption] is also an advantage of Russian competitors, which are in completely different position 
than we are. . . . Many Russian competitors have no constraints or can do business using corruption, in 
order to get orders” (Informant 27–I-6).  
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Consequences. The participants noted that EMCs frequently had a negative impact on 
profitability and/or revenues of their firms (cf. remarks on action consequences in the Section 
2.3.2.1). Totally, 15 managers mentioned adverse consequences for profitability, depicted by 
declining profit margins. “One of the influences, of course, is our price level and our pricing itself is 
reducing during the years. So we slightly have to adjust. Still, we can keep some premium pricing, but 
this is reducing step by step” (Informant 2-I). Thus, 12 participants had to provide discounts or 
adjust prices for their products to retain customers approached by EMCs. “Most probably we will 
provide 1-2% [discount], as a symbol of respect for our customer” (Informant 7-I-7). Out of them, 
three informants reported that they had to reduce their prices until or below the level of EMCs. 
“And they gave [Russian supplier] 50% of the share. . . . It ended by us lowering the price, to make it 
amenable to them again to stick with us as single source” (Informant 3-I). Additionally, three 
managers operating in the aftermarket mentioned that activities of EMCs resulted in a general 
decrease in the price level in the industry, forcing the German firms to adjust their prices, despite 
the absence of competition for the same customer segments.  
[EMCs] drop down the price level in the market for everyone. So if a [component] costs, I don’t 
know, I say 100 USD, and they come to the market with [component] for 50 USD more and more 
- the point is that the people don’t see a value in the [component] in general, because they think 
that [it] costs 50, and not 100. (Informant 31-I) 
In turn, the consequence for revenue was the main criteria used by participants for evaluating 
the threat from EMCs. Thus, almost all of the interviewees, when prompted to describe the 
competitive impact, mainly referred to cases and/or likelihood of their customers purchasing 
from EMCs. Here, a sharp variation existed between perceptions of managers representing 
companies operating in the OEM market and the aftermarket. Almost all participants working 
with Russian OEMs recognized instances of losing sales due to activities of EMCs and/or were 
concerned with the future occurrence of such cases. The particularly strong impact was reported 
in supplies to Russian OEMs producing commercial vehicles and mobile machinery. At the 
same time, almost all representatives of companies operating in the aftermarket or supplying to 
subsidiaries of global OEMs in Russia underlined that their market share and sales were not 
affected or only affected to a very limited extent by activities of EMCs. 
If I see the threat on the foreign [semi-knocked-down kits] manufacturers, I do not see the risk 
yet. The quality is not there. . . . If I [see Russian OEM] producing the same truck since 30 years, 
and the customer himself gets the program to sell that product against low-cost Chinese new 
development ones, he has a huge cost pressure. And on this one, we definitely feel it. (Informant 
2-I)             
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Changes between stages of data collection. A major shift in the perceived level of competition 
occurred between two data collection periods. Thus, 85% of the managers mentioned an 
intensified competitive threat from EMCs. Particularly strong changes took place in supplies to 
Russian OEMs, which can be explained by the developments in state trade policies. Meanwhile, 
several participants mentioned a growth of adverse consequences from activities of EMCs also 
in the deliveries to Russian subsidiaries of global OEMs and in the aftermarket. “Our global 
customers started considering localization in Russia more seriously and give a chance to Russian 
suppliers to participate in their purchasing volumes” (Informant 17-II-8).  
An important change also occurred in the perceived level of hostility between two data collection 
periods. Thus, the majority of the interviewees referred to increased competitive threat due to 
protectionism policies implemented by the Russian government. “For the Belarus, it always 
existed. However, in Russia in the meantime, this is a second word in the conversation in the import 
department at the moment - import restriction” (Informant 27–II-9). Particularly strong changes 
occurred in supplies to Russian OEMs, which was explained by their interrelatedness with the 
Russian government. “Russian machine-building companies are closely integrated with the state – 
they regularly communicate with ministers, committees and so forth” (Informant 9-II-10).  
In contrast, aftermarket customers were perceived as less dependent on Russian government in 
their purchasing decisions. “For automotive aftermarket - they are wholesalers. These guys are 
importing from all over the world. So they are not thinking so political. Very pragmatic, always take the 
best choice . . . not so much political or strategical” (Informant 10-II). Finally, in the second round 
of interviews, 40% of participants referred not only to Russian but also to Chinese firms 
benefiting from Russian trade policy. “It is just that our main customer is directly the Kremlin. So 
the Kremlin gave the directive either to use local products from Russia or to buy competitor products 
from emerging markets - like from China” (Informant 1-I). 
4.5.3. Summary of findings on research question 1 
In conclusion, the analysis showed that the managers mainly focused on rivals from other 
developed countries rather than on EMCs. The participants perceived that suppliers from 
emerging markets had typically cost-leadership orientation, based on economies of scale, access 
to cheap resources, as well as low investments in differentiation and global presence. Turkish 
and Chinese suppliers shared similar attributes in the eyes of participants when compared to 
Russian firms. The managers evaluated the perceived threat from EMCs with criteria of hostility 
and consequences for revenue and profitability. German managers interpreted activities of 
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EMCs as highly hostile, and often as having negative implications for the profitability of their 
firms. The strongest competition occurred in deliveries to Russian commercial vehicle and 
mobile machinery manufacturers, rather than in the aftermarket and deliveries to subsidiaries of 
global manufacturers. The interviewees mainly evaluated the threat from EMCs by 
consequences for revenue. Most frequently, the study participants referred to the loss of 
revenues due to activities of Russian suppliers, which benefited from local market 
embeddedness and access to cheap resources. The follow-up study registered an increased 
competitive threat from EMCs, especially from Russian firms. At the same time, attributes of 
competitors from emerging markets and capabilities of the German firms remained virtually 
unchanged. 
4.6. Research question 2: competitive reactions to emerging market 
firms  
The second research question investigates the decisions taken by the German companies in 
response to competitive actions of EMCs. In the light of the attributes of the related studies 
(Section 2.2.3), the research focused on defensive competitive reactions only. While competitive 
reactions were typically based on a combination of several strategies and tactics, three broad 
alternatives regarding the direction of competitive reaction were identified from the interviews 
and previous literature (Section 2.3.2.2) - to ignore observed actions of entrants, to retaliate 
against them, and to accommodate them. Section 4.6.1 explores nine conditions, which 
determined the lack of competitive response, namely entry barriers. Following the remarks of 
interviewees, particular attention is given to the differentiation barrier and conditions 
determining its height. Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 describe various forms of retaliation and 
accommodation. Figure 14 provides an overview of the identified competitive reactions. 
4.6.1. Ignoring a blockaded entry 
The first theme investigated within research question 2 describes the conditions leading to a lack 
of competitive reactions to EMCs. Both, interviews and literature on entry barriers (Section 
2.3.2.3), showed that managers typically ignore actions of competitors, which pose a low impact 
on the revenue of their firms. In some cases, EMCs were penetrating the market and affecting 
revenues of the German firms, but managers ignored their activities since they did not consider 
them as a sustainable threat. For example, several managers mentioned that they did not react 
when being replaced by Chinese competitors since they expected that these companies would 
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either increase their prices due to growing costs in China or will fail to provide appropriate 
quality. “Sometimes it happens that we return because the quality is not that good or technologically 
the [components] are entirely inappropriate” (Informant 14-I-11). 
Figure 14: Classification of identified competitive reactions 
 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data and reviewed literature (Sections 2.2.1, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3) 
The probability of ignoring was largely determined by the height of barriers, which blockaded 
entry of EMCs (cf. Section 2.3.2.3). Interviewees typically referred to entry barriers as to 
conditions, which impeded entry and post-entry performance for challenger firms. “What I think 
European manufacturers should do, not to lose clients and gain new ones, is establishing conditions, 
under which a customer is not willing to switch a supplier” (Informant 7-I-12). Table 7 contains an 
illustrative description of entry barriers, which interviewees identified as protecting them from 
EMCs. Descriptions of entry barriers were drawn from the literature review (Section 2.3.2.3) 
and adjusted according to the interview data. Information on the number of participants who 
referred to each barrier can be found in Appendix R.  
The majority of study participants referred to various forms of core offering, augmented 
product, and image differentiation as to the key entry barriers protecting their companies from 
EMCs. Among them, the particular importance was assigned to various dimensions of the core 
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offering differentiation, such as product quality, delivery performance, and product 
maintenance. Augmented product differentiation played a major role in the deliveries to OEM 
customers, whereas in the aftermarket it was mainly limited to marketing support, financial, and 
logistic services. As noted by one of the aftermarket players “We have nothing special when you 
speak about service, no. . . . Ok, we are training our partners, of course, give some knowledge, but this 
is not a big thing” (Informant 33-I).  
Table 7: Entry barriers blocking competition from EMCs 
Entry Barrier Description Illustrative quotation 
1. Capital 
requirements 
Need to conduct large-scale 
investments to enter and maintain 
competitiveness in the market. 
“The manufacturing is very much driven by 
expensive tooling, highly automized with robots, 
expensive machineries” (Informant 10-I). 
2. Experience 
and know-how 
Advantages from company-specific 
and highly tacit knowledge, primary 
embedded in firm employees 
“Our operational efficiency, or operational 
excellence that we should have in Germany [are] at 
the better level than South-East Asia” (Informant 
25-I). 
3. Location Advantages of a favorable location of 
the incumbent firm (excl. advantages 
determined by government policy)  
“[Our company] can provide the service within the 
lead-time of 2 weeks. In China, you can forget 2 
weeks” (Informant 34-I). 
 
 
4. Economies 
of scale and 
scope 
Advantages obtained due to high 
production volumes, high bargaining 
power against suppliers, or 
diversified product range  
“Vital is a total output of a part, let’s say yearly, or 
monthly by a certain manufacturer. The higher is 
the output of the same parts by a manufacturer – the 
cheaper they are compared to other 
manufacturers” (Informant 7-I-13). 
5. Access to 
strategic 
resources 
Preferential access to unique or cost-
optimizing strategic resources 
“We have our own receipts, and our own 
production compound of rubber … and I think in 
this field also, [OEM] is seeing this that we have a 
big advantage because they can be sure that our 
rubber is according to the specification” (Informant 
6-I). 
6. Government 
policy 
State limitations on market access for 
new entrants and/or state support 
provided for incumbent firms 
“I think the government saw this need in the 
beginning of the 90s when Chinese products really 
ran into Russia like nothing. And so they said ‘ok, 
we need to have some certificate, certification, a 
process, to prevent these Chinese products to get 
into Russia so easily’ ” (Informant 1-I). 
7. Customer 
switching costs 
Costs, which buyers face when 
switching from incumbent to new 
entrant 
“But actually it is not easy to evaluate some Chinese 
supplier – this involves costs of switching to another 
product, and they are not low” (Informant 22-II-
14). 
8. Core 
offering 
differentiation 
Customer loyalty and brand 
awareness, which result from core 
dimensions of the offering 
“The only fact that they did not use [Chinese] 
products were quality issues. I know exactly the 
point - it was only the quality issue” (Informant 18-
II). 
9. Augmented 
product 
differentiation 
Customer loyalty and brand 
awareness, which are based on the 
auxiliary services and benefits 
supporting core offering 
“We are offering a complete system solution . . . we 
can supply all products. Everything from one hand. 
And I believe this is the biggest advantage of [our 
company], compared with [Russian competitor] 
that if we are sitting together with the customer we 
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are offering a solution, not a product” (Informant 
28-I). 
 
10. Image 
differentiation 
Customer loyalty and brand 
awareness, which stem from the value 
of brand in the eyes of the customers 
“Made in Germany is seen as a quality sign in 
Russia, not only in Russia, it’s worldwide” 
(Informant 5-I). 
 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature 
In competition with non-Russian suppliers, the German companies were highly relying on 
localized elements of differentiation, including local product maintenance, customer proximity, 
financial advisory, and logistic services. “Russian customers they need local support, they need local 
face-to-face people, they need local service. And Chinese manufacturers are not offering it till now” 
(Informant 28-I). Finally, the German suppliers frequently utilized image differentiation, 
especially the one based on positive country-of-origin effects. “I think that nobody has canceled 
an expression Made in Germany. Everyone knows it till now. . . . Everyone is still very familiar with 
quality and reliability of German products” (Informant 24-I-15). Several participants suggested that 
this barrier was particularly efficient in competition with Chinese firms, due to widespread 
negative associations towards products originating from China. “When the name ‘China’ is 
pronounced, many engineers and purchasers sniff at it. That means the Chinese more and more get a 
worsening reputation” (Informant 27–I-16). 
The managers often connected differentiation with access to unique resources (e.g., exclusive 
technologies and components), customer switching costs, accumulated experience, and know-
how. Some interviewees underlined that these barriers, along with the capital requirements for 
R&D, served as foundation of differentiation. “There are always these things like - are they future-
capable? Are they innovative? Of course, [our company], with a big R&D overhead in Germany, is 
always in the top position” (Informant 3-I).  
Considering importance, which German managers assigned to the differentiation barriers, 
additional analysis investigated the industry conditions, which determined the height of these 
barriers. The interviews showed that customer price sensitivity, stage of the product life cycle, 
and criticality of the component were key determinants of differentiation barriers.   
Customer price sensitivity. OEM and aftermarket customers could be divided according to 
their level of price sensitivity into premium, mid-range, and low-end segments. The respondents 
agreed that the height of the differentiation barrier decreased parallel to the growth of customer 
price sensitivity. “We divide market in four segments. M1 is upper market segment, where price is high, 
but quality is high also, M2 is less price and less quality, M3 is middle, and M4 is very cheap price and 
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low quality” (Informant 5-I). Table 8 includes examples of customers, which typically 
constituted each market segment. 
Table 8: Segmentation of OEM and aftermarket customers according to price sensitivity 
Market 
Segment Example of OEM customers Examples of aftermarket customers 
Premium  Subsidiaries of OEMs from advanced economies 
 Russian OEMs producing vehicles and machines 
aimed exclusively for export                                                                                      
 Russian OEMs competing for differentiation-
driven final customers  
 Russian OEMs producing special vehicles and 
machines (new models and prototypes, small-
scale, niche, and customized vehicles and 
machines) 
 Intermediary  firms, which serve 
owners of new (under warranty and 
recently released from warranty) 
personal vehicles with global 
brands 
 
Mid-range  Russian OEMs, where design of vehicles and 
machines is partially determined by OEMs from 
advanced economies (joint ventures and 
licensing agreements) 
 OEMs with decision-making positions occupied 
by Western expat specialists 
 Russian OEMs aiming to compete for customers 
with moderate quality requirements 
 Russian OEMs producing vehicles and machines 
aimed at both, export and Russian market 
(combined versions) 
 Intermediary  firms, which serve 
owners of moderately used 
personal vehicles with global 
brands 
 Intermediary  firms, which serve 
owners of foreign commercial 
vehicles 
 
Low-end  Russian OEMs producing vehicles and machines 
aimed for mass, price-sensitive segments (state 
purchases, traditional and outdated models, 
large-scale production of standardized 
machines) 
 Russian OEMs competing for customers which 
typically prefer used vehicles with Western 
brands or new vehicles with Russian and 
Chinese brands 
 Intermediary  firms, which serve 
owners of used personal and 
commercial vehicles  
 Intermediary  firms, which serve 
owners of new personal and 
commercial vehicles with Russian 
and Chinese brands  
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature 
Stage of the product life cycle. The managers suggested that the market for maturing product 
categories was characterized by increased homogeneity, low importance of proprietary know-
how, declined level of skill intensity, important role of costs in product competitiveness, 
intensified price competition, low switching costs, and consequently lower opportunities for 
differentiation (cf. product cycle theory of Vernon (1966) in the Section 2.3.1.4). “There is a 
group of products which can be related to commodities, as marketing specialists say. Everyone has 
learned to manufacture them. . . . And competition in this segment has increased indeed” (Informant 9-
I-17). As suggested by one of the interviewees, an exception was the category of technologically 
advanced products. Such products in the market growth stage had limited opportunities for 
differentiation since customers were mainly not yet familiar with industry standards. “We are in 
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the phase of an early adoption in these devices in the market. And the market is confused” (Informant 
25-II). 
Criticality of the component. The interviews showed that the height of differentiation barrier 
was often determined by the role, which a particular component played in overall safety, 
functioning, prestige, external appearance, or comfort of a vehicle. “And we have a selected 
number of competitors because they do not entrust [crucial for functioning component] to everybody 
and anybody” (Informant 3-I). 
Other widely mentioned entry barriers stemmed from location factors. Location-related 
considerations had three major impacts on the competitiveness of the German firms. First, this 
aspect determined high customer switching costs for subsidiaries of global OEMs in Russia. 
Representatives of the German suppliers believed that such global customers would be reluctant 
to switch to Russian competitors since their purchasing decisions were taken in corporate 
headquarters and for global volumes. “In the central office [the global OEM] meets and discusses 
with the supplier volumes for China, Russia, USA, EU. . . . And such cherry picking, buying something 
special for Russia. . . . I do not think they are doing this” (Informant 9-I-18). Meanwhile, Russian 
suppliers typically lacked a global footprint, which limited their capability to conduct worldwide 
deliveries to global OEMs. “If they cannot export, because they are not competitive in the export, then 
the sourcing table will always reject them. Because who would go for the length of qualifying a supplier 
that can only do Russia” (Informant 3-I). Nevertheless, as suggested by several interviewees, this 
barrier was lower for global OEMs, which generated a significant share of their revenues in 
Russia and consequently pursued localization in Russia. “The [Global OEM] as you know that 
currently controls the [Russian OEM], jointly it is a rather big manufacturer. . . . And for this volume, 
they, of course, focus on special solutions, local suppliers” (Informant 9-I-19). Second, the proximity 
of the German suppliers to worldwide subsidiaries of global OEMs resulted in a high installed 
base, which stimulated aftermarket sales. “Because when I have a big installed base from the OEM, 
it’s very easy for me also to sell [components] in the aftermarket” (Informant 33-I). Third, the 
German firms with localized manufacturing were partially protected from Chinese and Turkish 
suppliers by the Russian government policy, import and currency barriers, as well as 
transportation costs. “If our localized share in Ruble is at least 50%, then we become less dependent 
on exchange rate fluctuations, and accordingly, our customer evaluates as lower risks associated with 
Euro exchange rate fluctuations” (Informant 9-I-20). However, the same factors typically 
deteriorated positions of the German firms, related to the Russian suppliers. “Till you bring [the 
Data analysis    113 
 
product] from Germany you will spend much money. You will spend 10% of customs duty, and you will 
spend 18% VAT” (Informant 19-I-21).  
With several exceptions, cost-enhancing barriers, such as access to cheap resources, economies 
of scale and scope played a low role in competition with EMCs. This specific can be attributed 
to the competitive advantage of EMCs on cost-related dimensions (Section 4.5.1). For instance, 
one of the interviewees suggested that scale economies, which were typically decisive in 
competition with Western firms, had limited efficiency in competition with Chinese companies. 
“Particularly in the market [for our products] vital is a total output of a part. . . . However, it is hard 
for me to say now why Asian [suppliers] provided lower prices” (Informant 7-I-22). 
Finally, none of the participants reflected on advantages gained from blocking access to the 
distribution channels (Section 2.3.2.3). Thus, despite importance assigned to strong distributor 
relationships and clear distribution policy, participants proposed that Russian wholesalers 
typically practiced multiple sourcing, which also included deliveries from EMCs.  
In majority of cases, the companies already starting his own distribution with the number of 
brands, and they are trying to play in different markets. If we are dividing the market by 4 
segment, the customers are trying to play not only in one segment, they are trying to play at least 
in 2 or 3 segments immediately. (Informant 5-I) 
Changes between stages of data collection. The second round of interviews revealed that shifts 
in the institutional environment decreased the height of differentiation- and location-related 
barriers protecting the German firms from the EMCs. Thus, some participants suggested that 
intensified localization pressure imposed by the Russian government neutralized switching costs 
for subsidiaries of global OEMs operating in Russia. “[Global OEMs] provide [them] with equal 
chances. Before it was not like that, we had priority. They talked to Russian suppliers just to remain 
polite. Now there are strict tender conditions, and they have a chance to take part too” (Informant 17-
II-23). On the other hand, a worsened macroeconomic situation in Russia lowered the role of 
differentiation for local customers. “It is simple calculation – if you have 100 Ruble, and before you 
could buy a good product for this money, and today for 100 Ruble you can buy an only bad product, but 
you need it – what will you do” (Informant 24-II-24). 
Consequently, the majority of interviewees in the follow-up stage of the study suggested that 
access to unique resources, including unique technologies and patents, turned into a key entry 
barrier protecting them from the EMCs. “If you have a unique offering in the product, which nobody 
can beat – it is easier. So with unique technologies or unique product features you can feel more 
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confident” (Informant 9-II-25). In short, given the deteriorated height of entry barriers, managers 
reported on intensified retaliation and accommodation in the follow-up interviews.   
4.6.2. Retaliation  
Retaliation is the second theme of research question 2. As suggested by literature (Section 
2.3.2.2) and interviews, retaliation occurs when entry barriers are too low to deter competitors, 
or when managers perceive that the threat posed by competitors is of a sustainable nature. In 
line with the definition in Section 2.3.2.2, retaliation embraces competitive reactions, which 
deliberately32 aim to worsen the competitive position of EMCs, after33 their market entry. Table 
9 provides information about a number of participants, who applied certain forms of post-entry 
retaliation, as well as a brief description of each reaction.  
Table 9: Categories of retaliation reported by the interviewees 
Response 
reaction 
Description No. of 
participants 
Introduction 
of stripped-
down products 
Introduction of new products by dropping down certain features and services 
of an existing offering 
3 
Captive 
offshoring 
Moving production of products and services out of the home country to 
subsidiaries abroad to benefit from location (e.g., access to cheap local 
resources, overcoming trade barriers, customer vicinity), while maintaining 
control of business activities  
1 (24) 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
Delegation of a significant share of a firm’s production activities to other 
companies located in a foreign country, which specialize in those activities 
and can thereby perform them at lower costs 
0 (8) 
Other 
measures of 
operational 
effectiveness 
Optimization of production techniques, (e.g., production automation, 
equipment modernization), implementation of cost-cutting programs, 
optimization of outbound logistics, and capacity utilization  
8 
Core offering 
differentiation 
A set of actions aimed to reach uniqueness in the core dimensions of the 
offering, including product quality, product range, delivery performance, and 
product maintenance 
34 
Augmented 
product 
differentiation 
A set of actions aimed to reach uniqueness through auxiliary services and 
benefits supporting the core offering, including customization, bundling 
services, know-how sharing, marketing support services, financial services, 
logistic services, and customer focus 
29 
Image 
differentiation 
A set of actions aimed to enhance the brand value in the eyes of customers 28 
                                                 
32 The majority of actions, which participants described as efficient in competition against EMCs, were introduced 
not with an exclusive aim to counter activities of competitors, but also as a reaction to other industry conditions. 
However, due to importance of these actions in competition, this study treats them as retaliations. 
33 None of the participants mentioned instances of pre-entry retaliation in competition with EMCs. 
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Localization of 
the value 
chain 
Transfer of production, sales, distribution, and service activities out of the 
home country to Russia 
24 
Frugal 
innovations 
Introduction of new or modified products that seek to provide functionality 
valuable for customers from emerging markets, at significantly lower prices 
than offered by existing solutions 
2 
Pricing Direct and indirect price reductions 18 
Comparative 
sales force 
effort 
Repositioning sales efforts aimed at customer retention 9 
Defensive raise 
of switching 
costs 
Purposeful raise of customer switching costs reached through product 
innovations and bundling  
5 
Protection of 
proprietary 
know-how 
Legal measures for protecting trademarks and technological know-how 5 
Unbundling Delivering product systems in a disassembled mode or cutting off augmented 
services 
3 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature (Sections 2.2.1, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.2.3) 
As shown in Figure 3, retaliation includes strategies and tactics, depending on the time and 
resources required to implement the certain measure. Strategies are further classified into those, 
which are applied with the aim of improving costs, differentiation, or both advantages 
simultaneously (Section 2.3.2.2)34. This section first discusses cost-enhancing, differentiation, 
and hybrid retaliation strategies, which were reported by the interviewees, and then proceeds to 
tactical retaliations.  
4.6.2.1. Cost-enhancing strategic retaliation  
The category of cost-enhancing strategic retaliations includes competitive reactions, which 
primary aim to enhance cost positions of German suppliers related to EMCs (Section 2.3.2.2). 
The reported retaliations are categorized into the introduction of stripped-down products and 
measures aimed to increase operational effectiveness, including captive offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing.  
Introduction of stripped-down products. Representatives of three firms reported that they 
applied this strategy, and three other informants considered it as a viable future option. All of 
the participants, which accepted the feasibility of such strategy, represented large firms, mainly 
                                                 
34 Grouping of strategic responses into cost, differentiation, and hybrid was not related to the overall orientation of 
the company, but was used to categorize strategic responses into those which were primary aimed to enhance a 
specific type of competitive advantage 
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operating in the aftermarket. Two of these companies applied offshoring for the production of 
the stripped-down products. “We are trying to catch up our customers bending down in this market 
segment. Providing them our cheap brand. . . . If the [premium brand products] are made in Germany, 
[cheap brand] is produced in our Chinese enterprises” (Informant 5-I). Meanwhile, when 
questioned, the majority of participants rejected this strategy, mainly due to the following four 
arguments. First, many informants expressed concerns regarding brand dilution, which could 
result from the introduction of stripped-down products. Nevertheless, companies, which 
introduced these products, addressed the issue by developing separate brands and independent 
business units. “There are situations where there is one brand, but it has three lines - professional, 
standard, and something else. In my opinion, this is not a correct way. . . . Because it diminishes the 
brand value for consumers” (Informant 29-I-26). 
Second, many participants suggested that the introduction of stripped-down products could lead 
to brand cannibalization. Consequently, interviewees proposed to distinguish their offerings by 
brand, price, quality, and distribution. “We are offering [premium brand] not to the whole market, 
but to the dedicated customers. It is only a few customer are able to sell [premium brand] in the market. 
It is one of the steps to prevent cannibalization” (Informant 5-I). 
Third, several participants rejected the idea of stripped-down products due to a potential lack of 
synergies with their traditional offering and diminishing scale economies. “The specific of our 
business is that we need to produce a product in millions. If we develop a separate article, even with 
lower specifications, but specific and required by one car producer only, the scale effect will be lost” 
(Informant 9-I-27). Nevertheless, one of the participants brought an example of synergies 
between traditional and stripped-down offerings. “We use standardized system within the group, all 
the companies are working with SAP system, and the smaller brands are able to share the supplier bases 
for example. And so they are able to use our sourcing and R&D capacity” (Informant 15-I). 
Finally, some interviewees referred to engineering difficulties associated with the introduction 
of stripped-down products. For instance, they proposed that downgrading features might have a 
critical impact on the safety of some product categories. “[Introduction of the stripped-down 
product] does not work for our products. Because [these] are security products, and you can’t mix it up 
a lot” (Informant 8-I).  
Increasing operational effectiveness. Interviewees reported on an array of cost-minimizing 
measures of operational effectiveness, including optimization of production techniques, (e.g., 
production automation, equipment modernization), cost-cutting programs, optimization of 
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outbound logistics, capacity utilization, captive offshoring, and offshore outsourcing. As 
suggested by the participants, their firms applied the majority of these measures on a daily basis, 
independently from the degree of competitive threat. “Costs optimization and general business 
efficiency. . . . It is a continuous process. So I would not talk about this as of something, which should be 
implemented from scratch. There must be a constant work on costs” (Informant 29-I-28). However, 
the related studies (Section 2.2.1) suggested that especially measures of captive offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing are often applied in the context of competition with EMCs. Therefore, I 
conducted additional analysis of these strategies.  
Captive offshoring35. Totally, 24 respondents represented companies, which had offshore 
production sites, mainly in countries of Western and Eastern Europe, China, Turkey, Mexico, 
Brazil, and India. China was the main destination for offshoring activities within the last 10 
years. Most of the companies with foreign production facilities were large firms. As suggested 
by the interviewees, their firms typically implemented offshoring to achieve proximity to the 
overseas markets. “We have this in China, we have a plant, one plant is producing for automotive, the 
other for [other mobile machinery product category], but only for the local market” (Informant 33-I). 
Only one participant suggested that his firm offshored some components specifically for the 
needs of the Russian market. 
We simplified and made [our products] cheaper by producing certain components in our factory 
in India. . . . Therefore my task is not only to sell, but I also need to visit our factories, search 
where we can produce what, purchase, organize logistics, procurement from India here [to 
Germany] and from here to Russia. (Informant 22-I-32) 
Additionally, managers of eight companies stated that offshore facilities enabled them to 
improve their cost competitiveness due to access to cheaper factor supplies, especially labor. 
When reflecting on captive offshoring and competition with EMCs in the Russian market, 
participants referred to such aspects as country-of-manufacturing effects, the quality level of 
offshored products, and sustainability of offshoring advantage. Concerning country-of-
manufacturing effects, six interviewees reflected on potentially negative impact, which 
offshoring to developing countries might have on the brand value of their companies. For 
instance, one of the participants, who was competing against another Western company 
manufacturing its products in China, suggested that the fact of offshoring was an important sales 
                                                 
35 Offshoring is limited here to the transfer of production activities only, which in strict terms corresponds to the 
concept of production offshoring (Dachs et al., 2006; Javalgi et al., 2009; Berger, 2006, p. 59, 93, 199). 
Additionally, this section does not describe relocation of production to Russia, which is commonly termed as 
localization (e.g., Tomyshev, 2014) and is reviewed in the Section 4.6.2.3. 
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argument. “If I ask ‘Do you know where [US-branded products] are manufactured?’ [customers] say 
‘In America.' And when I tell them that they are produced not in America, but in China, [customers] 
reply ‘Cannot be. You trick us’ ” (Informant 19-I-29). 
Similar to this, several managers have suggested that offshoring to low-wage countries might 
motivate their customers to request price discounts for their products. “I think they would try to 
get a better price then. I don’t think they will be willing to pay the price then as well if it’s produced in 
a different country” (Informant 11-I). However, the majority of participants who reflected on 
potential negative impacts of offshoring did not have the experience of supplying these products 
to the Russian market. When this topic was discussed with representatives of companies, which 
imported their offshored products to Russia, most of them suggested that country-of-design and 
corporate brand typically offset country-of-manufacturing effects. “For them, it does not matter 
where we are producing. Because if they see [our brand], they know the quality is always the same, all 
unit is the same” (Informant 28-I). Several participants, who faced adverse attitudes of Russian 
customers towards offshored products, were able to overcome them by persuading their clients 
about the uniformity of quality of products manufactured in different locations. For instance, 
one of the managers informed that his firm considered organizing promotion tours in its 
production facilities in developing countries:  
We have an idea to organize special tours to [our Chinese] factories, as we do it to Europe. . . . 
Where we send large distributors and their customers, and the same we can do with Chinese 
factories. Because the best way to persuade someone about something is to show the product as 
it is. Yes, it is costly, but at the end, these are considerable investments in the brand. (Informant 
29-I-30)  
Turning to the quality level, some interviewees declared that products offshored to developing 
countries had notably lower quality than those, which were manufactured in advanced 
economies. “We have also a company in China . . . but only for the domestic market, only for the local 
market. And with these products you can’t go to Europe, because they don’t fulfill the regulations” 
(Informant 33-I). At the same time, other respondents suggested that their firms were able to 
reach a uniform quality level in worldwide production locations. “It does not matter anymore what 
is on the [component]. . . . If it is ‘made in Argentina’ or ‘made in China’, or ‘made in Germany‘ . . . or 
anywhere else – it does not matter” (Informant 14-I-31). As analysis showed, such divergent 
opinions could be explained by two factors. First, quality was determined by levels of 
production automation applied for manufacturing of particular product categories. For instance, 
one of the interviewees suggested that offshored facilities, which widely applied manual labor, 
experienced lower product quality levels. “So the advantage you have in Asia is the ability to employ 
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a lot more people and have less automation in production. Which therefore automatically means that 
you are probably not able to guarantee level of quality” (Informant 25-I). Second, quality levels of 
products offshored to developing countries were determined by requirements of main customers 
in these markets. 
The defect rates are expected to be a little bit higher. This is completely ok in China. Because 
all of the competitors in China are not even at that level, but [Chinese customers] accept 
defective products, or not perfect products, a lot more than European customers. (Informant 
25-I) 
Finally, some participants questioned the long-term sustainability of offshoring and especially 
cost efficiency of offshoring to Asia. Managers reflected on such aspects as deteriorating cost 
advantages, changing the role of transportation costs and time-to-market, shifts in the portion of 
labor costs in overall costs, and risks of knowledge spillovers. “We will not build a factory in 
China, definitely not, because we want to protect our know-how and this is difficult if you set up a facility 
in China” (Informant 34-I).  
Offshore outsourcing36. Representatives of eight firms reflected on offshore outsourcing, 
mainly to Chinese suppliers. Four companies were sourcing certain components for their final 
products, while another four were buying complete products. “We have products which are 
produced by partners in Asia, not directly in [our] factory” (Informant 31-I). All of the managers 
recognized that outsourcing improved competitiveness on costs compared to other suppliers in 
the market, including rivals from emerging markets. Nevertheless, none of the companies 
introduced outsourcing exclusively with the aim to improve their competitiveness in the Russian 
market. Such conduct can be explained by a low share of the Russian market in the revenues of 
the German companies. “But from the customer point of view, just be aware that [our company] would 
not use Russia as the test market for the competitiveness to the emerging market suppliers. But it would 
use America or Europe, or China” (Informant 3-II). Similar to offshoring, several participants 
discussed country-of-manufacturing effects, quality level and sustainability of outsourcing. 
Several interviewees also expressed concerns regarding the management of contractual 
relationships with offshoring partners, such as hazards from contractual manufacturers directly 
approaching their customers:   
                                                 
36 Similar to offshoring, outsourcing is also limited here to the transfer of manufacturing activities only (cf. Javalgi 
et al., 2009; Berger, 2006; Koerte, 2006). 
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We see some signs in the last few months that they [Chinese sub-contractors] are starting to 
approach customers in Europe directly. . . . That would not be a good story for us . . . if they are 
going in direct competition with their customers. (Informant 25-I) 
Changes between stages of data collection. Interviews showed that cost-enhancing retaliation 
started to play a greater role in the second stage of the interviews. This shift can be attributed to 
the worsened macroeconomic situation and consequently increased price sensitivity of Russian 
buyers. As a result, several interviewees suggested a higher importance of stripped-down 
products for success in the Russian market. “During the crisis the suppliers who have both, premium 
and low-cost segments, they can more or less balance their sales” (Informant 17-II-33). Three 
participants reported on the intensified cost optimization measures applied by their companies. 
“We start working on the effectiveness of our operations. Because before this topic was at the second 
place. Now it is a priority – optimization” (Informant 29-II-34). Several interviewees noted that 
they increasingly relied on strategies of captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing. “But we 
also do not sleep and try to make offers from China in Yuan for the Russian market. Because we have 
several factories there, and we can supply our products from them” (Informant 17-II-35). Few 
participants mentioned that additionally to cost savings, these strategies had the potential of 
minimizing risks from deteriorated trade relationships between Russia and the EU. “We started 
to switch the purchasing volume aggressively to China from Germany. In order to be able, if something 
happens, to supply goods to the customer, to continue” (Informant 15-II). However, other 
interviewees did not support this explanation. “We consider [offshoring], but only as a measure to 
decrease costs and maintain competitiveness. This measure cannot help to overcome other barriers, 
including import substitution” (Informant 24-II-36). 
4.6.2.2. Differentiation-enhancing strategic retaliation  
In line with the literature (Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3), differentiation-enhancing strategies 
embrace those reactions, which aim to counter competition by providing customers with a 
unique and valuable offering. Participants suggested that in the light of high reliance of EMCs 
on cost leadership (Section 4.5.1), differentiation enabled them to sidestep confrontation by 
increasing loyalty and lowering price sensitivity of their customers. Consequently, the German 
firms widely applied differentiation, which constituted a basis for their competitive advantage. 
Following the literature in Section 2.3.2.3, differentiation-enhancing strategies are classified as 
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those related to core offering differentiation, augmented product differentiation, and image 
differentiation37. 
Core offering differentiation.  Interviewees brought abundant examples of differentiation in 
product quality, product range, delivery performance, and product maintenance. A detailed 
description of each sub-category, their illustrations from the interviews, as well as the number 
of managers who referred to each sub-category is provided in Table 10. 
Table 10: Illustrative description and absolute frequencies of core offering differentiation 
Name of the 
sub-category 
Description No. of 
participants 
Illustrative quotation 
Product 
quality 
Performance, reliability, 
durability, conformance, 
aesthetics and consistency of 
the products  
34 “It is just different features, different 
reliability, different performance, as well 
as durability or resistance to chemicals, 
vibrations, temperatures and so on” 
(Informant 25-I).  
Product range Width and innovativeness of 
a product range and 
additional features of the 
products 
21 “So they [Chinese competitors] have 
maybe three different types when we have 
thousands of possibilities” (Informant 11-
I). 
Delivery 
performance 
Accuracy and speed of 
product delivery  
8 “When the part is released, and the 
engineers and designers are out, and the 
sales people are out of the process, will the 
company deliver at the agreed price, the 
right volumes, to the right delivery location 
a working product, basically, according to 
spec?” (Informant 3-I). 
Product 
maintenance 
Local and international 
distribution and storage of 
spare parts; availability of 
service personnel; service of 
replacement delivery; ease of 
a product’s repair 
16 “What is quite important is for all, above 
the availability on the market, to provide 
the repair and the warranty claims 
services” (Informant 13-I). 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature (Section 2.3.2.3) 
Product quality was the most often mentioned source of core offering differentiation. 
Interviewees mentioned such quality aspects as performance, reliability, and durability 
particularly often. Over half of the informants named product range as a source of 
differentiation. When referring to Chinese competitors, a significant number of interviewees 
                                                 
37 The coding frame revealed a conceptual overlap between the sub-categories of differentiation barriers and 
differentiation-enhancing strategies. This can be explained by the fact that the German companies apply 
differentiation as a continuous strategy, independently from the intensity of competition from emerging market 
firms (cf. Koerte, 2006). Therefore, this thesis considers differentiation-enhancing strategy as a strategic action, 
which frequently results in differentiation barriers. As a result, sub-categories of differentiation-enhancing strategy 
were identical to earlier defined dimensions of differentiation entry barriers. 
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stressed the importance of differentiation through local product maintenance services, while in 
competition with Russian suppliers global repair services were especially important. This can 
be attributed to a weak focus of Chinese competitors on the Russian market and a weak global 
presence of Russian suppliers (Section 4.5.1). Finally, eight participants referred to the 
importance of delivery performance in competition with EMCs, which was particulalry 
pertinent in competition with Chinese suppliers. 
Augmented product differentiation. Interviewees identified several sources of augmented 
product differentiation, including customization, bundling services, know-how sharing, 
marketing support services, financial services, logistic services, and customer focus. Table 11 
provides a detailed description of augmented product differentiation and related absolute 
frequencies.  
Table 11: Illustrative description and absolute frequencies of augmented product differentiation 
Name of the 
sub-category 
Description No. of 
particip
ants 
Illustrative quotation 
Customization Tailoring and adaptation of products 
(including adaptation to the local 
market conditions); time-to-market 
for new products 
10 “[We] have a modular system, where we 
design our product . . . and that helps us a lot 
to be more customized, to have a more flexible 
system, to offer the specialized solution for 
each OEM” (Informant 23-I). 
Bundling 
services 
Consolidated purchasing; design, 
assembly (complementary products), 
testing, and maintenance of product-
service systems 
8 “[Russian competitors] only have for example 
1 or 2 components and then the customer 
needs to take from other competitors, to build 
their sub-system. They are not always fitting 
together. Our components are just made for all 
together. This is like Lego system, you know? 
We deliver a set, and you can use this set and 
build up your own Lego” (Informant 13-I). 
Know-how 
sharing 
Optimization of final technical 
applications of the buyer; resident-
engineering support; information on 
new technologies, industry trends, 
product installation, usage and repair 
28 “We are supporting [our customers], in 
designing the new drive systems, since we are 
able to do so. That is a different, whether you 
are just delivering some [parts], for instance, 
the customer is asking for, or whether you are 
able to redesign the existing drive systems. 
Therefore you have to be innovative, 
experienced and you also have to have the 
technical basics on that” (Informant 16-I). 
Marketing 
support services 
Advertising, sales promotion, public 
relationships, and sales force support 
aimed at buyer’s customers 
6 “We are offering some marketing support for 
our products. We are doing advertising, 
billboards, some articles in the magazines; we 
are providing POS, point of sales equipment” 
(Informant 5-I). 
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Financial 
services 
Trade credits, investments in 
customer-specific product 
developments, financial advisory 
9 “Financial logistics, in my understanding, is 
not a simple delay – simple delay is a big risk. 
There is an option of bank warranty for 
instance. . . . And we provide such services, so 
we search even for the partner bank, which 
conducts credit evaluation of this customer, 
provide certain bank warranty, which we can 
accept with our bank in Germany, and we 
compensate, for instance, part of costs by a 
discount” (Informant 17-I-37). 
Logistic services Product transportation; import and 
inventory services; flexibility in 
deliveries; optimization of buyer’s 
logistic systems 
24 “There is a type of customers which have no 
experience with imports – they have no 
brokers, they have no persons who have 
required knowledge, for them, this is 
additional expenses, additional headache, and 
nobody wants to deal with the customs. When 
we have a warehouse we can make the customs 
clearance by ourselves, deliver the goods 
there, a customer can buy these goods already 
for Ruble” (Informant 21-I-38). 
Customer focus Orientation on understanding 
customer needs and increasing 
customer value; customer 
commitment; personal interactions; 
cultural and geographic proximity to 
the customer; speed, and flexibility 
of decision-making 
29 “To be competitive in the Russian market you 
would need, on the first side, a Russian sales 
office or Russian location, with Russian people 
working there, and providing help to the 
customer, that’s the first thing at all” 
(Informant 8-I). 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature (Section 2.3.2.3) 
As seen from Table 11, almost all interviewees underlined the crucial role of customer focus 
and know-how sharing in competition with EMCs. Additionally, logistic services were 
considered as a particularly strong source of differentiation in competition with Chinese 
suppliers. Other frequently cited sources of augmented product differentiation included 
customization, financial services, and know-how sharing. Nevertheless, some participants 
operating in the OEM market highlighted the crucial role of bundling services (or system sales) 
in competition with EMCs. In contrast, this aspect played a relatively low role in the aftermarket, 
where the majority of participants referred exclusively to logistic services, customer focus, and 
marketing support services.   
Image differentiation. Participants frequently referred to image differentiation, which, in line 
with the literature reviewed in the Section 2.3.2.3 and specifically suggestions of Aaker (1991), 
could be categorized into dimensions of perceived quality, brand awareness, brand associations, 
and brand loyalty. Table 12 includes additional description of sub-categories of image 
differentiation, and the number of participants referring to each of them. 
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Table 12: Illustrative description and absolute frequencies of image differentiation 
Name of the 
sub-category 
Description No. of 
particip
ants 
Illustrative quotation 
Perceived 
quality 
Subjective judgment of the buyer 
regarding product quality level or 
firm overall performance 
28 “If the [product] is manufactured in Germany, 
then it has the brand, the image, and first of all 
the quality” (Informant 30-I-41). 
Brand 
awareness 
Ability of buyers to recognize and 
recall a brand as being representative 
of a particular product class 
17 “When we arrived in Russia, we did not 
replace an existing by that time supplier or 
product, but we came when then the necessity 
of such equipment in the vehicle was 
recognized. . . . Many people call [this 
category of products with our brand name], 
independently from the manufacturer. So this 
is a common name already, like Xerox or 
Aspirin” (Informant 20-I-42). 
Brand 
associations 
Perceptual connections of buyers to 
the brand rooted in attributes strongly 
associated with a certain product or 
firm 
21 “[Our firm] operates in the European market 
for more than 40 years, works with almost all 
automobile producers in Europe . . . and is 
also supplied in various forms to the assembly 
lines. . . . And consequently, Russian producer 
can be also certain that he will not be treated 
worse” (Informant 20-I-43). 
Brand loyalty Goodwill attitude towards a brand, 
which results in repeated purchasing 
behavior and resistance towards 
switching to other brands. 
8 “If he is trying to, to change, in most of the 
time he will lose his long-time relationship to 
his customers. Because within the last 10 years 
he has convinced of course his customers, why 
to buy a high-value brand” (Informant 2-I). 
Source: Collected data and reviewed literature 
Most of the interviewees recognized the particularly crucial role of perceived quality and brand 
associations. However, the other dimensions of image differentiation were also widely 
discussed. The participants suggested the following sources of image differentiation: previous 
positive experience with the incumbent firm and its products;  buyer’s uncertainty about quality 
and performance of the EMCs; communication efforts aimed at enhancing image differentiation 
(e.g., advertising, promotion, PR); quality assuring documentation (e.g., certificates, test 
protocols); inertia in switching from first-mover’s products; prototypical status of first-mover’s 
products; leadership image of the product and company; network effects (e.g., due to the OEM 
deliveries); public appearance of the company and its personnel; country-of-origin attributes 
related to country of design and manufacture. Nevertheless, one of the interviewees argued that 
image differentiation was more important for final customers in passenger car markets, rather 
than in markets for commercial vehicles. “Because in the passenger car market, these psychological 
factors play a much bigger role, than in the commercial vehicles market, there the positions of European 
manufacturers are not simply strong, nobody even attempts to challenge them” (Informant 20-I-44).  
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Changes between stages of data collection. The second round of interviews revealed several 
substantial changes, which occurred in the application of differentiation strategies. First, 
interviewees referred to a weaker applicability of core offering differentiation, due to increased 
price sensitivity of Russian buyers. “This is not only in Russia. This is everywhere – when the 
economic situation is bad then people try to buy something cheaper and save” (Informant 17-II-45). 
Second, changes in the institutional environment limited implementation of certain elements of 
augmented differentiation, such as financial services. “Before this was our competitive advantage, 
now we don’t have it. . . . Because such financial logistic was provided only by the largest Russian banks. 
And all of [them] . . . are on the sanction list” (Informant 17-II-46). Third, several interviewees 
noted an increased role of customer focus, required to offset the turbulences of the institutional 
environment. “We try to give a good service, to have our business from Germany operatively with 
frequent communication, for all the problems coming up” (Informant 10-I). Fourth, some 
participants stated that deteriorated economic relationships between Western countries and 
Russia had an adverse impact on the reliability image of the German firms. “You are an unreliable 
supplier for us [purchasers]’. Such phrase was repeated many times – precisely ‘unreliable supplier’ 
since the future stable supplies are uncertain. Because any moment someone can sign a new law in 
Brussels – and everything is over” (Informant 17-II-47). 
4.6.2.3. Hybrid strategic retaliation  
The participants provided examples for two strategies, which enhanced both, costs and 
differentiation positions, simultaneously: value chain localization and frugal innovation.  
Value chain localization38. Informants reflected on the localization of production, distribution, 
sales, and service activities in Russia. Only 10 participants represented exporter firms, without 
any form of localization in Russia. Seven respondents were employed by companies with a 
localized production in Russia. Out of them, two had licensing agreements with local partners, 
and five were running wholly owned production subsidiaries. Additionally, 14 interviewees 
considered production localization in the past or at the moment of the interview. The majority 
of participants believed that this strategy would improve both, differentiation (e.g., preferential 
government treatment) and cost positions of their companies. “Manufacturing in Russia [will bring 
                                                 
38 The definition accepted for this study is based on industry reports (e.g., Tomyshev, 2014), as well as academic 
literature on FDIs (e.g., Dunning, 2000), offshoring (Javalgi et al., 2009; Dachs et al. 2006), and international 
competition (e.g., Porter, 1986; Grant, 2010, p. 383). Therefore, the strategy of value chain localization is not 
limited to the transfer of production activities to foreign countries (cf. FDI conceptualization at Dunning (2000, p. 
163) but also embraces number of other downstream value activities, such as marketing, sales, and service (Porter, 
1986, p. 16). 
Data analysis    126 
 
us] first of all reduction of customs duties, cheaper labor . . . and the opportunity to work in some sectors, 
where it's hard for us to work now, such as defense industry“ (Informant 7-I-48). Totally, 24 
participants worked for companies with localized sales and service teams in Russia. All of them 
mentioned that localization increased their differentiation advantage, with a few participants 
reporting that local sales and service lowered their channel costs. “Since we have opened a Moscow 
office, we took away a dealership for some things and do them by ourselves. This also brings a certain 
result, by increasing our profitability” (Informant 17-II-49). Fourteen managers reported that their 
firms had product distribution facilities (warehouse) in Russia. According to participants, this 
aspect improved both cost efficiency (e.g., economies of scale in logistics, savings on currency 
hedging) and differentiation of their firms. “Those firms which have warehouses here, they react 
much more accurate and better to the demand changes, they always have available products” 
(Informant 29-I-50). Aggregated information on the localization of the analyzed firms is shown 
in Figure 15. 
Figure 15: Localization degree of the analyzed firms 
 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data 
Companies with localized value chain in Russia were mainly large and medium-sized 
enterprises focused on the OEM market. Meanwhile, companies without localization consisted 
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solely of SMEs, with half of them operating in the aftermarket. Participants frequently reflected 
on a broad set of institutional issues related to the implementation of localization in Russia, such 
as shortage of sub-suppliers, benefits from government policy, economic and regulatory 
volatility, and low local demand. Section 4.7 provides a detailed review of these aspects.  
Frugal innovations. Two interviewees brought examples of introducing new or modified 
products, which specifically aimed to satisfy needs of price-sensitive Russian customers. 
Additionally, three other participants reported that other divisions in their organizations applied 
a similar strategy. Managers underlined that this strategy involved the development of genuinely 
new products, rather than cutting down features of an existing offering.  
[German companies] say “Ok, we go [to emerging markets], and there is a local competition, 
but we gonna reduce maybe quality or we gonna sell basic products there”. . . . And what I 
noticed in some customers back in the days that it does not work. Because a lot of times 
customers don’t require the old products, you know the outdated products, but they rather want 
new one, but kind of adapted to the local requirements. (Informant 15-II) 
When probed, the majority of study participants rejected the idea of frugal innovations due to 
the same reasons, which prevented them from introducing stripped-down products. “How can 
you adapt [our products]? We are not supplying umbrellas. . . . They can be made cheaper. But in this 
case, we have to abandon German production, German reliability, German quality” (Informant 24-I-
51). Those participants, who referred to frugal innovations, underlined that this strategy enabled 
their companies to improve their positions on both, costs and differentiation, by providing 
cheaper products customized per needs of local customers. “They have this approach to adapt it to 
the local market, and then based on this they are able to produce actually innovative products, which 
are much better than their competitors’, but to reasonable cost“ (Informant 15-II). Interviewees 
suggested that contrary to the introduction of stripped-down products, the starting point of this 
strategy was lying not within the existing product line, but in requirements of local price-
sensitive customers (Section 2.2.1). “[Development of frugal innovations] is one reason for hiring 
local people so they can look for cheaper solutions and maybe somebody here in Germany can do. So 
that means local for local” (Informant 6-I). Two interviewees suggested that the introduction of 
this strategy was intertwined with elements of captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing.  
Another direction is expanding the portfolio downwards – which means not expensive and high-
tech [products], but simple [products], with low load, for smaller machines, which can also exist 
nowadays, for instance in India or China. . . . We cannot produce for this money in our German 
facility. . . . But there are [Russian OEMs] and other customers, which wish to make certain 
moves towards Asia. (Informant 24-I-52) 
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Consequently, such aspects as country-of-manufacturing effects, quality level, and 
sustainability of outsourcing also played a major role for the frugal innovation strategy.  
Changes between stages of data collection. Critical changes occurred in the implementation 
of localization strategy between both study stages. Thus, some participants delayed localization 
due to the negative economic situation in Russia. “We do not cancel the localization completely, but 
we reconsider the projects, reconsider the start of this localization” (Informant 9-II-53). On the other 
hand, several managers promoted intensified production localization efforts, arguing that in 
changed institutional conditions, this strategy became vital for maintaining a local foothold. “I 
think that in the future, all suppliers who want to enter Russian market or want to supply his component 
for OEMs which are active in Russian market – they will have to go there, necessarily. There is just no 
other way” (Informant 22-II-54). 
Such divergence in attitudes towards localization is explained by the role of the Russian market 
for the revenues of companies, at the time of the institutional shift. Thus, the analysis suggested 
that companies with a higher dependence on the Russian market strived to assure future revenue 
flow by increasing localization, whereas firms with a low share of Russia in their income 
lowered their dependence on the unstable market. Those companies, which considered 
production localization, discussed various forms of strategic alliances (e.g., licensing, joint 
ventures) as a way to minimize investment risks.  
Due to the crisis, we decided not to make the investment right now, not to set up our own 
production plant. . . . But we are looking for cooperation with local partner. And we will bring 
our technology in, but at least production will be done under our control by some local partner. 
It makes it easier, the partner has free capacity of course, due to the crisis, we must not make 
investments and we will not face the risk in the moment. (Informant 6-II)  
Additionally, few managers stated that they benefited from production localization due to 
increased cost competitiveness of Russian manufacturing. “[In our Russian factory] 2/3 of the 
revenues are actually exported, so we had a great time by the Ruble being weak and the Euro being 
strong, it helped our profits tremendously” (Informant 3-II). 
4.6.2.4. Tactical retaliation  
As suggested by the study participants, the German suppliers frequently relied only on short-
term tactical retaliations, which required a small commitment of resources and minor changes 
in business orientation (Section 2.3.2.2). The prevalence of such retaliations could be caused by 
generally low share of Russia in overall revenues of the analyzed firms. Thus, as suggested by 
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one of the participants, competitive reactions to EMCs in Russia were limited to activities of 
local divisions.  
Actually these competition questions are developed here, in our representative office. Do you 
know that we have a very small share in new [product sales for our company] since our country 
is extractive, such as Kazakhstan, for instance? And we actually do not have as many machine-
building companies as we wish. (Informant 19-I-55) 
Despite a large number of tactical retaliations proposed in the literature (Sections 2.2.1 and 
2.3.2.2), only five of them were mentioned by the study participants, namely pricing, 
comparative sales force effort, defensive raise of switching costs, protection of proprietary 
know-how, and unbundling.   
Pricing. Participants agreed that EMCs typically pursued an aggressive pricing policy (Section 
4.5.1). Consequently, the majority of respondents strongly advised against price wars (Section 
5.6.2). Managers referred to several factors, preventing them from such tactic, including high 
costs of differentiation, unequal access to resources and state support, as well as risks of brand 
dilution. “Sometimes the price differences are not percentages but times, 10 times, 20 times the 
[Chinese] products are cheaper than branded product. There is no possibility to compete with these 
products by reducing prices. It disappears the brand” (Informant 5-I). Nevertheless, the 
interviewees reported on pricing responses to the entry of EMCs, which can be categorized into 
indirect price cuts, price adjustments, and matching prices. 
Indirect price cuts. Several participants reduced prices by cutting augmented services. Thus, 
one of the interviewees suggested that his company was able to provide indirect price cuts by 
delivering product systems in a disassembled mode to OEM customers. “On a client’s demand 
we switched from complete [component] to [disassembled component], and gave certain share of the 
[component] to the customer. They pay not the complete price of the [component], but let’s say around 
1000 Euro less” (Informant 24-I-56). Another manager referred to volume discounts, which 
prevented customers from switching to EMCs. “We also try to motivate our clients to increase 
purchases from us, with a specially developed system of bonuses and discounts” (Informant 4-I-57). 
Price adjustments. Overall, the interviewees reported 12 cases of selective price adjustments. 
Participants primary referred to small-scale discounts for the most vulnerable customers. 
Despite the remaining price gap, such tactic often was sufficient to prevent the EMCs’ entry, 
since suppliers demonstrated their commitment to the cooperation, matched the bargaining 
orientation of Russian managers, and satisfied power needs of purchasing personnel. “It does not 
cost us anything to give a 2% discount if you wish. To show some result, in this way, yes, some employee 
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will demonstrate his job, it also happens. . . . We are ready to demonstrate our loyalty to the customer” 
(Informant 7-I-58). Several participants also stated that they adjusted prices for some parts of 
bundled products. “If we are selling a system in four parts, and with two products, we have to go down. 
. . Then maybe with this product we are in minus, but totally we are in plus” (Informant 28-I). 
Matching prices. Only three participants informed on lowering prices until or below the level 
of Russian competitors. Such cases occurred for mature products, which had relatively low skill 
intensity, few bases for differentiation, and were supplied to Russian OEMs. “For those products, 
which are related to commodities – when everything else is equal, I mean more or less acceptable quality, 
more or less clear supplier – of course, the price is a decisive condition” (Informant 9-I-59). All 
participants, who reported such tactics, represented large companies, which had a financial 
muscle to shake out smaller competitors. “Because they are large, they have such resources, they 
are ready even to lose on one product, or on one deal – because they know that they will compensate it 
later or in another place” (Informant 24-I-60). However, this tactic did not guarantee 100% share 
in supplies, due to multiple sourcing strategies applied by Russian OEMs.  
[Russian OEMs] do not go single-sourcing, if they can avoid. So they would probably award us, 
and then they try to get a competitor in. If he has a lower price - 70% of the share, a couple of 
years down-the-line. And if he has a higher price - 20% of the share. (Informant 3-I) 
Additionally, expected volume benefits from such tactics could abolish due low obedience of 
Russian OEMs to agreed purchasing volumes. “The purchasing departments here, they are telling 
you big figures, big turnover which they are planning to do, but nothing is real. It means that they know 
maximum one month” (Informant 28-I). 
Comparative sales force effort. Nine participants suggested that their firms intensified 
repositioning sales efforts when facing competition from emerging market firms. They reflected 
on standard personal selling techniques (e.g., presentations and handling objections) grounded 
in detailed competitive analysis and benchmarking. “We bring [competitor’s product] here, test it 
in our test stands. . . . We show what we can do and what our competitor can do. And this information 
remains by the producer” (Informant 14-I-61). Despite frequent reference to this tactic, only one 
case of customer retention was reported. Nevertheless, interviewees suggested that comparative 
sales efforts increased their chances for customer return. “We maintain relationships with the 
customers, even if the client does not work with us. . . . Clarify what are his needs, which problems he 
has. In case if we hear about some problem, we try to get involved” (Informant 7-I-62). 
Defensive raise of switching costs. The participants recognized the importance of customer 
switching costs in the competition. “Everyone tried to make it as easy as possible for the customer to 
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buy the unique products, and on the other hand - try to sell them as many as possible. So the switching 
burden becomes higher“ (Informant 15-II). Five interviewees reported on applying predatory 
product innovations and servitization to raise buyer switching costs.  
Predatory product innovations. Four managers referred to product innovations (e.g., 
introduction of products with patent-protected technologies or manufactured from exclusive 
materials), which explicitly aimed to exclude EMCs.  
We try to offer those solutions, which are patented [by our company], implement them in their 
production, at the same time provide them with good prices, but exclude for some long time 
period, which can be years, the possibility of someone else taking away from us this volume. 
(Informant 7-I-63)   
Two participants retained customers by implementing product improvements during the 
competitive attack. Here, EMCs could not match specifications and/or costs of new products, 
due to the technological leadership of the German suppliers.  
The Turkish firm offered an analog of our [component] and we responded by providing an 
improved version, with additional functions, and approximately for the same price, for which we 
supplied the previous one. . . . And Turkish firm could not offer the analog of our new 
[component]. (Informant 21-I-64) 
Meanwhile, Russian OEMs typically tried not to provide suppliers with a monopolistic position. 
Thus, customers developed several alternative suppliers for each product category, which 
limited the applicability of this tactic. “When you have a monopolist, with a good product – how can 
you decrease the price? You always need minimum two suppliers and almost all manufacturers . . . follow 
this ideology, to play them against each other” (Informant 24-I-65). 
Tactical servitization. Two interviewees suggested that they deliberately raised customer 
switching costs by infusing these services, which required low resource commitments and/or 
modifications of existing business processes (e.g., changes in delivery or financial conditions). 
“It is advised to connect the product with some system offer, include this product into a bundle with 
other products, add some service, via better financial and contract conditions, flexible delivery. To 
increase your competitive advantages with the service“ (Informant 9-I-66). 
Protection of proprietary know-how.  Interviewees reported several cases of property right 
violation, including those, which occurred due to the transfer of supplier’s knowledge to EMCs 
by Russian customers. “We see that informations what we are giving to our potential customers are 
always given to local suppliers as well. This is not fair, and it’s not the way we are working in the rest 
of the world” (Informant 6-I). Consequently, German managers referred to litigation against 
infringers and measures of secrecy, such as patent protection and limited access to technical 
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documentation. “You should not give away the technical information to absolutely everyone. . . . Think 
in advance, if you are not making yourself worse, if you give away certain information” (Informant 26-
I-67). Additionally, several German firms protected their trademarks by registering them at 
Russian customs authorities. “[Our trade mark] is registered at the customs. So when the goods are 
crossing [the border] under our brand, if the importer is not our company, we can stop this shipment by 
informing customs authorities” (Informant 29-I-68). 
Unbundling. Three managers unbundled their existing offering, by delivering product systems 
in a disassembled mode or cutting off augmented services.  
During visits almost every OEM customer suggests to us not to supply complete products 
anymore, but to disassemble previously complete products in three components, which to a great 
extent include the know-how of the product; to deliver these components to Russia where the 
customer, or cooperation partner, will assemble, test, machine . . . these components, and then 
deliver to the OEM customer. (Informant 27–II-39) 
In this way, the German firms complied with the localization requirements of the Russian 
government, provided indirect price cuts, and addressed the high level of vertical integration of 
Russian OEMs. “They have understood, in some cases, it’s better to buy components, not the whole 
[system], and make some additional work, just like welding application to make the [system] as a 
complete product by themselves” (Informant 23-I). Firms, which applied unbundling tactic, could 
also simultaneously benefit from bundling services. As proposed by the interviewees, bundled 
and unbundled products were supplied to different market segments, with larger, vertically 
integrated customers requesting unbundled products and smaller firms relying on bundling 
services of the German firms. “Some clients prefer not to deal by themselves with the questions of 
logistics, transport and customs clearance. In this case, our daughter firm realizes these services” 
(Informant 4-I-69). 
Changes between stages of data collection. The second stage of the data collection revealed 
that selective price adjustments were often applied to address increased price sensitivity of 
Russian consumers. “We did not react that we dropped prices or something - so with some products, 
we said ‘Ok, for this special time you get kind of special treatment or kind of special prices’ ” (Informant 
1-II). Additionally, one of the interviewees suggested that unbundling tactic became particularly 
relevant under higher localization pressure imposed by the Russian government. 
4.6.3. Accommodation 
Interview analysis and competitive reaction literature (Section 2.3.2.2) showed that 
accommodation reaction occurred in situations where entry barriers were low, the entrant 
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penetrated the market, and the incumbent had the low capability and motivation for entry 
retaliation. Accommodation embraced strategies of market retreat and cooperation with EMCs 
and thereby included actions of the incumbent, which were not threatening for the entrant. The 
study participants mentioned no instances of tactical accommodation. 
4.6.3.1. Retreat 
Retreat reactions cited by the participants are classified into those related to product and 
geographic market retreat (Sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2). Based on the data presented in 
Appendix S, the discussion below considers these reactions in details.  
Product market retreat. Totally 15 managers named cases of product market withdrawal, 
which resulted from competition with EMCs. Out of them, eight interviewees reported that their 
companies retreated from customer segments, which purchased less skill-intensive products. 
“We had once a combat with Chinese for one customer for [components] which are very small, it is easy 
and simple to produce them. So we have no chances, where there is no know-how” (Informant 17-I-
70). Another seven participants abandoned price-sensitive customers, which accepted products 
with low-quality specifications. “If [Chinese firms] participate in the tender, then we simply leave 
this tender, because we do not want to waste our time and efforts” (Informant 21-I-71). Out of 15 
respondents who reported on product market retreat, eight referred to activities of suppliers 
originating from Russia, another five mentioned Chinese firms, and two participants informed 
on both Chinese and Russian suppliers forcing them to abandon certain markets.  
Geographic market retreat. Nine participants referred to the reduction of the overall 
involvement in the Russian market by conducting divestments and canceling plans for 
localization. Nevertheless, most of them suggested that such reaction was determined not only 
by intensified competitive pressure but also by the lower economic attractiveness of the Russian 
market.  
The management was very much nerved that everything is changing in very difficult way, and 
they put their focus away from Russia. At least they will realize something there if it starts 
growing there, but they are not very much focusing on it now. I even say that at a certain extent 
they have given up their hopes in Russian market. (Informant 18-II) 
Several informants disagreed with such approach and suggested that this strategy could diminish 
the competitiveness of their firms against EMCs. 
If the firm leaves the market, it is immediately replaced. And then it will be very difficult to return 
to the market, in one or two years, when sanctions will be finished and Russia will increase its 
potential. Because German firms entered the market when it was free, they had no competitors, 
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and they took very advantageous positions. Now the competition in the market is very high. From 
China, from Russian manufacturers. And their market share will be simply taken by others. And 
it will be practically impossible to return it. (Informant 30-II-72)  
In total, 71% of retreat reactions were mentioned by representatives of large and medium-sized 
firms. Considering the vast resource advantages of these companies (Section 2.2.1), frequent 
application of market withdrawal was a rather surprising finding. Indeed, a manager 
representing one of the large German suppliers proposed that the German firms should rely more 
on their financial resources when competition with EMCs. [Local suppliers] can change their 
prices as they wish, these are usually relatively small firms. . . .If they earn nothing or work in minus, at 
some point they will not be able to work like that. (Informant 9-I-73) 
Several factors may explain the relatively frequent application of withdrawal strategy. First, 
market segments, which were typically threatened by EMCs, had low attractiveness for the 
German suppliers. “We are seeing the majority of the end consumers, are concentrating on M1 . . . of 
course M2, M3 [market segments] also, but M4 is really not so big segment in Russia” (Informant 5-
I). Next, the Russian market had low importance for the overall performance of some German 
firms. One of the interviewees proposed that this aspect could motivate EMCs to focus on these 
markets. “This can be actually an active marketing tool of Chinese company that they target markets 
like Russia, which are below the radar. You don’t attack in Germany, you attack in Russia for example 
- it makes sense” (Informant 3-II). Then, EMCs had an unsurmountable competitive advantage 
over the German suppliers in certain product categories (e.g., less skill-intensive products) due 
to specifics of their home economies. “Because yes, we have high production costs, we have different 
prices for energy, we have different personnel costs” (Informant 24-I-74). Last, the German 
suppliers avoided confrontation with EMCs to maintain their premium image and avoid brand 
dilution. “So we want to keep that [high quality] level that’s why we definitely do not decide for example 
to produce for the Iranian market some [products] in China” (Informant 34-I). 
A reaction similar to retreat was market avoidance. Totally, 24 managers emphasized that their 
firms specialized in those market segments, which were not threatened by EMCs. Almost all of 
these interviewees claimed that their companies deliberately avoided specific product markets 
with price-sensitive customers and low skill intensity. “We do not target this segment due to one 
simple reason: when we have made an initial target price analysis . . . we understood that we will never 
be able to penetrate this price segment” (Informant 24-I-75). One participant stated that his 
company avoided higher involvement into the whole Russian market, due to price sensitivity of 
local consumers. “This is what [owner of the company] also always brings to my agenda – ‘When do 
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we open the own distribution whole selling company in Russia?’. I always tell him ‘We have no chance 
to compete on the Russian market” (Informant 34-I).  
Additionally, several respondents mentioned that their firms benefited from specialization in the 
niche product categories. 
What we are specific about, in this world, we are specialists, we are working in a specific niche. 
We are talking independent aftermarket, our product is focused on [product category]. . . . Of 
course, you take that as advantage, some of our customers say “It means exactly why you are so 
well in this segment, because you pay so much attention to this product, and you will always end 
up being the best because you live or die from this.” (Informant 10-I) 
Nevertheless, participants also recognized such specialization as a competitive disadvantage. 
But here and there it has disadvantages, where you do not have a wider product portfolio, yeah. 
You could balance out weaker sales today here, stronger there. Some of our competitors are 
having these possibilities, something we don’t have. I am not saying necessarily that we wanna 
have that, to improve. That is another question. But this is something we do not have, and that 
some of competitors are having. And they use it, they use this tool against us. (Informant 10-I) 
Indeed, for the majority of the analyzed firms wide product range was an important element of 
product differentiation (Section 4.6.2.2). 
Changes between stages of data collection. While in the main study stage participants primary 
referred to retreat from specific product markets, in the follow-up stage many managers brought 
cases of reducing their overall involvement in the Russian market by conducting divestments or 
canceling plans for localization. The respondents explained such tendency by changes in the 
institutional environment, which strengthened the position of EMCs and lowered the demand in 
the Russian market. “Last year [we] finally opened the office in Moscow. There we had big plans, now 
these plans are being adjusted because currently, this office is unprofitable” (Informant 17-II-76). 
4.6.3.2. Cooperation 
The interviews unveiled two types of cooperative conduct: supply chain partnerships and 
acquisitions. 
Supply chain partnership. Representatives of two firms provided examples of partnerships 
within a supply chain with competitors from emerging markets. Two primary distinctions 
delineate supply chain partnerships from offshore outsourcing. First, in supply chain 
partnerships managers explicitly stressed that they considered firms from emerging markets as 
long-term partners, rather than as suppliers39. “These are not randomly chosen partners. So we have 
                                                 
39 The exact borderline between market transactions, described in outsourcing, and cooperative interactions is rather 
vague (Gulati, 1995; Duffy, 2008) and was based on judgements of the interviewees. 
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spent years looking at different products, from different companies, and in the end, we had two 
companies, which we believe do a good job” (Informant 25-I). Second, managers suggested that 
these partner companies were their potential competitors. Similar to offshore outsourcing, here 
the German firms aimed to fill product gaps, gain access to cheap resources, and achieve savings 
via economies of scale. “We work with suppliers in different product fields because sometimes have 
no production capacity to produce everything by our own. . . . Sometimes, not so much, but sometimes it 
can happen that a cost reason and a quantity reason” (Informant 31-I). One manager also reported 
on delivering products of his company to competitors in Russia. However, in this case, he 
explicitly highlighted that no cooperative behavior was present. “Sometimes we sell our 
components into their systems. . . . They need our [parts], so yes, we are in touch to make the interface 
work. But other than that we are pure competitors” (Informant 3-I).     
Acquisition40. Two study participants mentioned that their firms attempted to acquire Russian 
competitors. However, both managers stated that their firms were primarily driven by market 
development motives. Acquisition attempts in both cases ended unsuccessfully, due to cultural 
differences and excessive resources required for integration. “[Post-merger integration] indeed 
requires high investments. . . .Let’s say, it will be very difficult to restructure Russian company in your 
image. And here again, partially the mentality of management will play a major role in this respect” 
(Informant 14-I-77). Despite publically available information on the acquisition of competitors 
in other emerging markets (esp. China), interviewees did not mention them within the context 
of the competition with EMCs in Russia.  
Changes between stages of data collection. No significant changes occurred in the cooperative 
behavior between both rounds of interviews. Despite the fact that several interviewees referred 
to the growing importance of cooperation for localization in Russia, managers repeatedly 
underlined that they did not cooperate with local competitors. “What I wanted to make then, was 
to enter into joint venture with an active market player, not a competitor. Not the one, who already 
produces the same thing, but the player who also produces some components, which require 
engineering” (Informant 22-II-78). 
 
                                                 
40 Even though, in strict conceptual terms this strategy cannot be related to cooperative actions, several scholars 
theorized that cooperative relationships in strategic alliances may ultimately lead to mergers and acquisitions 
(Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p. 246). Additionally, strategy literature provides 
examples of acquisitions, resulting from accommodation strategy (Blees et al., 2003, p. 24).  
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4.6.4. Summary of findings on research question 2 
All in all, the majority of participants ignored activities of EMCs since they perceived that their 
companies were protected from competition by entry barriers, such as differentiation, location, 
switching costs, know-how, and access to strategic resources. Those firms, which responded to 
the EMCs, combined various competitive reactions, and mainly relied on strategies of 
differentiation, localization, and a narrow set of tactical retaliations. The cost-enhancing and 
cooperative strategies were rarely applied against EMCs. The analyzed firms implemented 
competitive reactions mainly with a focus on market segments with low price sensitivity and 
high skill intensity. In some cases, the German firms reduced their presence in market segments 
with excessive competition from EMCs. The interviewees provided no instances of pre-entry 
retaliation and tactical accommodation. In the follow-up study, the height of entry barriers 
decreased, which resulted in an intensified response of the analyzed firms to the activities of 
EMCs. Thus, cost-enhancing strategic retaliations and pricing became more important. In some 
cases, those suppliers, for whom the Russian market played an essential role, strived to assure 
future market positions by increasing their localization in cooperation with Russian firms. 
Meanwhile, companies with lower dependence on the Russian market conducted divestments 
or canceled plans for localization.  
4.7. Research question 3: influence of the Russian institutional 
environment 
An institutional environment has multifaceted effects on a firm’s strategy and industry 
competition (2.3.2.4), which cannot be covered within the scope of a single research. Therefore, 
this study focuses on the influence, which the Russian institutional environment had on  
competitive advantage (cost and/or differentiation) of the German suppliers against EMCs. 
Meanwhile, Turkish and Chinese competitors shared similar attributes in the eyes of German 
managers (Section 4.5.1). Moreover, relatively few participants referred to Turkish firms. 
Consequently, to facilitate the data analysis, competitors originating from China and Turkey are 
united here under a category of foreign EMCs. In total, 16 key drivers representing formal and 
informal facets of the Russian institutional environment41 were identified (Figure 16). Sections 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2 discuss each of the key drivers and their individual influence on the 
competitiveness of the German firms. Section 4.7.3 summarizes their aggregated impact, by 
                                                 
41 Further in text referred to as drivers 
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analyzing the relative importance of each driver and exploring changes, which occurred between 
the two stages of data collection. 
Figure 16: Identified formal and informal drivers of the Russian institutional environment 
 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data 
4.7.1. Formal drivers of the institutional environment 
The key formal drivers of the Russian institutional environment and their influence on the 
competitiveness of the German firms are described with the help of continuous text, enriched 
by numerous interview quotations (Schreier, 2012, pp. 220–222). The discussion is arranged in 
the order displayed in Figure 16.  
Russia-related trade and investment policy. The findings about the impact of trade and 
investment policy can be classified into those related to Russian import barriers, EU restrictive 
measures, as well as general trade relationships between Russia, the EU, and emerging 
economies.  
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Import barriers. Totally, 23 participants referred to the influence of local content requirements 
and various tariff and non-tariff import restrictions (e.g., customs duties, import licenses, 
barriers in customs procedures, homologation certificates, subsidies for locally produced 
products, and restrictions in access to certain industries) implemented by the Russian 
government. The role of trade barriers became particularly intense in the second round of 
interviews. Most of the managers proposed that these aspects diminished both, cost and 
differentiation advantage related to Russian suppliers.  
This is such aspect . . . related to the customs procedure, and related to the expenses for them, 
and related to a great number of additionally required documents, which local manufacturer 
does not need, as we do. . . . Of course, all this strongly weakens our positions. (Informant 20-
I-84)  
EU restrictive measures. Several participants suggested that restrictive measures implemented 
by the EU had an indirect impact on activities of their firms. Thus, the sanctions increased risks 
associated with deliveries from the German suppliers, reducing in this way their differentiation 
advantage. “Now, on the surface nothing changed. If the products are not obviously under sanctions, 
but the purchaser is a professional, he has to consider the possibility that hypothetically German high-
tech products can be included in the next sanction list” (Informant 9-II-85).   
General trade relationships between Russia and EU. In the follow-up study, several participants 
stated that deteriorated relationships between the EU and Russia had an adverse impact on the 
differentiation of the German firms. “Due to official communication, in media, also this have an 
effect on the thinking of managers. . . . It even went into unfriendly communication in the very end. Well, 
and this is poison for business” (Informant 18-II). Additionally, four interviewees proposed that 
the German firms intensified offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring to decrease potential 
risks from EU restrictive measures and Russian import barriers. As a side effect of these 
activities cost advantage of the German firms increased.  
This crisis was also kind of opportunity, if your purchasing is forced to do something, in order 
to maintain the operation, then they start to do the difficult things. . . . And actually, we found 
that we could save a lot of money. (Informant 15-II)  
General trade relationships between Russia and emerging economies. In the follow-up 
interviews, five participants referred to the general orientation of Russian government on 
stronger cooperation with emerging markets, especially China. Such measures negatively 
influenced image differentiation of the German firms. “The relations, even if they are not easy 
between China and Russia, probably will be much stronger, intensified, and then maybe the Chinese or 
Eastern Asian companies will have a stronger impact” (Informant 2-II). Nevertheless, several 
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managers proposed that effect from these measures was limited, due to unique resources of the 
German companies (Section 4.6.1) and weak technological capabilities of EMCs (Section 
4.5.1). “I do not think that [import substitution] will be really made, because at least in our sector . . . 
there are no manufacturers in Russia of appropriate quality” (Informant 30-I-86).  
Weak manufacturing sector. Respondents widely referred to a low role of the manufacturing 
sector in the Russian economy. Related aspects include five sub-categories: low industry 
standards, low volume of locally manufactured vehicles, poor resources and capabilities of 
Russian OEMs, poor resources and capabilities of Russian suppliers, and high vertical 
integration of Russian OEMs.   
Low industry standards. Six managers suggested that weak industry regulations determined low 
quality requirements of Russian customers.  
Maybe somehow [Russians] even don’t have existing standards and specifications for kind of 
products. If you look to Germany, we have a TÜV homologation. If we want to sell in the 
aftermarket some [products], [it] has to be homologated, due to some specifications, according 
to the car that this product is allowed to be installed on. And you cannot find this kind of 
standards and specifications in the emerging markets. (Informant 34-I) 
This specific of the institutional environment decreased differentiation advantage of the German 
firms against EMCs (Section 4.5.1). 
Low volume of locally manufactured vehicles.  Totally 14 participants claimed that the weak 
local output of machines and vehicles was the main factor preventing their firms from 
localization. “I also thought for the long time about local production. But at the moment there is no 
need for this. We came to the conclusion that the current volumes they are just too low to legitimize the 
local production” (Informant 5-I). In addition, one of the interviewees mentioned that both, 
differentiation and cost advantage of the German firms against Russian competitors decreased 
since, in conditions of low demand, Russian OEMs preferred buying from Russian companies, 
to maintain the survival of these alternative suppliers. As a result, this factor significantly 
diminished cost and differentiation advantages of the analyzed firms (Section 4.6.2).  
We have lost our delivery share, even though half the share was guaranteed, and the Russian 
maker got the 100%, and that is because he has invested in Russia, and if he does not get this 
volume, he will raise the prices, or will get bankrupt. Whereas [our company] never gets 
bankrupt. (Informant 3-II)  
On the other hand, five participants recognized that weak demand was the main reason behind 
low commitment of Chinese firms to the Russian market. This aspect enhanced differentiation 
of the German firms against foreign EMCs. “This process [of product development and approval] 
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is already expensive for Chinese, with regards to these relatively low volumes, which go for these buses 
and trucks” (Informant 22-I-79). 
Poor resources and capabilities of Russian OEMs. Overall, 19 participants reflected on poor 
resources and capabilities of Russian OEMs. On one side, as suggested by 15 managers, this 
aspect decreased differentiation advantage of the German firms. Thus, Russian OEMs were 
often characterized as technologically backward companies with low requirements to product 
quality and innovativeness. “Our customers have conventional, old-fashioned [components], 
innovations plays minor roles. Their specs have been existing for 20 years. . . . So they expect you to be 
cheaper than your competitor, and then you get the business” (Informant 3-I). Additionally, three 
participants stated that Russian OEMs had to outsource certain services, which the German 
firms could not provide as good as their competitors from Russia (e.g., local product storage, 
trade credits).  
We have to work with 100% prepayment. . . . Of course for Russian firms, it is very difficult, 
because of prepayment is for 6 weeks, then you have to freeze money for 6 weeks. Most of the 
firms do not have enough operating funds. . . . And between each other Russian firms can work 
without prepayment. . . . Firms can agree between each other that they will have delayed 
payment. After all, this is one market, one country. (Informant 30-I-80) 
On the other hand, six participants mentioned that poor resources and capabilities of Russian 
OEMs increased their dependence on the engineering, bundling, and know-how sharing services 
of their suppliers. This aspect enhanced differentiation of the German firms related to EMCs, 
which typically had weak technological capabilities (Section 4.5.1). “Our policy is not only to 
provide products. We also provide solutions which are very often useful or even necessarily, because in 
many cases we have to close the knowledge gap of our customers” (Informant 28-I). 
Poor resources and capabilities of Russian suppliers. Totally 16 managers reflected on poor 
resources and capabilities of Russian firms. This aspect had a two-fold impact on the 
competitiveness of the German firms. On the one hand, it determined the weak quality of 
Russian products, which increased differentiation advantage of the German firms. “These 
manufacturers for 15 years had a financial hardship, have no new models which correspond to modern 
requirements per quality, output, and input” (Informant 20-I-81). On the other hand, 10 
interviewees mentioned that lack of sub-suppliers in Russia limited localization opportunities, 
and consequently differentiation and cost advantages of the German firms. “We checked casting. 
We checked even mechanical rubber goods. There are no such suppliers. We have sent a request, and 
everyone responds to us ‘Sorry, we cannot provide you such quality.' About which localization can we 
talk here” (Informant 30-I-82). 
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High vertical integration of Russian OEMs. Totally 10 interviewees stated that OEMs in Russia 
often had strong vertical integration. Several managers explained such tendency by remnants of 
the Soviet economy, low local manufacturing costs, and influence of the state on local OEMs 
regarding local employment.  
Russian factories were built in such way that they do everything by themselves, starting from 
nuts, and finishing with final machines. Many factories kept such production. . . .Factories are 
mainly city-forming, and their management understands that if they reduce this production, it 
will cause layoffs of workers. Many do not agree on this since there are some orders from above. 
(Informant 30-I-83) 
As a result, domestic OEMs often produced components for own needs and purchased only 
specific product parts. “All things that they can do by themselves they want to do it. They are only 
looking for special components to buy from outside” (Informant 23-I). Frequently such parts were 
supplied by foreign EMCs. Consequently, this attribute reduced the role of bundled solutions 
and thereby lowered differentiation advantage of the German firms. However, as mentioned by 
three interviewees, due to the same specific Russian OEMs could act as partners for localization 
(sub-suppliers, licensees). This increased both, differentiation and cost advantage of the German 
firms over EMCs. “Our customers are detected to be the right partners to supply for us. We are actually 
right now in the project of localization, in the process of developing them, or their affiliates, to become 
reliable suppliers for parts” (Informant 18-I). 
National currency volatility. Some participants, particularly in the second round of data 
collection, referred to the effects of Russian Ruble volatility on their competitiveness. These 
effects are categorized into those related to depreciated Ruble value and exchange rate volatility. 
Depreciated Ruble value. As suggested by 12 interviewees, a depreciated Ruble lowered cost 
competitiveness of the exporting German firms related to Russian competitors. “At the moment 
Russian local providers have a huge advantage over foreign providers . . . the rate of Rubles is now 50 
Rubles for 1 Euro, compared to 38-39 Rubles to 1 Euro, one year ago” (Informant 27-I-40). 
Nevertheless, one of the participants in the second rounds of interviews argued that the cost 
advantage of the German firms increased, compared to foreign EMCs, which had dollar-driven 
costs.  
All currency fluctuations also affected Asian manufacturers, and maybe even stronger [than 
European suppliers], since the currency there is attached to Dollar. And they . . . started to lose 
their sole pricing advantage, and in this term reached products from developed, rather than 
from advanced markets. (Informant 20-II-113) 
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However, when probed, other interviewees suggested that this tendency had a small or transient 
influence on their competitiveness. “Nobody actively uses this yet [devaluation of Euro against 
dollar].  I think there is no certainty that this is a stable situation” (Informant 9-II-87). 
Exchange rate volatility. Six participants suggested that the volatile exchange rate destabilized 
pricing of the exporting German firms. This aspect made the cooperation more troublesome for 
Russian customers. “[Our customers] say – ‘Ok, it’s nice if Ruble would be a little bit stronger, but 
even more important is the stability in the exchange rate’. So that we are able to calculate” (Informant 
10-II). As a result, volatile Ruble lowered the differentiation advantage of the exporting German 
firms against Russian suppliers.  
High price sensitivity of Russian consumers. Totally, 20 managers proposed that many 
Russian consumers had low product quality requirements and high price sensitivity. “If you look 
to emerging markets, quality is not number one in their expectation – it’s the price. It’s always the price” 
(Informant 34-I). This driver became particularly strong in the second round of interviews, due 
to the economic crisis in Russia and devalued Ruble. “It is simple calculation – if you have 100 
Ruble, and before you could buy a good product for this money, and today for 100 Ruble you can buy 
only a bad product, but you need it – what will you do” (Informant 24-II-24). Such specific lowered 
differentiation of the German suppliers, related to cost-efficient EMCs (Section 4.5.1). 
Importance of the state in the economy. Participants highlighted that the significant influence 
of the state in Russian business environment decreased the differentiation advantage of their 
firms compared to EMCs. Thus, 13 interviewees referred to state influence on purchasing 
decisions of Russian OEMs. Such attribute was explained either by state ownership of Russian 
OEMs or by an influence on private firms. “Most of the factories in Russia have a share of state 
ownership” (Informant 30-I-88). “Russian automobile industry also includes private companies, but 
they are in many respect influenced by regulative authorities” (Informant 9-I-89). As a result, the 
government lobby provided Russian suppliers with preferential treatment from Russian 
customers and diminished the differentiation advantage of the German firms. “If [Russian OEM] 
hears from the government ‘import substitution for defense industry,' then they in principle have a 
message that the more import substitution it is – the better” (Informant 9-II-90). Furthermore, nine 
interviewees suggested that their firms had low competitiveness in state purchases. They 
explained this by low product quality requirements in such purchases and/or by the importance 
of differentiation dimensions where the German firms were not competitive against EMCs (e.g., 
high-risk trade credits, speed of deliveries). “People are not very concerned about the quality of 
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their vehicles, which are supplied to the state. Because the government, in any case, has a certain budget 
for repair of vehicles . . . and this money should be spent” (Informant 7-I-91). “For most of the tenders 
the state requires payment delay from one to three months. . . . And everybody in Russian market 
understands this, and therefore they are ready to wait and provide delays to their customers” (Informant 
30-I-92). However, the German firms were able to maintain a high competitiveness in state 
purchases, which were associated with prestige (Section 4.7.2). 
Integration in the global economy. Integration of Russia into the world economy had a two-
fold impact on the Russian market. The majority of interviewees in the main study suggested 
that their differentiation advantage over EMCs increased, due to several tendencies. First, 17 
interviewees referred to growing penetration of global OEMs into the Russian market, which 
prompted local OEMs to strengthen their competitiveness by enhancing differentiation, 
employing foreign managers, and cooperating with international OEMs. “To compete with these 
international OEMs, [Russian OEMs] have to supply the same product, the same quality” (Informant 
28-I). Likewise, three participants referred to a growing brand awareness among Russian 
aftermarket clients, due to installed base effects. “A lot of machines come from Europe to Russia. 
And normally, especially for the independent aftermarket, it should be a chance to install the current 
aftermarket [products] in a maybe older [product] from the European market” (Informant 33-I). 
Second, nine managers suggested that exports of Russian OEMs defined the importance of a 
global service network and/or product quality. 
The Russian OEMs do not have in all the foreign countries good sales network, and it could 
happen that they have a dealer, but then the dealer is not able to make any kind of service, and 
kind of repair work on the machine. . . . And that’s why they are looking for high-quality parts, 
where they never need any kind of repair work. (Informant 23-I) 
Third, some participants suggested that such aspects as general strengthening Russian industry 
standards, growing purchasing requirements of Russian consumers, and increased competences 
of Russian OEMs, enhanced the differentiation advantage of the German firms. “The higher the 
environmental norms will be, the higher the security requirements for the automobiles will be, the more 
local companies will lag behind” (Informant 9-I-93). “The market demands new vehicles. The new 
vehicles should correspond to new requirements” (Informant 26-I-94). “They come to us after one 
year, after two years. Some companies come after three and four years. They grow to this level” 
(Informant 19-I-95).  
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On the other hand, five participants mentioned adverse effects from the growing penetration of 
Chinese OEMs in the Russian market. This tendency led to increased cost pressure on domestic 
OEMs, which deteriorated the differentiation advantage of the German firms (Section 4.5.1). 
Chinese vehicles . . . rapidly increase their presence in the Russian market, and they crowd out 
everyone – Germans, and even Russians. [As a reaction Russian OEMs] significantly decreased 
their production, and the remaining production they are trying to save, for this they need to 
compete on price. To compete on price, they have to switch to lower quality components. 
(Informant 30-I-96) 
Limited access to financing. As much as 10 interviewees stated that Russian firms suffered 
from the restricted access to capital. “The banks in Russia, they are earning too much money . . . and 
that is not normal to have 25% of the fee, of interests just to finance one contract. That is not a normal 
rate” (Informant 23-I). Out of them, four managers mentioned that the shortage of financing 
forced Russian OEMs to transfer the burden of financial support to suppliers. Thus, suppliers 
were requested to provide trade credits, as well as overtake costs for product storage and R&D.  
In our countries often if you come, and the customer says “I want a development”, and you reply 
him “Guys, what about my costs, time of specialists”, you hear “Excuse me?! Do you want us 
also to pay you something!? You want to supply your product to us – so please do so. You were 
told what is required? So please do it. And the rest you can forget” (Informant 24-I-99). 
This aspect often demanded high risk-propensity from suppliers, which was an inherent attribute 
of emerging market firms (Section 4.5.1). As a result, limited access to financing decreased the 
differentiation advantage of the German suppliers. Nevertheless, six participants also suggested 
that the German firms gained both, costs and differentiation advantages, due to the limited 
access of Russian suppliers to capital required for improving their competitiveness. “They do 
not have those financial resources, required to upgrade their production and purchase new machines” 
(Informant 24-I-100). 
Low manufacturing costs. In total, 13 interviewees agreed that firms with localized production 
still benefitted from access to cheap factor supplies, especially energy and labor. “You have to 
work with your comparative advantage, which is two-fold one, one is low labor costs, and the other one 
is low cost of energy” (Informant 3-I). Given Russian Ruble devaluation, this aspect became 
particularly important in the second round of interviews. Russian suppliers typically had a 
higher share of Ruble-driven costs, even compared to the German firms with localized 
production. “And the Russian suppliers, they are even stronger, because the Ruble share of their costs 
is higher than the Ruble share of [our] costs” (Informant 3-I). As a result, the cost advantage of the 
German suppliers compared to Russian competitors decreased between the two stages of the 
data collection. Nevertheless, several interviewees suggested that the German firms with 
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localized production also benefitted from low manufacturing costs in Russia. “Russia is now a 
low-cost country. . . . When demands in Russia went down, [the localized Italian supplier] took 
advantage of the lowering production costs, and they would produce their stuff for Europe in Russia” 
(Informant 18-II).  Meanwhile, foreign EMCs typically had no localized production in Russia 
(Section 4.5.1). Consequently, this institutional driver increased cost advantage of the German 
suppliers with localized production, compared to foreign EMCs. 
Weak regulatory compliance. Totally, 17 participants recognized the influence of a weak 
compliance of Russian companies to rules and laws on their competitiveness. Out of them, 11 
interviewees agreed that Russian OEMs, especially smaller firms, suffered from corruption in 
the form of bribes and speed money requested by the purchasing personnel. “Another specific is 
of course corruption in these markets. When you visit a customer, and he will ask you what he personally 
gains from the cooperation. Well, but for this, we have no tools to compete within such markets” 
(Informant 15-I). As shown in Section 4.5.2, some interviewees pointed at cases where EMCs 
applied bribery in the competition. “Sometimes we lose customers because of illegal practices of 
competition” (Informant 13-I). Additionally, nine managers named cases of weak legal 
enforcement in Russia, including violation of intellectual property rights by EMCs and weak 
customs regulations. “The main problem for our company, but not only for our company, it’s also 
valid for [other competitors] in the current situation we have faced dramatic increase in black imports” 
(Informant 5-I). As a result, these factors limited opportunities for core product and image 
differentiation of the German firms. 
Strong trade sector. In the first round of interviews, some participants referred to the well-
developed trade sector in Russia and strong capabilities of Russian wholesalers. Thus, seven 
managers suggested that Russian distributors typically practiced multiple sourcing, which 
covered a range of brands in various segments. As a result, distributors often had EMCs in their 
suppliers’ portfolio, which abolished the barrier of access to distribution channels. “Several years 
ago big Russian importers started to call themselves ‘multi-brand companies.' So they all have in their 
portfolio products of various categories – premium, mid-segment and probably some cheap stuff” 
(Informant 32-I-97). Likewise, several interviewees stated that Russian wholesalers had 
international sourcing capabilities, which enabled them to source products from EMCs. These 
aspects lowered the differentiation of German firms from overtaking buyers’ sourcing and 
consolidation activities. “Chinese manufacturers are mainly represented here by private labels . . . 
which means a brand is registered and actually owned by some Russian firms or people which work here 
in Russian market” (Informant 29-I-98). In contrast, three participants stated that due to growing 
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global integration of Russian wholesalers, these companies conducted their daily business 
communication in a way similar to European companies. “There is not so many differences, in 
terms of way of communication, because they are just as professional as any other company” (Informant 
10-I). This factor increased the role of the customer focus differentiation of the German firms.  
Early industrialization. Totally 10 interviewees proposed that the long history of Russian 
industrialization had several effects on the German suppliers. First, products of local suppliers 
were typically well known and easy-to-repair for local customers, with domestic firms being 
deeply embedded in local supply chains. “The client says ‘Why do I need your [components] . . . 
when [Russian] product malfunctions my final customer will go to any nearest shop, buy spare parts and 
repair it in the field, almost with a hammer’ ” (Informant 19-I-102). “During Soviet times there were 
certain enterprises, which produced [components] according to the state plan, and which had to be used 
almost in every vehicle. . . . These relationships did not disappear after the collapse of Soviet Union” 
(Informant 14-I-103). These aspects limited opportunities for differentiation of the German 
firms against Russian suppliers. Furthermore, five participants mentioned that due to extensive 
manufacturing experience, Russian competitors were often able to catch up with the German 
firms in mainstream technologies.  
Many people in our company were shocked, when they found that in Russia still exist, and 
existed, even more, factories which were quite modern for their times and produced 
[components]. Of course, when they entered the market of China 10 years ago or enter now the 
market of some Indonesia – there is nothing even close to this. Consequently, here can be some 
competitors, which, even if they are not active now, simply sleeping, but as soon as the market 
appears – can bring such production very fast into working condition and finally even imitate . 
. . some modern products, and start their production. (Informant 20-I-104) 
Likewise, the manufacturing expertise of Russian OEMs prompted them to act as competitors 
of the German suppliers. Consequently, early industrialization of the Russian economy limited 
opportunities for differentiation of the German firms compared to Russian suppliers. 
Demand volatility. Totally, 12 managers referred to volatile buyer requirements in Russia. Out 
of them, two suggested that demand volatility increased the risks of value chain localization, 
and consequently decreased both, differentiation and cost advantages of the German firms. “The 
volumes in Russia is something which is very interesting. To establish a full-scale plant needs a certain 
minimum volume, which you do not reach at Russian market” (Informant 18-I). Nine participants 
proposed that demand volatility increased the significance of time-to-market, customer 
proximity, speed and flexibility of deliveries. “Now the manufacturer might have one requirement, 
to have a certain stock. And tomorrow can come some construction company, order for instance not 10 
graders but 100 graders and 30 loaders” (Informant 26-I-101). Considering that Russian 
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competitors often demonstrated a high strategic agility combined with local market proximity 
(Section 4.5.1), this aspect reduced opportunities for the differentiation of the German firms. 
“[For the product] to be fast available, you have to keep it on stock, or your need a local supplier. This 
is the biggest point, why all big OEMs are keeping a double strategy or the other supplier” (Informant 
28-I). Four respondents mentioned that demand volatility decreased the differentiation 
advantage of their firms compared to foreign EMCs, which had a faster reaction and shorter lead 
times than the German firms. “[Asian competitors] can deliver very fast. So the delivery terms are in 
most cases 3 times faster than . . . our factories” (Informant 13-I). Nevertheless, another four 
interviewees reflected on the customer proximity of the localized German firms. These 
companies were better equipped to counter such demand volatility than non-localized foreign 
EMCs. “One of the main, advantages of [our company] is that we are working from our stock in Russia. 
. . . The products are always, immediately available for our customers” (Informant 5-I). Consequently, 
demand volatility had a mixed effect on the differentiation advantage of the German suppliers 
over foreign EMCs. 
4.7.2. Informal drivers of the institutional environment 
Discussion on the key informal drivers of Russian institutional environment and their influence 
on the competitive advantage of the German suppliers follows the scheme presented in Figure 
16. 
Distributive approach to cooperation. The interviewees repeatedly referred to a distributive, 
rather than a cooperative approach of Russian customers to business relationships. Thus, 15 
respondents reported on manipulative and forceful behavior in negotiations. “Talking about 
negotiations, something like ‘We cannot do more, it is good for you and us’ will not work here. You have 
to let the customer feel that he has squeezed everything possible out” (Informant 22-I-106). Next, 11 
managers mentioned low obedience to contract conditions and purchasing volume agreements. 
“[Russian OEMs] use such manipulative methods to gain a good price. So very often what is written in 
a contract is not an obligation for purchasing” (Informant 9-I-107). Finally, ten participants 
elaborated on the short-term business approach of Russian managers, which was demonstrated 
by the low importance given to long-term business success, total costs of ownership, and 
industry regulations. “Mainly are taken not very well considered decisions, not calculated for the 
future, but are considered only for now, for today, how much it costs for me and how much I will gain 
on this” (Informant 24-I-108). The combination of these attributes lowered the potential of 
differentiation based on customer focus and commitment towards cooperation. Presumably, 
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EMCs typically possessed advantage here, due to their reliance on cost-leadership strategy and 
experience of operating in the hostile environments (Section 2.2.1). Consequently, the 
distributive behavior of Russian customers lowered the differentiation advantage of the German 
firms. Nevertheless, the majority of interviewees reported on generally cooperative approach of 
Russian companies, which emerged within the course of long-term work. Thus, participants 
underlined that building trustful relationships with Russian customers usually took them longer 
than with buyers from Europe, which may suggest that distributive approach to cooperation is 
valid for early stages of cooperation only. “It takes maybe longer time in the beginning, but the 
relationship, the personal relationship becomes warmer after certain period of time” (Informant 13-
I). Additionally, one manager suggested that the short-term approach to cooperation could result 
from high personnel turnover in Russian companies. “If you have a contact person or management 
level, which change every 2 years, they don’t really care what will be in 2 or 3 years” (Informant 13-
I). 
Importance of status symbols. Totally, 22 informants reflected on the role of status symbols 
for Russian customers. The interviewees proposed that attributes of company reputation, such 
as a pioneering status, an image of market leadership and a firm’s public appearance were 
especially important in Russia. “This is the typical Russian approach. . . . To get something which 
they can show off, basically. You know, what they can say ‘Wow, look, we have actually cooperation 
with this kind of brand’ ” (Informant 18-I). Furthermore, country-of-design played a significant 
role, especially for products purchased for private use and to support state prestige. “Even a 
person driving Renault Logan will simply not install a [product] manufactured in Russia. Because 
otherwise, he would buy [Lada]” (Informant 20-I-110). “We have the Olympic games in Sochi 
running, and this is the big benefit - they are investing of course in buses. And if all the tourists are 
coming, maybe the bus should run, and not break down” (Informant 2-I). Most of the managers 
informed that their firms had an advantage over EMCs due to a positive attitude to German 
brands and strong company reputation (Section 4.5.1). As a result, the prominent role of status 
symbols increased the differentiation advantage of the German firms over EMCs. In contrast, 
four participants informed on the preference of Russian customers for national brands and 
negative attitude to companies originating from Europe. “The population has certain patriotism, 
and I think any way they simply try to support own, local production. Even their compatriots I would 
say. And I think that is why they have a certain advantage” (Informant 21-I-111). Nevertheless, when 
probed, the majority of interviewees rejected a significant influence of such aspects on their 
competitiveness.  
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We mainly communicate with so to say, business people, and their primary goal is a personal 
success, as an employee or manager, and success of a company for which they work. 
Consequently, there prevails a business approach. (Informant 20-II-112) 
Risk and uncertainty avoidance. Overall, 20 managers referred to avoidance of accountability 
by Russian customers. This aspect influenced the competitiveness of the German firms in a two-
fold way. First, 14 managers referred to the bureaucratic and long-drawn decision-making 
process within Russian organizations. Consequently, close communication and customer 
proximity were crucial for the success in the Russian market. “A decision in Russian factories is 
made by a lot of people. . . . And to be successful you have to work on each inside the factory. . . . You 
have to work on each level” (Informant 12-I). Chinese suppliers generally lacked local customer 
orientation (Section 4.5.1), which enhanced differentiation advantage of the German firms 
against foreign EMCs. On the other hand, Russian suppliers had an advantage in this dimension 
(Section 4.5.1), which deteriorated the differentiation of the German firms. Second, seven 
participants argued that Russian OEM customers frequently shifted costs and responsibility to 
their suppliers, in such matters as high-risk R&D financing and storage of parts.  
Russian [client] thinks that manufacturer has to take a risk by himself and purchase certain 
tooling or machines to supply the product, which he needs, without giving any warranties at the 
same time. . . . And Russian [supplier] often follows this pass, simply because he is used to this, 
to such mentality. . . . Manufacturers of emerging markets . . . they also take certain risks. 
(Informant 14-I-105) 
This attribute often required a high risk-propensity from suppliers, which was an inherent 
attribute of emerging market firms (Section 4.5.1). As a result, this aspect decreased the 
differentiation advantage of the German companies compared to EMCs. 
Importance of personal relationships. The interviewees agreed that trustful interpersonal 
relationships were essential in the Russian business environment, especially for smaller clients. 
Thus, interpersonal linkages frequently replaced formal agreements. “Do not to trust any kind of 
paper, even if it’s signed and have a lot of stamps: paper is not trustful enough. You have to invest in 
personal relationships, it’s the most important thing” (Informant 23-I). Locally embedded Russian 
suppliers were typically in an advantageous position on this dimension (Section 4.5.1), which 
reduced differentiation of the German firms. However, foreign EMCs often had a weak local 
customer focus (Section 4.5.1), which increased the differentiation advantage of the German 
firms.  
[Chinese companies are not present in our segment], probably because I actually work with 
OEMs. And to enter the discussions and even to make a presentation you have to give many 
efforts, to enter the factory and find a person who wants to listen to you. (Informant 26-I-109)  
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Several participants suggested that despite a remaining importance, the role of informal 
interpersonal relationships was declining in the last years. Such development was explained by 
stricter compliance policies and adoption of Western business practices by Russian firms. “I 
would even say that, especially in the last 5 years, the relationships they started to become more similar 
with those we know from the western countries yeah. However some aspects still remain, I think 
unchanged” (Informant 28-I). 
4.7.3. Aggregated impact of Russian institutional environment 
This section describes the aggregated impact of the Russian institutional environment and 
explores changes, which occurred between both study stages.  
First, Figure 17 describes the aggregated influence of the institutional drivers on the competitive 
advantage of the German firms against Russian and foreign EMCs. Drivers of the Russian 
institutional environment had a predominantly negative impact on the competitiveness of the 
German firms against EMCs. The particularly strong deteriorative impact was perceived in 
competition with Russian companies. Thus, more than half of the effects reported for the 
competition with Russian firms decreased the competitive advantage of the German firms. 
Identified institutional drivers mainly affected the differentiation of the German companies, 
with relatively low influence on their cost position. This can be attributed to the typically high 
reliance of the German firms on differentiation (Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.2). Additionally, the 
main cost drivers for suppliers without localized production lie outside of Russia. Deeper 
analysis showed that several key drivers, which had a positive influence on the competitiveness 
of the German firms, were valid only for the companies with localized value chain in Russia. 
Thus, the localized firms benefited from the importance of personal relationships for Russian 
customers, national currency volatility, and low manufacturing costs.  
Next, the importance of each driver of the institutional environment was evaluated (Appendix 
T). For this aim, it was assumed that the number of participants referring to each driver 
represents the importance of this driver. The analysis showed that competitiveness of the 
German firms in the Russian market was mainly shaped by formal institutions. Especially often, 
the managers referred to the weak manufacturing sector, Russia-related trade and investment 
policy, integration in the global economy, and distributive approach to cooperation. 
Consequently, the most frequently named drivers of the Russian institutional environment had 
a strongly negative influence on the differentiation advantage of the German firms.  
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Figure 17: Aggregated influence of the key drivers of the Russian institutional environment on the competitive 
advantage of the German firms
Source: Own compilation based on collected data 
Changes between stages of data collection. The majority of participants suggested that 
substantial shifts in the institutional environment occurred between the two stages of interviews. 
To explore these changes, I analyzed the number of interviewees, referring to each driver, during 
each stage of the data collection (Table 13).  
Table 13: Importance of the drivers of Russian institutional environment in two stages of data collection 
Driver of the institutional environment 
1st stage, No. of 
participants 
2nd stage, No. 
of participants 
Change of 
importance 
Russia-related trade and investment policy 20 15 Increased 
Weak manufacturing sector 24 14 Decreased 
National currency volatility  4 13 Increased 
High price sensitivity of local consumers 15 9 Increased 
Importance of state in economy 12 11 Increased 
Distributive approach to cooperation 21 7 Decreased 
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Integration in the global economy 22 6 Decreased 
Importance of status symbols 22 6 Decreased 
Limited access to financing 8 5 Increased 
Low manufacturing costs 10 5 Increased 
Risk and uncertainty avoidance 20 3 Decreased 
Weak regulatory compliance 16 2 Decreased 
Importance of personal relationships 18 1 Decreased 
Strong trade sector 10 0 Decreased 
Early industrialization 10 0 Decreased 
Demand volatility 12 0 Decreased 
Source: Collected data 
As seen from Table 13, the participants frequently referred to Russia-related trade and 
investment policy, the weak manufacturing sector, Ruble volatility, and the importance of the 
state in the Russian economy in the follow-up study. On the contrary, integration in the global 
economy, and some cultural specifics, including the importance of status symbols, the 
importance of personal relations, uncertainty avoidance, and distributive behavior were named 
much less often. Consequently, the role of factors, which mainly had a negative influence on 
competitiveness (esp. differentiation advantage) of the German firms in Russia increased. 
Further analysis showed that this tendency was particularly strong for suppliers operating in the 
OEM market. Indeed, most of the managers underlined that institutional changes strongly 
deteriorated the competitiveness of their firms and reported intensified competition from EMCs 
(Section 4.5.2). The impact of institutional changes, which occurred between stages of data 
collection, was illustrated within each major section of Chapter 4. 
4.7.4. Summary of findings on research question 3 
In total, the study identified 16 key drivers representing formal and informal facets of the 
Russian institutional environment. These drivers had a multifaceted and complex influence on 
the competitiveness of the analyzed firms. Nevertheless, the Russian institutional environment 
predominantly weakened the differentiation advantage of the German firms compared to EMCs, 
especially against Russian suppliers. The companies with localized production benefited from 
the importance of personal relationships in Russian society, depreciated Ruble value, and low 
local manufacturing costs. Competitiveness of the German firms in the Russian market was 
primarily shaped by formal institutions. The most often cited drivers included a weak 
manufacturing sector, Russia-related trade and investment policy, integration in the global 
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economy, and distributive approach to cooperation. Changes in the Russian institutional 
environment between research stages deteriorated the competitiveness of the German firms 
against EMCs, especially the differentiation advantage in the OEM markets. 
4.8. Summary of findings  
To conclude the discussion, Table 14 provides the summary of the main findings related to each 
research question. 
Table 14: Summary of key findings 
Research 
question 
Key findings Thesis 
section 
Research 
Question 1 
 
Competition with emerging market firms was highly relevant for the selected sample. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the informants, especially in the first round of interviews, 
were mainly focused on rivals from other developed countries, rather than on EMCs 
4.5.2 
Identified EMCs could be classified according to their geographic origin into Russian, 
Chinese, and Turkish suppliers. Chinese and Russian suppliers were the most common 
competitors.  
4.5.1 
 
EMCs typically had a cost-leadership orientation, based on low investments in 
differentiation and access to cheap resources. Russian suppliers additionally benefited 
from local market proximity, whereas Turkish and Chinese companies utilized 
economies of scale.  
4.5.1 
Perceived attributes of EMCs had minor changes between both study stages. 4.5.1 
EMCs typically acted in a hostile manner by disrupting the conventional rules of 
competitive conduct through predatory pricing, state support, and bribery.  
4.5.2 
Activities of EMCs frequently had adverse consequences for the profitability of the 
German firms. 
4.5.2 
Activities of EMCs had especially negative consequences for the German firms serving 
Russian producers of commercial vehicles and mobile machinery. 
4.5.2 
Activities of EMCs had limited consequences for the German firms operating in the 
aftermarket or supplying to subsidiaries of global manufacturers in Russia. 
4.5.2 
Major increase in the perceived threat from EMCs (esp. Russian), which occurred in 
the follow-up study stage, is mainly explained by changes in the Russian institutional 
environment.  
4.5.2 
Research 
Question 2 
The majority of the participants ignored activities of EMCs since perceived that their 
companies were protected from the competition by entry barriers.  
4.6.1 
The main entry barriers protecting the German firms from EMCs were differentiation 
(core offering, augmented product, and image), location, switching costs, experience, 
and know-how, as well as access to unique resources.  
4.6.1 
The height of the differentiation barrier was determined by customer price sensitivity, 
stage of the product life cycle, and criticality of the component.  
4.6.1 
Changes in the institutional environment decreased the height of differentiation- and 
location-related barriers, thereby intensifying response reaction of the German firms. 
4.6.1 
Changes in the institutional environment did not affect firms protected from the 
competition by access to unique technologies and patents. 
4.6.1 
The German firms responded to EMCs mainly by combining strategies of 
differentiation, localization (primary non-production), and a narrow set of tactical 
retaliations, which were applied in market segments with low price sensitivity and high 
skill intensity.  
4.6.2 
4.6.3 
Cost-enhancing strategies, frugal innovations, production localization, and cooperation 
played a relatively low role in competition with EMCs. 
4.6.2 
4.6.3 
Due to activities of EMCs, the German companies frequently retreated and/or avoided 
product markets with low skill intensity and low quality requirements.  
4.6.3.1 
Data analysis    155 
 
The German firms did not apply pre-entry retaliation, as well as tactical 
accommodation against EMCs. 
4.6.2 
Changes in the Russian institutional environment limited the applicability of 
differentiation strategy and increased the importance of cost-enhancing strategies and 
pricing.   
4.6.2 
Changes in the Russian institutional environment motivated the German companies 
with low dependence on the Russian market to reduce their local involvement by 
conducting divestments or canceling plans for localization. 
4.6.3.1 
Changes in the Russian institutional environment motivated the German companies 
with high dependence on the Russian market to ensure their future market positions by 
increasing their localization in partnership with Russian firms. 
4.6.2.3 
Research 
Question 3 
Russia-related trade and investment policy decreased the differentiation advantage of 
the German suppliers against Russian firms, had mixed influence on their cost 
advantage compared to Russian competitors and differentiation advantage compared to 
foreign EMCs, and increased their cost advantage related to foreign EMCs. 
4.7.1 
The weak manufacturing sector in Russia had mixed influence on the competitive 
advantage of the German firms related to EMCs. 
4.7.1 
National currency volatility had a negative influence on the competitive advantage of 
the German suppliers against Russian firms and a positive influence on their cost 
advantage against foreign EMCs. 
4.7.1 
High price sensitivity of Russian consumers lowered the differentiation advantage of 
the German firms against EMCs. 
4.7.1 
The importance of the state in Russian economy decreased the differentiation 
advantage of the German firms compared to EMCs. 
4.7.1 
Integration of Russia into the global economy had mixed effects on the differentiation 
advantage of the German suppliers compared to EMCs. 
4.7.1 
Limited access to financing for Russian firms deteriorated the differentiation advantage 
of the German suppliers compared to foreign EMCs, had a mixed effect on the 
differentiation advantage compared to Russian companies, and enhanced the cost 
advantage against Russian suppliers.  
4.7.1 
Low manufacturing costs in Russia decreased the cost advantage of the German firms 
against Russian companies and increased the cost advantage for the German suppliers 
with localized production compared to foreign EMCs. 
4.7.1 
Weak regulatory compliance among Russian companies decreased the differentiation 
advantage of the German suppliers compared to EMCs. 
4.7.1 
A strong trade sector in the Russian economy had mixed effects on the differentiation 
advantage of the German suppliers compared to EMCs. 
4.7.1 
Early industrialization of the Russian economy decreased differentiation advantage of 
the German suppliers compared to EMCs and cost advantage compared to foreign 
firms. 
4.7.1 
Demand volatility in the Russian market decreased the differentiation advantage of the 
German firms against Russian suppliers and the cost advantage against EMCs, while 
having a mixed influence on their differentiation advantage compared to foreign EMCs. 
4.7.1 
Distributive approach of Russian customers towards cooperation lowered 
differentiation of the German suppliers compared to Russian suppliers and had a mixed 
influence on competitive advantage against foreign EMCs. 
4.7.2 
The importance of status symbols among Russian customers increased the 
differentiation advantage of the German suppliers compared to EMCs. 
4.7.2 
Risk and uncertainty avoidance of Russian customers had a mixed influence on 
differentiation advantage of German firms compared to foreign EMCs. 
4.7.2 
Importance of personal relationships for Russian customers decreased differentiation 
of the German suppliers compared to Russian firms and increased their differentiation 
advantage over foreign EMCs. 
4.7.2 
The most important drivers of the Russian institutional environment were a weak 
manufacturing sector, Russia-related trade and investment policy, integration in the 
global economy, and distributive approach to cooperation. 
4.7.3 
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The Russian institutional environment mainly weakened the differentiation advantage 
of the German firms compared to EMCs, especially against Russian companies. 
4.7.3 
The perceived competitiveness of the German firms in the Russian market was 
predominantly shaped by formal institutions. 
4.7.3 
Changes in the Russian institutional environment mainly deteriorated the 
competitiveness of the German firms against EMCs, especially the differentiation 
advantage in OEM markets. 
4.7.3 
Note: EMC stands for emerging market competitor; OEM stands for original equipment manufacturer 
Source: Collected data 
As seen from Table 14, the analyzed firms were primary concerned with hostility and 
consequences of EMCs in deliveries to Russian manufacturers of commercial vehicles and 
mobile machinery. Russian and Chinese suppliers posed the main competitive threat for the 
German firms. At the same time, the firms operating in the aftermarket and supplying to global 
OEMs experienced a relatively low level of perceived competition. The majority of managers 
ignored activities of EMCs since they perceived that their companies were protected by entry 
barriers, such as differentiation, location, switching costs, experience and know-how, as well as 
access to unique resources. The German firms highly relied on strategies of differentiation and 
localization, and relatively rarely applied cost-enhancing strategies. Nevertheless, a shift in the 
institutional environment, which occurred between both rounds of interviews, lowered the 
differentiation advantage of the German firms. Consequently, companies, which were not 
protected by access to unique technologies and patents, were forced either to leave the market 
or to rely increasingly on cost-enhancing strategies, pricing, and localization in partnership with 
local firms. The Russian institutional environment had a multifaceted and complex influence on 
the competitiveness of the German firms, primary decreasing their differentiation advantage 
against EMCs.  
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed analysis of data collected in both stages of the research. The 
analysis focused mainly on findings related to the research questions. Nevertheless, the chapter 
also described the coding framework and the study sample. The next part discusses the findings 
in light of the existing body of literature and summarizes implications of the current thesis.  
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5. Conclusions and implications  
5.1. Introduction  
The last chapter of this thesis synthesizes conclusions and implications of this research. Thus, 
Section 5.2 contrasts the findings of each research question with existing literature and thereby 
outlines advances and contributions of the current research (Charmaz, 2006, p. 166). Section 
5.3 draws overall conclusions about the research problem. Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 provide 
theoretical, methodological, and managerial implications. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
research limitations (Section 5.7) and recommendations for future investigations (Section 5.8). 
The structure of Chapter 5 is illustrated in Figure 18.  
Figure 18: Outline of Chapter 5  
 
Source: Own compilation  
5.2. Conclusions about research questions  
The key aim of the final chapter is to demonstrate how the thesis findings contribute or advance 
the existing knowledge (Perry, 1998, 2002 and Phillips and Pugh, 2005). Therefore, this section 
juxtaposes the findings presented in Chapter 4 with the literature from Chapter 2 and literature, 
which became relevant after revealing the research results (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 544–545; 
Strauss and Corbin, 2001, p. 45). To assure a transparent discussion, the key conclusions for 
each research question are summarized in Table 15. The new themes exposed by the thesis were 
classified into advances and contributions (Perry, 2002, p. 37). Advances represent research 
findings, which confirm the expectations from the literature about the phenomenon, but were 
produced in a different industry and country context, discipline, competitive setting, and 
competitive stance (cf. Section 2.2.1). In contrast, contributions represent topics which were not 
empirically investigated before (e.g., speculation and mentioning), have been studied but 
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produced different conclusions, or were not addressed in previous studies (Perry, 2002, p. 37). 
Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3 include a discussion on advances and contributions within each 
research question. 
Table 15: Main conclusions for each research question 
Research questions and conclusions Type of 
knowledge 
addition 
1. How do German managers perceive the competition from emerging market firms in Russia? 
1.1 The German managers in this study perceive EMCs in Russia as more distant competitors 
than companies from developed countries because of biases in competitor perceptions and/or 
low competition  
Advance 
1.2 Advantages of EMCs result from factor conditions in their home markets, savings on 
differentiation and, in some cases, economies of scale and local market proximity. Contrary to 
the literature, differentiation, innovation capabilities, frugal innovations, strategic agility, and, 
to some extent, local focus, ethnic connections, and economies of scale did not enhance the 
competitiveness of EMCs. Low differentiation of EMCs can be explained by managerial 
perception asymmetries, a numerous differentiated competitors in Russia, and/or specifics of 
the automotive industry. The small size of the Russian market in the analyzed industries defines 
the weak local focus of Chinese firms. 
Contribution 
1.3 The main criteria of perceived competitive threat for EMCs in Russia are hostility and 
revenue consequences. Despite the high hostility, activities of EMCs have divergent 
consequences for the revenues of the analyzed German firms. The lower consequences exist in 
industries with low price sensitivity, high speed of technological change and/or the important 
role of global integration, engineering capabilities, and branding. 
Contribution 
2. What are the competitive reactions of German companies to emerging market firms in Russia? 
2.1 The German managers mainly ignore EMCs in Russia due to the lack of motivation to 
respond or, in other words, presence of entry barriers. Key entry barriers protecting the analyzed 
German firms stem from technological and brand advantages, as well as the importance of 
global supply chains in the automotive industry. 
Advance 
2.2 There are links between customer price sensitivity, stage of the product life cycle, criticality 
of the component and the height of the differentiation barrier. 
Advance 
2.3 The study confirms the crucial role of differentiation, non-production localization, pricing, 
as well as market retreat in competition with EMCs in Russia. Weak local demand explains 
rare production localization of the German firms. Their reliance on low-scale price adjustments 
stems from the needs of Russian managers in negotiation, bargaining, and/or power. The study 
confirms that matching prices are applicable for markets with high price sensitivity and/or high 
concentration. Avoidance to skill-, capital-, and R&D-intensive industries results from 
differences in factor endowments and/or technology between the German firms and EMCs.  
Contribution 
2.4 The analyzed German firms do not apply pre-emptive reactions to EMCs in Russia due to 
their own large size, the short market experience of EMCs, and/or the vague demarcation 
between pre- and post-entry reactions. The German firms rarely apply tactical retaliations 
against EMCs in Russia because of divergent levels of competitive threat and/or the generally 
rare use of preemptive tactics. The German firms implement cost efficiency measures 
independently from the competitive threat from EMCs in Russia. Rare reliance on stripped-
down products and frugal innovations in Russia may result from the high purchasing power of 
local consumers and/or risks of brand dilution, brand cannibalization, lack of synergies, and 
engineering difficulty. A small volume of the Russian market and/or the diverse levels of 
perceived threat from EMCs determine the limited application of offshoring. The German firms 
Contribution 
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rarely cooperate with EMCs because of cross-cultural differences, performance risks, 
differences in business procedures, as well as the generally rare use of accommodation. 
3. How does the Russian institutional environment influence the competitive advantage of German companies 
compared to emerging market firms? 
3.1 All identified drivers of the Russian institutional environment are confirmed by the previous 
literature. This study provides a novel description of their aggregated impact on the 
competitiveness of the German firms: 
 The differentiation advantage of the German firms decreases due specifics of the Russian 
institutional environment, such as the weak manufacturing sector, Russia-related trade and 
investment policy, national currency volatility, high price sensitivity, importance of the 
state in the economy, instances of weak regulatory compliance, integration in the global 
economy, strong trade sector, limited access to financing, demand volatility, low 
manufacturing costs, early industrialization, risk and uncertainty avoidance, distributive 
approach to cooperation, and importance of personal relationships. 
 The differentiation advantage of the German firms increases due to specifics of the Russian 
institutional environment, such as Russia-related trade and investment policy, weak 
manufacturing sector, limited access to financing, integration in the global economy, strong 
trade sector, demand volatility, risk and uncertainty avoidance, distributive approach to 
cooperation, importance of personal relationships, and importance of status symbols. 
 The cost advantage of the German firms decreases due to specifics of the Russian 
institutional environment, such as the weak manufacturing sector, Russia-related trade, and 
investment policy, national currency volatility, demand volatility, early industrialization, 
and low manufacturing costs. 
 The cost advantage of the German firms increases due to the weak manufacturing sector in 
Russia, Russia-related trade, and investment policy, national currency volatility, limited 
access to financing, and low manufacturing costs in Russia. 
Contribution 
3.2 The deteriorative influence of Russian institutional environment on the competitiveness of 
the German firms might be determined by the institutional specifics of home economies of 
EMCs and the local embeddedness of EMCs. Due to a high reliance on differentiation and/or 
weak production localization of the German firms, the Russian institutional environment 
mainly shapes their differentiation advantage. The prevailing influence of formal institutions 
on the competitiveness of the German companies in Russia results from the managerial focus 
on hard factors and/or frequent application of non-production localization by the German firms. 
Contribution 
3.3 The findings confirm that changes in the institutional environment have a significant 
influence on the perceived threat, height of entry barriers, and competitive reactions. 
Advance 
Note: EMC stands for emerging market competitor; OEM stands for original equipment manufacturer; R&D stands 
for research and development 
Source: Own compilation 
5.2.1. Research question 1: perceived competition from emerging market 
firms    
The first research question explores the perceptions of the German managers about the 
competition from emerging market firms in Russia. Three main conclusions from the findings 
and their contribution to existing literature are discussed below.  
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5.2.1.1. Conclusion 1.1 
The German managers consider EMCs as rather distant competitors in the Russian market. Thus, 
the study participants mainly focused on firms from other developed economies rather than on 
EMCs. This finding contradicts the vast body of the existing literature. The threat is expected to 
be particularly strong in the context of an emerging market (e.g., Contractor, 2013; Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Mall et al., 2013, p. 5; Orr, 2016) and the analyzed manufacturing 
industries (e.g., Global Intelligence Alliance, 2012, p. 27; Khanna et al., 2015, p. 7; Lang et al., 
2015; Woetzel et al., 2015). Moreover, scholars suggested that Western firms should take the 
threat from EMCs seriously (Dobbs et al., 2015a; Ramamurti, 2012a) and warned against 
ignoring these competitors (Kumar, 2006; Zeng and Williamson, 2003).   
There are two possible explanations for this inconsistency. First, the strong in-group focus of 
the German managers could result from human biases in decision-making and competitor 
perceptions (DeSarbo et al., 2006, p. 101; Deshpandé and Gatignon, 1994).  Managers tend to 
perceive a limited number of competitors (Daniels et al., 1994 and Clark and Montgomery, 
1999). Moreover, the literature registered a general tendency of Western executives to 
underestimate competitors from less-developed countries (Ramamurti, 2012a, p. 241; Porac et 
al., 1989). Several studies proposed that Western executives often ignore the emergence of 
global rivals from developing economies and perceive them as rather weak competitors (Dobbs 
et al., 2015a; McKinsey & Company, 2008; Zeng and Williamson, 2003). Second, the lacking 
focus of the German managers on EMCs could occur due to objectively low competition in the 
analyzed industries and the Russian country setting (Section 5.2.1.2). Thus, suggestions about 
international competitiveness of EMCs were often based on examples of Chinese or Indian firms 
operating in Asian countries (e.g., Zhu et al., 2011, p. 527).  
To summarize, this conclusion contributes to the literature by demonstrating a strong in-group 
focus of the managers representing the analyzed firms. Furthermore, this study advances the 
work of Porac et al. (1989) by proposing that the competitive group boundaries remain valid for 
competition in the host country context. Additionally, the study reveals how industry 
representatives adapt to fast-changing environment (Porac et al., 2011, pp. 661–662), with the 
managers shifting their perceptions about EMCs in the second round of the interviews. 
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5.2.1.2. Conclusion 1.2  
The second conclusion refers to the key attributes of EMCs in line with the perceptions of the 
German managers. This research confirms the finding of McKinsey & Company (2008) that 
Chinese firms pose the highest competitive threat among EMCs. Additionally, the participants 
referred to Russian competitors almost as often as to Chinese companies. Consequently, despite 
their low role in the global competition (Lang and Mauerer, 2010, p. 17; McKinsey & Company, 
2008), Russian firms pose a significant threat in the local market. This finding corresponds to 
the suggestions of Global Intelligence Alliance (2012, p. 27), Khanna et al. (2015, p. 7), and 
Mall et al. (2013, p. 5) about local competitors in emerging markets.  
Several findings about the attributes of EMCs support the existing literature. First, regarding a 
cost-leadership orientation, the literature commonly suggested that low-cost manufacturing and 
access to cheap resources are the key sources of competitive advantage for EMCs (e.g., Dobbs 
et al., 2015a; Federico, 2014; Kothari et al., 2013). These benefits are explained by factor 
conditions in their home markets, such as access to cheap labor (e.g., Contractor, 2013; 
Ramamurti, 2012a; Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008). State support is also mentioned as an 
important advantage of EMCs (e.g., Deng, 2012; Jullens, 2013; Ramamurti, 2012a), especially 
those originating from Russia and China (Contractor, 2013). Next, some sources referred to the 
reliance of emerging market firms on economies of scale from revenues generated in the home 
markets (Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008; Williamson and Zeng, 2004) and sub-contracts from 
Western firms (Zeng and Williamson, 2003). Finally, with regard to savings on differentiation 
and innovations, diverse studies referred to low R&D (Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008), capital 
(Auer et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2006; Federico, 2014), quality (Antoniades, 2015), and skill 
intensity (Federico, 2014; Utar, 2014) of products supplied by EMCs42.  
                                                 
42 The literature provides several explanations of this attribute. First, low differentiation can be attributed to weak 
technological (e.g., Deng, 2012; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012; Li and Li, 2008) and marketing (e.g., Brandt 
and Thun, 2010; Chang and Park, 2012; Deng, 2012) capabilities in emerging markets. Thus, regarding Russian 
suppliers, low capabilities in large volume manufacturing may be rooted in the feminine culture (Hofstede et al., 
2010, p. 169). Additionally, resistance to change (Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003; Naumov and Puffer, 2000) and 
new knowledge (Puffer and McCarthy, 2011), combined with the low efficiency of formal institutions might 
explain low technological innovativeness (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014) and limited 
technological adoption (World Economic Forum, 2015). Finally, the weak customer orientation and product 
differentiation of Russian firms might be rooted in the heritage of the Soviet economy (Engelhard and Nägele, 
2003; McCarthy et al., 2005). Second, the maturity of the analyzed industries can determine low investments in 
differentiation. Thus, as suggested by Karlsson and Nyström (2003), entrants in the later stages of a product life 
cycle tend to have lower knowledge intensity than incumbents do. Similarly, Porter (1985/2004, pp. 431, 433–434) 
proposed that industry followers mainly act with unbundled strategies, characterized by a reliance on standard 
products without the auxiliary services. Third, low investments in innovation and differentiation may be rooted in 
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Second, Russian firms, contrary to foreign EMCs, utilize elements of differentiation strategy, 
which result from local market proximity. In the same way, the literature reflected on the ability 
of EMCs to develop close relationships with clients and governments in emerging markets (e.g., 
Contractor, 2013; Deng, 2012; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012), and described advantages 
of local firms against foreign entrants (e.g., Denk et al., 2012; Yaprak, 2012; Zaheer, 1995).  
Nevertheless, several important discrepancies exist between the study findings and the extant 
publications. First of all, the findings are inconsistent with the sources demonstrating enhanced 
differentiation and innovation capabilities of EMCs (e.g., Mion and Zhu, 2013; Moghaddam et 
al., 2014; Ping et al., 2013). The majority of interviewees mentioned that differentiation and 
innovation played a minor role in the competitiveness of EMCs.  Such disagreement can have 
several explanations. First, it might reflect asymmetries between the managerial perceptions of 
Western firms and EMCs (e.g., Ping et al., 2013), including a general tendency of Western 
executives to underestimate competitors from less-developed countries (Section 5.2.1.1). 
Second, Russia, contrary to other emerging markets, is characterized by a relatively low level 
of poverty (WBG, 2015c) and consumer preferences similar to those observed in advanced 
economies (Lang and Mauerer, 2010, p. 17, 19, 32). Consequently, the EMCs facing numerous 
differentiated competitors in Russia could be forced to follow a cost-leadership strategy (cf. 
Aulakh et al., 2000). Third, such disagreement can be caused by specifics of the automotive 
industry, where EMCs still lag behind the leading nations in innovation capabilities and mainly 
focus on labor-intensive and efficiency-driven components for low-end customer segments 
(e.g., Labitzke and Gronemeier, 2015; Lang et al., 2015; Woetzel et al., 2015). Finally, the 
existing literature might be biased towards overestimating the achievements of EMCs. Thus, as 
suggested by Deng (2012), strong technological expertise and branding remain “the exception 
rather than the rule” (p. 325) for emerging market firms.  
Next, the literature suggested that EMCs frequently benefit from the frugal approach to 
innovations (e.g., Ramamurti, 2012a; Williamson and Yin, 2014; Zeschky et al., 2011) and 
unconventional business models (e.g., Altenburg et al., 2008; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; 
Bonaglia et al., 2007). However, only a few participants referred to similar tendencies. The 
                                                 
weak copyright enforcement in emerging markets. Thus, the survey of McKinsey & Company (2008) showed that 
competitiveness of Chinese firms is often explained by savings on proprietary technologies. Considering weak 
protection of property rights in Russia (e.g., McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011; Heritage 
Foundation, 2016), similar argument might be also valid for Russian firms. Fourth, the newcomers from emerging 
markets may deceive buyers on the quality dimension of differentiation. Thus, as suggested by Farrell (1986), new 
entrants might maximize their profits by cheating on quality and practicing “fly-by-night” (p. 442) strategies. 
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interviewees mentioned that Russian competitors quoted lower prices due to applying a specific 
business model with postponed profit-generation (Section 4.5.1). Nevertheless, the informants 
did not consider such approach as innovation.  
Furthermore, multiple studies proposed that competitive advantage of EMCs is determined by 
a strong entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., Deng, 2012; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012; 
Luo and Rui, 2009), strategic agility (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2015a; Jullens, 
2013), and the ability to operate successfully in harsh and adverse environments (e.g., 
Contractor et al., 2007, Ramamurti, 2012b, 2012b). Despite the fact that interviewees confirmed 
agility and risk-seeking strategic behavior of EMCs, it had lower importance, compared to their 
cost advantages.  
In addition, the literature put forward that EMCs often benefit from close customer 
relationships, deep understanding of consumers in emerging markets (e.g., Contractor, 2013; 
Jullens, 2013; Kothari et al., 2013) and the ability to develop relationships with host country 
governments (e.g., Grosse, 2003; Santos and Williamson, 2015). Nevertheless, this research 
showed that Chinese EMCs typically lacked strong relationships with Russian stakeholders (see 
Section 4.5.1). Such inconsistency can occur due to the low commitment of foreign EMCs to 
relatively small Russian market (Gundermann et al., 2014; OICA, 2016b; German Mechanical 
Engineering Industry Association, 2015c). 
Moreover, contrary to the literature (Contractor, 2013; Grosse, 2003; Kumar, 2006), none of the 
participants suggested that foreign EMCs utilized ethnic connections and diaspora influences. 
Such divergence can be attributed to a low share of Turkish and Chinese ethnic groups in the 
Russian population (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation, 2015a, p. 78-80).       
Lastly, none of the interviewees mentioned that Russian firms benefited from economies of 
scale. This finding contradicts to the literature suggesting that EMCs benefit from large home 
markets (Bhattacharya and Michael, 2008; Williamson and Zeng, 2004), sub-contracts with 
Western firms (Zeng and Williamson, 2003), and linkages in the global value chains (e.g., 
Kothari et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2011). Such disagreement can be rooted in small size of the 
Russian market (Gundermann et al., 2014; OICA, 2016b, German Mechanical Engineering 
Industry Association, 2015a, 2015c) combined with low international competitiveness of 
Russian suppliers (International Institute for Management Development, 2016; Lang and 
Mauerer, 2010; Luo et al., 2011a; McCarthy et al., 2008).  
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Overall, the indicated inconsistencies determine a major contribution of this research. 
Additionally, as recognized in strategic management (Porter, 1980/1998) and industrial 
organization literature (Shepherd, 1999, p. 209), the competition is highly determined by the 
attributes of new entrants. Therefore, a detailed description of the competitor attributes assigned 
by market practitioners ensures an important advance of the literature on emerging market firms. 
Furthermore, the research on international competitive strategies is often limited to the analysis 
of firms from developed countries (Ping et al., 2013). The rare exceptions were mainly focused 
on Chinese and Indian firms (Section 2.2.3) or analyzed EMCs on an aggregated level (e.g., 
Guillén and García-Canal, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2015a; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010). 
Nevertheless, important differences exist between firms originating from different emerging 
markets (Dobbs et al., 2015a; Moghaddam et al., 2014). Consequently, by analyzing attributes 
of competitors originating from three groups of emerging markets, this study provides a 
distinctive contribution to the existing body of international business. In this way, this thesis 
extends the research of Ping et al. (2013) on international competitive strategies applied by 
emerging market firms. Moreover, the qualitative strategy helps to focus the analysis on 
competitors with roots in emerging markets only (cf. Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010; Koerte, 
2006) and empirically validate the sources of their competitive advantage (Contractor, 2013). 
5.2.1.3. Conclusion 1.3  
Perceptions of the German managers about the competitive threat from EMCs are mainly 
described by the criteria of hostility and consequences for performance. Thus, other criteria 
named in the literature (e.g., Heil and Robertson, 1991; Heil and Walters, 1993; Hultink and 
Langerak, 2002; Popma et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 1995; Waarts and Wierenga, 2000) play 
a minor role for the perceived threat from EMCs. Such finding can be explained by the fact that 
most of the previous studies on competitive threat investigated the competitors’ perceptions 
regarding new product introduction (Heil and Walters, 1993; Hultink and Langerak, 2002; 
Kuester et al., 1999; Popma et al., 2006; Waarts and Wierenga, 2000), while EMCs enter 
markets with standard and even obsolete products (Section 4.5.1). As a result, this research 
identifies the criteria applied to evaluate the perceived threat from entrants with existing 
products.  
Concerning the hostility criteria, the interviewees perceived activities of EMCs as highly hostile, 
which largely corresponds to the definition of “bad competitors” (Porter, 1985/2004, p. 212). 
Similar to the literature, the participants frequently referred to aggressive pricing (cf. 
Conclusions and implications    165 
 
Antoniades, 2015; Baack and Boggs, 2008; Eizenberg and Salvo, 2015), risk-seeking conduct 
(cf. Chang and Park, 2012; Contractor, 2013; Guillén and García-Canal, 2012), bribery (cf. Gao, 
2010; Hardoon and Heinrich, 2011; Venard and Hanafi, 2008; Wu, 2009), and state support (cf. 
Deng, 2012; Jullens, 2013; Ramamurti, 2012a) utilized by EMCs43. The study contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge by empirically validating the range of factors that determine the 
hostility of EMCs. For instance, the review of related studies (Section 2.2) did not reveal that 
these rivals applied bribery as a competitive tactic.  
The second criterion to describe the threat from EMCs was a consequence for revenue and/or 
profitability. The managers mainly evaluated the competitive threat based on the consequences 
for the revenues of their firms. Therefore, the following discussion is limited to this criterion 
only. Contrary to cross-industry studies which reported on generally growing market shares of 
EMCs (e.g., Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and Park, 2012; Santos and Williamson, 2015; 
Williamson, 2010), this research demonstrates that the representatives of the German firms 
perceived a heterogeneous impact on revenues of their firms, depending on the industry and 
customer market. In this way, the thesis resolves the contradiction between studies which 
proposed high (Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Global Intelligence Alliance, 2012; Thomson and 
Jiang, 2009) and low (Altenburg et al., 2008; Humphrey, 2003; Lang et al., 2015; McDermott 
and Corredoira, 2010) threat from EMCs for the Western automotive and mobile machinery 
suppliers. Thus, the activities of EMCs had different consequences for the sales to Russian 
OEMs producing commercial vehicles and mobile machinery, subsidiaries of global 
manufacturers, and aftermarket customers. The discussion below addresses the revealed 
heterogeneity.  
On one hand, the participants perceived that the threat from EMCs was the lowest in deliveries 
to subsidiaries of global OEMs in Russia, and the highest in deliveries to Russian commercial 
vehicles and mobile machinery producers. Despite the fact that similar conclusions can be 
                                                 
43 Several factors explain the perceived hostile behavior of EMCs. First, in the case of Russian firms, high intensity 
of rivalry might result from increased capabilities of Russian competitors and a lack of mutual forbearance in other 
markets with the German firms (Mutlu et al., 2015, p. 574, 577). Second, with regard to foreign EMCs, the hostility 
can be caused by relatively recent internationalization of these firms (e.g., Altenburg et al., 2008; Deng, 2012; 
Kothari et al., 2013), which determines their aggressive approach to global markets (Dobbs et al., 2015a, pp. 48–
50). Third, the hostility of EMCs can stem from the crucial role of costs in the automotive industry (Humphrey, 
2003, p. 133). Consequently, Western incumbents are likely to consider low-cost competitors from emerging 
markets (Section 4.5.1) as particularly threatening. Fourth, high hostility of EMCs can be determined by their 
generally small size (Section 4.5.1). Thus, smaller firms tend to initiate more competitive attacks than larger 
competitors do (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). 
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deducted from two sources (Humphrey, 2003; KPMG International, 2011), no further 
investigations on this issue were identified. Nevertheless, the literature suggests several 
potential explanations for these findings. First, the automobile industry is characterized by a key 
role of integration in the global value chain (e.g., Altenburg et al., 2008; Kumaraswamy et al., 
2012; McDermott and Corredoira, 2010) and engineering capabilities (e.g., Ju et al., 2013; 
Poulis et al., 2012; Woetzel et al., 2015). The German firms benefit from the capability to 
deliver modules and systems with complex engineering and interactions between suppliers and 
OEMs (Humphrey, 2003, pp. 124–125; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012; Li and Li, 2008; 
Woetzel et al., 2015). Furthermore, they often have geographical, cultural, and relational 
proximity to key locations of international OEMs (Humphrey, 2003, p. 125; Schmitt and van 
Biesebroeck, 2013; Spindelndreier et al., 2015). At the same time, EMCs typically have weaker 
positions on these attributes (e.g., Lang et al., 2015; Özatagan, 2011; Woetzel et al., 2015). 
Second, commercial vehicle and mobile machinery industries demonstrate a strong customer 
price sensitivity.  Thus, the share of Russian- and Chinese-branded products is significantly 
higher for commercial vehicles and mobile machinery, compared to the automobile market 
(Section 3.4.2). Third, mobile machinery industry has a lower speed of technological change, 
in comparison to the automobile industry (e.g., Hernandez et al., 2015, p. 53; Woetzel et al., 
2015). At the same time, EMCs typically have an advantage in industries with lower 
technological intensity (Chang and Park, 2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Lang et al., 2015; 
Woetzel et al., 2015). Fourth, one of the interviewees indicated the lower role of branding for 
the commercial vehicle market, in comparison to the automobile sales (Section 4.6.2.2). Parallel 
to this, EMCs traditionally outperform Western firms in less brand-intensive industries (Chang 
and Park, 2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008).  
On the other hand, the study revealed low perceived consequences for revenues of the German 
firms in the aftermarket. Such finding might result from a traditional focus of Western firms on 
the premium market segments, which are not accessible for the EMCs (e.g., Buse and Tiwari, 
2014; Plötner and Kupp, 2010, pp. 77–78; Wissmann, 2013). Here, developed-economy firms 
mainly benefit from brand awareness (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Deng, 2012; Poulis et al., 
2012), country-of-origin effects (Santos and Williamson, 2015), advertising and marketing 
capabilities (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Deng, 2012; Poulis et al., 2012). Additionally, it can 
be assumed that branding plays an important role in the aftermarket, due to high influence of 
the purchasing patterns of consumer markets (Aaker, 1991; Malaval, 2001, pp. 16–17). In 
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contrast, buying decisions of OEMs are mostly made by a team of professional purchasers 
(Kotler and Pfoertsch, 2006, p. 30; Kotler and Keller, 2012, p. 185) with an important role of 
rational considerations (Circle Research, 2015, p. 4; Webster and Keller, 2004, p. 395; Wilson, 
2000, pp. 787–788) including costs (Kotler and Armstrong, 2006, p. 43; Mathur, 2008, p. 293). 
To summarize, a growing penetration of EMCs to higher market segments (Chang and Park, 
2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Moghaddam et al., 2014; Orr, 
2016) was not confirmed in this study. Despite the reference to the hostility of EMCs, the 
informants suggested that their firms did not compete in the same market segments. Such results 
can be caused by the specifics of the analyzed industries, bias in the managerial perceptions, as 
well as attributes of the Russian market. Nevertheless, the current study provides an important 
contribution to the literature, by the specifying the level of threat for particular customer 
segments within the analyzed industries. 
5.2.2. Research question 2: competitive reactions to emerging market firms  
Research question 2 focuses on the competitive reactions of the German firms to the activities 
of EMCs in Russia. Four main conclusions are discussed below.  
5.2.2.1. Conclusion 2.1  
The interviews showed that the German firms mainly ignore the activities of competitors from 
emerging markets. This finding agrees with the extant literature. Thus, multiple studies put 
forward that incumbents frequently ignore new entrants (e.g., Geroski, 1995; Hopkins, 2003; 
Robinson, 1988, p. 382; Singh et al., 1998, p. 242; Steenkamp et al., 2005), including 
newcomers from emerging markets (McKinsey & Company, 2008; Dobbs et al., 2015a; Zeng 
and Williamson, 2003 and McKinsey & Company, 2008). However, several sources pointed out 
a low applicability of ignoring reactions in this research. Thus, it was expected that high price 
sensitivity of the emerging Russian market (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2015, pp. 287–
288; Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; WBG, 2015c) would result in a strong and broad reaction 
of incumbent firms (cf. Kuester et al., 1999). Likewise, a large size of the analyzed firms 
(Section 4.2) could determine their high responsiveness to competitive attacks (cf. Chen and 
Hambrick, 1995). Finally, firms are expected to respond early (Chen and MacMillan, 1992) and 
implement fast competitive actions (Ferrier, Walter, J. et al., 1999; Gatignon et al., 1997) to 
maintain a competitive advantage.  
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Several aspects can explain the prevalence of a passive reaction among the German firms. To 
structure the discussion, it follows the awareness-motivation-capability framework from the 
competitive dynamics literature (Chen et al., 1992; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Smith et al., 
2001). In line with this model, the lack of competitive response is rooted in a lack of awareness, 
motivation and/or capability for the action. Consequently, the lack of awareness can be caused 
by the decision bias of the German managers (DeSarbo et al., 2006, p. 101; Deshpandé and 
Gatignon, 1994), their low familiarity with EMCs (Kuester et al., 1999, p. 92), and a resistance 
to change (Hopkins, 2003, p. 22).  
The lack of motivation can be attributed to two factors. First, incumbents may benefit from new 
entrants. Thus, as proposed by Ashiya (2000, p. 983), the entry of weaker newcomers might 
deter stronger competitors. Additionally, dominant firms could use new entrants to develop 
embryonic industries (Hopkins, 2003, p. 22). Second, incumbent firms might perceive a low 
threat from challengers (Chen and MacMillan, 1992, pp. 563–564). This explanation was a sole 
reason provided by the study participants to justify their passive reaction to EMCs (Section 
4.6.1). The interviewees pointed out that their firms were protected from competition by certain 
entry barriers, or in other terms, were in a condition of blockaded entry (e.g., Bain, 1956; 
Besanko et al., 2013; Hüschelrath, 2005; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Shy, 1995; Tirole, 1994). The 
majority of the analyzed companies focused on those customer segments, where they benefited 
from high entry barriers (cf. Aulakh et al., 2000; Brandt and Thun, 2010; Colantone et al., 2015; 
Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008; Parrish et al., 2006; Seyoum, 2007). Consequently, they were 
not motivated to respond, since the entry of EMCs was perceived as small-scale (cf. Robinson, 
1988, p. 382), unimportant (cf. McKinsey & Company, 2008), and uncompetitive (cf. Hopkins, 
2003; Potter, 2004). Moreover, the German firms considered EMCs as targeting different 
customer segments (cf. Hopkins, 2003), having significantly different price level and low 
innovativeness (cf. Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2010), as well as not impacting their reputation 
(cf. Chen and Hambrick, 1995, p. 473). Despite the fact that EMCs were already operating in 
the same markets with the German firms, the participants were mainly confident about the long-
term competitiveness of their firms. This finding corresponds to the proposition of Geroski 
(1995, pp. 435–436) that entry barriers are a highly effective obstacle for the survival of new 
entrants in a post-entry stage.  
The study identified a range of entry barriers, which the participants perceived as important in 
competition with EMCs. These barriers correspond to traditional advantages of Western firms 
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in technological know-how and branding (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Deng, 2012; Ghemawat 
and Hout, 2008; Santos and Williamson, 2015), as well as the importance of global supply 
chains in the automotive industry (Humphrey, 2003; Jan and Hsiao, 2004; McDermott and 
Corredoira, 2010). At the same time, several entry barriers from the literature had minor 
importance for the study participants. None of the interviewees accepted the access to 
distribution channels as an efficient barrier against EMCs. This finding can result from multiple 
sourcing strategies, frequently applied by Russian wholesaler firms (Section 4.6.1). 
Additionally, several cost-related barriers were insignificant, such as access to cheap resources, 
economies of scale and scope. This finding can be attributed to traditionally strong cost 
advantage of EMCs (Section 5.2.1.2).  
Finally, the absence of competitive capabilities might explain the lack of competitive response. 
As proposed by Singh et al. (1998), incumbents might refrain from reacting to new entrants due 
to time and money required to counter competitor’s action. The lack of competitive capabilities 
could also prompt incumbents to implement an accommodating reaction (Section 4.6.3). 
Overall, this research sheds light on the determinants of passive competitive reaction and 
provides an in-depth analysis of entry barriers protecting the German firms from EMCs. The 
literature review identified only five studies which mentioned the role of entry barriers in 
competition with EMCs (Brandt and Thun, 2010; Deng, 2012; Potter, 2004; Santos and 
Williamson, 2015; Sun et al., 2010), with two of them being of conceptual nature (Deng, 2012; 
Sun et al., 2010). Also, a detailed description can help German manufacturing firms to focus 
their strategic efforts at utilizing and proactively enhancing (e.g., Lutz et al., 2010, p. 22; 
Pehrsson, 2009, p. 66; Shepherd, 1999, p. 211) key entry barriers (Section 5.6). 
5.2.2.2. Conclusion 2.2 
The participants recognized differentiation as the most important entry barrier. The analysis 
showed that three factors determine the height of this barrier: maturity of the component, 
customers’ price sensitivity, and criticality of the component. The deteriorating impact of the 
product maturity on differentiation was explained by the studies on product life cycle (e.g., 
Levitt, 1965; Vernon, 1966) and commoditization (Holmes, 2008; Rangan and Bowman, 1992; 
Reimann et al., 2010, pp. 188–190). The diffusion of knowledge among competitors, combined 
with buyers’ learning, determine the shift of production of mature products from developed to 
less-developed countries (Porter, 1980/1998, pp. 170–174; Vernon, 1966). Accordingly, several 
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studies confirmed that the competitive threat from EMCs is primary experienced in mature 
industries with standardized, process-driven products (e.g., Brandt and Thun, 2010; Labitzke 
and Gronemeier, 2015; Salonen et al., 2006). Despite an existing conceptual basis, rather scarce 
empirical research exists on the linkage between product life cycle stage and entry barriers 
(Karakaya and Kerin, 2007). Therefore, this investigation advances existing knowledge by 
describing a specific causal linkage between these constructs. 
Next, the study showed that the height of the differentiation barrier decreased parallel to the 
growth of customer price sensitivity. Similar conclusions about price sensitivity can be found in 
various existing sources (Kuester et al., 1999, p. 96; Porter, 1985/2004, p. 239; Robertson and 
Gatignon, 1991; Shepherd, 1999, p. 222). For instance, the conceptual article of Robertson and 
Gatignon (1991) and the empirical findings of Kuester et al. (1999) suggested that aggressive 
pricing, rather than differentiation, are more common in markets with higher price sensitivity. 
To illustrate the impact of this factor, the study proposed a classification of customers into 
segments according to their price sensitivity (Table 8). Despite the fact that similar 
classifications are common in the literature (e.g., Bain, 1956, pp. 296–304; Buse and Tiwari, 
2014, pp. 4–5; Gadiesh et al., 2007), the specific contribution of this research is determined by 
a detailed description of various market segments in the analyzed industries.  
Finally, the interviews showed that the height of the differentiation barrier is often dependent 
on the role of a particular component in the overall safety, functioning, prestige, external 
appearance or comfort of a vehicle. Equally, previous studies pointed out that EMCs typically 
dominate industries with lower R&D intensity and slower technological turbulence (Bergmann 
et al., 2004; Chang and Park, 2012; Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; Hernandez et al., 2015). This 
study advances these suggestions, by defining a set of industry-specific criteria, which 
determine the level of the differentiation barriers.   
5.2.2.3. Conclusion 2.3  
The analysis showed that the German firms mainly react to activities of EMCs by intensifying 
differentiation, non-production localization, pricing, avoiding, or retreating from product and 
geographic markets44. Differentiation traditionally plays a significant role for Western firms 
(Smiley, 1988, p. 174; Topajka, 2001; Vachani, 1990, p. 43, 44), especially in competition with 
                                                 
44 Competitive reactions reported by the participants were not mutually exclusive, and were frequently applied 
simultaneously (cf. Lutz et al., 2010, p. 31; Singh et al., 1998, p. 241; Timmor et al., 2009, p. 262; Vachani, 1990, 
p. 42).  
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low-cost competitors (e.g., Koerte, 2006, p. 203; Kumar, 2006; Morehouse et al., 2008; Ryans, 
2008). Differentiation enables the German firms to reduce direct competition (cf. Kumar, 2006; 
Potter, 2004; Ryans, 2010, p. 27; Sharp and Dawes, 2001; Vachani, 1990, pp. 42–43), reach 
more sustainable competitive advantage (Grant, 2010, p. 249), and address various attributes 
valued by buyers in the same industry (Porter, 1985/2004, p. 14). Furthermore, due to 
institutional specifics of emerging markets, differentiation and focus strategy seem to be the 
most efficient strategies for developed-country firms operating there (Baack and Boggs, 2008). 
Similarly, Shinkle et al. (2013) determined that pure strategies, including differentiation, are the 
most efficient for firms operating in countries with a relatively high market orientation, such as 
Russia (Heritage Foundation, 2016). The findings of this thesis represent a distinctive 
contribution by specifying the differentiation strategies and determining the importance of 
specific differentiation facets for various customer groups. Additionally, this study underlines 
specifics of this strategy in the Russian market setting, and thereby confronts the suggestions of 
Li and Li (2008) on applicability of cost leadership and hybrid strategies for foreign firms in 
emerging economies.  
Next, many participants suggested that their firms strongly relied on the localization of sales, 
service, and distribution in Russia. This finding reinforces the literature, which promoted closer 
managerial ties with emerging market stakeholders (e.g., Li et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011b; 
Santos and Williamson, 2015) and adaptation of strategies to the local institutional conditions 
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2010; Mutlu et al., 2015; Shinkle et al., 2013). However, the 
localization of the value chain was mainly limited to non-production activities. This finding is 
inconsistent with the previous literature (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Ramamurti, 2012a; 
Santos and Williamson, 2015; Williamson and Yin, 2014). Moreover, in view of the role of 
proximity for automotive sourcing (Humphrey, 2003, p. 125; Schmitt and van Biesebroeck, 
2013; Spindelndreier et al., 2015), the localization was expected to be particularly relevant for 
the analyzed firms. Nevertheless, several studies confirmed that foreign (Lang and Mauerer, 
2010, pp. 9–10), and specifically German firms (Buse and Tiwari, 2014, p. 6), rarely localize 
their production in Russia. The main factor determining weak production localization was low 
local demand (Section 4.7.1). Indeed, numerous sources provided evidence in supporting this 
finding (e.g., Gundermann et al., 2014; Lang and Mauerer, 2010, pp. 16–19; OICA, 2016b; 
German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 2015c). However, the second round of 
interviews demonstrated an increased interest in cooperation with Russian firms for production 
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localization (Section 4.6.2.3). This tendency can result from the intensified protectionist 
measures of the Russian government (Evenett, 2015)45. To sum up, while literature cites various 
aspects of localization, a new contribution of this research is the description of its peculiarities 
in the Russian setting. In particular, the findings question the aggregated approach to 
localization, by distinguishing differences between various value chain activities.     
Regarding the pricing, with a few exceptions (e.g., Eizenberg and Salvo, 2015) the literature 
agreed on the rare usage of this tactic (e.g., Geroski, 1995). Additionally, several publications 
specifically warned against overreliance on pricing tactics in competition with EMCs 
(Antoniades, 2015; Bugamelli et al., 2015; Kumar, 2006; Ryans, 2008). Moreover, pricing 
strategies are particularly hard to implement, considering a modest 7.5% average EBIT margin 
in the automotive supply industry (Lazard and Roland Berger, 2014, p. 3). As a result, the 
frequent mentioning of pricing tactic seems to be a surprising finding. However, the closer 
analysis showed that the German suppliers typically applied selective price adjustments and 
indirect price cuts, with only a few attempts to match the prices of EMCs. As suggested by 
several interviewees, such price adjustments satisfied the need of Russian managers in 
negotiation and bargaining. This goes in line with the literature on the Russian culture (Hofstede 
et al., 2010; Knight, 1987, p. 122; Rajan and Graham, 1991, p. 43, 53) and business-to-business 
relationships (Tellefsen, 2002, pp. 647–648). Moreover, the high concentration of the analyzed 
industries (Section 3.4) may cause the reported instances of matching prices. Price cutting is 
more widespread among incumbents in concentrated markets (Simon, 2005, p. 1238). Another 
explanation may stem from the common application of pricing in markets with high price 
sensitivity (Kuester et al., 1999; Robertson and Gatignon, 1991). Thus, the managers referred 
to matching prices exclusively in deliveries to price-sensitive Russian OEMs. Nevertheless, the 
majority of the study participants underlined the inexpediency of price wars against cost-
oriented EMCs (Section 4.6.2.4). In brief, this study demonstrates the limited applicability of 
pricing in competition with EMCs and thereby advances the knowledge on pricing in the context 
of emerging markets.  
Many participants suggested that their firms retreated or avoided markets with intense 
competition from EMCs. In view of traditional advantages of Western incumbents compared to 
late-comers from emerging markets (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Cho et al., 1998; Kerin et 
                                                 
45 Nevertheless, the conclusions on this issue has to be made with caution, considering the recent nature of the 
occurred changes. 
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al., 1992; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Santos and Williamson, 2015) and the 
generally rare applicability of accommodating reactions (Robinson, 1988, p. 371, 372), this 
finding is rather surprising. Nevertheless, the literature shows that Western firms facing EMCs 
frequently switch to products with higher skill (Bernard et al., 2006; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 
2008; Lu and Ng, 2013; Utar, 2014) and capital intensity (Bernard et al., 2006), focus on niche 
customer segments (e.g., Colantone et al., 2015; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008; Seyoum, 2007) 
with higher opportunities for product differentiation (Aulakh et al., 2000; Coucke and 
Sleuwaegen, 2008; Vachani, 1990), or specialize in narrowly-defined industries (Mascarenhas, 
2013). Such conduct can be explained by a typically lower impact of EMCs in skill-, capital-, 
and R&D-intensive sectors (Auer and Fischer, 2010; Federico, 2014), which occurs due to the 
existing differences in factor endowments and technology (Heckscher, 1949; Ohlin, 1967; 
Wang, 2003). Moreover, the frequent application of market retreat can result from the relatively 
large size of the analyzed firms (Section 4.2). Large firms commonly rely on high scale and 
therefore are often forced to exit industries threatened by low-cost import competition 
(Colantone et al., 2015). Several important remarks have to be provided regarding strategic 
retreat and avoidance. First, contrary to the suggestions of Bernard et al. (2006), Coucke and 
Sleuwaegen (2008), Koerte (2006), and Wang (2003), none of the participants reported on 
withdrawal to capital-intensive products. This finding can be attributed to unique strategies for 
capital access (Grosse, 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Kothari et al., 2013) and massive state 
support (e.g., Contractor, 2013; Deng, 2012; Jullens, 2013) utilized by EMCs. Second, many 
participants mentioned the reduction of the overall involvement in the Russian market in the 
second round of interviews. This finding conflicts recommendations to increase deployment of 
financial resources in emerging markets during periods of economic distress (Garcia-Sanchez 
et al., 2014, p. 1989). Third, contrary to the suggestions of Mascarenhas (2013), international 
specialization in a product category was mainly perceived as an inhibitor, rather than as a driver 
of competitiveness. Such disagreement can result from the fact that the industry-focused 
international strategies identified by Mascarenhas, were adopted by firms from emerging 
markets operating in the knowledge-intensive pharmaceutical industry.  
All in all, this research adds to the body of knowledge by contrasting the existing literature on 
the first-mover advantage and international competition. Thus, the study provides evidence that 
Western incumbents are rarely successful in maintaining cost-based pioneering advantages 
against EMCs. In addition, several important specifics of the retreat strategy were identified. To 
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summarize, the common applicability of market avoidance might indicate that all identified 
competitive reactions are applied with a clearly defined focus on specific market segments 
(Porter, 1980/1998, pp. 38–40). 
5.2.2.4. Conclusion 2.4 
Several strategies and tactics frequently suggested in the literature were either not reported by 
the participants or found rare applicability. The following discussion reflects on these tactics 
and strategies. First, none of the participants mentioned instances of pre-entry competitive 
reactions in competition with EMCs. This finding is inconsistent with several publications. 
Thus, on one hand, the studies of Bunch and Smiley (1992) and Reid et al. (1993, pp. 184–185) 
denoted that firms operating in highly concentrated markets tend to apply pre-emptive defensive 
strategies. Consequently, the frequent application of pre-emptive competitive reactions was 
expected to occur in the analyzed highly consolidated industries (Section 3.4). Similarly, 
(Smiley, 1988) proposed that pre-emptive entry deterrence is important for firms facing new 
entrants. Nevertheless, several factors support conclusions of the current research. First, the 
short market experience of EMCs explains the lack of pre-emptive reactions. Thus, the signal 
interpretation expertise of the competitor determines the efficiency of pre-emptive signaling 
(Heil and Robertson, 1991, p. 411). Recently established firms from emerging markets (Section 
2.2.1) have short experience in signal interpretation, which determines the low efficiency of pre-
emptive signaling to EMCs. Second, the relatively large size of the analyzed firms (Section 4.2) 
may determine the absence of pre-emptive reactions, since they typically react slower and 
weaker than smaller ones (Kuester et al., 1999). Finally, as implied by Kuester et al. (1999, p. 
92), it is hard to demarcate pre- and post-entry reactions in the real world competition. In short, 
this conclusion provides new knowledge on the pre-entry defense. In view of the revealed 
findings, the following discussion focuses exclusively on post-entry tactical and strategic 
reactions. 
In terms of tactical competitive reactions, a broad array of retaliating (e.g., Gatignon and 
Reibstein, 1997; Gruca and Sudharshan, 1995; Homburg et al., 2013; Kuester et al., 1999; 
Porter, 1985/2004; Robertson and Gatignon, 1991; Shepherd, 1999, p. 213; Smiley, 1988) and 
accommodating (e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 2005; Grimm et al., 2006; Robinson, 1988; Scherer 
and Ross, 1990) actions were described in the literature. However, the participants named only 
several of them. Additionally, all of them, except pricing (Section 5.2.2.3), were relatively rarely 
applied. Thus, comparative or repositioning sales effort might be an optimal defensive strategy 
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for firms experiencing a competitive attack (Hauser and Shugan, 2008). Despite the fact that 
nine participants referred to this tactic, only one case of customer retention was reported. 
Similarly, despite the fact that protection of proprietary know-how seemed to be essential for 
Western firms (Santos and Williamson, 2015), only five managers reported on such measures 
in the context of competition with EMCs. This finding is supported by the research of Singh et 
al. (1998), which revealed that companies rarely apply patenting to counter new and existing 
competitors. Several companies referred to the simultaneous application of bundling services 
and unbundling tactic. The analysis showed that bundled and unbundled products were supplied 
to different customer groups, with large, vertically oriented firms being more oriented on 
unbundling tactics. This finding goes in line with the suggestions of Porter (1985/2004) that 
both bundling and unbundling strategies can coexist if needs of customer segments differ 
significantly. The higher application of unbundling in the second round of interviews could 
occur because of economic downturn, which encourages this tactic (Porter, 1985/2004, p. 434). 
Only five interviewees referred to a defensive raise of switching costs in competition with 
EMCs. The applied measures included predatory product innovations and tactical servitization. 
The accepted definition of predatory product innovations could explain the low number of 
participants, who referred to this measure. Thus, in line with the recommendations of Gruca and 
Sudharshan (1995, p. 49), this measure embraces only innovations which primary aim to 
exclude rivals. Meanwhile, the majority of participants suggested that their firms continuously 
introduced changes in existing products or processes, independently of the competition with 
EMCs. Equally, servitization was mainly applied as a part of the overall differentiation strategy 
(cf. Gebauer et al., 2011, p. 1270). The participants named only a few cases of tactical service 
infusion. In summary, limited applicability of tactical retaliations can be attributed to the 
divergent levels of competitive threat from EMCs (Section 4.5.2) and generally rare application 
of preemptive tactics in competition (Kuester et al., 1999, p. 92; Smiley, 1988).  
In addition, the study participants rarely mentioned strategic reactions, such as introduction of 
stripped-down products, offshore outsourcing, captive offshoring, production localization, 
frugal innovations, and cooperation. Considering the attention these strategies received in the 
literature (Section 2.2), a discussion on each of them, except production localization (Section 
5.2.2.3) is provided below. Only six study participants accepted the applicability of the stripped-
down products in competition with emerging market firms. This finding disagrees with the 
suggestions of the existing literature to develop products and/or businesses tailored per needs of 
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mass segments in emerging markets (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2013; 
Zeschky et al., 2011; Zeschky et al., 2014). Likewise, the academic world experienced a virtual 
explosion of research on topics related to frugal innovations in the last years (e.g., Govindarajan 
and Trimble, 2012; Tiwari and Herstatt, 2012; Williamson, 2010; Zeschky et al., 2011; Zeschky 
et al., 2014). Therefore, it was surprising to find that only two firms applied frugal innovations 
in competition with EMCs in the Russian market. Three factors can explain such discrepancy. 
First, with relatively high GNI per capita (WBG, 2015b), Russian consumers have a strong 
purchasing power and low price sensitivity. Second, Russian consumers frequently share similar 
tastes with consumers in the developed markets (Lang and Mauerer, 2010, p. 17, 19, 32). Third, 
the interviewees stated that both of these strategies are associated with risks of brand dilution, 
brand cannibalization, lack of synergies, and engineering difficulty (Section 4.6.2.1). Similar 
arguments can be found across the literature (cf. Buse and Tiwari, 2014; Hilleke and Butscher, 
1997, p. 111; Kotler and Armstrong, 2006, p. 83. 84, 86; Kumar, 2006, p. 106; Plötner and 
Kupp, 2010, p. 77-78, 80; Ryans, 2008, 2010). The specific contribution of this study is that 
despite highlighting the difficulties, which incumbent firms face when introducing these 
strategies, it also explores practically relevant measures to overcome them.    
The literature frequently referred to measures of captive offshoring (e.g., Auer and Fischer, 
2010; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010) and offshore outsourcing 
(e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Mion and Zhu, 2013; Utar, 2014) in competition with EMCs. 
Likewise, this research showed the German companies often implemented offshoring and 
outsourcing. Similarly to the previous studies, the findings showed that China was the main 
offshoring destination for German firms (cf. Dachs et al., 2012; Spindelndreier et al., 2015), 
that offshoring was more popular among large firms (cf. Dachs et al., 2012; Wagner and 
Silveira-Camargos, 2011), and that main drivers for offshoring were proximity to the overseas 
markets and improved cost position (cf. Dachs et al., 2012; Dunning and Lundan, 2008, pp. 63–
77; Spindelndreier et al., 2015). The interviewees reflected on several aspects, which were 
widely covered by the previous literature on offshoring, including country-of-manufacturing 
effects (cf. Chen and Su, 2011; Fetscherin and Toncar, 2010; Funk et al., 2010), quality level in 
offshored production (cf. Ancarani et al., 2015; Dachs et al., 2012) and sustainability of the 
offshoring strategy (cf. Sirkin et al., 2014; Spindelndreier et al., 2015). Equally, the literature 
reflected on knowledge spillovers from subsidiaries of foreign firms located in emerging 
markets (Brandt and Thun, 2010; Chang and Park, 2012; Mudambi, 2008; Sun et al., 2010). The 
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distinctive contribution of this study is determined by the finding that offshoring was rarely 
introduced with the explicit aim to improve firm competitiveness in the Russian market. It was 
mainly applied as a part of a broader international strategy. A possible explanation for that might 
be the low volume of the Russian market (Gundermann et al., 2014; Lang and Mauerer, 2010; 
OICA, 2016b; German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 2015c), and the diverse 
levels of perceived threat from EMCs in Russia (Section 4.5.2). Moreover, low references to 
offshoring and outsourcing can be determined by the fact that participants seemed to be 
generally reluctant to discuss these strategies46.  
The study revealed that contrary to the literature reflecting on the benefits of cooperation with 
EMCs (e.g., Deng, 2012; Kothari et al., 2013; Santos and Williamson, 2015), only four 
participants named this reaction. Cooperation with EMCs was applied to fill product gaps, gain 
access to lower-cost resources, and achieve savings via economies of scale (cf. Dong and 
Glaister, 2006; Nielsen, 2003, p. 308; Suwannarat, 2010, p. 101, 104; Todeva and Knoke, 2005, 
p. 128; Townsend, 2003, p. 147; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995, pp. 285–286). The seldom 
implementation of this strategy can be explained by cross-cultural differences, performance 
risks, differences in adopted business procedures (Elmuti D., 2001; Yan and Zeng, 1999) as well 
as the generally rare application of accommodating reactions (Robinson, 1988, p. 371, 372). As 
a result, this research provides evidence of low application of the cooperation strategy in the 
setting of competition with EMCs in Russia. 
To summarize, the weak applicability of cost-enhancing strategies seems to contradict the 
suggestions to imitate cost-efficient strategies of EMCs (e.g., Chang and Park, 2012; Gadiesh 
et al., 2007; Williamson, 2010). However, the analysis showed that the analyzed firms 
implemented operational effectiveness measures independently from the competitive threat. 
Similar findings were identified for import competition with emerging economies (Bernard and 
Koerte, 2007, p. 24, 28; Koerte, 2006, p. 203).  The current investigation provides an essential 
contribution to the existing knowledge, by structuring various competitive reactions applied in 
the context of competition with EMCs, and giving an in-depth description of motives (Ju et al., 
                                                 
46 Several aspects can explain such conduct. First, offshoring by a company originating from advanced economy 
to developing economy may hurt the perception of the brand (e.g., Fetscherin and Toncar, 2010, p. 174; Funk et 
al., 2010, p. 639). Next, the German population generally has a negative attitude towards offshoring and other 
measures related to jobs losses for the home economy (Institute for Public Opinion Allensbach, 2006). Finally, the 
German managers became less interested in offshoring in the last years (Kinkel and Maloca, 2009). 
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2013, p. 13; Kaufmann and Koerte, 2010, pp. 255–256) and implementation peculiarities in the 
context of the Russian market.  
5.2.3. Research question 3: influence of the Russian institutional 
environment 
Research question 3 addresses the influence of the Russian institutional environment on the 
competitive advantage of the German firms. Consequently, the sections below describe the 
conclusions about each of the institutional drivers, the aggregated influence of the institutional 
environment, and changes in the institutional environment between the study stages. 
5.2.3.1. Conclusion 3.1  
Considering the importance of the institutional environment for the competitiveness of the 
German suppliers, this section provides separate conclusions on each institutional driver.  
Russia-related trade and investment policy. The study revealed the decisive role of Russia-
related trade and investment policy for the competitiveness of the German firms. This factor 
also received high attention in the literature and media. Thus, in line with Ezell et al. (2013, p. 
12) and Humphrey and Memedovic (2003, p. 19), authorities in emerging economies, including 
Russia, frequently implement import barriers to support domestic manufacturing. These barriers 
play a major role in the investigated industries (Tomyshev, 2014). Furthermore, significant 
changes occurred during the recent geopolitical turbulences. Thus, the EU imposed several 
restrictive measures with implications for export and financial sectors (Council of the European 
Union, 2015). Likewise, Russia implemented certain import restrictions (Administration of the 
President of Russia, 2014), intensified the support of import substitution (TASS, 2015), and 
declared an orientation on closer cooperation with other emerging economies (Koval, 2015). 
Despite the high attention to these topics, no empirical investigation explored their aggregated 
influence on the competitiveness of Western firms against EMCs in Russia. Consequently, this 
study provides a significant contribution by analyzing the perceptions of industry 
representatives about the impact of Russia-related trade and investment policy on the 
competitiveness of their firms. 
Weak manufacturing sector in Russia. This institutional driver was the most frequently 
mentioned specific of the Russian institutional environment. The existing literature confirmed 
the generally low level of technological capabilities in emerging markets (Nakata and 
Sivakumar, 1997, p. 468). Equally, some sources identified low technological innovativeness 
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(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014), limited technological adoption 
(WEF, 2015), and low productivity (Buck et al., 2000; Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004; WEF, 
2015) of Russian firms. Indeed, Russian gross domestic spending on R&D in 2013 was almost 
three times lower than in Germany and more than two times below the average value for 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD, 2016). Nearly 80% of the 
Russian manufacturing exports consisted of low-technology items (OECD, 2011, p. 78). Russia 
also experienced the sharpest decline in manufacturing employment and value added among 
BRIC countries during the last 28 years (Naudé et al., 2013, p. 13). This research provides a 
major contribution by specifying the multidimensional impact of the weak manufacturing sector 
in Russia on the strategy and competitive advantage of the German firms. Thus, several facets 
of the weak manufacturing sector in Russia emerged as having a mixed influence on the 
competition with emerging market firms, namely weak industry standards, low volume of local 
manufacturing, poor resources and capabilities of Russian manufacturers, as well as the high 
vertical integration of Russian OEMs. The literature reveals similar patterns. For instance, 
multiple studies pointed out that Russian automotive industry suffers from strong vertical 
integration of domestic OEMs, poor resources and capabilities of local manufacturers (Lang and 
Mauerer, 2010, p. 17, 36; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 8; Tomyshev, 2014, p. 12), weak 
industry standards (Becker, 2014, p. 9; KPMG International, 2011, pp. 19–20), and low volume 
of locally manufactured vehicles (Gundermann et al., 2014; Lang and Mauerer, 2010, pp. 16–
19; OICA, 2016b; German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association, 2015c). As a result, 
Russia has the lowest number of localized component suppliers among other BRIC countries 
(Berret et al., 2014, p. 20).  
National currency volatility. Several participants, particularly in the second round of data 
collection, referred to the adverse effects of the depreciated Ruble value and exchange rate 
volatility on their competitiveness. The high level of economic volatility in Russia is rooted in 
the instability of formal institutions (e.g., Batjargal et al., 2013; Estrin and Prevezer, 2011; 
Global Entrepreneurship Research Association, 2016), low political stability (e.g., McCarthy 
and Puffer, 2013; WBG, 2015d), and a highly turbulent business environment (e.g., Doern and 
Fey, 2006; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). Within last years, the 
Russian Ruble, along with a number of other currencies, has faced strong depreciation (Zweifel, 
2015), turning into “the world’s most volatile major currency” (Galouchko, 2015, para. 5). As 
a result, the German exporters mainly suffer from strong cost disadvantage in comparison to 
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Russian suppliers with a high share of Ruble costs. This research advances the existing literature 
by empirically validating the deteriorative impact that currency instability has on the 
differentiation advantage of the German firms in Russia.  
High price sensitivity of Russian consumers. A large number of the study participants referred 
to the prevalence of price-sensitive customers in Russia.  This finding agrees with the literature. 
Thus, emerging markets are typically defined by the high share of low-income consumers, 
which have low product quality requirements and high price sensitivity (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Ramamurti, 2015, pp. 287–288; Global Intelligence Alliance, 2012, p. 26; Prahalad and 
Hammond, 2002). In the case of Russia, the last decade was marked by declining poverty levels 
(WBG, 2015c) and growing consumers’ confidence (Nielsen Company, 2014). As a result, 
Russia has a higher GNI per capita than the majority of other emerging economies (WBG, 
2015b). However, a closer analysis reveals an extremely uneven distribution of incomes among 
the country’s population. Almost 85% of the wealth is held by the top decile of the population, 
which is the highest inequality even among emerging economies (Stierli et al., 2014, p. 31, 33, 
53). Furthermore, recent economic turbulences provoked a sharp decline in real earnings 
(Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation, 2015, p. 86), deteriorated consumer 
confidence (Nielsen Company, 2015) and increased the price sensitivity of the Russian 
population (GfK SE, 2015). In summary, the study advances the existing knowledge by 
illustrating the deteriorative impact of this institutional factor on the differentiation advantage 
of the German firms. 
Importance of the state in the economy. The high influence of the state in Russian business 
environment is well documented in the literature. Thus, according to Landes (1999), starting 
from the 16th century, Russia was an “epitome of state-driven development” (p. 268) which 
resulted in a massive state support of industrialization and the establishment of gigantic state 
enterprises. Various studies revealed that similar patterns are also valid for the modern Russian 
economy (e.g., Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 
2011; Heritage Foundation, 2016). Other sources reported on the growing share of state 
ownership and control (Cohen et al., 2014; Tompson, 2008), the considerable role of state-
owned companies in the main economic sectors and the high intrusion of state in the financing 
sector (Heritage Foundation, 2016). The important role of the state is considered to be one of 
the key inhibitors of the Russian economic development (OECD, 2013, p. 10, 13, 15, 18, 21), 
including free market competition. The interviews showed that the pivotal role of the state, 
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depicted by direct state purchases and indirect state influence on purchases of Russian OEMs 
decreased the differentiation advantage of the German firms. By providing these insights, the 
research makes a major contribution to understanding the influence of strong state involvement 
on the competitiveness of foreign companies in Russia. 
Integration in the global economy. The interviewees often referred to aspects, such as the 
growing penetration of global and Chinese OEMs in the Russian market, the enhancement of 
Russian industry regulations, exports of Russian OEMs, and stricter purchasing requirements of 
Russian consumers. These tendencies are well-illustrated by continuously increasing volumes 
of Russian foreign trade and the growing share of countries outside of the former Soviet Union 
in the Russian imports and exports (FTS Rossii, 2015). A similar trend exists in the automotive 
and mobile machinery industry. Here, on one hand, growing imports and intensified cooperation 
with foreign OEMs can be observed (Section 3.4.2). As stated by FTS Rossii (2014), imports of 
machinery, equipment, and vehicles in Russia increased almost 10 times within the period of 
1995-2011. On the other hand, Russian OEMs strived to enhance their internationalization in 
the last years. Thus, Russian exports of machinery, equipment, and vehicles increased almost 
five times between 1995 and 2011 (FTS Rossii, 2014). This research provides a specific 
contribution to the literature by postulating a two-fold impact from the increased integration of 
Russia in the global economy. Moreover, it demonstrates the significantly decreased role of this 
factor in the second round of interviews, which illustrates the impact of recent changes in the 
Russian institutional environment on the competitive advantage of the German firms. 
Limited access to financing. The literature provided a strong evidence on the weak 
development of capital markets in Russia (e.g., Latusek and Cook, 2012; Luo et al., 2011a; 
WEF, 2015) and limited access of Russian individuals and businesses to financing (e.g., 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014; Filippov, 2012; Shekshnia, 2008). 
Thus, restrained access to financing was frequently named as one of the main obstacles which 
Russian firms face during their operations (e.g., "Industry in Russia", 2012; OPORA Russia, 
2012, p. 37; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and WBG, 2014). 
However, no information about the impact of this attribute on the competitiveness of foreign 
firms in Russia was identified in the literature. Therefore, the current research contributes to the 
existing knowledge by describing the versatile impact of limited access to financing on the 
competitiveness of the German firms against EMCs.  
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Low manufacturing costs. Traditionally, Russia was characterized by a competitive cost 
structure in terms of access to natural resources and cheap workforce (Barnes et al., 1997; Ivlev 
and Nibbe, 2013, pp. 35–36). Similarly, the interviewees repeatedly reflected on the cost 
benefits of local manufacturing, especially those determined by cheap labor and energy. The 
recent Ruble devaluation (Tanas and Andrianova, 2015) restrained recent erosion of the Russian 
cost competitiveness (Sirkin et al., 2014). The finding of the current thesis shows that low 
manufacturing costs in Russia decreased the competitiveness of the German suppliers compared 
to Russian firms and increased the competitiveness of the German companies with a localized 
production against foreign EMCs. Moreover, this thesis depicts how recent institutional changes 
influenced the cost competitiveness of Russian manufacturing.  
Weak regulatory compliance. Many participants mentioned the influence of corruption, 
instances of intellectual property breach, and weak customs regulations on competition. This 
observation goes in line with the suggestions from the literature on the low development of 
regulatory institutions and legal infrastructure in emerging markets (Govindarajan and Trimble, 
2012, pp. 17–18; Luo, 2004b, p. 750). The literature discussed several facets of weak regulatory 
compliance in Russia, including the high level of public and private corruption (e.g., European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Venkatesan, 
2014) and the weak enforcement of property rights (McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011; WBG, 2015d). The study participants mentioned that aspects related to weak 
regulatory compliance frequently decreased the differentiation advantage of the German firms 
in comparison to EMCs. This conclusion goes in line with the findings of Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc (2008) on the dominance of emerging market firms in countries with low regulatory 
quality and weak control of corruption, and the suggestions of Kouznetsov (2011) about the 
inhibiting impact of corruption on the competitiveness of Western SMEs. Consequently, this 
research reinforces the existing knowledge by illustrating the perceptions of the German 
managers on these aspects. 
Strong trade sector. The fact that wholesale trade and repair constitute significant 17% of the 
Russian GDP (Russian investment agency, 2016) confirms the presence of strong trade sector 
in Russia. The same attribute can also be traced in the analyzed industries. Thus, Russian 
automotive distributors closely follow the highest world standards (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 
17).  Similarly, the report of Egli (2014, pp. 22–27) reflected on the all-country reach of main 
market players in the Russian automotive aftermarket, and the spread of highly specialized 
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wholesale companies. Nevertheless, no empirical investigation of the impact that the strong 
trade sector has on the competitiveness of foreign firms in Russia is evident in the literature. For 
this reason, the illustration of the two-fold impact of this institutional driver on the 
differentiation advantage of the German firms grants contribution of this research. 
Early industrialization. Contrary to other major emerging economies, Russia has a long-going 
history of manufacturing and industrial development (Reinert and Kattel, 2010, p. 11). Already 
by the beginning of 20th century, Russia was among the five largest industrial economies in the 
world (Landes, 1999, p. 268). The rapid and vast industrial expansion before World War II 
constituted the base for the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world superpower (e.g., 
Wheatcroft et al., 1986, p. 264). Despite the devastating years of market transition (Reinert and 
Kattel, 2010, pp. 12–13) and overreliance on resource-based sectors (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2012, p. 28; Mishura, 2010), the manufacturing industry is 
still important for the Russian economy ("Industry in Russia", 2012). The technological legacy 
of the Soviet Union plays a major role in the modern Russian economy (Bruton and Rubanik, 
2002; Luo et al., 2011a). Similar conclusions can be drawn when analyzing the automotive 
industry - Russia had strong automobile manufacturing long before the beginning of the 
economic liberalization (Lang and Mauerer, 2010, pp. 15–16).  Nevertheless, previous literature 
gave little attention to the role of early industrialization of the Russian economy for the 
competitiveness of foreign firms operating in Russia. Therefore, the current thesis provides first 
insights, by collecting qualitative evidence on this phenomenon. 
Demand volatility. The literature frequently described Russian business environment as 
chaotic, highly unstable, and turbulent (e.g., Lang and Mauerer, 2010, p. 6, 16, 19, 31; McCarthy 
and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). Moreover, the volatility of the Russian economy 
is significantly higher than that of other emerging economies (González et al., 2013). These 
findings go in line with the recent economic turbulences experienced by the Russian economy 
("Emerging markets", 2014). The thesis identifies several aspects related to demand volatility, 
which the participants perceived as essential for the competitiveness of their firms in the Russian 
market, including the importance of time-to-market, customer proximity, speed and flexibility 
of deliveries and increased risks of value chain localization. A description of the multifaceted 
impact of these aspects on the differentiation advantage of the analyzed firms represents a 
distinctive knowledge contribution. However, none of the interviewees referred to the demand 
volatility in the follow-up study, which might require further investigation.  
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Distributive approach to cooperation. The interviewees frequently reported on various facets 
of a distributive, rather than a cooperative, behavior of Russian customers47. Likewise, the 
literature implies that the Russian business environment is traditionally defined by low levels of 
trust (e.g., Filippov, 2012; Latusek and Cook, 2012; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013) and short-term 
orientation towards cooperation (Hitt et al., 2004; Jansson et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2011a). These 
attributes could result from the years of “hostile maze” (Puffer and McCarthy, 2001, p. 24) right 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the generally turbulent environment, and remnants of the 
Soviet mentality (Filippov, 2012; Graham et al., 1992, pp. 395-397, 410-411). As a result, 
Russian managers, especially the generation shaped in the Soviet era, typically demonstrate a 
transactional leadership style (Hofstede et al., 2010; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2011), secrecy regarding mistakes and problems (Filippov, 2012), and high reliance 
on power strategies for negotiations (Adair et al., 2004). Western managers describe such 
conduct as short-term oriented, uncompromising, and manipulative (e.g., Fedorov, 2015; 
Serscikov, 2010). Additionally, several studies argued that the Russian culture can be 
characterized by a situation-specific approach to truth and ethicality (Hofstede et al., 2010; 
Robertson et al., 2003). The interviews confirmed that Russian customers repeatedly 
demonstrated manipulative and forceful behavior in negotiations, low obedience to agreements 
and a short-term business approach. These aspects deteriorated the differentiation advantage of 
the German firms in Russia.  
Importance of status symbols. The study determined that status symbols play an important 
role for Russian customers. This finding received common acceptance in the literature. First, 
the Russian culture is traditionally characterized by high power distance (e.g., Elenkov, 1997; 
Girlando and Eduljee, 2010; Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 57). This factor, leads to the situation 
where “status symbols are normal and popular” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 76). Indeed, a study 
of Hein (2007) demonstrated that consumers from emerging markets typically prefer brands 
from advanced economies. Likewise, the crucial role of status symbols in Russia is manifested 
by high consumption of luxury products and Western brands (Godey et al., 2012; Kaufmann, 
2012; Khanna and Palepu, 2006), which is valid also for the automotive context (Lang and 
                                                 
47 Despite the emphasis on adversarial attributes, the majority of interviewees also brought numerous cases of 
cooperative relationships with Russian customers. Such finding can be attributed to the shift to liberal values among 
young Russians (e.g., Alexashin and Blenkinsopp, 2005; Puffer et al., 2010), and the lengthy period required in 
Russia for establishing trustful customer relationships (Rajan and Graham, 1991, p. 43, 53). 
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Mauerer, 2010, p. 17).  In contrast, other indicators point to advantages of Russian brands. Thus, 
the Russian culture can be characterized by a high national pride (Hofstede et al., 2010; WVSA, 
2016), which may result in consumer ethnocentrism (Shimp and Sharma, 1987). Consequently, 
the preference of national brands can offset the status benefits associated with Western products. 
This study resolves this disagreement, by showing that the participants mainly rejected the 
impact of consumer ethnocentrism on the competitiveness of their firms. This finding goes in 
line with the research of Batra et al. (2000), which showed that consumer ethnocentrism does 
not moderate brand non-localness. Consequently, this conclusion contributes to the existing 
knowledge on the role of status symbols in emerging markets. 
Risk and uncertainty avoidance. The finding regarding uncertainty avoidance of Russian 
managers goes in line with the existing literature. First, Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 92) suggested 
that the Russian culture is defined by an extremely high uncertainty avoidance. Several other 
studies confirmed his research (e.g., Bollinger, 1994, pp. 50–51; Naumov and Puffer, 2000, p. 
712). Second, the study conducted by WVSA (2016) reported a high orientation of Russians on 
survival values. In business practice, these cultural specifics result in punishment-oriented 
working culture (McCarthy et al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2008), low initiative of employees 
(Engelhard and Nägele, 2003; Hofstede et al., 2010), avoidance of decision-making and 
responsibility (Engelhard and Nägele, 2003), detail-oriented approach to information exchange, 
and high corporate bureaucracy (Graham et al., 1992, pp. 397–398; Hofstede et al., 2010). This 
study covers the gap in the literature by exemplifying the impact of these cultural specifics on 
the competitiveness of the German firms operating in Russia.  
Importance of personal relationships. The literature recognized the importance of personal 
interactions in commercial activities in the emerging markets (e.g., Nakata and Sivakumar, 
1997, pp. 475–476). Similarly, various studies underlined a vital role of personal and informal 
interactions in the Russian business environment (e.g., McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer et 
al., 2013; Serscikov, 2010). Some authors explained this specific by a void of strong formal 
institutions, which forces business counteragents to rely on informal arrangements (e.g., 
Batjargal et al., 2013; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Tretyak et al., 2013). Another explanation 
can be found in the literature studying national culture. According to Hofstede et al. (2010), the 
Russian culture is predominantly feminine with a high collectivism orientation. Both of these 
cultural orientations predetermine the significance of interpersonal relationships in society and 
business life (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 123). However, several authors indicated that the Russian 
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culture became more individualistic within last decades (Ardichvili and Gasparishvili, 2003; 
Muratbekova-Touron, 2002; Naumov and Puffer, 2000). Consequently, the role assigned to 
personal relationships by the literature is rather ambiguous. The findings of this thesis strongly 
confirmed the importance of interpersonal relationships in the Russian business environment. 
Such results can be attributed to the remaining collectivism orientation of the Russian culture 
and the predominance of the older generation of executives in the investigated industries 
(Naumov and Puffer, 2000). Additionally, the research contributes to understanding the role of 
personal relationships in competition by illustrating multi-fold implications that arise from this 
driver for the differentiation advantage of the analyzed firms. 
All in all, while the previous studies covered the specifics of the Russian institutions, this 
research is the first one to provide a holistic description of their links with the competitive 
advantage of Western firms against EMCs. 
5.2.3.2. Conclusion 3.2 
After reflecting on each of the institutional drivers, it is important to draw a cumulative picture. 
The research suggests a direct and mainly deteriorative impact of Russian institutional 
conditions on the competitiveness of the German firms, which gives support to several literature 
streams. First, numerous publications suggested that the institutional environment in emerging 
markets creates favorable conditions for EMCs related to their counterparts from developed 
economies. For instance, emerging market MNEs have developed efficient mechanisms for 
overcoming the lack of financial and managerial resources (Altenburg et al., 2008; Contractor 
et al., 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2006), risks of economic and political volatility (Altenburg et 
al., 2008; Guillén and García-Canal, 2012; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012; Khanna and 
Palepu, 2006), poor intellectual property rights (Altenburg et al., 2008; Brandt and Thun, 2010), 
and adverse environments of emerging economies (Contractor et al., 2007, Ramamurti, 2012a, 
2012b). Hence, EMCs tend to be particularly successful in other emerging economies that often 
share similar business environments with their home markets (Contractor, 2013; Guillén and 
García-Canal, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012a). Similarly, a deteriorative impact of the institutional 
environment in the competition with Russian suppliers can result from their local embeddedness 
(Section 4.5.1) and general advantages of local companies against foreign firms (e.g., Eden and 
Miller, 2004; Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995). Second, the literature review also showed that the 
institutional environment in emerging markets is an important direct determinant of the firm 
strategy and the competitive advantage (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.2.4).  
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This research produced several knowledge contributions. First, the literature on advantages of 
EMCs in the institutional conditions of emerging markets was mainly of conceptual nature, with 
a strong bias towards Asian and the least developed economies (Section 2.2.3). Consequently, 
this study extends the existing research by empirically exploring the impact of the Russian 
institutional environment. The qualitative methodology provides an in-depth illustration of this 
impact, which is combined with detailed characteristics of EMCs (Section 4.5.1). In this way, 
this thesis responds to the call of Contractor (2013, p. 316) to investigate the influence of home 
environment on the competitiveness of EMCs. Furthermore, it advances the propositions of 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2010) on the impact of host country conditions in the competition 
between developing-country and advanced-country firms. Moreover, the longitudinal elements 
help to overcome the shortcomings of previous cross-sectional research (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008, p. 975).  
Second, the research revealed that the Russian institutional environment mainly shapes the 
differentiation advantage of the German firms. This finding can be attributed to a high reliance 
on differentiation by the German firms (Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.2). Additionally, in view of 
rare production localization of the analyzed firms (Section 4.6.2.3), their cost structures 
experienced a relatively low dependence on the conditions in the Russian market.  
Third, the study implied that the competitiveness of the German firms is primarily influenced 
by formal, rather than informal Russian institutions. Such finding is surprising, considering the 
importance, which informal specifics of the Russian institutional environment received in the 
literature (Section 2.2.2.1). Nonetheless, it is explained by the overreliance of the managers on 
hard factors in their decisions (e.g., Cullen et al., 2000, p. 223), and the adaptation of the German 
firms to the informal environment through localization (Section 4.6.2.3).  
To summarize, while the literature widely covered drivers of the Russian institutional 
environment, the main contribution of this research is their linkage to the competitive advantage 
of the German against EMCs. 
5.2.3.3. Conclusion 3.3 
This research showed that changes in the institutional environment have a significant influence 
on the threat from EMCs, the entry barriers, and competitive reactions of the German firms. A 
growing body of literature focuses on the impact of institutional change on competition and firm 
conduct (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008, p. 209). In this vein, some studies analyzed the impact of 
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institutional change on the interfirm performance heterogeneity (Walker et al., 2002). Others 
examined the shifts in the competitive strategy of SMEs during institutional upheaval (Danis et 
al., 2010) and investigated organizational transformation in the conditions of institutional 
change (Chittoor et al., 2009). Transition economies, such as Russia, provide a particularly 
promising context for studying the impact of rapidly evolving institutional environment on firm 
strategy (Danis et al., 2010, p. 288). Nevertheless, the existing literature paid relatively little 
attention to the impact of institutional shifts on the behavior of firms operating in Eastern Europe 
(Meyer and Peng, 2005, p. 613). This research addresses this gap by examining how institutional 
changes of the host country influence the competitiveness of the analyzed firms against EMCs. 
In this way, the study responds to the call of Mutlu et al. (2015) and applies the institution-based 
view to examine the role of the institutional environment for competitive dynamics between 
firms competing in transition economies. The fact that two rounds of data collection occurred 
in the moment of a major institutional transition in the Russian host market determines the 
specific contribution of this research.  
5.3. Conclusions about the research problem 
The conclusions on each research question provide a foundation for the conclusions on the 
overall research problem. Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical framework, which guided this 
investigation (Figure 6). Consequently, this chapter presents the revised framework (Figure 19), 
which integrates the findings of the current research. 
Within the limits of research question 1, the study specified perceptions of the interviewees on 
competitors from emerging markets. The research provides an important contribution by 
identifying specific criteria applied by the managers for the perceived competition from EMCs, 
and describing the managerial perceptions for each of these criteria. 
Concerning research question 2, the findings suggest several modifications to the classification 
of defensive competitive reactions (Figure 3). As shown in Figure 14, reactions of retaliation 
and accommodation replaced an aggregated construct of response reaction. Next, this study 
identified specific entry barriers, strategies, and tactics, which the managers perceived as 
important in competition with EMCs. Lastly, the thesis thoroughly described each of these 
constructs, including managerial motivations and specifics of implementation.  
Finally, research question 3 investigated the impact of the institutional environment on the 
competitive advantage of the German firms. The interviews revealed 16 drivers representing 
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formal and informal facets of the Russian institutions and provided the in-depth description of 
their multifaceted impact on the competitiveness of the German firms. The institutional changes, 
which occurred between the two stages of the data collection, highlight the crucial role of 
institutional considerations for competition. 
Figure 19: The revised theoretical framework  
 
Note:  RQ stands for research question 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data and reviewed literature 
Altogether, the summary of key contributions for each research question (Table 15) and the 
modified theoretical model (Figure 19) provide the solution to the specified research problem. 
As the study showed, the analyzed firms mainly ignored activities of EMCs. Moreover, they 
implemented a narrow set of tactical retaliations, avoided market segments with strong 
competition from EMCs, or applied strategies independently from the competitive situation in 
the emerging Russian market. Such passive reaction may result from a strong in-group focus of 
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the German managers, a low perceived threat in the core market segments of the German firms, 
and a low capability to retaliate. The institutional environment in Russia had a significant 
influence on the competitiveness of the analyzed firms, primary deteriorating their 
differentiation advantage against EMCs.  
5.4. Theoretical implications  
This dissertation relies on theories from multiple disciplines (Section 2.2.3). As a result, the 
research findings and conclusions have implications for several parent and focal theories. 
Implications for parent theories. The current study provides several contributions to the 
industrial organization discipline. For instance, contrary to the suggestions of Shepherd (2005, 
p. 119), the findings confirm the central, rather than a peripheral, role of entry barriers in 
competition. Additionally, the developed classification of competitive reactions confirms the 
efficiency of entry conditions proposed by Bain (1956). Regarding strategic management, the 
research illustrates the role of managerial perceptions in competition (Johnson and Russo, 1997, 
p. 177, 192; Kaplan, 2011; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, pp. 8–9) and describes the direct 
impact of institutional factors on firm strategy and competitive advantage (Peng et al., 2009). 
Likewise, the study provides several implications for the marketing discipline. For instance, the 
findings confirm the high relevance of market pioneering (Cho et al., 1998; Kerin et al., 1992; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), which is depicted through the construct of entry barriers. 
Moreover, the research enriches the literature on the competitive market structure and 
competitive interactions (Sabnis and Grewal, 2012). Finally, the findings can be applied to 
extend the literature of international marketing, and particularly the stream analyzing the impact 
of foreign environment on the marketing practice (Bartels, 1976, p. 206; Sheth, 2011, p. 167). 
A detailed review of theoretical contributions to strategic management, marketing, and 
industrial organization is provided within the implications for focal theories. The study also 
provides several implications for international business. First, the research goes beyond 
analyzing internationalization patterns of emerging market firms (e.g., Guillén and García-
Canal, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006), and focuses on the important consequence 
of this process, namely the intensified competition for established Western firms. As a result, it 
contributes to the fragmented literature on rivalry among EMCs and Western MNEs (Kothari et 
al., 2013, p. 296; Mutlu et al., 2015, p. 573). In addition, contrary to the majority of the identified 
sources (Section 2.2.3), this research analyzed the specifics of competition among these firms 
occurring in a host country environment, and particularly in the conditions of the largely 
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overlooked Russian market. Lastly, the competitors analyzed in the thesis are not limited to 
firms originating exclusively from Asia, but also include largely under-researched Turkish and 
Russian companies.   
Second, the findings support most of the international trade and FDI theories, which explicate 
competitive reactions to EMCs in the cross-national context (Section 2.3.1.4). Thus, the nature 
of the identified entry barriers corresponds to the suggestions of the diamond of national 
advantage (Porter, 1990b, p. 78), the international product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), and 
the theory of factor proportions (Heckscher, 1949; Ohlin, 1967). Considering the access of 
EMCs to resources in home markets, the German firms often relied on entry barriers, which 
were determined by skill and R&D intensity (cf. Porter, 1990a). Next, the findings on 
determinants of the differentiation barrier comply with the international product life cycle theory 
(Vernon, 1966), which suggests that competition from developing countries grows parallel to 
the product maturity. Furthermore, the motives for localization, outsourcing, and offshoring, 
mentioned by the study participants, correspond to the factors described by the eclectic 
paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 2008), the internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 2009), 
and the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Finally, some 
advantages of Russian firms, including customer proximity and governmental support can be 
explained by barriers to international operations (Hymer, 1960, p. 38). 
Third, the research identified several discrepancies with existing international business 
literature. Above all, the findings indicate that a springboard perspective (Luo and Tung, 2007) 
as well as linkage, leverage and learning framework (Mathews, 2006) have limited applicability 
to the case of Russian firms. These companies primarily focus on domestic markets and have a 
weak international presence (Section 4.5.1). Next, the propositions of Heckscher (1949) and 
Ohlin (1967) about the specialization of capital-abundant (Western) economies in capital-
intensive products find weak support, which, however, corresponds to the findings of Leontief 
(1953). Lastly, contrary to the diamond of national advantage (Porter, 1980/1998), the study 
demonstrates a direct impact of the institutional environment on firm competitiveness.  
Implications for focal theories. Regarding the competitive perception theory, the findings 
largely support the behavioral or cognitive view on competition, with its emphasis on 
managerial perceptions in firm-level competitive interactions (Johnson and Russo, 1997, p. 177, 
192; Kemp and Hanemaaijer, 2004, pp. 8–9). For instance, the interviews demonstrated the 
importance of cognitive classifications of competitors (cf. Kaplan, 2011; Porac et al., 1989). 
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Furthermore, the research identified measures, which can be applied to evaluate the perceived 
threat from new market entrants, rather than from the introduction of new products (cf. Hultink 
and Langerak, 2002; Popma et al., 2006; Waarts and Wierenga, 2000). In this way, the thesis 
refines indicators applied in the competitor perceptions theory and offers variables for future 
quantitative investigations. Similarly, the research itemizes the attributes, which managers apply 
for identifying competitors (cf. Clark and Montgomery, 1999).  
The thesis also produces several important implications for the competitive reaction theory. A 
novel synthesis of the multidisciplinary literature on competitive reactions was conducted 
(Figure 3). Moreover, the thesis develops an international extension to the existing literature on 
competitive reactions. Additionally, literature on competitive dynamics may benefit from the 
study. Thus, the study findings confirm the cognitive foundations of awareness-motivation-
capability framework (Chen et al., 1992; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Chen and Miller, 2012, 
pp. 152–153; Smith et al., 2001). Finally, competition literature is predisposed towards issues 
related to offensive strategies (Homburg et al., 2013, p. 186; Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2010, 
p. 1078). Therefore, this research assures a major contribution by providing a detailed 
description of defensive competitive reactions, which are highly relevant for the competition 
with latecomers from emerging markets.  
This study offers two implications for the entry barriers theory. First, by incorporating 
multidisciplinary approach and undertaking an investigation in the cross-national context, it 
investigated the role of entry barriers in the international context (Karakaya, 1993, p. 8). Second, 
the thesis confirms a post-entry influence of entry barriers (cf. Geroski, 1995, p. 436). 
Next, this research provides several implications for the institution-based view of strategy. 
While the earlier literature registered all of the identified institutional drivers (Sections 2.2.2 
and 5.2.3.1), no previous research investigated their composite influence on the competitiveness 
of foreign firms operating in Russia, especially related to EMCs. As a result, this research 
contributes to the knowledge by using “already known material but with a new interpretation” 
(Phillips and Pugh, 2005, p. 62). Moreover, by registering changes in the competitive 
perceptions within the period of institutional change, the study provides a vivid illustration of 
the influence of institutional factors on the competitive advantage of a firm. Additionally, the 
majority of studies, which analyzed the impact of institutional conditions in emerging markets, 
were focused on the market entry (e.g., Bruno et al., 2013; Kouznetsov, 2011; Ulrich et al., 
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2014). In contrast, this research demonstrates how these conditions affected firms, which 
already operate in the market. 
Several literature streams, which are peripheral for the current research, can also benefit from 
the study results. For instance, the findings on the role of status symbols, specifics of offshoring 
and outsourcing can be applied in the country-of-origin literature. Moreover, the data regarding 
frugal innovations can be useful for the innovation management literature. Next, the conclusions 
about the role of informal institutions in Russia may contribute to the intercultural studies in 
international business and marketing. Finally, a body of literature on the firms originating from 
emerging economies can be enriched by the perceptions of Western managers regarding the 
attributes and strategies applied by these companies.  
5.5. Methodological implications  
The research adopted qualitative methodology, which, despite its merits, is relatively rare in 
strategic management and international business (e.g., Bettis et al., 2015; Doz, 2011, pp. 583–
585; Kriek et al., 2009, p. 132; Rynes and Gepahrt, 2004). As a result, several methodological 
implications became evident. First, the managers frequently benefited from the interviews by 
being able to reflect and summarize their perceptions on competition, specifics of the Russian 
environment, and sources of competitive advantage for their firms. No references on such an 
outcome from the interviews was found in the business research literature48. Further qualitative 
investigations may utilize this benefit to facilitate the access to study participants.   
Second, several interviewees were reluctant to discuss the topics of offshoring and outsourcing. 
Such conduct can be explained by mainly negative attitude among the German population 
towards globalization (Institute for Public Opinion Allensbach, 2006). Consequently, the 
produced findings were triangulated with other available information on the analyzed firms. 
Future research on offshoring and outsourcing should consider potential difficulties in obtaining 
information on these topics from German managers.  
Third, the study integrated elements of grounded theory analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967/2006; Strauss, 1987/2003; Strauss and Corbin, 2001) with qualitative content 
                                                 
48 However, similar effects were described in psychology (e.g., Koelsch, 2013). 
 
Conclusions and implications    194 
 
analysis (Schreier, 2012). Thus, quantitative representations of the research findings enhanced 
the descriptive power of this research. A similar combination can be applied to other qualitative 
studies investigating patterns of international competition.   
Fourth, an original procedure for gaining access to the participants was developed. The 
representatives of the analyzed firms were approached during specialized trade shows. This 
measure helped to establish trustful relationships with the interviewees, their colleagues, and 
managers. Such approach is recommended for other researchers facing obstacles in recruiting 
participants for qualitative investigations (Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 169-173, 179-180). 
Finally, the two-stage data collection demonstrated that the member-check technique (e.g., 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985) could be successfully combined with elements of longitudinal 
investigation (e.g., Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 155–156). Consequently, future researchers may 
also benefit from integrating longitudinal elements into the member-checking procedure. 
5.6. Managerial implications   
A choice of competitive reaction is situation-specific and depends on the capabilities of a 
particular firm, the attributes of industry, and the institutional environment (Section 2.3.2.4). 
Nevertheless, in line with the recommendations of Perry (2002, p. 40) and Shugan (2003, p.11), 
the study synthesized specific recommendations, supporting the decision-making of German 
managers. These recommendations include a decision framework for competitive reaction and 
an overview of typical pitfalls in the competition with EMC.   
5.6.1. Decision framework for competitive reaction  
As seen from Figure 20, a foremost attention must be paid to an objective assessment of the 
competitive threat (Section 4.5.2). For this, a company must evaluate entry barriers protecting 
its positions related to new entrants. For German firms it is of particular importance to consider 
a share of price-sensitive customers in their portfolio, a stage of product life cycle, and the 
criticality of their products (Section 4.6.1). The assessment should not be limited to industry-
related factors, but needs to contemplate an impact of institutional drivers (Section 4.7). If the 
analysis shows that the activities of EMCs pose a sustainable threat, a manager should consider 
an expedience of a counterattack (Section 4.6.2). Here it is vital to determine potential benefits 
of retaliation and estimate required resources. A manager, who takes the decision to retaliate, 
should evaluate the impact of competition in Russia on the overall performance of his firm. It is 
necessary to consider not only the share of the Russian market in profit and revenue of the 
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company but also the potential effect of the competition in Russia on other markets. In the case 
of a strong impact, it makes sense to invest in strategic retaliations. It is of particular importance 
that a company maintains a balance between its core strategy, and a necessity to change when 
facing a new type of competitors. Highly differentiated German suppliers should consider 
alternative ways of enhancing their value proposition, by increasing investments in 
technological leadership, branding, and augmented services (Section 4.6.2.2). These measures 
might be intertwined with cost-enhancing and hybrid strategies (Sections 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.3). 
Deteriorated economic conditions in Russia are especially favorable for low-investment 
strategies, such as the licensing, as well as the implementation of frugal products, which can 
also be sold in other countries. However, it is essential to apply cost-enhancing strategies only 
in combination with differentiation strategies (cf. Raynor and Ahmed, 2013).  
Figure 20: Decision framework for competitive reaction to EMCs
 
Note:  EMC stands for emerging market competitor 
Source: Own compilation based on collected data 
In those cases, when competition in Russia has a low impact on the overall performance of a 
firm, an incumbent should resort to resource-thrifty and short-term tactical retaliations (Section 
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4.6.2.4). For instance, under conditions of economic turmoil, a combination of easy-to-reverse 
indirect price adjustments and comparative sales efforts might be particularly efficient. If a 
counterattack of the competitor makes no sense, the company may consider opportunities of 
cooperating with a new entrant, for instance by establishing a supply chain agreement (Section 
4.6.3.2). In this way, German companies can benefit from capabilities of EMCs to manufacture 
goods at ultra-low costs. However, it is imperative to ensure top management commitment to 
coopetition and trustful relationships between competing firms (cf. Chin et al., 2008; Elmuti D., 
2001). In an ultimate scenario, if a company faces EMCs with significant advantages and 
expects weak long-term market perspectives, a reduction of market presence might be a feasible 
option (Section 4.6.3.1). However, this decision should be made with utmost caution. It might 
be difficult to win back positions from lower-priced competitors, which managed to build 
relationships with former customers.  
5.6.2. Pitfalls in competitive reaction  
Besides the decision framework for competitive reaction, the research revealed some typical 
pitfalls, which German firms should avoid when facing EMCs. 
Overreacting. Distorted competitive perception may lead to overemphasizing the threat from 
EMCs (cf. Yu et al., 2015). A firm should realistically assess an overall value of the competitors’ 
offering when planning price cuts and omit brand dilution for the sake of short-term gains (e.g., 
deviation from standard quality level with the aim of cost savings). Pricing retaliation should 
not poison the market and must be commonly coordinated with other subsidiaries of the firm 
(Section 4.6.2.4). This is particularly valid for those suppliers, which have an exclusively 
premium orientation and do not practice a multi-brand strategy with frugal or stripped-down 
products (Sections 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.3). Finally, a firm should carefully evaluate an expediency 
of market retreat, especially in the case of substantial advantages over EMCs and long-term 
attractiveness of the Russian market (Section 4.6.3.1).  
Complacency. Contrary to the previous point, companies often tend to be overconfident about 
their competitive position (Moore and Urbany, 1994; van Zant and Moore, 2013; Varadarajan 
and Jayachandran, 1999, p. 127). A supplier must be extremely cautious when ignoring activities 
of EMCs. Several participants reported on losing sales due to new competitors, which were 
initially not considered as a realistic threat. Although EMCs often play a low role in the global 
competition, they frequently hold strong positions in the Russian market (Section 4.5.2). To 
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avoid this pitfall, a firm should not only monitor the competitive environment but also learn 
from new entrants. These competitors are accustomed to performing successfully in turbulent 
and resource-scarce environments of their home economies (Sections 2.2.2 and 4.5.1) - an 
advantage which becomes crucial in the conditions of economic turmoil. Additionally, a firm 
must ensure sustainability of entry barriers (cf. Yip, 1982), which might increase with their 
intangibility, dependence on unique historical circumstances, and social complexity (Besanko 
et al., 2013, pp. 377–378).  
Lack of customer focus. Companies risk becoming passive if they focus exclusively on the 
activities of their competitors. A balance must be created between competitor and customer 
orientation by considering the needs of buyers when implementing competitive reactions (Guo 
and Wang, 2015). Incumbents should inform their customers on the overall value of their 
offering, underlining own strengths rather than weaknesses of their competitors. It is particularly 
important to exclude defensive actions, which customers might perceive as harmful. For 
instance, the integration of patented products, which limits buyer’s switching opportunities 
(Section 4.6.2.4), must be clearly communicated to the buyer in order to omit potential 
misunderstandings. Similarly, technologically superior German firms should be utterly careful 
with the patriotic spirit and self-esteem of Russian customers (e.g., Hofstede et al., 2010) and 
restrain from communicating with them from a teaching position.     
Rigidity. Speed and flexibility play an important role in the volatile Russian environment 
(Sections 2.2.2 and 4.7.1). This factor is particularly critical in competition with highly agile 
rivals from emerging markets. Prompt reactions to competitive threats and institutional 
turbulences, as well as flexible approach towards customer communication, production, 
logistics, contractual obligations, and new product development, are essential in the 
competition. The key challenge for German companies is to find a balance between strategic 
agility and process standardization, which assures the reliability of their offering (cf. Aghina et 
al., 2016). 
Remoteness. Manufacturing site proximity, which is articulated by just-in-time and just-in-
sequence production requirements, is a well-documented imperative in the automotive supply 
industry (Spindelndreier et al., 2015; Wagner and Silveira-Camargos, 2011). Several managers 
considered an economically expedient localization of production as the only way for German 
suppliers to maintain a high-scale presence in the Russian market (Section 4.6.2.3). However, 
to counter EMCs and address volatile requirements of Russian customers (Section 4.7.1), 
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German companies should go beyond considering localization as an exclusive relocation of 
assembly or production operations. Successful localization often embraces fundamental changes 
in a firm’s business model, including R&D activities, customer communication, logistics, and 
distribution. As stated by Informant 18-I, “you have to think in some way Russian” to maintain local 
competitiveness (cf. Bernhart et al., 2013; Govindarajan and Trimble, 2012; Khanna and Palepu, 
2006; Ramamurti, 2012a, p. 248).  
Single-instrument reaction. Reaction to formidable competitors should be based on a 
combination of several strategies and tactics (Section 4.6). As expected (Section 2.2.1), the 
managers warned against an exclusive focus on pricing and costs, when competing with EMCs 
(Sections 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.4). For instance, captive offshoring was applied only in combination 
with differentiation measures. Nonetheless, a pure core offering differentiation starts losing its 
efficiency when the price gap is higher than 20% (Potter, 2004). Consequently, a firm should 
reach a reasonable price-quality ratio by balancing differentiation with cost efficiency measures.  
Short-term orientation. Considering an exclusive importance of the local market for Russian 
suppliers (Section 4.5.1) and lengthy negotiation orientation of local customers (Gulbro and 
Herbig, 1999; Knight, 1987, p. 122; Rajan and Graham, 1991, p. 43, 53; Tu et al., 2011, p. 179), 
German firms must be ready for a gradual development of cooperation and a long-term 
confrontation with Russian competitors. An incumbent would need to invest in sustainable 
competitive reactions and be prudent with tactics, which might undermine their long-run 
competitiveness (e.g., overpromising on product features). In this context, the current economic 
situation with slow return on investments challenges the long-term commitment of German 
companies to Russian market (Section 4.6.3.1)  
5.7. Research limitations   
Delimitations, accepted for this research, were discussed in Section 1.2. Additionally, Section 
3.9 reflected on limitations associated with the qualitative methodology. However, several 
shortcomings should be outlined in this section. The first limitation is determined by a reliance 
on phone interviews. As suggested by Saunders et al. (2009, p. 349), face-to-face interviews 
suite better for investigating sensitive topics. Nevertheless, the long distance and the high 
number of interviewees hindered the frequent application of face-to-face interviews. Several 
measures ensured the reliability of findings, including preliminary contact with interviewees at 
trade shows and a detailed description of the study in the correspondence (Section 3.8).  
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Next, the study could haven been affected by its reliance on managerial perceptions. Thus, the 
initial interviews showed that the research problem appeared to be highly sensitive for the 
participants. To overcome this limitation, the most critical issues were addressed with the help 
of implicit questions and probes. Additionally, various techniques enhanced research 
trustworthiness (Section 3.8). Nevertheless, despite the best efforts to ensure the reliability, the 
results of this study should be considered in the light of the potential informant bias.  
Finally, despite the thorough choice of the study sample, the analyzed industries do not represent 
all manufacturing sector of the German economy. Nonetheless, the findings might have 
applicability to some other mature manufacturing industries. For instance, the identified drivers 
of the institutional environment can be also valid for industries with a slow technological change 
and a weak market growth, such as construction equipment, mobile port cranes, and shipping 
containers (Ghemawat and Hout, 2008).   
5.8. Implications for future research  
Several avenues for further studies result from the findings, delimitations, and limitations of this 
investigation. First, the qualitative methodology applied in this study determines future 
opportunities for quantitative research (Perry, 2002, p. 41). The quantitative research may 
enhance external validity for the findings, and thereby generalize data patterns revealed in the 
current investigation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 297; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 158; Yin, 2003, 
p. 37). Next, the criteria identified in this research, such as themes of perceived threat (Section 
4.5.2), can be used as variables in a large-scale survey. Finally, the revealed relationships 
between different constructs, such as outlined impact of institutional drivers on the competitive 
advantage of the German firms, can be tested on a larger sample.  
Another possibility for future inquiries stems from the delimitations and limitations of the 
current research. First, subsequent research can validate and generalize the study conclusions in 
different research settings. For instance, other manufacturing or service industries could be 
investigated. As proposed by Ping et al. (2013), the industrial sector strongly determines a 
choice of international competitive strategy. For instance, patterns of competition with emerging 
market companies in the commercial banking industry do not resemble conditions in the 
manufacturing sector (Petrou, 2007). Second, similar investigations can be carried out in other 
emerging markets, which also gained limited research attention so far. This research revealed 
several country-specific peculiarities, which highly influence the competition patterns. 
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Consequently, investigations in countries, such as Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, or South Africa, may 
reveal differing specifics of competition with EMCs. Third, future studies may explore the 
perspectives of other industry players on the same phenomenon. On the one hand, the 
perceptions of managers representing EMCs might identify potential cases of competitor 
asymmetry (Chen, 1996). On the other hand, perceptions of customers could integrate a 
demand-based perspective on competition (Clark and Montgomery, 1999; DeSarbo et al., 2006; 
Sabnis and Grewal, 2012; Yu et al., 2015). This approach might resolve the disagreement 
between the research findings and the existing literature on differentiation and innovation 
capabilities of EMCs (Section 5.2.1.2). Moreover, it can evaluate the awareness of German 
managers about the EMCs (Section 5.2.2.1). Fourth, future studies may also perform a deeper 
analysis of several selected cases with a higher number of face-to-face interviews. Such 
inquiries may identify the resources (e.g., Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991) and dynamic capabilities 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007) crucial for maintaining firm 
competitiveness. Last, future research might aim to produce normative findings by integrating 
performance variables and covering a longer period of analysis. Consequently, the 
recommendations on the applicability of specific competitive reactions could be derived, based 
on the long-term performance results of the analyzed firms. An example of similar investigation 
is provided by the 10-year longitudinal research of Matthyssens and Vandenbempt (2008) on 
the firm transition to service-based solutions49.  
The study findings determine several other important directions for future research. For 
instance, rationales behind the limited applicability of retreat to markets with higher capital 
intensity, tactical retaliations and accommodation, offshoring and cooperation strategies should 
be addressed by specific investigations. The further research may also investigate the reasons 
behind the low references in the second round of interviews to drivers of the institutional 
environment, such as demand volatility, weak regulatory and legal compliance, strong trading 
sector, early industrialization, risk and uncertainty avoidance, and importance of personal 
relationships. Finally, the subsequent inquiries may analyze how the identified drivers of the 
Russian institutional environment influence the broader competitiveness of German firms. For 
instance, in comparison to other Western suppliers. 
                                                 
49 Nevertheless, researchers following this pass should consider the turbulent nature of Russian business 
environment (e.g., Doern and Fey, 2006; Hunter, 2003; McCarthy and Puffer, 2013; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011) 
and the related difficulties in isolating performance antecedents. 
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5.9. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this thesis fills the gap in the existing business literature on the specifics of 
competition between developed and emerging market firms in the shifting institutional 
conditions of a major emerging economy. While the German companies primary demonstrate a 
passive reaction to EMCs in Russia, the institutional environment strongly influences their 
strategies and competitive advantage. In this way, this multidisciplinary research provides 
important implications for several streams of business literature, including the institution-based 
view of strategy and competitive dynamics research. Considering an importance of emerging 
markets and growing internationalization of EMCs, the findings of this research support global 
competitiveness of German manufacturing firms.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Literature on defensive competitive reactions 
Source and 
theoretical 
foundation 
Competitive reaction 
Ignoring Response 
Bain (1956), 
industrial 
organization 
 Easy entry  
 Effectively 
blockaded entry 
  
 
 
 Ineffectively impeded entry  
 Effectively impeded entry (control of production techniques via patents or 
secrecy; ownership or control of strategic supplies; limitations of the 
supplies of productive factors; control of superior product designs; 
ownership or control of favored distributive outlets; increasing large-scale 
economies; lowering prices to prevent entry; efforts of sellers to distinguish 
products; advertising; sales promotion; brand loyalty) 
Besanko et 
al. (2013), 
strategic 
management 
Blockaded entry  Accommodated entry;  
 Deterred entry (limit pricing, predatory pricing, strategic bundling, sunk 
costs, production barriers, reputation, switching costs, tie-up of market 
access, holding excess capacity) 
Blees et al. 
(2003), 
strategic 
management 
and 
industrial 
organization 
- Endogenous barriers to entry, which can be raised by incumbents to protect 
their market: 
 Access to distribution channels 
 Advertising 
 Brand name 
 Causal ambiguity 
 Control over strategic resources 
 Customer switching costs 
 Dynamic limit pricing 
 Excess capacity 
 High wages for employees and managers 
 Packing the product space 
 Patents (product or process) 
 Product differentiation 
 Research and development intensity 
 (Expected) Retaliation by incumbents 
 Seller concentration 
 Selling expenses 
 Technological change 
 Vertical integration 
Carlton and 
Perloff 
(2005), 
industrial 
organization 
-  Noncooperative strategic behavior (limit pricing; predatory pricing; 
investments in R&D to lower production costs; increasing sales to benefit 
from learning by doing; raising rival’s costs (unethical methods of 
espionage and theft; preventing rival from gathering information; 
stimulating government regulation; using complementary products to 
create customer tie-ins through incompatible product design and 
contractual ties to buy complementary products); raising consumer 
switching costs and thereby increase entrant’s marketing costs; raising 
wages or other input prices; raising expenditures which incumbent already 
carried and which new firms will have to spend to enter the market (e.g., 
supporting stricter government regulations, high advertising costs, 
deterring access to distribution and preventing access to scarce resources); 
introducing fighting brand 
 Cooperative strategic behavior (penalty for price discounts, advance notice 
for price change,  setting delivered pricing, swaps, and exchanges, 
introducing most-favored-nation and meeting-competition clauses in 
contracts, information sharing, dividing the market, setting uniform prices 
and information exchanges) 
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Chen and 
Miller 
(2015), 
strategic 
management 
-  Relational view of competitive dynamics (actions aimed at gaining support 
of the broad set of societal stakeholders, e.g., building reputation for 
socially responsible behavior)  
 Competitive-cooperative view of competitive dynamics (establishing 
industry standards with competitors, joint collocation, lobbying, collusion, 
sharing resources with rivals, price signaling) 
 Rivalrous view of competitive dynamics (economic tactics and strategies 
aimed to retaliate and avoid retaliation, including price changes, 
promotions, strategic investments) 
Farrell 
(1986), 
industrial 
organization 
- Entry deterrence (exploiting reputation barrier arising from moral hazard 
problem of new entrants) 
Gable et al. 
(1995), 
marketing 
- Post-entry endogenous barriers, created and maintained by established firm 
responses to new entrants: 
 Creation of excess capacity 
 Increase sales promotional activity 
 Increase advertising  
 Increase personnel productivity 
 Limit pricing 
 Price restructuring 
 Changing merchandise lines or brands 
 Increase use of direct marketing 
 Increase use of private brands 
 Remodel store 
 Changing store hours 
Gatignon et 
al. (1989), 
marketing 
Negative 
reaction (no 
reaction) 
 Negative reaction/withdrawal/(cutting back marketing mix resources 
devoted to the market) 
 Positive reaction/retaliation/counterattack (increasing expenditures on 
marketing mix instruments to combat entrant) 
Geroski 
(1999), 
strategic 
management 
Wait and see  Preempting the entrant by moving first (launching innovative product 
divisions competing with existing ones; blocking entry by raising entry 
barriers, including access to inputs, blocking distribution channels, 
proliferating products, owning IPR, increasing capital requirements)  
 Following the entrant as a second mover (imitation of new entrant’s 
strategy, price war, escalating marketing expenditures) 
Grimm et al. 
(2006), 
strategic 
management 
-  Cooperative actions (market signaling on changes in prices, disclosure of 
competitive information, such as prices and costs, base point pricing) 
 Deterrent actions (limit pricing; predatory pricing; brand and product 
proliferation; building loyalties by advertising and promoting; investing in 
excess capacity; aggressive/preemptive innovation and patenting; 
information manipulation; price leadership; learning curve effects; signing 
long-term contracts with key suppliers; influencing development of product 
regulations; aggressively reacting in entrants’ test markets; product 
secrecy; locking up sub-suppliers; conducting early sales to opinion 
leaders; preannouncing new products) 
Hauser and 
Shugan 
(2008), 
marketing 
- Defensive strategy (increase/decrease of prices, increase/decrease of 
expenditures on distribution, product improvement in attributes 
toward/away from the attack, decrease of expenditures on awareness 
advertising, comparative marketing efforts by increasing expenditures on 
advertising along incumbent’s strength)  
Homburg et 
al. (2013), 
marketing 
-  Deterrence before entry (e.g., limit pricing, preannouncements of 
innovations, raising customer switching costs, blocking access to suppliers 
and sales channels) 
 Shakeout response after entry (e.g., comparative advertising, predatory 
pricing, enticing customers away from competitors and influencing) 
 Influencing response after entry (e.g., litigation, advertising) 
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Hüschelrath 
(2005), 
industrial 
organization 
Blockaded entry  Deterring/impeding before entry by raising rival’s costs or reducing rival’s 
revenues through: 
 Raising structural entry barriers (economies of scale, absolute cost 
advantages, capital cost requirements, product differentiation, learning 
economies, innovation, promotion, customer loyalty, switching costs, 
product positioning and variety) 
 Conducting strategic moves/behaving strategically (product/brand 
proliferation, blocking entry through contract or vertical integration, limit 
pricing, capacity/R&D investment) 
 Reacting after entry, including entry accommodation, marketing mix 
reactions, raising rival’s costs/foreclosure, new product introduction, 
predatory pricing 
 Accommodating entry 
Kuester et 
al. (1999), 
marketing 
Entry ignored  Withdrawal 
 Accommodation 
 Retaliation (through product, price, promotion, distribution) 
Lutz et al. 
(2010), 
strategic 
management 
- Strategic barriers to entry, resulting from a firm’s behavior and represent 
entry-deterring strategies: 
 Limit pricing 
 Masking profit/gaps and asymmetric information 
 Retaliation 
 Collusion 
 Excess capacity 
 Securing input/control over strategic resources/location/vertical 
integration 
 Strategic behavior differentiation/packing the product space 
 Strategic behavior distribution channels 
 Strategic behavior knowledge/pre-emptive patents 
 Strategic behavior R&D 
Neven 
(1989), 
industrial 
organization 
- Strategic entry deterrence (commitment to a capacity; establishing new 
divisions which imitate behavior of entrant; raising entrant’s costs via 
industry-wide wage settlements or lobbying sales tax; denying rival’s 
access to technology via preemptive patenting; brand proliferation; choice 
of product location which discourages entry; heavy advertising; increasing 
reputation and brand loyalty; stimulating cheating behavior of entrants; 
product compatibility; acquisition of fighter reputation via predatory 
pricing; non-disclosure of profit;  use of experience curve; limit pricing) 
Pehrsson 
(2009), 
strategic 
management 
- Endogenous barriers, which are based on incumbents’ reactions to new 
entrants activities: 
 Increased advertising 
 Increased sales promotion 
 Price competition 
 Reactions in general 
Porter 
(1980/1998), 
strategic 
management 
-  Bluffing and true market signals (prior announcements of moves; 
announcements of results or actions after their occurence; public discussion 
of the industry; discussions and explanations of own moves; conciliation 
signals; changing the manner in which strategic changes are implemented; 
divergences from previous goals; divergence from industry standards; 
cross-parry moves; fighting brand introduction; private antitrust suits) 
 Cooperative/non-threatening competitive moves (moves which improve 
own and competitors’ stance even if competitors do not match them; moves 
which improve own and competitors’ stance only if competitors match 
these moves (e.g., joint price increase); moves which improve own stance 
because rivals will not match them (e.g., moves which are not threatening 
for a competitor)  
 Defensive/deterring competitive moves (preventing potential moves of 
competitors by signaling commitment to retaliate (e.g., excess cash 
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reserves; excess production capacity; extensive research facilities; large 
sales power; stripped-down product introduction; new products aimed at 
competitors’ key markets; pattern of consistent behavior in the past; 
defensive R&D programs; announcements of commitment intentions; sunk 
costs preventing firm to back down; ability to detect compliance); 
responses to occurred moves, aimed to discipline competitor (e.g., fighting 
brand introduction or targeted price cut) and deny competitor’s base to meet 
goals (e.g., price competition, increasing research expenditures, and 
loading customers’ inventories) 
Porter 
(1985/2004), 
strategic 
management 
-  Coalitions with likely challengers 
 Defensive tactics aimed to raise structural barriers (filling product or 
positioning gaps; blocking channel access; raising buyer switching costs; 
raising the cost of gaining trial; defensively increasing scale economies; 
defensively increasing capital requirements; foreclosing alternative 
technologies; investing in protecting proprietary know-how; tying up 
suppliers; raising competitors’ input cost; defensively pursuing 
interrelationships; encouraging government policies that raise barriers; 
forming coalitions to raise barriers)  
 Defensive tactics aimed to increase expected retaliation (signaling 
commitment to defend; signaling incipient barriers; establishing blocking 
positions; matching guarantees; raising the penalty of exit or lost share; 
accumulating retaliatory resources; encouraging good competitors; setting 
examples; establishing defensive coalitions; disruption of test markets or 
introductory markets; leapfrogging; litigation) 
 Defensive tactics aimed to lower the inducement for attack (reducing profit 
targets, managing competitor assumptions) 
 Response to price cutting (corresponding price cuts for localized customer 
segments, employing blocking positions in other industries, indirect price 
cutting by via services and additional equipment, discounts, introducing 
stripped-down products or fighting brands, unbundling by cutting 
additional services)    
Robertson 
and 
Gatignon 
(1991) and 
Gatignon 
and 
Reibstein 
(1997), 
marketing 
Ignoring new 
entrant 
 Abandoning the market (cutback in funding, full market abandoning) 
 Accommodate new entrant/cooperative behavior   
 Retaliate against new entrant (respond in the same or different product or 
market through price, awareness advertising, image advertising, 
distribution, sales force, promotions, comparative sales efforts or 
repositioning of existing products, the introduction of new products) 
Robinson 
(1988), 
marketing 
Passive reaction  Aggressive reaction (product change matching the entrant’s product or 
putting it at a disadvantage, advertising, and promotion expenditures, price 
cuts, distribution reaction) 
 Accommodating reaction (price increase, lowering marketing expenditures, 
licensing to encourage market development, product changes strengthening 
the entrant) 
Scherer and 
Ross (1990), 
industrial 
organization 
Blockaded entry  Give away/Accommodation (maximizing profits by raising prices);  
 Fight/Limiting entry/Deterring entry (limit pricing, exclusionary pricing, 
expansion of plant capacity, geographic space packing by preemptive 
geographic location of plants, product differentiation by product space 
packing, heavy advertising, sales promotion, and strategies for product 
deterrence named by Smiley (1988)  
Shepherd 
(1999), 
industrial 
organization 
- Endogenous sources of barriers and strategic actions: 
 Retaliation and preemptive action, including price discrimination via 
selective price cuts, and selective or uniform predatory action aimed to 
stop newcomers and scare off potential entrants (esp. price reductions, but 
also advertising, promotional programs, targeted innovations, changes in 
product quality and design, counteractions in related markets) 
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 Excess capacity 
 Advertising and other selling expenses leading to brand loyalty 
 Creation and accentuation of market segmentation 
 Patents 
 Controls over strategic resources 
 Raising rivals’ or entrants’ costs 
 Packing the product space by brand proliferation 
 Secrecy on market conditions and opportunities 
Shy (1995), 
industrial 
organization 
Blockaded entry  Accommodated entry;  
 Deterred entry (limit pricing, building irreversible capacity, investment in 
capital replacement, credible spatial preemption, raising rivals costs by 
wage contracts or lobbying higher tax rates, signing preemptive contracts 
with buyers, licensing outdated technologies, subcontracting to other 
incumbents, patenting technologies, proliferating product range) 
Singh et al. 
(1998), 
industrial 
organization 
Ignoring rivals  Take account of competitors (including exclusionary behavior)  
 Strategic behavior (comprehensive patenting, research and development, 
advertising, capacity creation, and pricing, assured supply of raw materials 
and intermediate products, selling network and agreement with competitors 
over pricing and other strategies) 
Smiley 
(1988), 
industrial 
organization 
- Entry deterrence (excessive product promotions and low pricing aimed to 
create experience curve effects, capacity investments, loyalty creation by 
advertising and promotion, preemptive patenting, create rivalrous 
reputation, limit pricing, filling product niches, masking profitability  
Steenkamp 
et al. (2005), 
marketing 
Passive  behavior 
(no competitive 
reaction) 
 Accommodating behavior (substantially decreasing advertising or price-
promotion) 
 Retaliatory behavior (substantially increasing advertising or price-
promotion) 
Timmor et 
al. (2009), 
marketing 
-  Join (production agreements, brand licensing, joint venture)  
 Flee (move to other product/segment, private label agreements, niche 
strategy)  
 Direct/indirect fight and counter-offensive strategy (technological 
improvement; signal defense commitment; product service improvement; 
attack weaknesses; enhance local brand image; brand variation; price 
matching; market blocking; cultivating government intervention; price 
reduction; brand differentiation; control of distribution; differentiated 
marketing; expansion to foreign markets; communication with focus on 
domestic culture and tradition; enhancing service; increase of switching 
costs) 
Tirole 
(1994), 
industrial 
organization 
Blockaded entry  Noncooperative behavior, including: 
o Accommodation of entry 
o Deterrence of entry:  
- in a short run by adjusting the price, output, advertising and 
sales force effort;  
- in a mid-run by adjusting cost structures, product 
characteristics (e.g., quality, product design, delivery delay, 
the location of outlets), capacity, production techniques), 
advertising;  
- in the long run modifications of product characteristics and 
cost structures due to research and development activities 
(process and product innovations) 
o Inducement of exit via “top dog”, “puppy dog”, “lean and hungry 
look” and “fat cat” business strategies 
 Cooperative behavior (collusion) 
Vachani 
(1990), 
marketing 
Hold  Compete head-on (price reduction),  
 Seek defensible position within existing strategic group (positioning 
advertising to enhance product differentiation, niche product development)  
 Avoid (threatened market segments, retreat) 
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Wilson 
(1992), 
industrial 
organization 
- Entry deterrence (preemption via offering large product line, customer 
switching costs, raising entrant’s costs, vertical integration with suppliers 
of inputs, capacity investments, signaling via limit pricing and attrition, 
price predation) 
Young et al. 
(1996), 
strategic 
management 
-  Firm- and industry-level cooperative activity (equity arrangements, 
mergers, technology licenses, participation in trade associations and 
consortia) 
 Firm- and Industry-level competitive activity (product introduction, product 
announcements, marketing/promotion campaigns, price cuts)  
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Appendix B: Classification of entry barriers 
Entry 
barrier 
Description Source 
1. Capital 
requirements 
A requirement to conduct large-scale investments to enter 
and maintain competitiveness in the market. This barrier is 
determined by the ease of access to capital resources for 
market entrants and capital intensity of the industry. 
 
Bain, 1956; Besanko et al., 
2013; Blees et al., 2003; 
Harrigan, 1981; Karakaya and 
Stahl, 1989; Lutz et al., 2010; 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Porter, 1980/1998, 2008; 
Shepherd, 1999; Yip, 1982 
2. Experience 
and know-
how  
Advantages resulting from company-specific and tacit 
knowledge, primary embedded in firm employees. It might 
be determined by:   
 Learning curve effects and experience advantage, which 
provide advantages in unit costs and uniqueness of the 
offering  (e.g., automatization) 
 Incumbent’s R&D superiority, which may be determined by 
investments in technology and R&D intensity in the 
industry. 
Besanko et al., 2013; Blees et 
al., 2003; Cho et al., 1998; 
Denk et al., 2012; Eden and 
Molot, 2002; Eden and Miller, 
2004; Harrigan, 1981; 
Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; 
Kerin et al., 1992; Lutz et al., 
2010; Niu et al., 2012; Porter, 
1980/1998, 2008; Rumelt, 
1987; Shepherd, 1999; Spence, 
1981; Yip, 1982 
 
3. Location  Advantages, which result from a favorable location of the 
incumbent firm (excluding advantages determined by 
government policy). Might have following facets:  
 Customer access barriers: 
o Access to the most productive retail locations 
o Ability to provide superior pre- and aftersales service 
due to geographic proximity to the key customer 
locations 
 Currency barriers: 
o Actual costs from exchange rate fluctuations  
o Costs for hedging from risks of exchange rate 
fluctuations 
o Costs for transactions in foreign currency 
 Transportation cost barriers: 
o Costs per unit of product for shipping, insurance, 
communication. 
o Costs arising from capital frozen in purchase  
 Transportation convenience barriers: 
o Necessity for long-term planning and limited flexibility 
in delivery lots  
o Speed of warranty product return process and 
implementation of product modifications  
o Time and efforts for customs clearance.  
Besanko et al., 2013; Blees et 
al., 2003; Cho et al., 1998; 
Denk et al., 2012; Eden and 
Molot, 2002; Eden and Miller, 
2004; Hymer, 1960; Kerin et 
al., 1992; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Porter, 
1980/1998, 2008; Simon, 1986; 
Zaheer, 1995 
 
4. Access to 
distribution 
channels 
Advantages from blocking access to important distribution 
channels for new entrants. May be determined by: 
 Contractual arrangements aimed at enhancing ties with 
dealers (exclusivity arrangements, territorial & pricing 
policy, bonuses & discounts system) 
 Close non-contractual links to distributors (e.g., 
interpersonal relationships, commitment to cooperation) 
 Entrant’s lack of knowledge on the specifics of the 
functioning of the host country distribution system. 
Bain, 1956; Besanko et al., 
2013; Blees et al., 2003; 
Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; 
Kerin et al., 1992; Lutz et al., 
2010; Porter, 1980/1998, 2008; 
Rebernik and Mulej, 2000; 
Rumelt, 1987; Simon, 1986; 
Yip, 1982 
5. Economies 
of scale and 
scope 
Advantages obtained due to: 
 Lower average product costs for large-volume producers. 
Most often occur due to spreading fixed costs of production, 
Bain, 1956; Besanko et al., 
2013; Blees et al., 2003; 
Harrigan, 1981; Karakaya and 
Appendices    XXI 
 
 sales, service, R&D, infrastructure and human resources on 
the higher output volume  
 Lower costs due to increased bargaining power against 
suppliers 
 Lower company costs due to greater variety of produced 
products. Occurs due to cost synergies and 
interrelationships between complementary products  
 Uniqueness advantages which occur due to the diversified 
product range. 
Stahl, 1989; Karakaya, 1993; 
Kerin et al., 1992; Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1988; Lutz et 
al., 2010; Porter, 1980/1998, 
2008; Reed and DeFillippi, 
1990; Rumelt, 1987; Shepherd, 
1999 
6. Access to 
strategic 
resources 
Preferential access to unique or cost-optimizing strategic 
resources: 
 Trademarks 
 Patents (for products and technologies) 
 Raw materials 
 Personnel 
 Components 
 Complimentary products. 
Bain, 1956; Blees et al., 2003; 
Cho et al., 1998; Harrigan, 
1981; Karakaya and Stahl, 
1989; Kerin et al., 1992; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988; Lutz et al., 2010; Porter, 
1980/1998, 2008; Shepherd, 
1999  
7. 
Government 
policy  
State limitations on market access for new entrants and/or 
state support provided for incumbent firms: 
 Customs duties 
 Tariffs 
 License fees 
 Costs for customs clearance procedures 
 Local content requirements 
 Restrictions on access to certain industries  
 Safety and testing requirements 
 Discriminatory treatment by host and/or home government  
 Host and home government subsidies and lobbying. 
Blees et al., 2003; Denk et al., 
2012; Eden and Molot, 2002; 
Eden and Miller, 2004; Hymer, 
1960; Karakaya and Stahl, 
1989; Lutz et al., 2010; Porter, 
1980/1998, 2008; Shepherd, 
1999; Zaheer, 1995 
8. Customer 
switching 
costs 
Costs which buyers face when switching from incumbent to 
new entrant: 
 Contractual switching costs:  
o Penalties for terminating contracts 
o Measures for switching suppliers in licensed models 
o Loss of benefits of loyalty programs, such as 
accumulated bonuses  
 Non-contractual switching costs:  
o Investments to adapt to new offering, including 
validation and testing costs and time; change of systems 
and product design; time and costs of employee training 
o Losses in profits due to loss of customers loyal to old 
supplier  
o Costs due to supplier-specific learning and adaptations 
of the buyer  
o Emotional switching costs based on the feeling of 
loyalty to the suppliers and brands, stemming from 
cooperation termination  
Besanko et al., 2013; Blees et 
al., 2003; Burnham et al., 2003; 
Cho et al., 1998; Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1988; Lutz et 
al., 2010; Karakaya and Stahl, 
1989; Karakaya, 1993; Kerin et 
al., 1992; Porter, 1985/2004; 
Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; 
Rumelt, 1987; Shepherd, 1999 
 
9. Core 
offering 
differentiation 
Customer loyalty and brand awareness, which result from 
core dimensions of the offering, purchased by customers. 
Might have following sources: 
 Product quality (performance, reliability, durability, 
conformance, aesthetics and consistency) 
 Product range (width and innovativeness of a product range 
and additional features of products) 
 Delivery performance (accuracy and speed of delivery) 
 Product maintenance (local and international distribution 
and storage of spare parts, availability of service personnel, 
service of replacement delivery, ease of a product's repair). 
Bain, 1956; Blees et al., 2003; 
Garvin, 1987; Gebauer, 2008; 
Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; 
Kenyon and Mathur, 2001; 
Kerin et al., 1992; Kotler and 
Keller, 2012; Levitt, 1980; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988; Lutz et al., 2010; Porter, 
1980/1998, Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990, 1990; 
Shepherd, 1999; Ulaga, 2003; 
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Ulaga and Eggert, 2006; Yip, 
1982 
10. 
Augmented 
product 
differentiation 
The uniqueness of the auxiliary services and benefits 
supporting core offering. Might have following sources: 
 Customization (tailoring and adaptation of products 
(including adaptation to the local market conditions), time-
to-market for new products)  
 Product installation services (installation services for own 
and  third-party products) 
 Bundling services (consolidated purchasing; designing, 
assembling (complementary products), testing and 
maintenance of product-service systems) 
 Know-how sharing (optimizing final technical applications 
of the buyer; resident-engineering support; providing 
information on new technologies, industry trends, product 
installation, usage, and repair) 
 Marketing support services (advertising, sales promotion, 
PR and sales force support aimed at buyer’s customers) 
 Financial services (trade credits, financing optimization 
and new developments of buyer’s product, financial 
advisory) 
 Logistic services (product transportation, import and 
inventory services; flexibility in deliveries; optimizing 
buyer's logistic systems) 
 Customer focus (orientation on understanding customer 
needs and increasing customer value; customer 
commitment; personal interactions; cultural and geographic 
proximity to the customer, speed, and flexibility of 
decision-making). 
Bain, 1956; Blees et al., 2003; 
Gebauer, 2008; Karakaya and 
Stahl, 1989; Kenyon and 
Mathur, 2001; Kotler and 
Keller, 2012; Levitt, 1980; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988; Lutz et al., 2010; Porter, 
1980/1998, 1985/2004; Reed 
and DeFillippi, 1990; 
Shepherd, 1999; Ulaga, 2003; 
Ulaga and Eggert, 2006; Yip, 
1982; Reed and DeFillippi, 
1990; Kerin et al., 1992 
 
11. Image 
differentiation 
The uniqueness of the brand value in eyes of the customers. 
Consists of following dimensions: 
 Perceived quality (subjective judgment of the buyer 
regarding products’ quality level or firms overall 
performance)  
 Brand awareness (ability of buyers to recognize and recall 
a brand as being representative of a particular product class)  
 Brand associations (perceptual connections of buyers to the 
brand, rooted in attributes strongly associated with a certain 
product or firm) 
 Brand loyalty (goodwill attitude towards a brand which 
results in repeated purchasing behavior and resistance 
towards switching to other brands). 
Aaker, 1991; Bain, 1956; 
Besanko et al., 2013; Blees et 
al., 2003; Gebauer, 2008; 
Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; 
Kerin et al., 1992; Kotler and 
Pfoertsch, 2006; Kotler and 
Keller, 2012; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Lutz et al., 
2010; Min Han, 1990; Reed 
and DeFillippi, 1990; Yoo et 
al., 2000; Porter, 1980/1998; 
Shepherd, 1999; Yip, 1982 
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Appendix C: Example of E-mail for gaining access 
Dear Mr. ---  
 
I have got your contacts from --- , at Reifen 2014 (Essen). My name is Dmytro Koriachenko, I am a research fellow 
at Fraunhofer MOEZ. Currently, we are conducting a study on competition of German companies against firms 
from emerging markets (e.g., China, India, Russia). The investigation is carried out among suppliers of components 
in automotive and mobile machinery industries, active in the markets of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. As I was 
advised by --- , you are responsible for the competitive strategy of your company in the Russian market. Therefore, 
we would like to invite you to participate in this study, in a form of a short phone interview. During the interview, 
we would like to discuss the experience of your company in the competition against rivals from emerging markets. 
The goal of this research is to develop recommendations for German suppliers on competitive strategy against 
emerging market suppliers in the context of the Russian market. By participating in the study, your company will 
benefit from the access to the results of this research. The interview should take around 45 minutes and can be held 
at any time, which is convenient for you, starting from 23.06.2014. All information gained during the interviews 
will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. In the attachment, you may find detailed information on the 
interview and the study. 
Please let us know about the possibility to make an interview. I believe that you will enjoy participating in our 
research. 
 
Kind Regards and greetings from Leipzig! 
 
Dmytro Koriachenko 
-- 
 
M.Sc. Dmytro Koriachenko, Fraunhofer MOEZ,  
Research Fellow 
Neumarkt 9-19, 04109 Leipzig, Germany  
Telefon +49 (0) 341 23 10 39 - 135 
dmytro.koriachenko@moez.fraunhofer.de 
www.moez.fraunhofer.de 
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Appendix D: Interview description 
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Appendix E: Date, mode, and duration of main study interviews 
Informant Interview date Interview mode 
Interview duration, 
min 
Informant 1 15.10.2013 Phone 54 
Informant 2 16.10.2013 Phone 64 
Informant 3 24.10.2013 Phone 65 
Informant 4 14.11.2013 Face-to-face 65 
Informant 5 18.11.2013 Phone 70 
Informant 6 20.11.2013 Phone 48 
Informant 7 26.11.2013 Phone 84 
Informant 8 28.11.2013 Phone 63 
Informant 9 02.12.2013 Phone 60 
Informant 10 12.12.2013 Face-to-face 75 
Informant 11 09.01.2014 Phone 59 
Informant 12 14.01.2014 Phone 57 
Informant 13 15.01.2014 Phone 72 
Informant 14 16.01.2014 Phone 76 
Informant 15 20.01.2014 Phone 80 
Informant 16 28.01.2014 Phone 62 
Informant 17 28.01.2014 Phone 78 
Informant 18 31.01.2014 Phone 76 
Informant 19 12.02.2014 Phone 68 
Informant 20 13.02.2014 Phone 73 
Informant 21 13.02.2014 Phone 60 
Informant 22 18.02.2014 Phone 80 
Informant 23 19.02.2014 Phone 67 
Informant 24 20.02.2014 Face-to-face 148 
Informant 25 21.02.2014 Phone 55 
Informant 26 27.02.2014 Phone 56 
Informant 27 05.03.2014 Phone 38 
Informant 28 05.03.2014 Phone 66 
Informant 29 12.03.2014 Phone 69 
Informant 30 17.03.2014 Phone 69 
Informant 31 25.03.2014 Phone 46 
Informant 32 08.04.2014 Phone 32 
Informant 33 03.07.2014 Phone 39 
Informant 34 07.07.2014 Phone 64 
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Appendix F: Interview guide for the first interview 
Pre-briefing 
Organization:  
Name of the respondent: 
Place/Date: 
Preliminary remarks: 
 Fraunhofer MOEZ is a unit of Fraunhofer’s which is focusing on issues of value creation, 
competitiveness, and internationalization. We are particularly oriented on markets of Eastern Europe, 
including CIS area 
 Objectives of the study – develop a strategy which can help G. exporters to maintain relationships with 
their customers in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, under price pressures from low-cost rivals. We 
especially focus on the aspects of competition between G. automotive suppliers, and their competitors 
from emerging markets, such as China, India, Russia  
 Our interview will consist of 4 main parts: introduction, factors which bind your customers to your 
company, competition with low-cost rivals, feedback to the interview approach    
 Interview duration 
 Specific examples of relationships with foreign clients – no names needed! 
TURN ON THE RECORDER  
 Confidentiality, anonymous data  
 Recording consent – for complete data collection? 
 We can stop during the interview 
 Questions? 
 
Introduction  
 
1. As we start, I would like to ask you a few warm-up questions to get us going. Could you please give me 
a brief description of your company?  
 Size (employees, revenue) 
 Products? 
 Your years of work experience is sales?   
 Years of professional experience in the CIS area?  
 Sales structure in Russia (share of the revenue)?  
 Sales in Russia: aftermarket or OE (International or Russian)? 
 
1. Identifying bonding categories 
 
1. Could you please think of one or several Russian customers whom you consider important. Could you 
describe the story of your experience with them?  
 How did the relationship start, progress, evolved?  
 Other customers? 
 
2. Thinking back about the time when you started working with customer “A”, why do you think he started 
working with your company?  
 Example/Elaborate/Explain? 
 What do you mean by? 
 Repeating, silence prompts 
 What is the difference for you between … and …? -- terms named by informant 
 Anything else? 
 For customer “B”? 
 
2.1 What motivates your Russian customers to buy from you now? Which benefits do they receive 
from working with your company? 
 Probing Benefits from the literature---  
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2.2 What is the barrier that restrains your Russian customer from leaving you? Imagine if they want to 
leave you, what would be the barrier for them to leave? What would be their costs of switching 
from you? 
 Probing Switching barriers/costs from the literature ---money, time, psychological   
 
2.3 Your customers have certain costs for working with you, one of them is the price for your products. 
Can you think of other costs which your Russian customers have, due to working with your 
company? Can you think of areas where you could save expenses of your clients on purchasing 
your products? 
 Probing Costs from the literature  
 
3. Could you please remember executives from one of your customer companies, who were personally 
responsible for purchasing process. Which aspects were important personally for those persons, when 
they were buying your products? 
 Who are those persons? 
 
4. This part, dealing with the motivation of your customers to work with your company is finished. Do you 
have anything else to add before we proceed? Other reasons why your customers work with your firm? 
 
2. Exploring low-cost impact 
 
1. How would you describe the competitive situation in your product segment? 
 The position of your company? 
 Who are your main competitors now? 
 Which competitors will present the main future threat for your activities in Russia? 
 
2. What do you understand by the term “low-cost competitors”?  
 Please describe several of them? 
 From which countries are they (emerging countries)? 
 Their strengths? 
 Their weaknesses? 
 What is the influence of low-cost rivals on activities of your company in Russia? 
 Is influence is growing? Why is influence growing? 
 How low-cost companies are developing?  
 Why not experience? 
 
3. Now that you think back, could you please remember a situation, when your customer has switched 
because of the low-cost competitor? Maybe competitor from emerging market? Maybe not your 
customer, of another supplier? 
 Why switched? Type of customer? 
 Differences in your offer? 
 How you reacted? 
 What is important for a customer in your reaction? 
 
4. Now let’s think of a positive experience. Can you remember when your customer stayed with you 
despite being offered significantly lower prices from your competitor? Especially interesting would be 
the situation with a competitor from emerging markets? 
 Type of customer? 
 Is it long-term? 
 How you reacted? 
 
 
5. You have mentioned a number of aspects which make your company competitive against rivals which 
are cheaper than you. Can you think of other means, which you do not have now, but which could make 
your company more competitive?  
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 Mention all possible options, maybe used by other suppliers? 
 Financial, human, IP, technological and managerial know-how resources 
 And could be a long-term response, requiring a strategic change in your company? 
 
6. You have mentioned today a number of responses which can help you to compete with low-cost rivals. 
Out of them, what do you think are the top 3? And why?  
 
7. Based on your experience, what would you recommend companies not-to-do, when they face low-cost 
competitors? Kind of not-to-do list? Maybe based on mistakes which you have done or other people you 
know have done? What do you think would be a failure response strategy? How should they not react? 
 
3. Closure 
 
1. Do you think we have missed some important points during the interview? Do you have anything to 
add? 
 
2.  What information would be of interest to you personally in the area of the competition of German 
suppliers with their lower-priced rivals? If you were me, what specific additional questions would you 
ask?  
 
3. Who else do you think might be interested in participating in this study?  
 Colleagues 
 Other companies 
 Customers 
 
TURN OFF THE RECORDER 
 
4. Thank you for your time, I appreciate you sharing very interesting experiences today. How did you feel 
being interviewed today?  
 
5. As agreed, I will send you a summary of the study. Would you be willing to provide feedback on this 
summary?   
 
6. I will also send you small additional survey, with several post-interview questions. It will take you 2 
minutes to fill it in. 
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Appendix G: Interview guide for the 34th interview 
Pre-briefing 
Organization:  
Name of the respondent:   
Place/Date: 
Preliminary remarks: 
 Thank you for giving an opportunity to interview you 
 Fraunhofer MOEZ is a unit of Fraunhofer Gesellschaft which is focusing on issues of value creation, 
competitiveness, and internationalization. We are particularly oriented on markets of Eastern Europe, 
including CIS area. 
 Aim of the study – develop recommendations which can help G. suppliers of components for 
automotive, agricultural and construction machinery industries to compete against suppliers from 
emerging markets. Under suppliers from emerging markets, we understand companies from China, 
India, Turkey, Taiwan, S. Korea, as well as from Russia by itself. 
 Aim of the study – develop recommendations which can help G. exporters of automotive parts, active in 
the Russian market, to compete against suppliers from emerging markets. Namely from China, India, as 
well as from Russia by itself. 
 Our interview will consist of 3 main parts: introduction, main factors which bind your customers to your 
company, matters of competition, concluding part  
 Interview duration 45 
 Specific examples of relationships with foreign customers  
TURN ON THE RECORDER  
 Data will be kept with confidentiality; we assure your anonymous participation in the study. You, your 
company or any other company or person which you mention during our conversation will not be 
recognizable from the study report 
 The information, which you provide will be used for the managerial summary of the study, provided 
exclusively to the participants of this research, as well as in a doctoral thesis written in the Leipzig 
University 
 For complete data collection – tape record? Do you agree?  
 Questions? 
 
1. As we start, I would like to ask you a few warm-up questions to get us going. Could you please give me 
a description of your company in a few sentences?  
 Products 
 Your personal experience & responsibilities in the company 
 
2. Your activities in Russia. Who are your main customers in Russia?  
 Aftermarket or OE (International or Russian)? 
 Exclusivity  
 
3. Can you give me a brief overview of your main competitors? 
 
4. The purpose of our research is to study competition with suppliers from emerging markets, especially 
with companies originating from China, India, Turkey, and Russia. Do you know any suppliers like that 
in your product segment?  
 In which segment do you experience impact (customer segment/product segment) 
 How this segment is developing now (growing, decreasing, stable) 
 Please describe those competitors, which you consider as the most active them? Their 
strategies? 
 Do Chinese work directly or only via trade houses/wholesalers? 
 Could you compare EMCs and one of your Western competitors, not with your company, but 
with each other 
 Chinese and Russian/Turkish suppliers – compare 
 Why do you not experience their influence? --- critical products, bulky transport, reputation 
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5. Thinking of this emerging market supplier, what motivates your Russian customers to buy from you, but 
not from him? Which benefits do they receive from working with your company, which they wouldn't 
get while working with emerging market supplier? What differentiates you from these competitors? 
 How customers are benefiting from these advantages of your company? 
 Services/Solutions – what do you mean? Which different services do you deliver to your clients? 
Why are they important for your customers? How do these services support your clients? 
 Cam you describe technical support/customer support 
 Payment delay 
 Marketing support 
 Technical support – what do you mean? Why is it important? 
 Exclusivity – why you make it? What are advantages of your customer from exclusivity? 
 
6. Can you describe specifics of competing in the conditions of the Russian market, compared to Western 
markets?  
 Specifics of purchasing culture 
 Attitude of Russian customers to Technological aspects of your offer 
 Role of internet 
 Political/Legal 
 Economic 
 
7. You have mentioned a number of aspects which make your company competitive. We are taking about 
suppliers from emerging markets. What do you think, which aspects which your company does not have 
now, can help you to compete with these suppliers more successfully?  
 Additional services which you think are worth of developing? 
 Offshoring to Asia, or Outsourcing – what is your attitude? Country-Of-Origin effect; price 
cheaper; 
 Have you considered the introduction of the 2nd brand? 
 Warehouse in R. 
 
8. Now we are coming to the end of the interview, and I would like to ask you last questions. Based on 
your experience, what would you recommend other auto components suppliers not-to-do when they face 
EMCs? Maybe based on what you observed in the market or on your personal actions in the past, which 
you consider wrong now?  which you have done, or other people you know have done? How should 
they not react? 
 
9. And to summarize our conversation, what do you think are top 5 aspects, which help you to stay ahead 
of competitors from emerging markets? Those, which are the most important for your customers? 
 
Closure – feedback to the interview approach 
 
7. Do you think we have missed some important points during the interview? Do you have anything to 
add? 
 
8. What information would be of interest to you personally in the area of the competition of German 
suppliers with rivals from emerging markets? If you were me, what specific additional questions would 
you ask?  
 
9. Who else do you think might be interested in participating in this study?   
 
TURN OFF THE RECORDER 
 
10. Thank you for your time, I appreciate you sharing very interesting experiences today.  
 
11. Do you have any questions after the interview? 
 
12. As agreed, I will send you a summary of the study. Would you be willing to provide feedback on this 
summary?    
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Appendix H: Date and duration of follow-up interviews 
Informant Interview date Interview duration, min 
Informant 2 20.05.2015 23 
Informant 3 22.05.2015 30 
Informant 9 25.05.2015 27 
Informant 15 13.05.2015 51 
Informant 19 22.05.2015 8 
Informant 20 14.05.2015 25 
Informant 24 21.05.2015 50 
Informant 25 12.05.2015 and 15.05.2015 44 
Informant 26 13.05.2015 13 
Informant 29 21.05.2015 14 
Informant 30 18.05.2015 39 
Informant 27 11.06.2015 20 
Informant 34 11.06.2015 8 
Informant 17 11.06.2015 38 
Informant 14 19.06.2015 50 
Informant 10 22.06.2015 38 
Informant 6 23.06.2015 16 
Informant 1 30.06.2015 13 
Informant 22 02.07.2015 37 
Informant 18 02.07.2015 58 
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Appendix I: Example of notes taken during interviews 
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Appendix J: Example of notes after interviews 
Location Phone interview,  KR III 
Date and time 25.03., 10:00-10:47  
The setting of the 
interview 
The room was quiet; connection was good 
Background 
information about 
the participant 
(gender, post, 
personality) 
Male,  Director of marketing  
My immediate 
impression of how 
well it went 
In general – the interview was mediocre because the person was too tense to answer the 
questions. Seems like he feels ashamed that they do not produce part of products by 
themselves & that they removed production out of Germany   
Positive: 
- We talked on outsourcing – 2nd example 
- He was competent on the overall company level 
-  
Negative: 
- My questions were not clear 
- I was not able to go deeper into ITH topic – compare them with Chinese 
- I haven’t managed to establish rapport with him – he became even tenser by 
the end of the interview (most probably due to the time pressure) 
- He had low experience on Russia 
- He brought no negative features of German suppliers 
  
Interesting points: 
- He confirmed lowering margins due to EMCs – spoiling the market 
- He provided clear explanations on value benefits – service, brand (also due to 
history), quality (performance, failure-rate), explained that design is important 
for car (accessory), explained that stable sales structure is important  
- Provided examples of marketing activities(exhibitions, advertising) 
- Explained what is a difference between quality and features, same features but 
different quality 
- Confirmed that Chinese come directly 
- Did not confirm that outsourcing partners come directly. Explained that they 
prevent it via contracts 
- Explained that they have fought with legal measures with counter fakes 
- They are example of company which completely moved production out of 
Germany, due to costs === it is not much cheaper for them to outsource 
- Confirmed that Chinese are learning (more technology) 
-  He explained why no 2nd brand --- scared to damage main brand image 
- Warned against bad market knowledge (and I can include here looking at 
short-term trends only, like growth of B segment) 
- Warned against downgrading quality on the main brand  
- We have talked in details on outsourcing – they do not separate brand (main 
brand), explain to the customer that it is outsourced (due to ethical concerns).  
- He explained that they outsource cause of capacity issues + sometimes costs 
(cheaper + economy of scale) 
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Appendix K: Example of notes taken during transcription 
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Appendix L: Example of coding memo 
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Appendix M: Example of diagram memo 
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Appendix N: Example of the open coding 
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Appendix O: Development of pricing category after the first five interviews 
Category Dimension Property Interview quote 
Pricing Reasons for price 
reduction 
Keep market share “We have 100% share, but this is a loss-
making proposition, unfortunately” 
(Informant 3-I). 
Gain market share “Keep on penetrating, trying on quality, 
product, pricing, service” (Informant 2-I). 
Price comparisons Russian against German “And this company told us that there is a 
supplier from Russia, who makes it at a 
fraction of our costs” (Informant 3-I). 
Chinese against German “The price differences are not...percentages 
but times, 10 times, 20 times the PRC 
products are cheaper than branded product” 
(Informant 5-I). 
Chinese against Russian “I compare local Russian producers, against 
Chinese, maybe Chinese even higher 
quality, but same price level” (Informant 2-
I). 
Level of price 
reduction 
Lowering till level of EMC “It poisons the market, because what's the 
use if you get all the orders, but loose money 
on it, it's just not right” (Informant 3-I). 
 
Somehow lowering “And if the market is already moving to the 
more cheaper products, if the market 
expecting more cheaper product, we should 
offer the market this product. But without 
destroying price opinion to our first brand” 
(Informant 5-I). 
Absolutely no decrease “Then we sent them a letter back, and said, 
- well, you specify, and if you lower your 
spec to that level then go with a competitor, 
our pricing stays here” (Informant 3-I). 
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Appendix P: Original versions of translated interview quotations 
No Original version 
1 Dann merke ich schon, dass es da auch aus China Angebote gibt, die Preisen anbieten, wo selbst 
Russische Hersteller nicht mithalten können. 
2 То ценовое преимущество которое отечественные производители имели, оно стало особенно на 
пике валютных всех этих обвалов, значительно больше. 
3 И они стали терять единственное свое преимущество, ценовое, и в этом отношении приближаться 
скорее к продуктам с развитых рынков, чем с развивающихся. 
4 Изменения естественно политические сильно отразились и экономические. . . . Клиенты - даже не 
просто клиенты из России; но и глобальные клиeнты, наши начали смотреть больше и глубже в 
Китай, и на локализацию. 
5 Действует программа нашего правительства по импортозамещению. Т.е. предприятиям, пока это 
только в рекомендательной форме, это не закон, это рекомендации, предлагается искать 
поставщиков в России или в странах СНГ. И как можно меньше закупать в Европе и США. 
6 [Korruption] ist auch ein Vorteil von Russischen [Konkurrenten] ist, die in ganz andere Situation sind 
als wir. . . . Viele Russische Konkurrenten haben nicht die Auflage oder können durch Korruption 
Geschäfte machen. 
7 Cкорее всего мы предоставим 1-2% [discount], как бы в качестве уважения некоего к клиенту. 
8 Глобальные клиенты наши начали тоже смотреть больше на локализацию в РФ, и давать шансы 
российским поставщикам учавствовать в своих объемах. 
9 Für Weißrussland existierte das schon immer. Aber in Russland ist es mittlerweile das zweite Wort in 
der Unterhaltung in Moment in Import Abteilung.  
10 Российские машино-строительные компании в значительной степени интегрированы достаточно 
мощно с государством - они регулярно общаются с министрами, с комитетами, и т.д. 
11 Иногда это случается что мы приходим обратно, потому что качество оставляет желать лучшего, 
или просто технологически те [компоненты] совершенно не соответсвуют. 
12 Что мне кажется нужно делать Европейским производителям, для того чтобы не терять клиентов, 
или получать больше, - это создание условий, условий в которых клиент не хочет менять 
поставщика. 
13 Очень важным является общее колличество производимой той или иной детали, ну допустим 
ежегодно, или ежемесячно тем или иным производителем. Т.е. чем больше производитель делает 
одних и тех же деталей, - тем они у него дешевле, по отношению к другим производителям. 
14 Но на самом деле так просто оценить какого-нибудь Китайского поставщика - там же и затраты 
чтобы переключится на другого поставщика, на другой продукт - это тоже немало. 
15 И я думаю что еще никто не отменял выражение Made in Germany. Все это до сих пор знают. . . . 
Всем до сих пор близко и очень хорошо известно качество, надежность немецких продуктов. 
16 Wenn der Name China ausgesprochen wird, wird also von vielen Konstruktoren oder Einkäufern der 
Mund verzogen. Bedeutet der Chinesen haben mehr und mehr eine schlechte Lobby bekommen. 
17 Есть часть, группа продуктов, которую можно отнести, ну как маркетологи говорят, к 
commodities. Их все научились делать. . . . И конкуренция в этом сегменте действительно 
увеличилась. 
18 В центральном офисе [global OEM] встречается и обсуждает с поставщиком объемы на Китай, 
РФ, США, ЕС. . . . И вот такой cherry picking, что-то специальное покупать для России . . . В 
принципе я не думаю что они этим занимаются. 
19 [Global OEM] как вы знаете они сейчас контролируют [Russian OEM], сумарно это достаточно 
крупный производитель. . . . И на этот объем они конечно более мощно давят на специальные 
решения, на местных поставщиков. 
20 Если у нас доля локализованная, ну как минимум на 50% Рублевая составляющая, то в этом 
смысле мы становимся менее зависимыми от изменения курса, ну и соответственно наш клиент 
оценивает как меньшие риски в связи с изменением курса Евро. 
21 Пока вы его из Германии привезете, вы потратите довольно большое колличество денег. Вы 
потратите 10% пошлины и вы потратите еще 18% НДС. 
22 Вот именно на рынке [for our products] очень важным является общее колличество производимой 
той или иной детали. . . . Но вот почему Азиатские [suppliers] дали цены ниже сейчас конечно 
сказать трудно. 
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23 [Global OEMs] дают [them] равные шансы как и нам. Раньше этого не было, у нас был приоритет, 
они с Российскими поставщиками разговаривали только из вежливости. Сейчас жесткие 
тендерные условия выставляются и дают им шанс поучавствовать тоже. 
24 Здесь же простая арифметика - если у тебя на руках 100 рублей, и ты в свое время мог за эти 100 
рублей купить хорший продукт, а сегодня за 100 рублей можно купить только плохой продукт, а 
тебе в принципе продукт нужен - что вы сделаете. 
25 Там где есть уникальное предложение, в самом продукте, которое никто не может побить - там 
проще, т.е. уникальные технологии, или уникальные свойства продукта, там можно чувствовать 
себя более уверенно. 
26 Есть ситуации когда бренд единый, но в нем есть 3 линейки - Professional, Standard и еще какая-
то. Вот этот  путь он несовсем правильный, с моей точки зрения. . . . Потому что это размывает 
ценность бренда в глазах потребителей. 
27 У нас специфика бизнеса такова что действительно продукт надо выпускать миллионами. Если 
создать отдельный артикул, даже пусть с заниженными качествами, но это достаточно 
специфичная вещь, которая требуется лишь одному автопроизводителю, то эффект шкалы 
теряется. 
28 Работа над оптимизацией издержек и повышение общей эффективности бизнеса . . . это в 
принципе непрерывный процесс. Поэтому говорить об этом как о чем-то что необходимом с нуля 
внедрять я бы даже не стал. Да, естественно над издержками надо постоянно работать. 
29 На вопрос «А вы знаете где [US-branded products]  производятся?», [customers] говорят «В 
Америке». А когда я им говорю что они не в Америке, а в Китае производятся, [customers] говорят 
«Ну что вы говорите. Вы тут специально мне это говорите». 
30 Bот у нас тут идея организовывать специальные туры на [Chinese] заводы, как мы делаем 
допустим в Европу . . . отправляем там крупных дистрибуторов и их клиентов, тоже самое делать 
и с Китайскими. Т.е. самый лучший способ кого-то в чем-то убедить, это показать товар лицом. 
Да, это затратно, но в конце концов это существенные инвестиции в бренд и в его популяризацию. 
31 Уже не важно, что стоит на [component], . . . стоит «сделано в Аргентине» или «сделано в Китае», 
или «сделано в Германии», или сделано в Чехии, или сделано в Англии или еще где-то - не имеет 
смысла. 
32 Упрощяли для сборки и удешевляли [our products] путем например производства определенных 
компонентов на нашем заводе в Индии. . . . Поэтому моя задача не только что-то продавать, а мне 
надо ездить по нашим заводам, искать где есть возможность что произвести, закупать, 
организовать логистику, закупку с Индии к нам сюда [in Germany], и от сюда в Россию. 
33 Когда кризис, поставщики которые имеют и премиум сегмент и лоу-кост, они более или менее 
могут сбалансировать продажи свои.  
34 Начинаем работать над увеличением эффектинвости работы. Потому что раньше эта тема на 
второй план всеми была отставлена. Сейчас это является приоритетом номер 1. Оптимизация. 
35 Но мы на самом деле сами тоже не спим, и пытаемся делать предложения из Китая в юанях в 
Россию. Потому что у нас там есть несколько заводов и мы от туда можем тоже продукцию 
поставлять. 
36 Рассматривается [offshoring], но только в виде снижения себестоимости и сохранения 
конкурентноспособности, прочие барьеры, в частности импортозамещение этим не обойти. 
37 Финансовая логистика в моем понимании это не просто отсрочка, - просто отсрочка это большой 
очень риск. Есть вариант например банковской гарантии. . . . И мы такие услуги предоставляем, 
т.е. мы исчем даже сам банк-партнер, который этому клиенту проводит его кредитную оценку, 
дает какую-то банковскую гарантию, которую мы у себя в Германии уже можем принять своим 
банком, и мы например часть расходов компенсируем за счет скидки. 
38 Есть определенный контингент клиентов которые не имеют опыта осуществлять импорт - у них 
нет брокеров, у них нет людей которые имеют требуемые знания, для них это дополнительные 
затраты, дополнительная головная боль, и с таможней мало кто хочет связываться. Имея склад 
мы сможем сами растаможить товар, его туда поставить, клиент может этот товар купить уже за 
рубли. 
39 Wird fast bei jedem OEM Kundenbesuch nachgelegt, dass wir zum Beispiel kein komplettes Produkt 
mehr liefern, sondern dass wir ehemaliger komplette Produkt in drei Baugruppen zerlegen, die zum 
größten Teil das Know-How des Produktes beinhalten, diese Baugruppen nach Russland liefern, und der 
Kunde, beziehungsweise Kooperationspartner die Baugruppen zusammenbaut, prüft, einschleift . . . und 
dann in die Montage von OEM Kunden geliefert wird.  
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40 Im Moment haben natürlich Russische lokale Anbieter ein extrem großen Vorteil gegenüber 
ausländischen Anbietern . . . der Kurs des Rubels ist mittlerweile auf ein Euro für gleich 50 Rubel im 
Vergleich zu früher vor einem Jahr eins zu 38-39.   
41 Если [product] сделан в Германии, то это марка, это имидж, это в первую очередь качество. 
42 Когда мы приходили в Россию, мы приходили не на замену существующего на тот момент 
поставщика или существующего на тот момент изделия, а именно по мере осознания 
необходимости наличия такого оборудования в транспортном средстве. . . .  Многие называют 
[this category of products with our brand name] вне зависимости от того кто их произвел. Т.е. это 
уже нарицательное имея как вот Ксерокс или Аспирин . 
43 [Our firm] работает на Европейском рынке 40 лет, работает с практическими всеми крупными 
производителями автомобильной продукции в Европе . . . и собственно поставляется в том числе, 
в той или иной степени на конвеер. . . . И соответственно Российский производитель может быть 
уверен что с ним будут поступать не хуже. 
44 Поскольку на рынке легковых машин, вот эти психологические факторы они играют гораздо 
большую роль, чем на рынке коммерческого транспорта, там позиции Европейских 
производителей, они не то что сильны, они просто пока ни кем даже и не оспариваются особо. 
45 Это не только в РФ, это везде - когда экономическая ситуация хреновая, то люди стараются 
покупать что-то подешевле и экономить. 
46 Раньше это было наше конкурентное преимущество, сейчас у нас его нет. . . . Потому что такие 
инструменты, касательно финансовой логистики, предоставлялись только крупнейшими банками 
РФ. А все [of them] . . . они в списке санкционном. 
47 «Вы для нас [purchasers] являетесь ненадежным поставщиком». Вот такая формулировка 
неоднократно звучала - именно «ненадежный поставщик», за счет того что нет уверенности в 
будущей стабильности поставок. Потому что в любой момент может кто-то подписать еще один 
закон в Брюселе - и все закончено. 
48 Производство в России [will bring us] в первую очередь снижение таможенных пошлин, более 
дешевый человеческий труд . . . и возможность работать в некоторых отраслях, в которых нам 
работать сейчас сложно, таких как оборонная например промышленость.  
49 Т.к. мы Московский офис открыли, мы дилерство на некоторые вещи забрали у компаний, и 
делаем чисто сами. Это дает результат тоже, определенный по увеличению маржи. 
50 Те компании у которых есть здесь склады, они гораздо более четко и существенно качественней 
регируют на изменений спроса, у них продукт всегда есть в наличии. 
51 А как [our product] адаптировать? Ведь это же не зонтик мы поставляем. . . . Их можно сделать 
дешевле. Но для этого мы должны уйти от Немецкого производства, уйсти от Немецкой 
надежности, от немецкого качества. 
52 Другое направление это расширение линейки вниз - т.е. не дорогостоящие, сверхтехнологические 
[products], а простые [products], с маленькой нагрузкой, под меньшие машины, которые сегодня 
тоже имеют место быть, допустим и в Индии и в Китае. . . . Мы с нашего Немецкого производства 
за такие деньги сделать не можем. . . . Но есть [Russian OEMs] и другие клиенты которые хотят 
сделать определенные движения в сторону Азии. 
53 Мы не отказываемся от локализации как таковой, но пересматриваются проекты, 
пересматривается начало этой локализации. 
54 Мне кажется в будущем, ни один из поставщиков, который скажем хочет выходить на Российский 
рынок или хочет поставлять свои компоненты для ОЕМов которые активные в Российском рынке 
- им надо будет идти туда обязательно. Без этого никак не обойтись.  
55 Ну на самом деле вот эти вопросы конкуренции, они здесь, именно в представительстве у нас 
рождаются. А вы знаете мы занимаем совсем маленькую долю по новым [product sales for our 
company], потому что наша страна добывающая, так же как Казахстан к примеру, да? И 
машиностроительных предприятий у нас на самом деле не так много как хотелось бы.  
56 По желанию клиентов перешли от готового [component] еще и на [disassembled component], отдав 
определенную процентную составляющую производства [component] самому клиенту. Они 
платят не полную стоимость [component], а допустим где-нибудь на 1000 евро, к примеру, этот 
продукт уже стоит меньше. 
57 Мы также стараемся мотивировать наших клиентов к увеличению закупок у нас, специально 
разработанной системой бонусов и скидок. 
58 Для нас не стоит ничего на 2% в принципе скинуть, если вы хотите. Показать там какой-то 
результат, да там, какое-то должностное лицо, покажет свою работу, такое тоже бывает. . . . Мы 
готовы показать свою лояльность клиенту. 
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59 Для тех продуктов, которые относятся к коммодитис, - при прочих равных, я имею в виду более 
менее приемлимое качество, более менее понятный поставщик, - естественно цена является 
определяющим условием. 
60 Потому что они большие, у них настолько запас, они готовы даже потерять на одном продукте, 
или на одной сделке - потому что они знают что они закроются потом, или закроются в другом 
месте. 
61 Мы привозим [competitor‘s product] сюда, испытываем на наших испытательных стендах. . . . Мы 
даем знать что мы можем, и что может наш конкурент. И эта информация остается у 
производителя. 
62 Мы поддерживаем отношения с клиентами, даже если клиент с нами не работает. . . . Выясняем 
какие у него есть потребности, какие есть проблемы. В случае если мы слышим о какой-то 
проблеме, мы пытаемся к этой проблеме подключиться. 
63 Мы пытаемся предложить те решения, которые запатентованы [by our company], внедрить их в 
его производство, при этом предоставив ему хорошие цены, но исключив на какой-то долгий 
промежуток времени, исчисляющийся годами, возможность того что кто-то заберет у нас даный 
объем. 
64 Турецкая компания предложила аналог нашего [component], а мы ответили тем что мы 
предложили улчшенную версию, с дополнительными функциями и примерно по той же цене, по 
которой мы поставляли и предыдущий. . . . И Турецкая компания не смогла предложить аналог 
нашего, уже нового [component]. 
65 Когда у тебя монополист, с хорошим продуктом - как снижать цену? Т.е. постоянно нужно иметь 
минимум 2-х поставщиков, и почти все производители . . . живут этой идеалогией, чтобы их 
сталкивать постоянно лбами, делить между ними квоты. 
66 Рекоммендуют свзязывать с каким-то системным предложением, включить этот продукт в пакет 
с другими продуктами, добавить какого-то сервиса, за счет лучших финансовых условий или 
контрактных условий, за счет более гибкой поставки. Сервисом можно повышать свои 
конкурентные преимущества. 
67 Техническую информацию не надо раздавать направо и на лево. . . . Подумай наперед не делаешь 
ли ты себе хуже, если ты дашь ту или иную информацию. 
68 [Our trade mark] зарегистрирована на таможне. Т.е. при пересечении товара [the border] под 
данным брендом, если это не наша компания завозит, у нас есть врозможность, соответствено 
сообщив об этом таможенным органам, приостановить эту поставку. 
69 Некоторые клиенты предпочитают не заниматься самостоятельно вопросами логистики, 
транспорта и таможенной очистки. В данном случае осуществление этих услуг берет на себя наша 
дочерняя компания. 
70 У нас с Китайцами возникала один раз схватка за одного клиента по [components], которые очень 
маленькие, их очень просто и легко сделать. Т.е. там где отсутствует какая-либо ноу-хау, там 
шансов у нас нет. 
71 Если [Chinese or Turkish companies] участвуют допустим в тендере, то просто мы например, часто 
просто покидаем этот тендер, потому что не хочется зря тратить время и усилия. 
72 Если компания уходит с рынка, ее место тут же занимают. И вернуться на рынок, через год когда 
закончатся санкции или через два года когда Россия поднимет свой потенциал будет очень 
сложно. Потому что немецкие компании выходили на российский рынок в 90-е годы, когда рынок 
был свободен, и у них не было конкурентов и они заняли очень хорошие позиции. Сейчас 
конкуренция на рынке очень высокая. Со стороны Китая, со стороны Российских производителей. 
И просто их доля рынка будет занята другими. И вернуть ее обратно будет практически 
невозможно. 
73 [Local suppliers] могут как угодно там качать ценами, они зачастую относительно небольшие 
компании. . . . Если они работают в ноль или в минус они, ну рано или поздно не будут в состоянии 
работать таким образом. 
74 Потому что да - у нас себестоимость производства высокая, у нас совсем иначе стоят 
энергоресурсы, у нас стоимость персонала другая. 
75 Мы не идем в этот сегмент по одной простой причине: проведя изначально анализ целевых цен . 
. . мы поняли что мы в этот ценовой сегмент никогда не зайдем.  
76 В прошлом году [мы] все-таки открыли офис в Москве. Там были большие планы, сейчас эти 
планы перестраиваются, потому что офис в данной ситуации убыточный.  
77 [Post-merger integration] требует действительно очень много инвестиций. . . . Переделать 
Российскую компанию под себя, скажем так, будет весьма сложно. И в этом есть опять же, доля 
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того что  просто напросто, ментальность менеджмента она будет играть тоже большую роль в 
этом отношении. 
78 Что я хотел тогда делать, это войти в СП с активным игроком на рынке, не конкурент. Не к игорку 
который уже тоже самое делает, а войти к игроку который делает тоже какие-то компоненты, 
которые с инженерингом. 
79 Этот процесс [of product development and approval] для Китайцев уже считается дорогим, в 
отношении этих сравнительно маленьких объемов, которые идут на эти виды автобусов, 
грузовиков. 
80 Нам приходиться работать по 100% предоплате. . . . Конечно для Российских компаний это очень 
тяжело, потому что если предоплата за 6 недель, это за 6 недель нужно заморозить деньги. У 
большинства компаний нет достаточного колличества оборотных средств. . . . А между собой 
Российские компании могут работать без предоплаты. . . . Компании могут между собой 
договориться что у них будет пост-оплата. Все-таки это один рынок, это одна страна. 
81 Эти производители 15 лет перебивались с хлеба на квас, никаких новых отвечающих 
современным требованиям моделей, ни по качеству, ни по тому что они дают, ни по тому что они 
требуют. 
82 Мы смотрели литье, мы смотрели даже резино-технические изделия - нет таких поставщиков. Мы 
отправляли запрос, и все нам отвечают «Извините, мы не можем обеспечить такое качество». О 
какой локализации может идит речь. 
83 Российские заводы строились так, что они делают все сами, начиная от гаек, и заканчивая 
готовыми машинами. На многих заводах это производство сохранилось. . . . Заводы в основном 
градообразующие, и руководство заводом понимает, что сейчас если сократить это производство, 
это будет увольнение рабочих. Многие на это не идут, потому что «есть приказы с выше». 
84 Это тот момент . . . связаный с процедурой таможенной, и связанный с расходами на это, и 
связаный с тем что дополнительно требуется достаточно большое колличество документов, 
которые не требуются отечественному производителю, как нам. . . . Это все сильно конечно 
ослабляет наши позиции. 
85 Сейчас,  внешне  ничего не изменилось. Если продукция явно не попала под санкции, но если  
закупщик профессионал, он обязан учитывать возможность того, что гипотетически  
высокотехнологичная продукция  от германских компаний может попасть в следующий 
санкционный список.  
86 Я не думаю что это [import substitution] действительно будет сделано, потому что по крайней мере 
в нашей отрасли . . . нет производителей в России соответствующего качества. 
87 Никто на этом [devaluation of euro against dollar] пока сильно не играет. Я думаю что нет 
убежденности что это стабильная ситуация. 
88 Большинство заводов в РФ, все-таки в них есть доля государственного участия.  
89 Российский автопром входят и частные компании, но они во многом подвержены влиянию 
регулирующих органов. 
90 Eсли [Russian OEMs] слышат со стороны правительства «импортозамещение для военной 
промышленности», то в принципе для них мессадж что чем больше импортозамещения, тем 
лучше. 
91 Люди не очень обеспокоены качеством своей техники, которую они поставляют для государства. 
Потому что у государства в любом случае заложена на ремонт техники какая-то определенная 
сумма денег . . . и эти деньги нужно осваивать. 
92 По большинству тендеров условия оплаты государством, в течении от одного до 3-х месяцев 
после поступления товара. . . . И все это на Российском рынке понимают, и поэтому они готовы 
ждать и готовы давать своим поставщикам клиентам. 
93 Чем выше будут экологические нормы, чем выше требования к безопасности автомобиля, тем 
больше будут отставать все-таки местные компании. 
94 Рынок требует новой техники, новая техника должна соответствовать новым требованиям. 
95 К нам приходят через год, к нам приходят через два. Некоторые через три и четыре года приходят 
предприятия. Понимаете, они дорастают. 
96 Китайская техника . . . на Российском рынке идет просто семимильными шагами, и вытесняют 
всех - и немцев и даже русских. [As a reaction Russian OEMs] очень сильно сократили 
производство, а оставшееся производство они пытаются спасти, для этого им нужно 
конкурировать по цене. Чтобы конкурировать по цене они переходят на менее качественные 
комплектующие. 
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97 Несколько лет назад крупные импортеры Российские стали называть себя  «мультибрендовыми 
компаниями». Т.е. они все имеют в своей торговой программе товары разной категории - премиум 
класса, среднего класса, ну и наверное дешевка. 
98 В основном Китайские производители здесь представлены либо через Private labels . . . т.е. бренд 
зарегистрированный, принадлежащий по-факту там каким-то Российским компаниям, либо 
людям которые работают здесь на Российском рынке. 
99 В наших странах зачастую если ты прийдешь, и тебе клиент говорит «Я хочу разработку», a ты 
ему говоришь «Ребята, ну мои расходы, время на специалистов», тебе говорят «Извини!? Ты что 
хочешь чтобы мы тебе еще что-то заплатили!? Ты хочешь нам поставлять продукт - вот поставляй. 
Тебе сказали что нужно? Вот поставляй. А все остальное забудь». 
100 Они не располагают теми финансовыми ресурсами, для того чтобы усовершенстовать свое 
производство и закупить новую технику. 
101 Cегодня у производителя может быть одна потребность, да иметь какой-то запас. А завтра может 
прийти там какая-то строительная компания и заказать там не 10 грейдеров, а скажем сотню 
грейдеров и 30 погрузчиков. 
102 Клиент говорит «Зачем мне ваши [components], те которые не готовы, когда я ставлю [Russian 
product]. Мой клиент конечный, при поломке этого [components] поедет в любой ближайший 
магазин, купит запчасти и отремонтирует его в поле, там чуть-ли не ломом». 
103 В период Советского Союза были определенные фирмы которые делали просто по плановости 
[products], и они должны были использоваться почти во всей технике. . . . Эти отношения не 
нарушились с распадом Советского Союза. 
104 У нас для многих было шоком, что в РФ до сих пор существует, а существовало еще больше и для 
своего времени достаточно современных заводов по производству [these products]. Естественно 
когда они приходили на рынок там 10 лет назад Китая, или сейчас приходят на рынок какой-
нибудь Индонезии - там ничего подобного даже близко нет. И соответственно тут могут быть 
некие конкуренты, которые даже если сейчас они не активны, а просто спящие, но как только 
появляется рынок - очень быстро в приницпе, может подобное вот производство быть приведено 
в рабочее состояние и в конце концов даже перенять . . . какие-то уже современные изделия, и 
начать их производство. 
105 Российский [client] считает что производитель должен сам идти на риск, и закупать какие-то 
определенные оснастки или станки, для того чтобы обеспечить поставки продукта который ему 
нужен, не давая при этом никаких гарантий. . . . И Российский [поставщик] часто идет этой 
дорогой, просто потому что он к этому привык, к той ментальности. . . . Производители 
развивающихся стран . . . они тоже идут на определенные риски. 
106 Если речь идет о переговорах, то тут как бы «Вот мы больше не можем, вот это и для вас хорошо, 
и для нас хорошо» - это не пойдет. Тут надо дать клиенту просто почувствовать что он выжал все 
возможное. 
107 [Russian OEMs] используют такие манипулятивные методы, чтобы добиться хорошей цены. Т.е. 
то что прописано в контракте, не является обязательством со стороны закупок, очень часто. 
108 В основном принимаются решения неглубоко взвешенные, непросчитанные действительно на 
перспективу, а смотрятся только сегодня, сейчас, сколько мне это стоит и сколько я выйграю на 
этом. 
109 [Chinese companies are not present in our segment], потому что я наверное действительно работаю 
с ОЕМ, и чтобы дойти хотя бы до вопроса обсуждения и провести презентацию хотя бы - это 
нужно будет приложить немало усилий, чтоб попасть на завод и найти человека который Вас хотя 
бы выслушает. 
110 Человек даже на Renault Logan, он не будет ставить просто [product] произведенное в РФ в 
принципе. Потому что иначе он бы покупал [Lada]. 
111 Есть определенный патриотизм у населения и просто пытаются все-равно мне кажется 
поддержать свое, собственное производство. Даже своих соотечественников так сказать. И я 
думаю что из-за этого у них есть какое-то преимущество. 
112 Мы скорее общаемся с людьми которые, скажем так, делом заняты, и для них первоочередной 
целью является личный успех, как сотрудника, или руководителя, и успех предприятия на 
котором он работает. То соответственно там больше преобладает такой деловой настрой. 
113 Естественно все валютные изменения они точно также затрагивали производителей из 
Азиатского региона. В принципе даже сильнее [than European suppliers], потому что валюта там 
привязана к доллару, и падение было сильнее чем у Европейских поставщиков. И они . . . стали 
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терять единственное свое преимущество, ценовое, и в этом отношении приближаться скорее к 
продуктам с развитых рынков, чем с развивающихся.   
114 По качеству Китайская продукция лучше чем Российская и дешевле. Но Российская держится за 
счет того что все-равно она считается, я думаю так что она считается там своей и все-таки и еще 
близость к региону помогает им держаться. 
 
Appendix Q: Number of informants who referred to the themes of perceived threat from each competitor category 
Theme of perceived threat Number of participants 
Referred to 
Russian 
competitors 
Referred to 
Chinese 
competitors 
Referred to 
Turkish 
competitors 
Hostility    
1. Predatory Pricing  26 28 5 
2. Government support  17 12 1 
3. Bribes and/or speed money in competition 8 - 2 
Consequences    
1. Profitability  11 6 1 
3. Revenue  27 24 7 
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Appendix R: Number of informants who referred to specific entry barriers 
Entry Barrier 
Number of participants 
 Totally 
mentioned 
Referred to Russian 
competitors 
Referred to Chinese 
competitors 
Referred to Turkish 
competitors 
1. Capital 
requirements 
8 6 6 0 
2. Experience and 
know-how 
22 13 15 1 
3. Location 8 5 7 1 
4. Economies of 
scale and scope 
5 3 2 0 
5. Access to 
strategic resources 
17 10 9 1 
6. Government 
policy 
5 0 5 2 
7. Customer 
switching costs 
11 9 5 1 
8. Core offering 
differentiation 
34 27 32 6 
9. Augmented 
product 
differentiation 
29 21 23 3 
10. Image 
differentiation 
28 16 22 4 
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Appendix S: Retreat reaction of the analyzed German firms 
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Appendix T: Number of informants who referred to each institutional driver 
Rank Driver of the institutional environment 
No. of 
participants 
1 Weak manufacturing sector 26 
2 Russia-related trade and investment policy 24 
3 Integration in the global economy 24 
4 Distributive approach to cooperation 23 
5 Importance of status symbols 22 
6 High price sensitivity of Russian consumers 20 
7 Risk and uncertainty avoidance 20 
8 Importance of personal relationships 18 
9 Weak regulatory and legal compliance  17 
10 Importance of the state in the economy 16 
11 National currency volatility  14 
12 Low manufacturing costs 13 
13 Limited access to financing 12 
14 Demand volatility 12 
15 Strong trade sector 10 
16 Early industrialization 10 
 
